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TJIE 


VIEWS AND OPINIONS 


OF 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B., 

n 

Aide-de-Camp to the Queen ; 

Aide-de-Camp to the Governor-General of India, &c. &c. &c. 
Late commanding-in-chief the British Forces in Persia ; 

At present commanding the Sind Irregular Horse, 
and Political Superintendent of the 
North-West Frontier of Sind. 


COLLECTED AND EDITED 

BY 

CAPTAIN LEWIS I> ELLY, 

AUTHOR OF “ OUR NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.” 


SECOND EDITION. 


LONDON: 

SMITH, ELDER & CO., 65, CORNHILL. 

BOMBAY : SMITH, TAYLOIi & CO. 


1858 















*b v 3 \c iT 

/ 





The Address of Captain Lewis Felly is 


55, Wigmore Street, Cavendish Square. 








































“ ‘ I have sometimes thought it a great pity that every one seems ashamed 
of publishing to the world that a certain able man is alive and still usable. 
But no sooner is the able man disabled by death, than any number ot 
Biographers will abuse the poor world for letting him slip through their 
fingers.’ 

“ ‘ Well, well, neighbour, I am thinking it would require some pluck to 
print thy virtues and sign my name. Yet, peradventure, and we were both 
honest, a man might dare even this.’ ”—Old Novel. 


“ Here is an earnest, truth-speaking man ; no theorizer, sentimentalizer, 
but a practical man of work and endeavour, man of sufferance and endurance 
The thing that he speaks is not a hearsay, but a thing that he has himself 
known, and by experience become assured of. * * * His grand excellency 
is this, that he is genuine. As his primary faculty, the foundation of all 
others, is Intellect, depth and force of Vision ; so his primary virtue is Justice, 
the Courage to be just. * * * He lives, as he counsels and commands, 

not commodiously in the Reputable, the Plausible, the Half, but resolutely in 
the Whole, the Good, the True .”—Thomas Carlyle. 


ERRATUM. 

Page 23 . 3 , line 4 ,for saddle-bag read saddle-cloth. 




TRACTS ON THE NATIVE ARMY OE INDIA. 


By BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B. 

The First Complete Edition, including New Matter never before Published. 

Octavo, price 2s. 6 d. 


RIFLE PRACTICE. 

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B. 

Fourth Edition , Corrected and Enlarged, with Plates. Octavo, price 2s. 



ERRATA. 


l’age 44, line 4 — for “the seaport at Kotree, & c.,” read “ the seaport at Kur- 
rachee. Kotree, the station on the western bank of the river, opposite 
Hydrabad, appears to be the only available point for the river ter¬ 
minus of the railway, within the terms of the contract; but the whole 
place,” &c. 

Page 50, last line —-for “ involve,” read “ follow.” 

Page 51, last line but one—for “what other minds have written,” read 
“ what others have written.” 

Page 81, line 21 —for “that of the canal,” read “that of the Begaree 
Canal.” 

Page 82, line 29—for “ Khyree Ghurree Canal,” read “ Begaree Canal.” 

Page 134, line 6—erase the words “ one troop only of.” 

Page 177—after “ Memorandum, No. II.,” insert the date, “ 1848.” 

Page 193, line 17 —for “a hostile population; they,” read “a hostile popu¬ 
lation; and the people are generally,” &c. 

Page 193, line 20 —for “-remain,” read “ become.” 

Page 193, line 25—for “upsets,” read “ repels.” 

Page 230, line 13 —for “for their own amusement,” read “or for their own 
amusement.” 

Page 230, line 20—for “ he is convinced of,” &c., read “ he is convinced 
that manly confidence, ready intelligence, and habits of self-reliance 
which are invaluable in war, are best developed in the absence,” &c. 

Page 310, line 9 —for “ Tructnee,” read “ Trukkee.” 

Page 320, line 21 from bottom —for “Loree Kooshtuck,” read “ Slioree 
Khooshtuck.” 

Page 408, line 25, and last line —for “Nanarck,” read “ Nanazek.” 

Page 409, line 5—for “ Gurikhan,” read “ Guseekhan.” 

Page 411, line 13 —for “ Bushire,” read “Reshire.” 

Page 415, line 14 —for “ steamers lie alongside,” read “steamers cannot lie 
alongside.” 

Page 422, line 3 —for “ town,” read “ turn,” &c. 

Page 422, line 11 —for “ the whole moral growth,” read “ their whole moral 
growth.” 

Page 423, line 10 —for “ poor ensigns,” read “ wretched ensigns.” 

















- 




























CONTENTS. 


Preface 


PART I. 

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 

The Secret of our Rule in India. 

Moral Being. 

European Officers should not be wasted on Trivial Employ¬ 
ments . 

Natural Forces. 

The Control of Predatory Tribes ...... 

Interference with Trade opposed to the Laws of Political Eco¬ 
nomy . 

The Liberty of the Press ......* 

On Missionaries ; and the Interference of the State in matters 
appertaining to Religion ....... 

Selection versus Examination ...... 

Reduction of Civil Salaries ...... 

Should Officers unable to Pass in the Language of a District be 
removed from Office ?....... 

Non-Removal of Incompetent Officials ..... 

Abolition of Statute Labour advocated .... 

Minute on Objections urged against the Abolition of Forced 
Labour in Sind ........ 

Abolition of Forced Labour in Sind ..... 

Calculation of Labour Rates in certain Districts 
Wheel-Carriages and Bridges ...... 

Repairs of Roads by Contracts ...... 

Plans and Estimates versus a Road and Canal 
A Navigable Canal to the Indus, and the Requirements of Kur- 
rachee as a Port ........ 

Public Ferries ......... 

b 


PAGE 

xi 


1 

2 

3 

3 

4 

5 

6 

8 

9 

14 

17 

18 
18 

21 

2G 

34 

35 

37 

38 

40 

41 





VI 


CONTENTS. 


Remarks on a Railway to connect the Indus with the Seaport 
of Kurrachee ......... 

Travellers’ Bungalows and Serais . 

Trade creates a Market, but does not necessarily follow a Mar¬ 
ketplace ......... 

Political Science related to all Science ..... 

Customs and Pier Dues ....... 

Frontier Trade Returns ....... 

The Indus Flotilla and Forest Conservancy beyond the sphere 
of the State’s Functions ....... 

Engineer and Normal Class Scholars should not be limited to 
Government Employ ....... 

Remarks on the Revenue System of the North-West Provinces 
Revenue Settlement ........ 

Titles to Land, and Leases ....... 

Artificial Encouragement to Agriculture .... 

Management of Pastoral Hill Tracts ..... 

Tax not the Desert ........ 

Restoration and Duties of Village Accountants 

Salaries to Village Accountants ...... 

Protection of Bunds by Contracts ..... 

Tank-Digging ......... 

Effect of removing Dams ....... 

Increased Cultivation followed by more abundant Rain in the 
Desert .......... 

Moral Influence exerted as an Element in securing large num¬ 
bers of Labourers among Rude Tribes .... 

Military Commissions as Courts of Civil Judicature 

Police Confessions ........ 

On the Supply of Carriage in a Free Market .... 


PART II. 

ON MILITARY MATTERS. 

On the Arming of a Free People ; and on the true Principles 
of the Organisation of the Armies of England 
The Defects of the Bengal Army. 

Comparison between the Systems obtaining in the Armies of 
Bengal and Bombay ...... 


PAGE 

43 

49 

50 

51 

52 

52 

53 

54 

55 
57 
59 
71 
71 
73 

73 

74 
76 

78 

79 

80 

80 

83 

83 

84 


93 

101 

117 



CONTENTS. 


VII 


PAGE 


Remarks on the State of the Native Army of India in general; 
upon the Principles whereon its Efficiency depends ; and on 
the Means whereby its existing Defects may be remedied . 
Silidar Horse ......... 

On granting Compensation to Silidar Corps .... 

Silidar Rifle Corps ........ 

Three Memoranda on the Constitution of the Sind Irregular 
Horse, as exemplifying the Silidar Principle 
Carriage Arrangements of the Sind Irregular Horse 
Camp Supplies and Baggage Corps ..... 

The Military Fund ........ 

Furlough Regulations ........ 

Daily Orderly-Room to be held by every Commanding Officer. 209 
The Vices of the Seniority System in the Native Army . .211 

Fixed Head-Quarters for Regiments . . . . .213 

The Obedience of Soldiers not to depend on their own pleasure 214 
On the Purchase of Horses by Government for Military Pur- 


124 

135 

164 

168 

170 

189 

193 

203 

204 


poses ....... 

. 214 

Stud-bred Horses ..... 

. 217 

The Military Board and Audit Department 

. 219 

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS. 


Military Rules on High Caste Men 

, 220 

Sepoy Mutineers and their Officers 

. 220 

Powers of Commanding Officers, and Candidates 

for Enlistment 221 

Prize Property ...... 

. 221 

Fortifications ...... 

. 222 

Flank Companies and Sizing 

. 222 

Qualifications of Staff Officers 

. 222 

Night Attack by Shere Mahomed . 

. 222 

The Sepoy’s Musket ..... 

. 223 

Horse Fairs ...... 

. . .223 

Cavalry Swords . . • 

. 224 

The Point and Cut ..... 

. 225 

Cloth Pantaloons versus Leather Breeches for Mounted Men . 227 

Horse Artillery and Cavalry Charges 

. 228 

Good Tools do not make Bad Workmen 

. 228 

The Greatest Danger to our Indian Empire . 

. 229 

Removal of a Prohibitory Order . 

. 230 

Cavalry Charges should succeed 

. 230 

European and Native Soldiers on Service 

. 231 



Till 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Directions for a Saddle . . • • • - .232 

Memoranda on Rifles, in their Application to the Purposes of 
War, and on Rifle Practice . . . . . .233 

Penetration of Jacob’s Iron-pointed Rifle Balls . . .275 

Best Army Rifle . . . . . • • • .275 

Explanation of the Difference between the Mini6 and Jacob 
Rifle Ball.280 


PART III. 

RELATING TO THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF 

INDIA. 

Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Kutchee, 
to the North-West of the Frontier of Sind . . . 287 

Subsequent Proceedings on the North West Frontier of Sind 
up to the close of the year 1847 . . . . .317 

Appendix to the Memoir . . . . . . .326 

Arrangements carried into effect for the Security and Pros¬ 
perity of that portion of the North-West Frontier forming 
the Boundary between Sind and Beloochistan, comprising— 
Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on the North- 
West Frontier of Sind ....... 349 

Summary of Arrangements made on the North-West Frontier 

of Sind.353 

Military System introduced for the protection of the North- 
West Frontier of Sind . . . . . . .356 

Disarming of the North-West Frontier of Sind . . .362 

Mistaken Leniency towards Marauders . . . . .364 

Standing Orders for the Frontier Posts of the North-West 

Frontier of Sind.367 

Assessment on the Land of the Frontier District of Sind . .367 

Advice to a Native Prince . . . . . . .369 

The Brahooees, Affghans, and Patlians, considered as Recruits 

for our Armies.370 

Suggestions towards the Permanent Defence of the North-West 

Frontier of India.375 

Memorandum of Proposed Arrangements in case of a British 
Force being stationed at Quetta, or at other convenient Spot 
above the Bolan Pass.385 



CONTENTS. 


IX 


PART IV. 

RELATING TO THE PERSIAN WAR. 


PAGE 


Its Policy.401 

On the Policy of invading Persia . . . . . .403 

The Valleys of the Karoon and Euphrates; and Russian 

Policy.403 

Cavalry for Transport by Sea to the Persian Gulf . . .406 

Military Requirements in the Expedition to the Persian 


Gulf.407 

On Holding our own Ground after Victory . . . . 408 

Kuzistan having become ours by Conquest, should be perma¬ 
nently occupied ........ 409 

Water Supplies at Bushire and Karrack . . . .411 

Mohumra, Karrack, and Bushire, considered as places for 
Troops to summer in . . . . . . .411 

Insalubrity of Mohumra . . . . . . .412 

Supplies from Bombay . . . . . . .413 

Supplies from the Valley of the Euphrates . . . .413 

Employment of the Men in Hutting themselves . . .414 

It is better to be, than to seem, strong . . . . .414 

Bushire as a Point of Embarkation . . . . .415 

Orientals are commanded, not by Etiquette, but by Habitual 
Nobility of Being ........ 415 

The School of Smooth Words . . . . . .416 


PART V. 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF 
INDIA, AND ON THE REORGANIZATION OF ITS 
CIVIL AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. 

Three Extracts on the present Condition of India . . .419 

A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Civil and Military 
Administration of India ....... 425 

Reply to some Observations on the Scheme of Reorganization . 439 






X 


CONTENTS. 


ADDENDA. 

Security for the Good Conduct of Recruits 

Order relative to the Mahomedan Festival of the Mohurrum 


PAGE 

. 447 
. 448 


Index 


451 




PREFACE. 


We frequently find theorists advocating the appli¬ 
cation of Natural Law to the affairs of men. We 
more frequently find the legislators and actors in 
these affairs working in contempt or ignorance of that 
law. But it is of very rare occurrence to meet a 
man possessing at once the ability, will, and oppor¬ 
tunity himself to apply the Law of Nature in many 
departments of common business. And believing 
that General Jacob has both faithfully and success- 
fully so applied it, I have collected some of his views, 
and now lay them before the public, in the hope that 
they may become as useful to others as they have 
been to myself. 

I beg the reader to hear in mind, when perusing 
the following papers, that they are not the effusions 
of a mere theorist, but contain some of the pungent 
maxims arrived at by a man whose life has been 
passed in action. Himself believing in Universal 
Law, the General has dared to apply its principles to 
business immediately in hand, presuming that what 
was true for the whole could not but prove true for 



Xll 


PREFACE. 


the particulars of this whole. And thus, testing his 
theory by practice, and finding his assumptions borne 
out by practical results, he now claims to affirm these 
with the authority of a master. 

The foregoing observations apply equally to the 
papers upon civil and upon military matters. But 
it is upon their application to the latter that I propose 
to remark : for it is but too manifest that our existing 
military system in India has failed ; and that if 
England still purpose to hold India, she must do so 
by means either of undisguised English military 
occupation, or of a Native army re-organised on 
sound and lasting principles. 

Choosing the former course, we must be prepared 
to maintain in India an English force as large as, 
or larger than, we were able to maintain in the 
Crimea ; to acknowledge before all the world that our 
rule in India is based, not on the good-will of the 
governed, but upon palpable military occupation ; 
to maintain our English army in India, still undi¬ 
minished, in the event of an European war ; to 
increase this army in the contingency of our Euro¬ 
pean enemies extending their influence into Asia; to 
drain (beyond the drain already involved in our 
government as foreigners) India of that wealth 
which is now returned to her in the form of pay and 
pensions to a vast Native military establishment ; 
and, lastly, to create and provide for discontent 
among a large section of our Indian subjects who now 
trust to the military profession for subsistence. 

Choosing the latter course, it is incumbent on us to 
lose no time in availing ourselves of such material for 


PREFACE. 


Xlll 


a loyal and efficient Native army, as may be ready to 
hand; and in availing ourselves of all workmen able 
to fashion this material into shape. 

Convinced that neither the present military re¬ 
sources of England, nor the present financial resources 
of India, could permanently support, in India, an 
English army equal to holding our Eastern empire; 
and convinced, moreover, that if those resources 
could respond to this demand, England would not 
be justified in subjecting India to an English military 
occupation—I accept the alternative of reorganising 
our Native army; and I appeal to the military 
papers contained in this volume, and to the practice 
upon which they are founded, in proof of the asser¬ 
tion which I now publish—that we have at least 
one, man among us who can discern and point out to 
us the material for a Native army, and who has shown 
himself able to organise it into loyalty and efficiency. 

It is unquestionable that, standing alone, at the 
hazard of his commission, and subjected to prolonged 
obloquy and opposition, General Jacob has during 
a period of many years past, exposed the vices of 
the system now failing us ; has predicted that the 
combined direct and indirect operation of this system 
would result in failure; and has, at the same time, 
advocated, elaborated, and carried into effect, under 
very adverse circumstances, and without once fal¬ 
tering, a new system, capable of bearing every test, 
and which, though often assailed,—and sometimes 
virulently,—has never yet been shown to be hollow or 
defective. 

Whether for good or for ill these principles, which 


xiv 


PREFACE. 


General Jacob has exemplified in the constitution of 
his regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, have, from 
the first, had in view the reformation of our Native 
armies in India. The reformation thus exemplified 
has, from the first, been declared to be, not in degree, 
but in essence; to aim, not at a modification of the 
existing system, but at a radical, essential abolition 
of this system, in favour of another by him intro¬ 
duced. This latter was, in the first instance, tried 
with one, subsequently with a second, and is about to 
be tried with a third regiment of horse. In the two 
first instances, the men enlisted were drawn from the 

very heart of those districts now in revolt. In both 

* 

these instances, the experiment met with strenuous 
and continued opposition from all quarters ; and was 
stigmatised as mere theory, inapplicable to the real 
practice of war. In both instances it proved, under 
severe and prolonged trial, to be completely suc¬ 
cessful. 

There remained, however, one supposed objection 
to the permanent and extended application of the 
General’s system. It was this—that though suc¬ 
cessful when carried out under his immediate direc¬ 
tion, it would fail if entrusted to less able men. 
Nevertheless, one of the regiments so trained was 
recently sent on foreign service under the command 
of a young lieutenant ; was harassed by sea as 
cavalry seldom have been harassed; and was then 
scattered under its Native officers to Kurrachee, 
Bombay, Poona, and elsewhere. Yet those detach¬ 
ments remained staunch under their native officers 
while mutiny was being enacted in these stations, 


PREFACE. 


XV 


by regular troops ; and showed, as plainly as need 
be, that the School had formed both officers and 
men. 

Meantime, the other regiment so trained remained, 
under another officer, on the frontier ; and this 
officer’s military powers were unavoidably contracted 
by the presence of a senior officer in command 
of an irregular corps from Bengal. To the rear of 
this frontier was the station of Shikarpoor, holding 
disaffected regular troops ;* to its right front was 
the Punjaub, in which nearly every regular regi¬ 
ment was in revolt or disarmed ; to its left front 
was the State of Khelat, in temporary disorder, 
attributable to the Khan’s demise ; and in its imme¬ 
diate neighbourhood was a border chieff striving 
to awaken rebellion. Yet this second regiment 

* The most important arm, the Native Artillery, actually broke 
out into open mutiny ; while one of the most trusted Subedars 
in the only Native Infantry regiment at the station of Shikar¬ 
poor was arrested, and soon after executed, as ringleader of a 
plot to mutiny and murder. I should add, that no Euro¬ 
pean troops were stationed within several hundred miles of the 
frontier. 

f This borderer wrote to all his neighbouring chiefs, calling 
upon them to strike a blow for freedom. He told them it would 
be in vain to tamper with the troopers of the Sind Horse, but 
that they should all assemble at Jacobabad on an appointed day, 
under pretence of making their usual obeisance, and should, then 
and there, upon a signal to be by him given, rise and murder 
the European officers, and afterwards raise the surrounding 
country. 

Among the chiefs so addressed was one, of whose tribe some five 
hundred men had, within the past ten years, been destroyed by the 
officer then commanding the Sind Horse. Yet he, like all his 
neighbours, returned for answer that the English Government had 


XVI 


PREFACE. 


stood and stands staunch, although in a position, 
and under temptations, than which it were difficult 
to imagine any more trying to the loyalty of mer¬ 
cenaries. 

I am well aware that, in thus plainly laying the 
truth before the public, I may incur, from some 
persons, the charge of undue presumption. But I 
am not less confident that every man, really careful 
for the honour and welfare of our Indian Government 
and its army, will dispassionately consider whether 
the system advocated and practised by General Jacob 
is or is not adapted to our requirements; and, in the 
event of his denying its suitability, that he will sup¬ 
port his denial by valid reasons, and endeavour him¬ 
self to submit a system which Theory may argue, 
and practice have proved, to be preferable. Mean- 
w T hile, to those who look for precedent I would suggest 
that our own history affords an example of an army 
remodelled upon a regiment of Silidar Horse— 
which regiment was Cromwell’s. 

Having found occasion to use the term “ Bengal,” 

been just to them, and that they would take no part in the proposed 
massacre. Many of them also sent in trusty agents, bearing news 
of what had occurred. 

Upon receiving this intelligence, the officer commanding called 
for two of his native officers, informed them of the plot, and 
directed them to provide for its frustration, and for securing its 
ringleader. They arranged accordingly ; and the borderer had no 
sooner arrived upon the day appointed, than he was quietly arrested. 
Yet his plot had been divulged to some hundreds of the men in the 
lines; and its divulgence was, further, known to many of the border 
chiefs on the frontier. The traitor alone remained ignorant of his 
own betrayal. 



PREFACE. 


XVII 


in connection with the defects of our military system, 
I deem it on every account proper to explain that I 
am far from intending to cast reflections upon any 
officer or body of officers. The development of 
the present crisis has assured me that our failure is 
attributable, not to individuals, but to system; and 
for the framing of this system the executive are not 
responsible. 

For myself, had not the Indian army, to which I 
belong, been disgraced by mutiny, I had assuredly 
remained silent. But as matters are, I should deem 
myself culpable in neglecting to submit to our 
legislators, and the English people, information 
which they should, in the present crisis, possess; 
and towards supplying which I chance, by a long resi¬ 
dence with General Jacob, on his personal Staff,* 
to have been favourably circumstanced. 

I am convinced that no unprejudiced person, accu¬ 
rately acquainted with the history of our native 
army, can read these military papers, or become 
familiar with the practice on which they result, with¬ 
out perceiving that the principles advocated are in 
exact conformity with whatever has been or still 
may be worthy in the constitution of that army. I 
believe there is scarcely a commanding officer or 
an adjutant of a regiment who would not at once 
acknowledge that the details in which he has found 

* As Assistant in the Revenue and General Department when 
the General was acting as Commissioner in Sind ; as Aide-de- 
Camp when he was in Command of the Cavalry Division Persian 
Field Force ; and as Political Secretary when he was Commander- 
in-Chief in Persia. 


XV111 


PREFACE. 


himself hampered are those pointed out in these 
papers. And all who have perused the works of the 
late Sir John Malcolm, and the selections from the 
correspondence of the late Lord Metcalfe, recently 
edited by Mr. Kaye, will be impressed with the 
coincidence of the principles enunciated by these 
statesmen with those independently practised by 
General Jacob. One principle, common to all three 
writers, cannot be too strongly urged. It is this— 
That from the moment when the command of a Native 
Regiment becomes less sought for than other employ, 
we may date the commencement of our downfall. To 
render this command so sought for, we must jilace 
the commander in a position to be looked up to by 
his own men, and by society, whether English or 
native; and we must support him in the exercise of 
full authority . To do this involves selection ,— 
selection, that is, of officers for a class of appoint - 
ments more essential to the existence of our rule in 
India than any other class of appointments whatso¬ 
ever, be they military or civil . 

LEWIS PELLY. 

Camp Pokrun, 

December 1857. 



PART I. 


CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 




CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 


The Secret of our Rule in India. 

To the Anglo-Saxon race self-government is essential. 
But force the Oriental to take his share in government, 
and you will soon have no government at all. The 
former considers that which unnecessarily interferes 
with his freedom to be wrong, and thinks and acts upon 
the principle that all men have equal rights. The 
latter considers being compelled to govern himself as 
the greatest oppression and tyranny. He expects to 
be ruled, and to be ruled well; otherwise he will, 
perhaps, rebel and destroy his bad rulers. But in 
no case will he attempt to establish freedom. 

It is obvious that two races of men with principles of 
action and feelings different, can never be successfully 
managed by adopting one system, and forcing it alike 
on both. But while incapable of self-government, the 
natives of India, like other human beings, feel gratitude 
and devotion towards those who raise their moral, 
intellectual, and social position; and are actuated by 
a strong wish and earnest zeal to show that they are 
worthy of the respectable position to which they are 



2 


raised. Too mistrustful of their equals to submit to 
their rule, they cheerfully submit to an English gentle¬ 
man, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their 
superior. 

We hold India, then, by being in reality, as in repu¬ 
tation, a superior race to the Asiatic; and if this 
natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and 
could not, retain the country for one week. If, then, we 
really are a morally superior race, governed by higher 
motives, and possessing higher attributes than the 
Asiatics, the more the natives of India are able to 
understand us, and the more we improve their capacity 
for so understanding, the firmer will become our power. 
Away, then, with the assumption of equality ; and let 
us accept our true position of a dominant race. So 
placed, let us establish our rule by setting them a high 
example, by making them feel the value of truth and 
honesty, and by raising their moral and intellectual 
powers. 

But if we are not superior to the Indians, the attempt 
to retain our sovereignty over them will be as hopeless 
as it will he vicious. And England neither can nor 
wishes to be powerful in evil.—(1854.) 

Moral Being. 

I would untiringly inculcate the maxim : Be . Be 
yourself; and all the attributes and effects which 
nature has attached to that condition of existence must 
necessarily attend and follow you. Our rank in the 
universe depends on our real nature—on what we are , 
not on what we seem, or others think us, to be ; and I 
would remind you, that among these rude people in 



3 


particular our real intentions and motives are those 
which tell. If we really do wish them well, and always 
act fairly, honestly, and justly towards them, their old 
mistrust will certainly disappear. For our real cha¬ 
racter, and the real nature of our proceedings, must 
necessarily produce their natural results.—( 1857 .) 

European Officers should not be wasted on 

Trivial Employments. 

Whatever tends to make European gentlemen 
“ cheap”—to lessen their evident value—to hold up 
their vices rather than their virtues to the view of the 
natives—to show them to the natives only in inferior 
positions, where their powers are not called forth, and 
where they have little influence for good—must tend 
to destroy in no slight degree the hold we have on the 
people. Whatever, on the contrary, raises the Euro¬ 
pean character in the eyes of the natives of India, and 
in reality, must greatly add to our security and power. 
—( 1854 .) 

Natural Forces. 

Our regulation authorities do not seem to have any 
idea of natural causes, or to know that natural forces 
exist. Yet all other forces are contemptible, and 
deceptive appearances only. Our present proceedings 
are exactly like those of a man who, wanting a great 
forest, should stick some huge branches into the earth, 
and then think the business done. His labours would 
make a grand display for a while, but in one season or 
so all would rot and disappear. 

But if he sowed acorns—feeble-looking things at 

B 2 





4 


first, but containing mighty principles of life and 
growth—he would assuredly raise giant oaks, whose 
strength might resist the utmost force of the storm for 
a thousand years.—(1856.) 

The Control of Predatory Tribes. 

It is moral more than physical force which is required 
to control predatory tribes : both are doubtless neces¬ 
sary, but the latter is so, chiefly, to enable us to apply 
the other. Justice, honesty, high principles, unswerv¬ 
ing firmness, and force without violence, succeed best 
with these men, as with others. If we imitate their 
crimes, on pretence of retaliation, we only perpetuate 
the evil. The power of the border marauder does not 
wholly consist in the damage he is able to cause, or in 
the terror he is able to inspire, but in the fact that his 
name and deeds are associated, even in the minds of 
those he injures, with chivalric daring, and attributes 
not altogether bad. But if the trade of marauder be 
proved to be unsuccessful, and disreputable, it soon 
receives the ridicule and contempt of all. 

The province of-and the frontier district of-, 

containing more than 10,000 square miles, and some 
100,000 of the wildest and most untameable men on 
earth, were formerly one continued scene of rapine, 
murder, and every conceivable horror; yet in the 
course of a few years’ just administration, these 
borderers have settled down to peaceful industry, 
and to as tate of repose as little disturbed by violence 
as many of our old districts in India. 

The most active and the most violent of the old 
robber tribes are now cheerful and thriving agricul- 




* 


5 

turalists. And, believe me, the principles which have 
guided proceedings in this instance are of universal 
application. If we are just and true , we shall be 
trusted even by the Affghans, whatever measures we 
may find it necessary to undertake.—(1856.) 

Interference with Trade opposed to the Laws 

of Political Economy. 

I am astounded at finding that the export of corn 
has been prohibited by proclamation ; and that the 
prices of the market have been regulated by general 
orders. I do assure you, I cannot imagine any publica¬ 
tions more certain to contravene the universally received 
law r s of political economy than these documents, which 
defeat, moreover, the very object for which they pro¬ 
fess to have been issued, namely the maintenance of 
an abundant supply and low prices. 

Bat such notifications not only tend to produce 
present scarcity, but are calculated to leave deep and 

lasting ill consequences to the trade of-, and to 

cause deplorable ill consequences, in this country, to 
the reputation of the British Government for wisdom 
and justice. For it cannot but be expected that the 
evil effects of such authoritative interference with 
trade, and with the rights of private persons, will be 
felt long after such interference shall cease. 

The confidence of merchants and traders is delicately 
sensitive ; and, when once justly shaken, cannot be 
speedily restored to a healthy state. Supplies will not 
readily flow from distant points towards a market 
which is not free, and where the rates of sale and 
purchase are arbitrarily regulated in lieu of being left 



6 


to be adjusted naturally, by the existing relations of 
supply and demand. 

I beg that all restrictions of every description on 
the commerce and external trade of this place may be 
immediately removed by proclamation, and that, hence¬ 
forth, no interference with the private rights of buyers 
and sellers may be permitted, on any pretence what¬ 
soever.—(1857.) 

The Liberty of the Press. 

I am very glad indeed that you cancelled the letter 
you drafted relative to the newspaper criticisms on your 
proceedings. Rely upon it, every public man will best 
command public praise by deserving it; and every 
attempt to stop the mouths, even of false railers, is 
unwise and weak. Let those who will, rail on ! If 
you are abused, the abuse will only excite reaction in 
your favour; but if you wince under criticism or cen¬ 
sure, the chastisement will be thought to be merited. 
It is what we are , not what is said of us, that is alone 
worth thinking on. 

Every servant of the public should glory in publicity; 
and if he be really striving simply and solely for the 
public good, he will rejoice in seeing his proceedings 
subjected to the full light of public opinion, which, 
more surely than any other means, will expose his 
errors and defects. It is only evil that dreads pub¬ 
licity. 

It is the fashion to abuse the Indian press for its 
scurrility and falsehood. But the press, like the 
government, is everywhere indicative of the people 
supporting it. If society be scurrilous, the press, 


7 


which is the expression of its contributors, will be 
scurrilous also. If, again, the Government, and those 
possessing accurate information, maintain secresy, the 
press must seek information from unreliable sources. 
But it is illogical to argue that the press, which is 
dependent for its existence upon the subscriptions of 
the public, would wilfully mislead that public, or adopt 
language other than that which was found to be most 
popular and remunerative. 

On the whole, however the press may libel you, 
you have, and Government should also have, but three 
remedies, viz., to inform the editor of the real facts of 
the case in point; secondly, to employ a governmental 
organ for publishing the truth; or lastly, to prosecute 
the libeller according to law. 

Even assuming the lowest ground for argument, and 
contending in conformity with the views of the nar¬ 
rowest and least scrupulous minds, I should still main¬ 
tain that it is unwise to gag the press. When all are 
free to speak, men know that the worst is said. Ill- 
will and sedition evaporate in words, and the public 
believe as much as they please of what they see 
printed. But when the public voice is stifled, sus¬ 
picion, distrust, fear, discontent, and almost every 

other public ill, commence. 

****** 

I would wish to see every government and every 
public man live down calumny and falsehood. If you 
really are good, be sure that the consequences which 
nature has attached to that goodness must ensue. It 
is not more certain that a pound of matter, scatter it 
how you will, still weighs one pound in God’s universe, 


8 


than that a good performed, hide it, deny it how you 
will, has its due and certain weight in the same 
universe. In this, as in all else, the law of the moral 
is identical with that of the physical world. There¬ 
fore, I say again, be yourself J and leave consequences 
to the Author of all being: perfect freedom is perfect 
law.—( March , 1857.) 

On Missionaries; and the Interference of the 

State in Matters appertaining to Religion. 

To interfere with the labours of the missionary, by 
whatsoever church or sect deputed, would be as unjust 
and impolitic as to interfere with the business of any 
person trading or professing. Let the missionary 
preach, and, if he can, convert, so long as he remains, 
and be generally known to be, wholly unconnected 
with the State. But the interference of Government, 
or the members of Government in their official capa¬ 
cities, to countenance or sanction the endeavours of 
missionaries, or any other ministers of religion, is, in 
India, fraught with evil. And every semblance, even, 
of such sanction or countenance, should be studiously 
avoided. 

There is no maxim of government more certainly 
true and wise than that all interference whatever on 
the part of Government with the creeds or religions 
of the people is mischievous and unjust This maxim 
is in my opinion true in all places, and at all times. 
But such interference, whether for patronage or dis¬ 
couragement, must be more than usually unwise where, 
as in India, there are many different faiths, and those 
the most ancient and revered of any on earth, existing 



9 


among two hundred millions of men, who cling to 
their religion as to their life; while the governing 
class, who propose to make their own faith the religion 
of the State, may count their numbers, probably, as 
one to ten thousand of those subjects on whom their 
doctrines are to be forced. 

It seems to me unwise to carry our State religion to 
India at all, even as respects Englishmen in this 
country. In our public capacity, as governors of 
hundreds of millions of men, of twenty different faiths 
and sects, we cannot, with justice or propriety, exclu¬ 
sively patronise any religion. Absolute freedom should 
be allowed to all so long as they do not annoy others. 
But Government should identify itself with none. It 
appears most injudicious to parade our State religion. 
In short, a State religion in India is absolutely 
incompatible with the security of our empire.— 
(1857.) 

Selection versus Examination. 

Among the objections to our competitive examina¬ 
tions, and in fact to our examinations generally, are 
the following:—That they are limited to intellectual 
acquirements, and wholly ignore moral and physical 
acquirements. That even in regard of intellectual 
acquirements, they do not test those which are most 
requisite in civil and military servants of the public. 
That the candidates are generally of an age when it is 
impossible for any examiner to predicate, or reasonably 
to infer, what their future value as public servants 
may he. And, that the examinations have a tendency 
to force the young brain ; and thus to deteriorate the 


10 


material out of which our public servants are to be 
formed. 

Experience shows that the highest order of mind is 
bv no means of the quickest growth. The future 
statesman mav very probably appear a dull and stupid, 
or an idle boy, while the clever clerk is learning by 
rote. The mental power of the former is growing; he 
is acquiring that power with which he will afterwards 
work; and, it may be, is training his body in those 
manly sports natural to youth. The latter, meantime, 
is earning to his nest the thoughts - of other men, 
without once attempting to assimilate them into his 
own being, or to originate fresh thought. And yet it 
would be the clever clerk, and not the embrvo states- 
man—the receptive and not the creative mind—that 
would carry off the prize at our examinations. 

Look, for instance, at the competitive examinations 
for entrv into our Indian civil service. These tests 
are excellent in their way; but they most assuredly 
do not test the qualities which we desire to see in our 
civil administrators of India. The test of superin¬ 
tending a factory were infinitely preferable, for by 
this the candidate would at least prove himself able 
to organize labour, and to manage men; whereas, by 
the other, he is simply shown to be a more or less 
efficient scholar. And the argument that the most 
brilliant among our public men have also been accom¬ 
plished scholars, appears to me wholly without force 
when applied to the question now under discussion. 
It were as reasonable to allege that all candidates 
must possess extraordinary physical endurance because 
our lord chancellors have shown themselves to possess 


11 


this among numerous other excellencies. We are not 
dealing with the geniuses of English administration, 
but with the average material of administrative capa¬ 
city which the gentry of England supply for the 
government of India. Observe, again, the effects of 
our examinations in the native languages. Nobody 
denies that every officer who undertakes to command, 
or to deal with, the natives of India, should, among 
other qualifications, possess that of communicating 
with these natives. But the objection is to selecting 
this one qualification, and making it the one test upon 
which all appointments in India shall depend. Nor 
is this all; for the examination in this case also fails 
of securing that which it professes to aim at, viz., the 
appointment of none but officers able to communicate 
with the natives in their vernacular tongue. 

Let us examine a little into these two objections: 

1st—An officer is required, say to command a body 
of horse, or to take charge of a collectorate. What 
is the one question asked regarding the nominee ? It 
is this: “Has he passed in the language?” If he 
have passed, he is appointed; if he have not passed, 
he is rejected. Yet the commander or the collector 
should surely possess qualities of infinitely greater 
importance than that of grammatical knowledge of a 
native language,—qualities which, if they did possess, 
would most certainly induce them to so far acquaint 
themselves with the vernacular as business should 
require; and qualities which, if they did not possess, 
would be in no degree compensated by a knowledge of 
all the languages of India. 

2nd ,—It is notorious that as a body (there are of 


12 


4 


course brilliant exceptions) the passed officers have 
less knowledge of the language for practical purposes 
than the unpassed. That is to say, they show them¬ 
selves less able to communicate with the mass of 
natives with whom they come in contact. This asser¬ 
tion may seem paradoxical; but it should be remem¬ 
bered that while the one young man has been studying 
books the other has been studying men. The former 
will be able to read a native book, or to converse with 
his Moonshee in elegant phraseology, but will be pro¬ 
bably quite incapable of understanding the expressions 
of a peasant, or of making the peasant understand 
him. The latter would be quite unable to read a 
word of the book; but having been associated with 
the people , would talk with them readily. A know¬ 
ledge of the thoughts, habits, beliefs, desires, wants, 
&c., of the natives of India, is to be gathered, not 
from Hindoostanee books, but from intercourse w T ith 
the people. 

It is remarkable, again, that while passing in the 
native vernacular is considered as the sine qua non 
for detachment from a native regiment upon miscel¬ 
laneous employ, the rejection of a candidate involves 
his remaining in command of native troops, — a 
position which, one would suppose, required, equally 
with or more than any other, a knowledge of the 
sepoys’ language. Fortunately, however, a knowledge 
of the language is widely different from a passed 
examination in the vernacular ; and thus some of the 
best practical linguists, and those most intimately 
acquainted with the ideas of their men, remain with 
their regiments. 


13 


But, in truth, unless the chief business to be per¬ 
formed related to such knowledge of oriental language, 
there should be no need of passing any examination 
in any native tongue whatsoever. The best security 
for fitness in this, as in other respects, is in the 
opinion and approval of the candidate’s superiors, 
who if efficient themselves, and allowed sufficient 
power, would take very good care that their subor¬ 
dinates were as well qualified in this as in any other 
portion of their duty. But this arrangement would 
necessitate the maintenance of competent superiors. 
It would, in truth, go to the root of the matter, and 
involve the selection of proper men at the head of 
affairs. And in this lies the secret of opposition to, 
and the certainty of success for, a system of selection. 
I firmly believe that at this very hour we have in 
India a total amount of English talent and energy 
adequate for all the administrative requirements of 
our empire; provided only this total were so organized 
and distributed as to ensure its acting with full effect. 
But as matters at present are, we cripple the entire 
body by wasting the energies and crushing the minds 
of thousands of English gentlemen upon trivial 
military duties, which could equally well, and with 
far greater general advantage, be performed by native 
officers properly trained; while at the same time we 
overtask another portion of the body, by confining 
the administration of the empire to the members of 
the civil service. Nor is this all; for the continual 
emergencies of the service requiring that the military 
members shall be availed of as civilians, we are often 
compelled to accept this material without having 


14 


prepared it, and, when rendered really efficient, to 
discard it, to make room for a civilian, to the detriment 
of the general administration, and to the disgust of the 
military officer, who thus finds himself excluded from 
active and lucrative employ, not because he is ineffi¬ 
cient, hut because an officer -possibly an inferior 
one—belongs to another service, which enjoys the 
monopoly of administering the empire. 

But I am convinced that, in India at least, we must 
ere long discard examinations and monopoly, and 
adopt selection. The energies and moral excellence 
introduced into India by a given number of English 
officers form the general stock of power for the civil 
and military government of the country. This stock 
forms the sole import to counterbalance the millions 
sterling of which, as foreigners, we annually drain 
India. And it is surely incumbent on us to use 
this stock in the most profitable manner possible, by 
adopting a system which tends to develope and im¬ 
prove English energies and moral power, and by 
selecting from the whole body in accordance with the 
principles advocated in my remarks on the native 
army. 

Beduction of Civil Salaries. 

Reason, experience, and observation alike concur 
to convince me that the civil officers in this province 
are much underpaid; and that the salaries of the 
appointments, although not, perhaps, always of the 
individuals now holding them, might be considerably 
raised, with advantage to the State. 

I arrive at this conclusion on purely economical 
principles, holding that to be the best and most judi- 



15 


ciously adjusted rate of salary which ensures the 
largest return to the State. 

There is no investment of capital in this world 
comparable, with regard to the return which it pro¬ 
duces, to liberal payment of efficient civil officers in 
India. Every reduction of salary below that which is 
necessary to command the highest available moral 
power and intellectual vigour on the part of our 
revenue officers, and civil officers generally, must 
assuredly result in the exclusion from the public 
treasury of many thousands of times the amount 
supposed to be so saved in the salaries. A decent 
mediocrity of talent may be secured, perhaps, at what 
appear to be more economical rates even than those 
now paid for the services of English gentlemen in 

this countrv; but the effects of such reduction will 
* * 

assuredly be most lamentable. 

The energy and moral excellence which we intro¬ 
duce into India by means of English officers form the 
only articles of import—the only possible means—by 
which we can restore and repay to India the amount 
of capital which, as foreign rulers, w r e are and must 
be continually draining from the country. 

Whatever tends to add to the self-confidence of the 
timid Asiatic, to increase the active working-power of 
the people, to give them new thoughts and new 
desires, and to put them in the way of advancement 
generally, must, in like proportion, add directly to 
the wealth of the nation, and consequently to the 
revenue of Government. 

A single European officer in a large district is 
often able, in a few years’ time, by the influence 



of personal character alone, to multiply the wealth 
of the people, and of course the Government share 
of that wealth, fourfold. I have myself witnessed 
instances of this : such effects might almost always 
be produced if care were taken to choose men for 
appointments on the principle of fitness alone, by 
causing them to feel that their services are appre¬ 
ciated, and by furnishing them with the means of 
residing comfortably and free from sordid cares in 
the country in which they are labouring. But such 
effects will never follow when civil officers are under¬ 
paid, and, therefore, probably of inferior ability in 
the first place, and also made discontented and un¬ 
willing to throw their whole force and energy into 
the public service of a Government which holds their 
labours cheap. 

It is not less pay, but more English mind (which 
is cheap at any price), which is required for India. 
The underpaid official will, if he feel himself not 
fairly appreciated by Government, assuredly not re¬ 
main in the country, or, if he do continue to hold his 
appointment, he will probably be of an inferior stamp 
of mind, and will get through his duty with stolid 
listlessness, which will cause everything to stagnate 
around him. 

In introducing European honesty, energy, perse¬ 
verance, knowledge, high principle, and ability, into 
this country, we are, in fact, importing so much life; 
every single human creature within the range of such 
influence becomes a higher order of being, and pos¬ 
sibly tenfold more productive, as respects the public 
wealth than before. 


17 


On the other hand, to employ the listless, indif¬ 
ferent, and unintellectual European in the revenue, 
magisterial, or indeed, in the performance of any 
civil duties, is bringing in death—is to dry up, as 
it were, the very sources of natural wealth, and to 
destroy the public revenue.—(1856.) 

Should Officers unable to pass in the Language 
of a District be removed from Office ? 

I would on no account fix a time within which an 
officer on civil employ must pass an examination in the 
language of the district. 

All such rules operate, I think, injuriously to the 
public service. It often happens that the officer most 
highly qualified for the work entrusted to him, and 
most able and willing to perform the duties of his 
appointment efficiently, is, under the proposed rule, 
excluded, because unable to satisfy a committee as to 
his knowledge of a language, an acquaintance with 
which may he the only qualification possessed by the 
successful candidate. 

If, from want of knowledge of the language, or owing 
to any other deficiency, an officer cannot perform his 
duty in a perfectly satisfactory manner, he should, 
after a fair time allowed for trial, be removed from his 
office. But long experience assures us that those who 
appear to be the best linguists before a committee are 
not always those who are best able to interchange ideas 
with the country people.—(1856.) 


c 


18 


Non-removal of Incompetent Officials. 

A man in office, known to be inefficient, is sometimes 
allowed to remain, because there is no superior who 
will take upon himself the odious task of causing a 
good-natured, and perhaps really estimable individual, 
to be removed from a position for which, nevertheless, 
he has shown himself to be unfit. This is a great 
evil; and, in its consequences, so widely disastrous as 
to render the non-removal criminal. It is to indulge 
benevolence at the expense of conscience, or to deceive 
oneself by undue regard for a friend. But it should 
be borne in mind by public men, that omissions of this 
description injure frequently thousands of square miles 
of cultivation, and affect the rights, the happiness, and 
the civilization of thousands of human beings He 
who, fearing to offend the few with whom he is in 
immediate contact, consents to perpetuate evil influence 
on the many subject to his control, is unfit to rule. 
And, however the circumstances of the case may 
appear to the ruler himself, such shrinking from duty 
does practically resemble the conduct of Alexander, 
who burnt Persepolis to please a courtesan.—(1857.) 

Abolition of Statute Labour advocated. 

I have laboured hard for many years to inculcate on 
all around me the evil effect on all parties—even on 
those supposed to benefit by the arrangement—of 
interfering with market prices, and the great and 
certain advantages to the consumer as well as the 
producer of absolutely free trade. 

I have, during a long series of years, enforced 


19 


absolute freedom for market prices in the bazar of the 
Scinde Irregular Horse with the happiest effect, not¬ 
withstanding that great opposition and prejudice had 
at first to be overcome. The supply of two strong 
cavalry regiments is equal to the transaction of a large 
town, so that the scale of the business has been 
sufficiently large, while it has been tried under great 
variety of circumstances. 

Whatever those circumstances might be, I always 
insisted that every man should sell at whatever rate he 
chose to every one whatever, and that all purchasers 
should pay at those rates, even though the prices rose 
to a thousand rupees a seer for grain. 

The effect of this has been that—with the exception 
of a part of the period, when we were at a station 
where the proceedings of the collector disordered all 
the natural relations of demand and supply—the bazar 
has always been most amply supplied at the lowest 
possible rates. 

A proclamation almost exactly similar to that now 
received from you had been already published by me 
throughout the district under my charge, a copy 
supplied to every thana and outpost, and to every 
kardar and tuppadar, &c. 

The proclamation now received will also be published 
as directed. 

As connected with this subject, I beg permission to 
remark that similar principles might, with the greatest 
possible advantage, be applied to the question of statute 
labour. The present state of affairs in this respect is 
of enormous evil: it crushes every energy, and, more 
than all else, stops real improvement in the country. 

c 2 


20 


It reduces the peasantry to a species of slavery, causes 
all labour to be looked on as an intolerable hardship , 
and places it in the power of ill-disposed ^emindars to 
delay or to prevent the execution af all public works. 

The remedy appears to me at once evident, simple, 
practical, and most readily applicable. Thus, a certain 
amount of labour for canals, or other public works, is 
due from certain villages or lands. This labour is 
evidently due from the landlords of the villages or 
lands, who receive all the profits—from those, in fact, 
who own them and their produce. 

Let, then, the number of labourers which a landlord 
is hound to supply for any work be engaged and 
regularly paid by the British officers, at the full market 
rate of hire, whatever it may be, each man receiving 
his hire personally. The amount, whatever it may be, 
to he recovered from the zemindar from whom the 
supply of labour may be due. 

This plan seems calculated to meet every difficulty. 

The labourer w^ould not be cheated, and, at the 
same time, it would be directly for the advantage of 
the zemindars to keep the price of labour low, and 
every effort and all fair means w ould be employed by 
them to induce the labourers to offer themselves for 
the work, and thereby keep the supply equal to the 
demand. 

The labour market w T ould soon assume a healthy 
state ; the habit of free labour established, all odium 
would be removed from it, all men would endeavour to 
share in its profits, and labourers would be procurable 
in the greatest possible numbers, at the lowest fair 
rates, for all public works. 


21 


All parties must largely share in the profit of such 
an arrangement. Its effect on the society generally 
would be like that of restoring a sickly and feeble body 
to vigorous health and strength. The actual amount 
of labour available, and the productiveness of the 
people generally, would become enormously increased: 
for one willing and free working man will do as much 
as five or six “statute labourers”; exactly as the 
vigorous and healthy individual can do five times as 
much work as one suffering from the languor of disease 
or famine. 

At the same time, the moral effects must prove 
unspeakably great, but they will readily suggest them¬ 
selves, and it is perhaps unnecessary to enter on them 
here.—(1855.) 

Minute on Objections urged against the Aboli¬ 
tion of forced Labour in Scinde. 

This letter of -’s appears to me to be written 

under entirely erroneous impressions as to facts, and 
undoubtedly with very mistaken ideas as to the 
true principles involved in the questions of which lie 
treats. 

All experience and all reason prove that the freest 
market is the cheapest market. 

The increased demand for labour mentioned in 

-’s first paragraph will probably cause—and ought 

in reason and justice to be permitted to cause—a rise 
in the price of labour. 

If this price rise to such a height as to make it 
profitable for labourers to immigrate into Scinde, they 
will immigrate accordingly, and the price of labour 




22 


will soon adjust itself to the lowest natural rate, 
which natural rate is always the best for all parties 
in the end. 

If, on the other hand, the increased demand do not 
cause the price of labour to rise sufficiently high to 
induce the labourers to offer themselves for the work, 
it never can be a profitable transaction for Govern¬ 
ment to import labourers from other countries. 

For, with respect to the countries here in question, 
Government could never with reason hope to effect 
this so cheaply as could the labourers themselves. 

But the fact really is, that there is an abun¬ 
dant SUPPLY OF LABOUR IN SciNDE, WHICH HAS 
HITHERTO BEEN KEPT OUT OF THE MARKET BY OUR 
INSISTING ON REDUCING THE LABOURING MAN TO THE 
CONDITION OF A SLAVE, AND BY OUR EFFORTS TO FORCE 
THE MARKET BY AUTHORITY. 

To remedy this,-would prescribe more autho¬ 

rity ! But the reports of the executive officers all 
over the province show that a full supply of labourers 
is always obtainable at fair rates of wages. If the 
rates rise above these, we need not fear! A FBEE 

PEOPLE WILL NOT LONG CONSENT TO REMAIN IDLE AND 
POOR, WHEN SOME OF THEIR BRETHREN AROUND AND 
AMONG THEM ARE DAILY GROWING RICH BY THEIR 
INDUSTRY. 

Every one will soon be anxious for work, and down 
will come the prices to their lowest healthy level. 

It is the slave who abhors labour, for he works for 
a task-master. 

Th v freeman glories in his industry, for he labours 
for himself and his children,—for food, for luxury, for 



23 


the gratification of every natural and artificial desire 
and want. 

-is manifestly in error in supposing that an 

increased rate of payment by Government for labour 
in this country must be injurious to the interests of 
the State. 

Whatever stimulates the industry and adds to the 
productive power of the people, must undoubtedly in 
like proportion directly add to the public revenue. 

Scinde is capable of yielding ten times the revenue 
it now pays: the revenue is now low, because the 

PEOPLE ARE POOR, AND ARE WITHOUT THE CAPITAL 
NECESSARY FOR CULTIVATING THE GROUND. 

As the people become rich, and when they feel 

FREE TO USE THEIR LABOUR AND WEALTH AS THEY 
please, cultivation will extend, and population in¬ 
crease. Every rupee paid to the inhabitants of the 
country for their labour, above the amount necessary 
to purchase their mere subsistence, will be returned 
to the soil, and ultimately be restored with large 
interest to the Government treasury. 

But the foreign labourer will take with him out of 
the country all his surplus earnings; none such will 
return to the ground, but the profit will he entirely 
transferred to other countries. 

It is abundantly certain that the most natural, most 
simple, most healthy, and most economical method of 
obtaining labour, is to pay whatever may be necessary 
to command the required supply in the open market: 
all good authorities are agreed on this head. 

Private persons, if left freely to themselves, gene¬ 
rally know their own interests much better than does 



24 


any government. Labourers will speedily flock to a 
field where they are highly paid and fairly treated. 
There is no need to “ import ” them : they will, if 
there be a natural want of their services, soon come 
of themselves. 

It is undoubtedly the truest economy for Govern¬ 
ment to abstain from interfering with market prices. 

This had, I thought, been considered by well- 
informed persons as axiomatic, at least since the 
time of Edmund Burke. (Yide his “ Thoughts and 
Details on Scarcity.”) 

But there are higher and nobler principles than any 
which-has touched on, which point to the self¬ 

same end as do considerations of immediate profit and 
loss. 

We have no more right to force any man to labour 
for less than he chooses to work for, than we have to 
steal his household property. To attempt to do so 
is criminal; and to speak of the “ extortionate ” 
demands of labourers appears to me to imply con¬ 
fused ideas of natural right and wrong. 

The labourer demands nothing: the employer may 
possibly demand the labourer’s services, and—as for¬ 
merly in Scinde, until the practice was prohibited and 
abolished by me—may sometimes enforce his demand 
by unjust violence; but the poor labourer can only 
offer his services, and—having no capital but those 
services—he must either obtain work or starve. 

Nothing tends to repress the productive energies of 
a people more than a sense of injustice. The labourer 
working for Government has a right to such a share 
of the public wealth as the labour which he performs 



25 


may represent, or may be fairly equivalent to. This 
cannot be arbitrarily assigned; it can only be known 
—only be ascertained —by allowing every man to fix 
his ow r n price on his exertions. 

If he value these too highly, we need not employ 
him : hunger will soon teach him what his labour is 
really worth in the market. 

On the other hand, the labourer has no right to 
more than this due share; and to give him more has 
also a depressing effect on productiveness, as it may 
tend to encourage idleness, and waste the public 
capital. The true and just amount can only be dis¬ 
covered in a perfectly free market. 

Freedom, moreover, developes every manly attribute, 
increases all the natural powers, is the strongest 

POSSIBLE STIMULUS TO INDUSTRY, AND VASTLY AUG¬ 
MENTS THE PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF THE PEOPLE ; 

whose energies and self-respect are, on the contrary, 
crushed by slavery and injustice. 

A labourer who has once experienced the advantage 
of being fully paid for his freely offered labour is not 
likely ever wilfully to remain idle when work is to 
be had. 

The slave flies from his work, which to him is 

ASSOCIATED WITH MISERY AND DEGRADATION ; THE FREE 
LABOURER GOES REJOICING TO HIS TASK, FOR TO HIM IT 
IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY COMFORT AND HAPPINESS IN LIFE: 

WHEREFORE, the slave is in the end ruin¬ 
ously COSTLY AND FREE LABOUR IS COMPARATIVELY 
CHEAP ALL OVER THE WORLD. 

This is the case, proportionally, in every degree 
and with respect to every approximation to absolute 


26 


slavery or perfect freedom. Every approach to in¬ 
justice to the labourer lessens his productiveness, 
drives men from the field of labour, and injures the 
Government revenue. 

There is no escape from this axiom, that the freest 
market is the cheapest market all over the world, and 
with regard to everything which has an exchangeable 
value among mankind. 

Government have called on the Commissioner on 

his return to the province to report on-’s letter, 

but I think it my duty to leave this minute on record, 
for communication to Government, or not, as the 
Commissioner may think proper. 

I am further of opinion, that, to aid in the execu¬ 
tion of public works, a corps of Sindhee labourers 
might he permanently embodied with much advantage 
to all parties.—( March , 1857.) 

Abolition of Forced Labour in Scinde. 

In the-collectorate, all canals, above a certain 

size, are cleared, or are supposed to be cleared, by the 
officers of Government, and a water-tax is levied to 
meet the cost. But owing to attempting to work at 
rates very greatly below the fair value of labour, much 
fraud and confusion has been there introduced. 

False measurements were habitually used; the 
people were debased, disgusted, and defrauded; while 
the public revenue was frequently wasted to an enor¬ 
mous extent, and large sums were expended on clearing 
canals which yielded little or no return, and, at the 
same time, the most valuable and productive feeders 
were often neglected. Much improvement in these 




27 


respects was introduced by-; but to bring matters 

to a healthy state, and to prevent enormous loss of 
revenue, an entire change of system appears necessary. 
The statistics of canal-clearances, &c., are much the 
same in the-as in the-collectorate. 

In the-collectorate, only the main feeders have 

been cleared, wholly or partially, at the expense of 
Government and under Government superintendence. 
The zemindars make their own arrangements for the 
clearance of their private canals, and with these no 

interference seems necessary. But in -, also, 

“ statute” or forced labour is largely had recourse to, 
even when the work is superintended by Government 
officers. In some instances these statute labourers 
receive food, or some trifling money payment; in 
others, nothing whatever is paid to them, though they 
may be kept at the work for months together. 

I would respectfully observe that the question of 
the advantage or disadvantage of pressed labour 
appears to me to depend on those laws of political 
economy which are as well established as the truths 
of geometry. No disputed doctrines are involved in 
this matter. The principles on which I rested my 
arguments are, it seems to me, as self-evident as the 
axioms of the mathematician. 

The differences of opinion shown in the summary 
now forwarded appear to me to have been caused 
solely by want of study and of acquaintance with the 
general laws affecting the matters in question. To 
say, with regard to such matters, that what may be 
right with respect to one part of a country might be 
wrong with regard to another, appears to be like 







28 


asserting that though a triangle might have three 
sides at Bath, yet at Bristol it must have four. 

The natural laws and principles on which the truth 
of the matter depends may be shown very clearly in 
a few words. 

A certain amount of labour has to be performed by 
the inhabitants of a country in order to make that 
country productive. In the case of Scinde this labour 
is canal-clearing, and such like irrigational works. 

The amount of work to be done is the same in 
whatever form it may be represented or be brought to 
account; its real value is always the same. And this 
must be taken from the people of the country in some 
shape or other, in whatever manner the work be 
performed. 

It is evidently indifferent whether the actual work 
performed be called so many cubic feet of earth, 
so many rupees, or so many days of human labour. 
These all represent the same thing, and, however 
reckoned, the work so represented requires ultimately 
the same amount of the capital existing in the country 
to be expended in its performance. 

The capital of the country may be in this instance 
represented by the amount of labour available. 

The arguments brought forward by me, and main¬ 
tained by-, are to this effect: that paying a full 

and fair rate of wages for the labour required—that 
is, paying such a price as might be sufficient to induce 
a full supply of labourers to offer themselves of their 
own accord—tends to make men work with greater 
power and energy; to add to the number of men 
willing and able to work; and thus to increase the 




29 

capital, and necessarily, of course, the revenue of the 
country. 

On the other hand, forcing men to work without 
pay, or with insufficient pay, disgusts them with 
labour; drives them into idleness ; excites all manner 
of ill-feeling; produces a very great amount of crime, 
disorder, and disaffection; and thus destroys a great 
proportion of the capital, and, therefore, of the 
revenue of the country. 

This question I would urge as being one of the 
greatest importance. I have little doubt, if the 

matter should remain in the hands of-or myself, 

hut that forced labour of every kind may gradually 
ere long be totally abolished in Scinde ; hut meanwhile, 
much evil may be, and must be, caused by the remains 
of such a system ; and I would therefore suggest that, 
inasmuch as many men bow to authority who are deaf 
to reason, it would he highly beneficial to the revenue, 
and to the country generally, if it were at once 
positively prohibited to have recourse to statute, or 
forced, or unpaid, or ill-paid labour, under any cir¬ 
cumstances whatever. 

It is evident that whatever drives that labour from 
employment, whatever induces idleness and weakens 
the productive energies of the people, must exactly, 
in like proportion, injure the public revenue. Twist 
and turn the subject as we will, the facts are as I 
have endeavoured to set forth, and in this, as in all 
else, the eternal law of Nature and of God holds true 
—that to be unjust is to be unwise. 

The manner in which I would propose to carry out 
these principles is as follows :— 



30 


All canals, being main feeders, and generally such 
as have hitherto been cleared out by Government 
partially or wholly by means of forced or statute 
labour, and the revenue returns from which show that 
it would be advantageous that Government should 
continue to clear, be henceforth cleared by hired or 
contract labour, paid for only at free market rates. 

The work to be superintended by Government 
officers, and paid for by measurement; a rate being 
at first assumed, such as may be considered fair, and 
afterwards increased or decreased, as it may be found 
to affect the labour market on the spot. 

The amount of available labour in the country, and 
of the work to be performed, must be generally nearly 
a constant quantity, so that the natural and fair rate 
of hire will very soon be ascertained. Little change 
will afterwards be found requisite, and estimates can 
then be prepared with certainty and precision. 

I have found it an excellent plan to divide the 
work of excavation into small portions, such as five 
or ten rupees’ w T orth, and to allow labourers to con¬ 
tract for the execution of one or any number of these 
portions within the required time. 

Under this arrangement, a man and his family can 
get through a surprising amount of work, while the 
least possible amount of superintendence is required. 
Even the little children do something, while each 
member of the family works at any time of the day he 
pleases; and I have often observed the people con¬ 
tinuing their task all night, relieving each other as 
they found convenient. This plan I would recom¬ 
mend for general adoption. 


31 


Wherever statute labour may have been due for the 
clearance of canals, I would recommend the levy of a 
water-rate on the lands irrigated; the rate being pro¬ 
portioned to the number of labourers which the 
zemindars holding those lands have hitherto been 
compelled to supply. 

Any zemindars who may wish to clear their own 
canals, without Government aid or interference, 
should be permitted to do so; and from them, of 
course, no water-rate should be levied for lands so 
irrigated. 

But whenever Government is called on to interfere 
in the work, the clearance should be executed in the 
same manner as that of the main feeders. 

These rules appear to be applicable to every species 
of canal superintendence; and however the canal 
department may he arranged, the adoption of the 
above rules throughout the province of Scinde would, 
I think, meet every difficulty, and tend to abolish 
every abuse. 

It nowhere appears that Government ever autho¬ 
rized the practice of seizing labourers and making 
them work without pay; but, on the contrary, it 
seems evident that Government supposed the amount 
estimated and sanctioned for canal-excavations to 
have been a fair equivalent for the work to be per¬ 
formed. 

The system of forced labour appears to be an abuse 
which existed under the government of the Ameers, 
and which has been heedlessly allowed by the local 
officers to continue since the annexation of Scinde. 

A monstrous idea seems gradually to have estab- 


32 


lished itself in the minds of the civil officers, to the 
effect that whenever they fancied that more canal work 
ought to be done than the sum of money allowed by 
Government would pay for, they were at liberty to 
force the people of the country to execute such work 
without remuneration. But it is evident to me, that 
however such an idea may have arisen, the assumption 
of a right to force men to labour unpaid is, in this 
instance, as little supported by authority as by reason. 

The fact of such a barbarous practice having existed 
under a rude native government can never suffice to 
justify its continuance under British rule; while its 
ill effects, wdiich now prove to be absolutely ruinous, 
must have been comparatively little felt under the 
native princes, for the simple reason that under the 
native rule the whole revenue of the country, however 
drawn from the people, justly or unjustly, by fair 
means or by foul, was again expended among them, 
and thus capital was to some extent circulated, and 
though much injustice was done to individuals, 
nothing was lost to the whole community. 

Under the practice which-and myself have 

been labouring to put a stop to, the estimates were 
never trustworthy; the measurements were untrue; 
and the rates of account were not those by which the 
work was really executed: the whole arrangement 
was as faulty and unsound as its results were evil. 

In introducing a more healthy system, with work 
truly and fairly performed, accounted for, and paid 
for, it will doubtless be necessary at first to raise the 
estimates and the amount sanctioned for canal clear¬ 
ances ; but it is equally certain that the real cost to 



33 


the State will be actually much less, because the work 
will be better done, and the people will not be im¬ 
poverished. 

Having now personally witnessed the ruinous effects 
of the old system throughout the province, and being 
deeply impressed with the urgent necessity of its 
abolition, I have thought it necessary to follow up 
-*s intentions, and at once to prohibit, in antici¬ 
pation of orders, the use of forced labour throughout 
Scinde. I have done this as the only means of restor¬ 
ing productiveness to the country, and preventing a 
greater and still increasing loss of revenue to the 
State; and in so doing I trust that I shall receive 
support and approbation.—(1856.) 

Notice . 

I. Statute or forced labour is abolished. 

II. Every man is at perfect liberty to work when, 
where, and at what rates he may please. 

III. Any Government servant who may hereafter 
be guilty of compelling any person to labour, whether 
upon canals or any other public or private work, 
will be liable to be dismissed from the Government 
service, and to legal prosecution by the injured 
parties. 

IV. Every work, of whatever description, may be 
performed either by means of contract or measured 
task-work, or by payment of daily task wages, at the 
discretion and pleasure of the parties immediately 
concerned. But no person must henceforth assume 
the right arbitrarily to fix the rates at which labourers 
or others are to be paid for work performed. Such 

D 



34 


rates must always be fixed by free consent and mutual 
agreement of the parties themselves. 

Calculation of Labour Eates in certain 

Districts. 

I cause the nature and extent of the proposed work 
to be explained by proclamation all over the country, 
and then invite tenders for its execution by contract. 
Having 1 thus ascertained that the work can be 
executed for a certain sum, and that no one giving 
good security would undertake it for a less amount, I 
calculate the rates in my estimate forwarded for 
sanction, so as to meet the sum required. 

This I find to be the very best mode of obtaining 
fair work at fair cost, and I have never yet been 
disappointed in the result. The rates thus esti¬ 
mated cannot, it appears to me, be higher than is 
necessary. In executing thus, in these particular 
districts, we do the best possible, I think. Some¬ 
thing, however, must be left to my discretion. I will 
be responsible that the works proposed be executed for 
the amounts mentioned, that full value be received for 
the public money expended, that the means allowed 
he not wasted, and that the work answer the purpose 
intended. I will answer, in short, for the general 
result; but I cannot pretend to be able to conform 
always to the rates of the engineer department, or to 
make estimates correct in minute detail.—(1853.) 

Note . — This practice has been found eminently 
successful.— (1857.) 



35 


Wheel-Carriages and Bridges. 

With regard to bridges, those built without lime- 
cement stand tolerably well when the arch-joints are 
correctly drawn to a centre, and when the bricks are 
rubbed, and carefully laid, so as to fit, with very little 
mud between them. But whenever lime is procurable 
at a reasonable cost, it would be far better to build 
the bridges with lime mortar throughout, and this 
would ultimately prove the more economical plan. 
But the first cost would be great, and the time and 
establishment required would exceed those at my 
disposal. 

To give a permanent pavement to bridges built 
without cement would be out of place. On the whole, 
it has seemed preferable to secure moderately-good 
roads at the least possible expenditure of time, money, 
and labour, than to have the prospect of better roads 
ten years hence. Indeed, with the means available 
in this country, ten years would not have sufficed to 
construct all my bridges with lime, mortar, and paved 
roadways. 

Accordingly, I set to work (not altogether in 
ignorance of constructive art) after a fashion of my 
own, without establishments, without any aid whatever, 
and with the people of the country alone. The result 
is, that a country which was almost impassable is now 
traversed with ease and comfort, at all seasons, in 
every direction. And the work has been accomplished 
in one year, at a very trifling comparative cost. 

With regard to the preservation of the roadways of 
the bridges, experience shows that the most effectual 

d 2 


36 


way of protecting the masonry in this district is to 
keep it well covered with earth. The bridges near 
camps or towns, which necessarily are those most 
used, should be covered with stable litter or such like, 
which, if renewed occasionally, till the whole be 
consolidated into an elastic mass, stands better than 
anything else. No ordinary metal will bind in so 
very dry a climate. The earthing of the bridges 
should be included in the road-repair contracts. 

With regard to the question of wheel-carriages 
with iron tire, &c., everything in my power has been 
done to endeavour to introduce a better construction 
of vehicle; but I have for some time past abandoned 
all attempts of the kind, being convinced that they 
are useless. 

The introduction of wheel-carriages with iron tire, 
&c. might be an advantage in many ways, but would 
not, I think, benefit the roads much, if at all; the 
whole ground of the country, with the exception of 
a few patches of salt earth here and there, being 
such that the roads become speedily reduced to an 
impalpable powder, many inches in depth, whatever 
description of wheel-carriage be used . 

The roads are excellent for camels, by which the 
traffic of the country is almost wholly carried on, the 
carts being chiefly used for the transport of agricul¬ 
tural produce: but the roads in such a soil could not 
be made well adapted even for the best wheel-carriages 
without metal, which is not readily procurable, but 

which, I think, from the excessive drvness of the air, 

•> / 

would be found not to answer. 

Bridges always passable, and straight roads from 


37 


place to place, form an immense improvement on the 
former condition of things ; but it would be unreason¬ 
able to hope for roads really good for wheel-carriages 
in this country. 

The introduction and general use of an improved 
description of wheel-carriage with iron tire, &c., 
implies a complete change in the entire native 
population or society; it involves the necessity for the 
existence in each little village of such artificers as are 
now not to be met with in twelve places throughout 
the province; it involves, also, the existence of 
increased capital, new wants, and improved habits, 
among the country-folk generally : all this may come 
in due time naturally, as civilization advances. 

But as things now are, the carts at present in use are, 
perhaps, better adapted to the means and wants of the 
people than anything we could hope to succeed in 
substituting for them. 

The things are rude and noisy, it is true, and at 
first sight seem ridiculous : hut they can be con¬ 
structed in any village at a cost of four or five rupees 
each; they can he kept in repair by the village 
carpenter : while the loads they carry are as heavy as 
could well be drawn (I have carried from six to eight 
hundredweight of iron) by a pair of bullocks on these 
roads.—(1854.) 

Repairs of Roads by Contracts. 

I request attention to the annual repairs of roads. 
If the contract for repairing them be made for one 
year only, it evidently becomes the advantage of the 
contractor to execute the work as cheaply that is, as 



38 


badly—as possible, just keeping within the terms of 
the contract. In fact, the worse the work may he 
done, the more the man will profit by it. 

There must be a continual endeavour on the part of 
the contractor to conceal defects, instead of remedying 
them. In such extended works as these roads and 
bridges, the means at our disposal do not admit of the 
continual and minute surveillance necessary to guard 
against this, and the evil becomes most serious. 
Besides this, even where the contractor behaves with 
perfect honesty, he cannot, to advantage, lay out 
capital on the work for one year, as he could do were 
his contract extended over a longer period. 

On the other hand, where the contract has been 
entered into for a series of years, it becomes the 
interest of the contractor to execute the repairs in the 
strongest and most durable manner; while not only 
will the work (quality being equal) be executed at 
considerably less cost, but repairs must he much less 
frequently required, and the nuisance of continually 
breaking up bridges he avoided.—(1853.) 

Plans and Estimates versus a Koad and Canal. 

We have occupied the country for fifteen years, and 
for the last ten years and more it has been our own, 
yet still this most important little piece of road in the 
whole province is even in a worse state now than it 
was in 1839. There have been far too many u plans 
and estimates,” and too many discussions for any work 
to be done ; and now that the thing has been given 
up to the tender mercies of “ the board,” it may, I 
fear, be classed with a Chancery suit, and we may 


39 


expect nothing but plans, estimates, and wise opinions 
to all eternity ! Yet the business presents not the 
least difficulty, and the whole might have been 
accomplished in one season by contract at a very 
moderate cost. 

It is as plain as the day, that to secure constant dry 
communication by land, and straight communication 

by water, between-and --, all that is necessary 

to he done is to dig a canal from one place to the 
other, throw the earth excavated to one side only, 
and on the top of this bank make your road,—all the 
watercourses crossed by the bank being of course 
bridged. What can be simpler or better for the 
purpose? This was proposed by me in 1840; and, 
in spite of all the plans and estimates, I doubt if 
anything better has been thought of since. 

As things are now, the road by land—very bad at 
all times—is quite impassable for four months in the 
year; while, though the direct distance be only 
twenty-tw T o miles, the distance by water is about 
seventy ! 

The bank on which the road would be carried would 
abot ethyf five feet wide at top, but nowhere more 
than seven high — generally much less. But last 
season experiments were made with a bank ten feet 
thick, apparently in order to ascertain whether one of 
five times that breadth would stand or not. The 
strange devices played off on this little piece of road, 
or rather no road, during the last twelve years, are 
almost incredible. The money wasted would have 
made the work properly several times over, I believe. 
—(1854.) 






40 


A Navigable Canal to the Indus, and the 
Requirements of Kurrachee as a Port. 

The measures really requisite to affording this port 
free scope for becoming whatever its geographical or 
commercial position may admit of its becoming, may 
be summarised as follows : — 

1st .—The bar at the entrance of the harbour should 
be so far removed as to render it possible for ships of 
heavy burthen to enter the port at all seasons, without 
risk or hindrance. 

2nd .—A steam-dredge should be maintained in the 
harbour ready to remove silt or sand accumulating 
along the fair-way channel. 

3rd .—Two European and four native pilots should 
be appointed. 

4th .—The Chinnee Creek should be reclaimed, in 
view to improving the salubrity of the neighbourhood, 
and for the convenient extension of building-ground. 

5th .—A navigable canal should be constructed to 
connect the port with the Indus. No work is of so 
great importance to the prosperity of the port as this. 
It would afford that supply of fresh water which is 
vitally essential to the full development of every great 
seaport town. It would furnish, by the cultivation 
along its banks, those necessaries of life which have 
now to be brought from a distance, at considerable 
risk of loss or damage, and consequently at an en¬ 
hanced value. It would maintain an unbroken water 
communication between the Indus, its tributaries, 
and this their natural outlet on the sea coast. It 
would obviate the inconvenience at present experienced 


41 


during the monsoon months, when communication by 
sea between the mouths of the Indus and the harbour 
is closed. It would make the port independent of 
the Ghizree Creek, the passage through which is 
tedious and uncertain. Above all, it would he a sure 
and necessary preparatory to the introduction of the 
railway, which all considerations, as well political as 
commercial, induce me to conclude must—unless it 
be permitted to fail—ignore the town of Hyderabad, 
and all merely provincial termini, and seek, by the 
directest route practicable, that one sole, fixed point, 
viz., Sehwan, where all possible lines of communica¬ 
tion and trade from the northward concentrate. A 
glance at the map shows these lines to pass from the 
north and north-east down the Punjaub, and from the 
north-west—that is, from Affghanistan, the Khelat 
State, and Central Asia in general—down the Bolan 
Pass. 

Lastly .—Establish your telegraphic line along your 
north-west frontier, and connect its Kurrachee ter¬ 
minus so soon as possible with London.—(1856.) 

Public Ferries. 

I consider the farming of ferries to be an evil. 
The object of Government is economically to provide 
means of safe and commodious transit for the public 
across the river; and no more effectual means could 
be devised for defeating this object than the farming 
system. 

The system of licensing is doubtless a great im¬ 
provement on the farming arrangement. But, under 
the circumstances existing on the-, I am con- 





42 


vinced that the best plan would be to make all the 
ferries on the river wholly free and open to the 
unrestrained action of public competition. 

The experiment of freedom has accordingly been 
tried at numerous ferries, where, owing to the scan¬ 
tiness of the population, it was thought that the 
experiment would be most likely to fail. I was 
assured repeatedly by those who should have been 
trustworthy authorities, that the greatest inconve¬ 
nience to the public would certainly ensue if my 
principles on this subject were to be carried into 
practice. Nevertheless, as these principles appeared 
to me as being universally true, the experiment was 
fairly tried, and found to prove perfectly successful. 
The public have never been better accommodated: 
boats have always been ready in sufficient numbers, 
and of sufficient size, and the rate of hire has some¬ 
what decreased;—the truth being that the trade in 
ferry passage, like all other trades, follows the well- 
known laws of demand and supply. 

It has been urged in regard of the ferries contracted 
for, that the contractors would not care for the smaller 
ferries. Possibly so ; for, holding a monopoly, their 
gains are independent, to some extent, of the amount 
and quality of accommodation which they provide. 
But where all is left free, ferries will certainly be 
established, men and boats will be ready for hire at 
all points where ferries were required, and people 
were willing to pay for their passage. Free competi¬ 
tion must undoubtedly afford the amplest accommoda¬ 
tion at the cheapest rate, and exactly of that quality 
and quantity best adapted to the wants of the public. 


43 


Municipalities are of course at liberty under this 
system to establish their own ferries under their own 
arrangements; provided always they do not prevent 
other parties plying for hire. 

Approaches to ferries should be considered as parts 
of the road with which they are connected, and pro¬ 
vided for accordingly : they no more require special 
arrangement than the approaches to a bridge.— 
(1856.) 

Remarks on a Railway to connect the Indus 
with the Seaport of Kurrachee. 

On the subject of the railway in Scinde I have clear 
and decided opinions. 

It seems that by the terms of the contract entered 
into by the railway company and Government, the 
railway should be taken from Kurrachee to Kotree,— 
Kotree being the only available point which can be 
described as being “ at or near to Hyderabad.” 

The contracting parties appear to have forgotten 
that to reach Hyderabad from Kurrachee, the river 
must be crossed. But be this as it may, it appears to 
me to be clear, that in any wise scheme for a railway 
in Scinde, whether considered as a part of a great 
northern line, or solely as a means of connecting eth 
traffic of the Indus with the sea, Hyderabad should 
be totally neglected. In my opinion, the mention of 
Hyderabad at all, in connection with the scheme of a 
railway in Scinde, is a very grave error, and one which 
could only have been caused by the absence of correct 
information and of due consideration. 

Hyderabad is not even on the Indus: this town is 


44 


some four miles from the river. It is on no great 
permanent line of communication, and has the Indus 
where the stream is greatest running between it and 
the seaport at Kotree, the station on the western 
bank of the river opposite Hyderabad, which appears 
to be the only available point for the railway terminus 
within the terms of the contract. The whole place 
for several miles around is insecure; any station 
formed there would be liable to be carried awav 
bodily by the river at any moment during the inun¬ 
dation. It rests wholly on the alluvial soil, which 
near the banks of the Indus is never safe anywhere 
from year to year; while this particular spot, Kotree, 
has been, within my recollection, several times on the 
point of destruction. 

Supposing other circumstances to be favourable, it 
seems, then, that to make Kotree the terminus of the 
railway would be to incur great risk of loss and 
destruction. 

Such a site for the river terminus of the railway 
might probably ere long result in rendering a consi¬ 
derable portion of the line absolutely useless; for if 
the terminus at Kotree were carried away by the 
river, a new and more safe site must be sought for, 
and a new line constructed, to connect with it. 

But it appears to me to be almost certain that, 
until a water communication shall have been esta¬ 
blished between the Indus and the harbour of Kur- 
rachee, any railway constructed merely to connect 
the seaport with the river will prove an enormous 
failure. 

To give a chance of a profitable return from such 


45 


a railway, we must first connect the seaport with the 
Indus by water; and the best project for this purpose 
with which I am acquainted is the canal proposed and 
planned by the late Lieutenant Chapman. 

By such a canal, the river would be perfectly 
connected at all seasons with Kurrachee as respects 
navigation; and at the same time an inexhaustible 
supply of fresh water would be provided, and a large 
tract of country now desert waste would be rendered 
productive. 

The one great want at all large seaport towns, 
sooner or later, is a full supply of fresh water.. 

The proposed canal would, in meeting this want, 

supply the means of life and growth to a large city 

and seaport at Kurrachee, which could not exist 

without it, and which, with it, must ultimately 

become the chief, or probably the only, outlet to the 

ocean of the commerce of a portion of the globe far 

more extensive than even the whole of the countries 

drained by the Indus and its tributaries. 

* 

The growth and vitality of such a seaport are 
essential to the full employment and success of the 
railway which leads to it; and the construction of 
such a canal as that proposed, instead of being in 
anywise antagonistic to the rail, is, in my opinion, a 
work necessary to be undertaken in the first instance, 
to enable the railway to prove really remunerative. 

Again, the bulky agricultural produce borne by the 
river boats, which would not hear the cost of transport 
by rail, would by means of this canal be at once trans¬ 
ferable with the utmost facility to the sea-going craft 
in the Kurrachee harbour. While a very large tract 


46 


of country now lying waste for want of water would, 
by means of the canal, become highly productive; 
and its produce, both of pasture and arable land, 
would reach the market at the seaport in the easiest 
and cheapest manner by means of the canal itself, 
which had fertilised the ground. 

At present, even to supply the existing limited 
demands, Kurrachee is compelled to import by sea 
large quantities of grass, grain, firewood., &c., from 
Kutch and Kattywar. 

Indeed, whether a railway be constructed or not, I 
am quite convinced that sooner or later such a canal 
must be constructed. 

It is very improbable that any railway, constructed 
merely to.connect the Indus with the seaport, will 
ever prove remunerative. But the natural commer¬ 
cial road to the ocean of the greater part of the 
countries from Bokhara to Mekran,—of a very large 
portion, in fact, of Central Asia,—is that by the 
Bolan Pass. 

This road, and the country in the table-land of 
Afighanistan near the head of the pass, is in the 
territory of the Khan of Khelat. The government 
and people of this country have for a long time past 
been entirely friendly and well disposed towards us, 
and towards the extension of commerce. 

We have it in our power to improve this grand 
natural and almost sole outlet,—the Bolan,—as a 
commercial road, to almost any extent. 

Sooner or later, it must become the channel of a 
mighty stream of commerce from Central Asia to the 
ocean,—there is no other great road. 



47 


From Dadur, at the foot of the Bolan, to Sehwan, 
in Middle Scinde, the country is the most favourable 
possible for a railway. It is almost a dead level, 
hard, dry plain. Sehwan is on the Indus, and is 
nearly in a straight line from Dadur to Kurrachee. 

Such a railway will at some future time assuredly 
be laid down, and it appears to me that, if a railway 
is now to be made to connect the Indus with the sea, 
Sehwan is the proper point for its river terminus. 

Such a line, straight through the hills from Kur¬ 
rachee to Sehwan, or its neighbourhood, would not 
only at once serve to bring all the produce of Upper 
Scinde and the Punjaub by the shortest possible route 
to the sea, but would ultimately form a most valuable 
portion of the main line of one of the greatest rail¬ 
ways in the world. 

The station at Sehwan would occupy a rocky site, 
and apparently the most permanent position along 
the whole course of the Indus in Scinde ; and in this 
respect it must be considered as a highly eligible situa¬ 
tion for a river terminus for a railway, considered as a 
means of connecting the Indus with the ocean: while 
all the great northern lines of road naturally converge 
to and pass through this point. If it be proposed to 
continue the railway from Kotree to Sehwan along the 
valley of the Indus, it will be found that the peculiar 
nature of the hills which abut on the river at the 
latter place will present a practically insuperable 
obstacle to the communication, whether by tunnel or 
otherwise. 

With regard to the direct line through the hills 
from Sehwan to the sea, I may observe that I know 


48 


the road well personally, having repeatedly traversed 
it at all seasons. It does not appear to me that any 
very serious engineering difficulties exist anywhere 
along its whole course; but to speak with any degree 
of certainty on such matters without a regular survey, 
and critical examination, is of course out of the 
question. 

But supposing this line of road to be as practicable 
as it is said—and I believe truly said—to be, it must, 
I think, be the best possible, as being the shortest 
from point to point, and as avoiding all crossing of the 
Indus, lying, as this route does throughout, on the 
same side of that river as the seaport. I can imagine 
no change of circumstances which will not tend to 
add to the advantages of this route, and to lessen those 
of every other. 

Whatever may become of the question of the rail¬ 
way, it appears to me to be certain that the wisest 
possible course of proceeding, at present, for improving 
the commercial communication through Scinde, would 
be to construct Lieutenant Chapman’s canal, and to 
complete as speedily as possible good broad metalled 
roads from Kurrachee along the valley of the Indus 
over the Lukhee Hills, and also straight through the 
western hills by the line proposed above for the rail¬ 
way, from Kurrachee to Jungar and Sehwan. 

The profit which must ensue from these works, the 
increased productive power and wealth which they 
must create in the country, might perhaps—if any¬ 
thing could do so—make remunerative even the short 
line of railway from Kotree to Kurrachee.—( July , 
1856 .) 





49 


Travellers’ Bungalows and Serais. 

I have the honour to observe that, in my opinion, it 
would be of the greatest advantage to the public, and, 
therefore, necessarily to Government, if good travel¬ 
lers’ bungalows were erected at convenient distances 
along the chief lines of communication throughout 
• 

Every bungalow should have plenty of roomy out¬ 
houses or sheds, which can be erected and kept in 
repair at a trifling expense, while it is of the greatest 
importance that every one travelling in this country 
in the hot season should be able to find cover. 

At each station, quite distinct from these bunga¬ 
lows, it would be well to have a large shed, for the 
accommodation of native traders and travellers. 

I am certain myself that all such accommodation, 
made available to the public entirely free from all 
payment whatever, must result eventually in a pecu¬ 
niary return to the State. 

Thus, by way of example, say one-third of the pro¬ 
duce of the land belongs to the State, and comes into 
the public treasury ; the country is not half peopled, 
and not half cultivated; every increase of means of 
the people is employed in increased cultivation: 
wherefore, everything which adds to the means of the 
people, in like proportion adds to the revenue. 

Travellers and traders are attracted by good roads, 
good accommodation, and safety. The amount which 
such persons expend among the people is out of all 
proportion greater than any fees which could be col¬ 
lected from them: one-third of such expenditure 

E 



50 


almost always finds its way eventually into the coffers 
of the State; while the free passage of strangers 
through a country excites new wants, new desires, and 
new efforts to gratify them, and thereby adds to the 
energies as well as to the means of the people. 

On the other hand, the imposition of fees for 
accommodation is a merely deceptive gain : the impost, 
however just it may appear, is assuredly unwise. The 
amount collected is itself trifling, but the injurious 
effect of such collections may be very great. They 
tend to keep strangers out of the country, and to 
impede their progress through it; and assuredly every 
rupee so received into the public treasury keeps three 
rupees out of it. 

This principle is a law of nature ; its effects are 
certain. Even the establishment for registering traffic 
on this frontier acts repulsively ; and though we col¬ 
lect no import or export duties, we actually pay an 
establishment to impede trade and injure the revenue. 
—( 1854 .) 

Trade creates a Market, but does not neces¬ 
sarily follow a Market-place. 

I am unable to concur in the opinion that the 
increase of exports is attributable to the proclamation 
of fairs; and that the most important element of suc¬ 
cess still wanting is the establishment of a market at 

-. For I consider that to believe the development 

of trade to be consequent and dependent upon the 
establishment of a market is to mistake an effect for a 
cause. Trade implies and creates a market, but does 
not necessarily involve a market-place artificially pre- 



51 


pared for it. In like manner, to assume that the 
proclamation of a fair is sufficient to attract commerce, 
under a free government, is, in my opinion, to assume 
that a measure which, in barbaric countries, where 
the highways of commerce are unsafe, is essential to 
the congregation of merchants and to the rendering 
of trade possible, is applicable also to a civilized state, 
wherein the functions of Government should be strictly 
confined to the removal of obstacles, and should in no 
instance extend to direct interference with commercial 
enterprise, whether for stimulus or restriction. And 
my belief is, that the impetus given to the exports of 
this province shortly subsequent to the period when 
the proclamation under notice was issued, is attri¬ 
butable to the construction of a series of bridged 
roads, to the abolition of frontier duties, and to the 
reduction of transit dues in the neighbouring territory. 
—( 1856 .) 

Political Science related to all Science. 

It is false political economy to increase the rates of 

import duties, or to tax duty-free goods, as temporary 

expedients, to be given up when “ the land-tax and 

other revenues have expanded to sufficient dimensions 

to permit of a reduction of the tax on trade” The 

land revenue will and must increase bv the reduction 

%/ 

of taxes on trade, and in proportion very much greater 

than any such reduction. -should be told that to 

form correct ideas of the principles—the natural laws 
—at work in the science of political economy, it is 
most necessary to study what other minds have written 
thereon. In fact, to understand any science thoroughly, 

e 2 




52 


acquaintance with all science is necessary, for nothing 
is isolated in nature. Political economy, for example, 
may be treated chemically, as Liebeg shows in his 
“ Letters ”—vide page 467-—( March , 1856.) 

Customs and Pier Dues. 


I am of opinion that the pier fees should be abolished 
so soon as practicable, and that all parties, of what¬ 
ever description, should be allowed the free and wholly 
untaxed use of the pier. If, as apprehended, the 
present pier accommodation prove, under a system of 
freedom, insufficient for the accommodation of goods 
and passengers, additional accommodation should be 
provided. But the policy of securing free and 
unimpeded means of transit in every direction, and 
under all circumstances, appears to me as unquestion¬ 
able. * * * —(1856.) 

The levy of a moderate import duty, which for¬ 
merly existed, could not check the introduction of 
machinery into this country. While the difficulty 
experienced in defining precisely what articles consti¬ 
tute machinery causes much discontent and uncer¬ 
tainty. * * * —(1856.) 

* * * Either goods should be passed on the 

valuation of the importer, or, on his declining to pay 
the duty on the appraised value, the goods should be 
purchased on account of Government. The one rule 
is a perfect check on the other. * * * —(1856.) 

Frontier Trade Returns. 

The annoyance to traders and the impediment to 
trade, caused by the vexatious interference to which 


53 


they were subjected by the measures necessary to 
obtain the information requisite for the framing of 
trade returns, were at least equal to that caused by the 
levy of the old transit dues. 

The happiest effects have followed the introduction 
of perfect freedom of trade on the frontier; and if a 
Jarge increase of the trade itself be held to be of more 
value and importance than the preparation of trade 
returns on paper, it is certain that the abolition of the 
establishment maintained for registering the trade was 
a most just and wise proceeding.—(1856.) 

4 

The Indus Flotilla and Forest Conservancy 

BEYOND THE SPHERE OF THE State’s FUNC¬ 
TIONS. 

If the flotilla be maintained, as at present, by 
Government, arrangements should be made for ren¬ 
dering it complete in itself, and independent of the 
dockyard at Bombay : in other words, proper docks, 
and the requisite establishment for repairing and 
building river-steamers and flats, should be prepared 
on the Indus itself. But, in my opinion, it would be 
advisable for the flotilla to be made over wholly to 
private enterprise. The effects of Government agency 
in this matter are, that traffic on the Indus by steam 
is uncertain, irregular, and costly. The people are 
driven, by the proceedings of the flotilla servants, from 
the banks of the river; and the agency itself is more 
costly to Government than would be that of private 
companies contracting with Government to perform 
the transit accommodation required by the State along 
the line of the Indus. 


54 


The conservancy of the forests by Government 
agency should also, I think, cease ; and the forests be 
let in long lease to private parties, similarly with other 
landed estates. A clause should be entered in the 
lease providing for the maintenance, during the entire 
term of the lease, of the forests in proper condition. 
I am aware that, owing to the requirements of the 
State and the people, in regard to fire and building- 
wood, many administrators, who, in other particulars, 
justly limit the functions of Government, yet shrink 
from asserting the principle of non-interference in this 
instance: nevertheless, it seems plain, that in regard 
of steam requirements, the transit companies would be 
as careful to maintain an adequate supply of fuel as 
of machinery, and that the lessees of forest land would 
be as anxious to produce a remunerative supply of 
timber for general sale as are the lessees of ordinary 
estates in regard of corn. 

Engineer and Normal Class Scholars should not 

BE LIMITED TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOY. 

It seems that a wish is evinced by many of the 
educational authorities to stipulate with the scholars 
of the engineering class, and with the teachers of the 
normal school, that they shall accept no employment 
other than that of Government. But from this mea¬ 
sure I wholly dissent. The object of Government in 
maintaining institutions of the above description is to 
create in the country a better description of artificers 
and a higher class of public instructors. And every 
normal teacher or engineer who proceeds into the 
districts, whether upon private or public employ, tends 


55 


directly to further this object. The knowledge he has 
gained is at some time applied to use, and influences 
those around him. Thus education and engineering 
knowledge become general, and the State indirectly 
profits a thousand-fold. Whereas, every stipulation 
for limiting the sphere of the scholar’s future exertions 
tends to limit the sphere of the whole, and to reduce 
the supply of candidates proportionately. Every 
scholar leaving the school, and working for his own 
profit, carries with him into the districts the know¬ 
ledge he has acquired, and becomes a centre of 
practical instruction. 

Remarks on the Revenue System of the North- 

West Provinces. 

It remains only to notice one particular in which I 
propose to deviate from the practice which I under¬ 
stand to have obtained in our North-West Provinces. 
It relates to the system of coparcenary in a village, 
with joint and mutual responsibility on the part of 
the villagers to pay the Government demand upon 
the entire village. This coparcenary is not, I believe, 
compulsory ; and can, upon the petition of one partner 
or more, be in part or wholly dissolved, each partner 
thus becoming responsible for his own estate or share 
in an estate. I gather, also, that under certain rights 
of “ pre-emption,” which are declared to “ exist in 
communities of landholders,” a member of such com¬ 
munity may transfer his share, whether by sale or 
otherwise. But it appears to me, that whatever may 
be the advantage of thus preserving the village system 
in provinces where this system may yet survive, it 


56 


would not be consistent with the spirit of our rule to 
introduce among a people already too prone to follow 
various modifications of caste rules, a system which, in 
my respectful opinion, is artificial, and of a tendency 
to lead the community to the conclusion that Govern¬ 
ment have sanctioned their allotted spheres in life. 

It is true, as I before observed, that, upon petition, 
the coparcenary may be dissolved. But, as the natives 
are found in this quarter, it would require an indi¬ 
vidual to possess unusual force of character to assert 
his independence ; and, when asserted, it might create 
ill-will between him and those with whom he should 
live in daily friendly relations. And, on the whole, 
it appears to me that no method of procedure is at 
once so simple and so adequate to all the true and 
permanent requirements, as well of the peasant as of 
Government, as that which—after ascertaining and 
recording, in respect of lands already claimed and 
brought under the plough, the names of all parties 
having rights therein, together with the nature and 
extent of these rights—determines what the demands 
of Government should be against each and all of these 
parties, and then fixes and records what in perpetuity 
or for a long term of years are the exact limits of 
these demands. 

While, in regard of lands unclaimed and lying 
waste, it should be generally understood that, upon 
application being made, any person might receive at 
the hands of Government such area as he may require, 
on long lease, upon terms admitting of the lessee’s 
reaping a fair profit upon all labour and capital that 
may he expended. 



57 


By adopting this course of procedure, Government 
would, I consider, exercise all its own legitimate 
functions, and would place the entire community in a 
position to adjust itself in the readiest and best 
manner possible, and in that wherein all its energies 
would most certainly be called forth. The relations 
of neighbours would he wholesome and lasting, in 
that, while they would one and all be independent, it 
would be to the common interest of one and all freely 
to assist one another. 

I beg, however, to add, that in thus expressing my 
opinion I am far from presuming to criticise pro¬ 
ceedings which may have resulted beneficially under 
circumstances differing from those to be encountered 
here. But I have, at the same time, no hesitation in 
submitting that, in so far as this province is con¬ 
cerned, we should, by binding up the peasantry in 
village coparcenaries, or by sanctioning their being so 
bound up, interfere directly or indirectly with the so¬ 
cial freedom of society. We should place the agricul¬ 
turalists in false relations among themselves; should 
increase indolence and want of independent spirit; 
and, precisely in proportion as we might prove suc¬ 
cessful in creating and maintaining the village com¬ 
munities to be so composed, should tend to stereotype 
society, to nip the expansive energy of the people, and 
thereby to check industry, and to diminish the sources 
of wealth and of increased public revenue.—( August , 
1856.) 

Bevenue Settlement. 

We cannot too earnestly bear in mind that a re¬ 
venue survey and settlement is merely a short name 


58 


for proceedings involving the rights, good order, and 
advancement of the true interests of the Government 
we serve, and of the people confided to our charge. 
When boundaries have once been clearly defined and 
permanently marked, and when agricultural rights 
have been fairly ascertained and registered, the col¬ 
lector and magistrate should exercise his revenue 
powers as seldom as possible, and should endeavour 
never to appear unless in his judicial capacity. To 
prevent neighbour interfering with neighbour; to 
positively resist all undue interference on the part of 
Government agency, whether high or low; to leave 
the people alone and let them grow: in this lies the 
essence of a really good collector. He should never 
for an instant allow the appearance of his next re¬ 
venue report to weigh against any measure which he 
knows to be right, and for the permanent good of his 
districts. For myself, I have long perceived, that 
despite the best intentions on the part of our home 
and Indian governors, we have sadly overtaxed the 
people. They have no surplus ; no room for growth ; 
no spare cash wherewith to indulge any wish, even 
for the cheapest luxury. And, fully aware of all 
that has been said in favour of exactly adjusting the 
Government demand to the quality of the soil and its 
facilities of waterage, I am persuaded that, with our 
defective information of the real resources of the 
country, and perhaps under any circumstances, we 
should better and more permanently have developed 
our agricultural wealth, should have more surely 
secured the comfort and the increasing productive 
powers of the agricultural classes, and should at this 


59 


day have been richer as a Government, and with more 
certain prospect of future increase, both for the 
people and Government, had we in the first instance 
limited our demand to that which the poorer soils 
can bear, and had we considered the waterage not as 
a separate tax, but as included in the one sole demand 
per acre upon the land. 

Above all, avoid over-governing and unnecessarily 
interfering. Depend on it, the people understand 
their own interests better than you do. See that all 
men know, and feel secure in, their rights. Remove 
all obstructions to free intercommunication ; and then 
stand by to keep the peace. 

Titles to Land, and Leases. 

I learn that in some parts of the-collectorate 

considerable extents of arable land have been thrown 
out of cultivation, owing to what seems to me an 
unquestionable misapprehension of the instructions 
which have from time to time been issued relative to 
proprietary rights and claims upon the soil. 

It appears that when a cultivator rents land upon 
which a zemindar or other claimant may hold an 
admitted right to a portion of the surplus produce, 
whether under the name of “lappa” or what not, the 
practice is to demand from such cultivator the same 
rate of tax which Government may be levying from 
similar lands cultivated by a proprietor subjected to 
no claim intermediate between himself and the State ; 
and then to allow the zemindar, lappawalla, or other 
claimant, to levy what he may claim as his due from 
the cultivator also. In other words, the Government 



60 


having levied what is assumed to be the full tax 
which the cultivator can pay, and yet retain a fair 
profit upon his own labour and capital expended,— 
having, that is to say, taken as much of the surplus 
produce as can be equitably taken,—another and 
third party, under the name of lappawalla or zemin¬ 
dar, is allowed to make a further demand upon the 
remaining produce, which Government had left to 
the cultivator as necessary to a fair profit on his 
own labour and capital. Nor is this all; for when 
the cultivator, gradually impoverished by the levy of 
this double land-tax, is compelled to relinquish his 
fields, it is supposed that no other tender of tenancy 
can he accepted, unless upon condition of the appli¬ 
cant’s assenting to the double tax which had already 
ruined his predecessor. 

Manifestly, such a mode of procedure must in¬ 
evitably lay waste and ruin any country subjected to 
it; and, in the instances under notice, amply accounts 
for the wide tracts of good land, with facilities for 
waterage, which, during my tour through the dis¬ 
tricts, I observed to be lying waste. 

As manifestly it never would or could have been 
the intention of Government that any tax should be 
levied from the cultivator, whether on behalf of 
Government or by the zemindar, unless upon the 
surplus produce, I consider it is necessary to explain 
that no rules should be held as rules inculcating that 
Government and all other claimants on the soil are to 
be in the first instance satisfied to the full, and then 
the remainder, if any, of the produce, to be left with 
its immediate producer, the tenant or cultivator; but 


61 


that all rules should invariably be understood in 
the spirit in which they were written, viz. as pointing 
out to the revenue and settlement officers, that 
claims of the specified descriptions would he ad¬ 
vanced in different parts of the province, for greater 
or lesser portions of the surplus produce of the land, 
and that, where found, the settlement officer should 
carefully investigate them. 

And deeming it further essential to preclude the 
possibility of measures so widely disastrous in their 
effects as those now commented on being stereotyped 
under the regular settlement, I think it right to lay 
down the following propositions, which, taken in con¬ 
nection with former correspondence on the same 
subject, will, I trust, render it impossible for any 
revenue or settlement officer to feel himself at a loss 
to determine who may have claims upon any given 
area of land, what may be the nature of those claims, 
upon what terms they are to be admitted, and from 
what particular portion of the gross produce of the 
said land they are to be satisfied. 

I. All lands, of whatsoever description, must fall 
under one or other of the three following headings:— 
1. Lands lying waste, and unclaimed. 2. Lands 
lying waste, but claimed, wholly or in part. 3. Lands 
claimed, brought under the plough, and cropped, 
whether annually or after a shorter or longer suc¬ 
cession of fallows. 

1st Heading—Waste Lands , Unclaimed . 

II. Wherever any revenue or settlement officer 


62 


may find land coming under the first heading (waste 
and unclaimed), he is at perfect liberty to grant all 
or any portion of the said land in lease for a short or 
long term of years, upon such terms as he may con¬ 
sider expedient and equitable ; and subject, of course, 
to the confirmation of competent authority. 

III. Leases so made shall be drawn up, duly 
signed, and witnessed; and shall be administered in 
exact conformity with the terms specified in the deed 
itself. 

a 

IY. In leases so made of waste lands unclaimed, 
the sole parties having any claim whatsoever upon 
the land leased are the Government and the lessee. 
And every man in the country is perfectly free to 
contract for such lease, without let or hindrance on 
the part of any jagheerdar, zemindar, or other party, 
provided he (the lessee) be willing to accept the 
terms, and give the security required by the leasing 
officer, in the deed of lease. 

Y. It is not necessary that the lessee should be 
one, and one only. On the contrary, if two or more 
persons tender to accept a lease, they shall severally, 
and with joint responsibility, sign the deed, as set 
forth in Rule III., and shall jointly and severally be 
held responsible for the fulfilment of the terms of 
the lease. 

YI. Should the lessee so contracting make pri¬ 
vate arrangements with third parties, whether in 
view to sub-letting, or other contract or advantage, 
he is at liberty so to do. But in the event of any 
dispute arising consequent upon the sub-tenancies, or 


63 


other private arrangements, such dispute shall be 
tried in the ordinary manner of a civil suit in the 
civil courts. 

VII. And no sub-tenant, private contractor with 
the lessee, or other third party, shall be admitted by 
the revenue officer as having any claim whatsoever 
upon the land leased, which land, upon the expiry of 
the lease, shall revert free and unencumbered to the 
Government, unless the same or some other lessee shall 
accept the said land in further lease, upon terms to 
be re-adjusted and registered in the form laid down 
in Rule III. 

VIII. Upon the lease being re-adjusted, preference 
should be given to the former lessee over any in¬ 
different party. 

2nd Heading — Lands lying Waste , but Claimed, 

wholly or in part . 

IX. Wherever the revenue or settlement officer 
may find lands lying waste, but nevertheless wholly 
or in part claimed, he should, after thoroughly satisfy¬ 
ing himself of the validity of such claim, interrogate 
the claimant as to whether he were able and willing 
either to cultivate all or any portion of the land him¬ 
self, or to produce other parties to do so under his 
superintendence, or under his guarantee of the Go¬ 
vernment tax. Evidence should also be taken from 
trustworthy persons as to the period during which 
the land in question may have remained waste. And 
if it should appear that the land had lain waste for 
a continuous period of six years, and that the claimant 
was still unable or unwilling to take the responsibility 


64 


of paying the Government tax upon all or any portion 
of it, this whole or portion should be declared to be 
unclaimed waste land, and should be treated in exact 
conformity with the rules already enumerated in re¬ 
gard of lands lying waste and unclaimed (viz. Rules 
II. to VII., inclusive). For no deviation should be 
allowed from the rule that every claim upon the 
surplus produce of land—every claim, that is, to 
participate in rent, whether under the appellation of 
zemindaree, lappa, or other name—does by its origin 
and nature imply and involve the Government’s re¬ 
ceiving its fair amount of revenue also; and that, 
therefore, unless the claimant can ensure the latter, 
he cannot equitably advance the former. 

X. But should it, on the other hand, be ascertained 
that the land claimed, although at present lying 
waste, had been cultivated within the period of 
limitation, viz. six years, and that there existed a 
reasonable probability of its being again brought 
under the plough within a moderate term, say of 
one or two years, it will in such case remain in the 
discretion of the settling officer to allow the claimant 
one or two years’ law, or, in the event of another 
party offering to take the land in lease, to grant 
such lease, for a long or short term, and to decide 
that, during the term of the said lease, the claim 
should remain dormant, but be capable of revival at 
the expiry of the lease, in the event of the claimant 
being then in a position to fulfil, and willing to 
satisfy, the conditions inherent in the origin of the 
claim. 

XT. Waste land claimed, and thus to be brought 


65 


again under cultivation, will, of course, be dealt 
with as land claimed and already under the plough, 
as set forth under the next heading. 

3rd Heading—Lands Claimed , and under Crop or 

lying Fallow . 

XII. Under this heading, it is manifest that all 
claims must be either upon the means requisite to 
production, or upon the profits of production. 

Clause 1. By the means requisite to production is 
understood the outlay of capital and labour, and the 
fair equivalent for risk in, and interest upon, this 
outlay, without which the producer cannot subsist 
and continue to produce. 

Clause 2. By the profits upon production is under¬ 
stood the surplus yield of produce over and above the 
outlay requisite to production, as set forth in the 
receding clause. 

XIII. And it is to be clearly understood and acted 
upon, that on no occasion, and under no circumstances 
whatsoever, should claims upon the said surplus yield 
be allowed to fall upon the means necessary to enable 
the producer to continue production. In other words, 
whenever there may exist one or more parties other than 
the Government, having valid claims upon the surplus 
produce, the claims of Government and of the other 
claimants must be so settled as that the total of them 
shall not exceed the total of the said surplus yield. 
For example, suppose an estate to yield a gross 
produce whose money equivalent should be equal to 
Bs. 300 annually; and that of these Bs. 300 some 
Bs. 166§ were expended in the tillage, waterage, 

F 



66 


and other outlays requisite to secure the said gross 
produce, while Es. 33J were required as an equiva¬ 
lent for risks and interest on outlay. 

Clause 2. Further, suppose this estate to be held 
successively under the following tenures:—1. By the 
proprietor, holding direct from Government, and 
cultivating the estate himself. 2. By a zemindar, 
holding a claim of greater or lesser value upon the 
surplus produce, and cultivating the estate by hired 
labour. 

Clause 3. In either case, it is evident that, if any 
portion greater than Es. 100 be taken in the shape of 
rent or surplus produce, whether by one or more 
claimants, such excess must be taken from the re¬ 
maining sum, Es. 166§ 4- 33J = Es. 200, which are 
required in order to render continued full production 
possible, and must therefore inevitably result in the 
state of matters described as being now visible in 
parts of the-collectorate. 

Clause 4. It follows, then, that this state of affairs, 
can he avoided only by Government and all other 
parties limiting the aggregate of their claims upon 
the estate to an annual demand not greater than that 
of Es. 100. 

Clause 5. If, then, as supposed in the first instance, 
Government should make its demand direct upon the 
cultivating proprietor, it should consider that beyond 
the Es. 166§ requisite for tillage, waterage, &c., the 
proprietor should also be allowed a certain margin on 
account of risks and interest, &c. This margin has 
been now supposed equal to Es. 33J. There would 
then remain a balance of Es. 100 leviable as rent, 



67 


and which balance would, accordingly, form the limit 
of the possible Government demand, although it 
would not follow that Government should in every 
case demand this full amount. 

Clause 6. Again, suppose, as stated in the second 
instance, that a zemindar or other claimant upon the 
said estate should intervene between the actual cul¬ 
tivator and the Government: in such case, Govern¬ 
ment should not, as appears to have been the practice 
in some instances, levy the full rent of Rs. 100 direct 
from the cultivator, and then leave the zemindar to 
levy his perhaps indefinite demand from the cultivator 
also. But Government should, on the contrary, first 
admit that, be the claims on the surplus produce 
what they may, Bs. 200 must remain with the pro¬ 
ducer, or otherwise production would eventually cease; 
and that therefore, be the claims on the surplus pro¬ 
duce what they may, they must not in the aggregate 
exceed Bs. 100. So much admitted, it would next 
remain to be ascertained who the claimants may be, 
what the validity of their claims, and what their 
extent. Suppose, then, it to be ascertained that the 
zemindar took all risks, and provided all capital, &c., 
requisite to production: Government would in such 
case consider him entitled to the margin set apart as 
before shown, as an equivalent to those risks, &c., 
viz. Bs. 33 J, and would consider the limit of the extreme 
Government demand to be Bs. 100, leaving the re¬ 
maining Bs. 200 in the hands of the zemindar, to do 
with as he might please. 

Clause 7. But suppose the proved claim of the 
claimant to be merely that of a small and specified 

f 2 


68 


lappa: it would then be open to Government to select 
either of two courses, viz., to constitute the claimant, 
if he be so willing and able, the responsible tax-payer 
of Government, defining, at the same time, the rights 
of his sub-tenant, or cultivator, and so to levy upon 
the claimant the Government’s fair tax ; or, in the 
second place, to settle directly with the sub-tenant or 
cultivator in the manner laid down in regard of the 
cultivating proprietor, viz., to allow the party settled 
with Rs. 166§, on account of outlay requisite for 
tillage, waterage, &c., Rs. 33ij on account of interest 
and risks, and to consider the Government demand 
limited to the remaining Rs. 100. But, in this 
second case, the lappawalla would have no claim 
whatsoever against the sub-tenant’s or cultivator’s 
Rs. 250. On the contrary, whatever he might 
receive, he would receive out of this Rs. 100 surplus. 

Clause 8. But although, in each and all of these 
examples, Rs. 100 forms the limit which the Govern¬ 
ment could demand, and yet admit of production con¬ 
tinuing, and the producer’s subsisting and fairly meet¬ 
ing his risks and outlay, yet it does not follow that 
Government should in all cases demand the Rs. 100 
in full. On the contrary, in the case of the lappa 
claimant, referred to in the preceding paragraph, a 
specified portion of the Rs. 100 would be set aside for 
him. In like manner, but in greater proportion, 
would a zemindar proving a claim to the entire rent, 
minus the Government tax thereon, participate in the 
Rs. 100. 

XIV. The settlement officers should bear in mind 
that, having determined what the Government demand 


69 


upon any given area shall be, and having further 
particularised upon whom the demands shall be made, 
they have reached the limit to which the interference 
of Government can legitimately extend in regard of 
Government’s relation to the soil. And any further 
inquiries and decisions which the settlement officer 
may record are purely of a judicial character, having 
for their object,—1. To determine clearly, and for a 
permanence, what the exact position of the tax-payer 
may be, to the end that, when he has entered into his 
contract of lease with Government, he may not be 
subjected to the fraudulent claims of other parties.— 
2. To decide and record, once for all, all rights and 
claims in this soil which might otherwise come before 
the ordinary civil courts, held at times and in places 
where it would be impracticable for the judge to 
collate evidence of the fulness and reliability which is 
usually open to the settlement officer. 

XV. The determination of these claims (other 
than those of the Government) and relations being 
of this purely judicial nature, the settlement officer 
should be most careful to avoid checking the indivi¬ 
dual freedom and energies of the villagers, by binding 
up the entire community, as it were into one body 
corporate. To do this would be to return in spirit to 
rules of caste, and to nip the energies of the people in 
the bud. Nothing of this character, therefore, should 
be attempted. On the contrary, while recording 
what may be the proved rights and claims upon a 
given area of land, the settlement officer should never 
omit to make all the villagers understand that every 
man, be he whom he may, is at perfect liberty to 


70 


employ his labour and capital in such place and in 
such manner as he may consider most advantageous 
to his own interests. And that it is, therefore, quite 
open to him and his neighbours to take up new lands, 
or lands lying waste, in lease, upon his own account, 
if he consider such course preferable to remaining on 
land whereon other parties may hold claims proved 
and admitted before the settlement officer. 

XVI. If the settlement and revenue officers will 
constantly and effectually impress the foregoing free¬ 
dom of action upon the villagers, and decide upon and 
register the proved claims, we may then become 
perfectly assured that, in regard of determining all 
rights in the soil, and in removing at the same time 
all obstacles to the free development of agricultural 
industry, we shall have accomplished all that is prac¬ 
ticable with advantage. And if, after such warning 
and adjudication, it should be found that the villagers 
still remain in the hands of the bunya, or remain as 
sub-tenants or mere labourers, while it is wholly at 
their option to take up fresh lands upon their own 
account and on equitable terms, we may also become 
assured that the party voluntarily remaining thus 
trammelled and subordinate does so on account of 
circumstances subsisting between the bunya or the 
zemindar and himself, which induce him to consider 
that, on the whole, it is preferable to remain in his 
present position rather than try his venture elsewhere. 
To obviate or ameliorate circumstances of the descrip¬ 
tion here alluded to is beyond the power, as it is 
beyond the province, of Government. They can 
diminish and cease only with the growing intclli- 


71 

gence, honesty, and industry of those who suffer from 
them. 

In the foregoing rules, no mention is made of 
“ jagheer,” 44 hissadaree,” or other rights to the Govern¬ 
ment share. These rights are alienations, in part or 
altogether, of the Government share. 

Artificial Encouragement to Agriculture. 

It is the practice in some districts to endeavour to 
stimulate the exertions of peasantry towards the culti¬ 
vation of some peculiar produce—such, for instance, 
as linseed or indigo—by proclaiming rewards or 
honorary distinction to the individual who may suc¬ 
cessfully extend the cultivation of the specified 
produce. But it seems to me, that the effect of this 
artificial encouragement on the part of Government is 
to defeat the object in view. In brief, it unhealthily 
interferes with the natural market of the articles 
thus forced into existence; and, by disturbing the 
free adjustment of demand and supply, tends in the 
long-run to diminish the latter. The fair profits of 
farming, in an open market, are the best and sole 
legitimate stimulants of an extended cultivation. 

Management of Pastoral Hill Tracts. 

I instructed the collector that I did not anticipate 
we should be enabled to turn this region to any pro¬ 
fitable account by collecting a revenue from the pre¬ 
sent scanty agricultural produce of its rain lands, and 
that I should not deem it advisable to levy such tax, 
even although cultivation should be extended; but 
that the hill tracts were chiefly valuable as grazing- 


# 




72 


lands, and that we might do something towards amelio¬ 
rating the condition of the hillmen, by assisting them 
to construct a few wells or bunds for supplying their 
cattle and themselves with water; by endeavouring to 
introduce into their villages or grazing districts some 
form of patelship; by ascertaining, registering, and 
perhaps levying some slight capitation tax upon the 
cattle; and by opening up roads through the more 
frequented villages, to enable the hillmen to bring the 
produce of their flocks and herds readily to market. 

With the object of more accurately ascertaining the 
social statistics of this region, I supplied the collector 
with a form of statement, showing the name of every 
village, tract or valley; the names of the chief men, 
and approximate estimate of the numbers of inhabit¬ 
ants ; the size and description of boundaries ; the 
number of flocks and herds ; and the number of wells. 
But, above all, I impressed on him the necessity of 
bearing in mind throughout these proceedings with 
the people of the hill tracts, that they are essentially 
a pastoral, and, therefore, in some degree a nomadic 
race, and that no attempt should be made towards 
compelling them to have recourse to agriculture; on 
the contrary, that they should he left wholly free to 
choose their own mode of life, as circumstances might 
permit. 

The staple wealth of these districts naturally con¬ 
sists in flocks and herds. These, together with ghee, 
wool, and other pastoral produce, they can exchange 
for the more varied commodities of the plains, thereby 
commanding the supplies of distant markets at a less 
cost than they could be produced for at home; and I 


* 


think that our object should be to promote these inter¬ 
changes, by means of improved communications, and 
thus gradually to create, among these half-civilized 
races, new wants, increased productiveness, and a 
higher social condition. By thus encouraging its 
natural development, we should tend to supply wants 
now much felt in the plains. And as the hill region lies 
along our western frontier, we should, by civilizing and 
attaching to us its wild people, tend to cause a 
corresponding extension of wholesome English in¬ 
fluence among exterior tribes, and so, permanently 
and by the most unexceptional means, to strengthen 
our front, whether for peaceful or warlike operations. 

Tax not the Desert. 

The Thurr or Desert District yields a coarse but 
very nutritious grass. I would not, however, recom¬ 
mend that any grazing-fee should be levied upon this: 
for it appears to me that, in a tract like the Thurr, 
our main object should be to induce the tribes to 
refrain from plunder, and settle down peaceably to 
the agriculture of the neighbouring lowlands ; and 
that, in order to secure this result, we should render 
their circumstances easy, by leaving untaxed their 
pastoral wealth. 

Bestoration and Duties of Village Accountants. 

Government have resolved upon restoring the 
ancient office of putwaree or village accountant, which 
fell into desuetude when the village communities were 
broken up. This agency is intended to record and 
and preserve the rights of the cultivator, and to 


74 


supply full and accurate agricultural statistics. These 
registers will be maintained in a form so clear, simple, 
and public, as to preclude the possibility of the abuse 
of power on the part of Government servants. These 
accountants will be paid by Government; but their 
being thus rendered Government servants does not 
preclude their keeping the accounts, or providing for 
the interests, of the cultivator. On the contrary, 
these agents are intended to form the connecting link 
between Government and the land-tax payers, in their 
mutual relations. It will be their duty equally to 
protect the Government revenue from fraud on the 
part of the cultivator, and the cultivator from undue 
interference on the part of the Government officials. 
The putwaree’s records will eventually be kept in the 
provincial vernacular ; but in the first instance general 
intelligence and good character should determine the 
selection. And no candidate should be rejected 
simply because he does not understand a particular 
written character. A Hindoo villager may be as apt 
material for an accountant as a Persian writer, 
although he may he conversant only with the 4 khoda- 
wadee’ mode of writing. 

O 

Salaries to Village Accountants. 

The question is in fact reduced to this :—Shall the 
putwaree (village accountant) be paid by Government 
in cash, or be remunerated in kind or what not by the 
cultivators ? Viewed from a financial point merely, 
it is manifestly immaterial which alternative be 
adopted. For if the cultivator should pay this tax, 
allowance would he made accordingly in the revenue 


75 


settlement; otherwise the labour of the cultivation 
would he indirectly forced to the amount of the tax. 
If, on the contrary, Government should pay the 
putwaree, the revenue demand upon the cultivator 
would be proportionately increased. In other words, 
the interest of Government and the cultivator being 
identical, and there being a given amount of wealth 
to be partitioned in equitable and recognised propor¬ 
tions between these two parties, it is evidently in¬ 
different whether these portions be allotted under the 
name of revenue, or pay to putwarees. 

The question of who should be the direct remune- 
rator of the putwaree must, then, depend upon con¬ 
siderations other than those of finance. And it 
appears to me, that, when introducing a settlement 
whose chief intent and use is to define, register, and 
secure the rights and obligations of both Government 
and cultivator in their relations to the soil, it would 
be neither consistent nor wise to leave the wages of 
the connecting link—the putwaree-—between the two 
parties unfixed, undefined, and liable to the caprice 
and convenience of the less wealthy and less intelligent 
party. For these, and other reasons, I beg you will 
act upon the principle that all putwarees are to be 
paid in cash, by Government. The exact amount of 
remuneration in every individual case, being dependent 
upon the yield and difficulties of the particular charge, 
may he left to the discretion of the settling officer.— 
[April, 1856). 





76 


Protection of Bunds by Contracts. 

I am of opinion that these disbursements are the 
most unsatisfactory that are made. They are wholly 
unchecked, and are made at a season when frauds can 
be, and doubtless are frequently committed. 

It becomes necessary, therefore, to remedy the pre¬ 
sent unsatisfactory state of this public expenditure, 
and to endeavour so to provide, as that, while the 
bunds shall be efficiently watched and guarded, no 
charges shall be made on such account other than may 
be fairly and necessarily incurred. 

It may not, perhaps, be practicable to make these 
provisions with any great degree of accuracy: still 
something may be done ; and I quite concur in a 
recent suggestion that the zemindars, really interested 
in the security of these bunds, should be invited to 
enter into contracts for their maintenance. Accord¬ 
ingly I request that, upon all future occasions of 
providing for abkalanee expenses, you will be guided 
by the rules now transmitted. 

It is possible that, for a year or two, the tenders 
for these contracts may be unreasonably high ; and in 
the first instance, therefore, no contract should be 
entered into for a longer period than one season. 
But sooner or later the market will certainly find its 
own level, and it will then remain in the discretion of 
the local officers to grant contracts for one or more 
years, as they may deem expedient. 

Whether the work be given to contract or be 
estimated for (vide Buie VI.), each and every work, 
given in contract or estimated, should be reported, so 


77 


that the Government may he informed beforehand of 
the amounts to be expended, during each successive 
year, in watching and protecting the bunds in this 
province. 

Rules relative to the Preservation of Bunds . 

I. The watching and protection of bunds will, for 
the future, be performed by contract. 

II. With this view, the collector or his deputy will 
annually invite tenders for the watching and protection 
of all bunds situate within their districts. 

III. All parties making tender shall provide full 
and good security. The security should be some 
substantial native banker, who should agree to make 
good whatever cost may be necessary, in the opinion 
of the officer making the contract, to complete any 
portion of the work contracted for, which the con¬ 
tractor may have failed properly to execute. 

IY. The parties directly interested in the preserva¬ 
tion of the bunds must be those who will be able to 
undertake the contracts for keeping them in repair at 
the smallest cost to the State, and greatest profit to 
themselves ; and the officers concerned in these trans¬ 
actions should endeavour, as much as possible, to 
induce a right understanding of this business among 
the zemindars whose lands the bunds affect. 

Y. The work the contractor will be expected to 
perform is, before the water reaches the bunds, to 
fill up all cattle-tracks, to fill up any sinking, all 
cracks or ruts, and all rat-holes ; to repair, and, 
where necessary, to renew the “juk.” When the 
water comes on the bund, the contractor must keep 
up the number of watchers ordered. He must at 


78 


once stop all leaks and breaches, and repair all 
damages done by rain. 

VI. Failing any tender, the probable expenses of 
watching and protecting bund or bunds should be 
approximately estimated, upon a calculation of the 
average expenses of former years, allowances being of 
course made for any accidental circumstances that 

J 

may affect the particular season under estimate. 

Tank Digging. 

The object contemplated in digging the-tank 

was to try whether a considerable body of fresh 
water could not be made to penetrate into the ground 
during the inundation of the Indus, and whether 
thereby it might not be possible to render the sub-soil 
sweet, and to make the wells in the neighbourhood of 
the tank supply a sufficiency of fresh water all the 
year round. It was also expected that eventually the 
tank itself might be made to contain water throughout 
the year. 

The experiment, as far as it has gone, has been 
perfectly successful, and the tank has proved a very 
great blessing to the people. One of the wells in its 
neighbourhood, into which the river-water was not 
turned, purposely to try the percolation of the tank, 
has been rendered perfectly sweet, whereas before it 
was brackish. The tank itself contained water two 
months after the subsidence of the inundation; and 
if dug deeper would never be dry. * * * Qf course 
no masonry is used for lining the tank.—(1852). 



79 


Effect of Kemoving Dams. 

I find that all the offshoots from the main feeder 
have had their mouths constructed with dams pro¬ 
jecting far into the channel of the main feeder. This 
practice is most injurious under any circumstances, 
is liable to the greatest abuse, and has been the cause 
of much unfairness in the supply of water to the 
landholders, without corresponding benefit to any party. 

While these dams greatly impeded the onward flow 
of the water in the main channel, they really added 
very little, if anything, to the quantity flowing into 
the smaller canals, which (the main channel being 
sufficiently full) must be regulated by the quantity 
drawn off from them for irrigation. * * * I there¬ 
fore determined to remove every particle of dam. 
Upon this, many of the landholders refused to clear 
their canals, and gave out that the removal of these 
dams would prevent them getting a drop of water, 
and that every rupee expended on their water-cuts 
would be wasted. Such, however, proved to be the 
increased supply, owing to the free clearing and 
opening of the main channel, that the water, even in 
these uncleared canals leading from it, stood two feet 
higher than usual, and, in many instances had to be 
banked out of the fields. * * # 

Many of the landholders have now admitted the 
unreasonableness of their opposition ; and the com¬ 
plete exposure of the fallacy of their strong prejudices 
in this matter will, I doubt not, be of great benefit 
generally among the country-folk.—(1853). 



80 


Increased Cultivation followed by more 
Abundant Lain in the Desert. 

My remarks regarding the boundary line on this 
frontier, and the advantage of having the political to 
coincide with the geographical boundary of the desert, 
were founded on the supposed permanency of the 
latter. No change appeared to have occurred between 
the time of my first visiting the desert and that of 
recording my opinion—an interval of twelve years. 
According to the traditions of the natives, no im¬ 
portant change had occurred for nearly a century, and 
its limit appeared to me to he as permanent as that 
of the sea shore. It now, however, seems that the 
desert is partially disappearing, and that its line is no 
certain boundary. I attribute this disappearance in 
part to the greatly increased cultivation along the 
border, which tends to augment the fall of rain. It 
is true the natives attribute this fall to the blessing of 
God, which may be true enough; but the secondary 
cause is cultivation. And I anticipate that if peace 
and quiet continue, and a few more such seasons as 
the last occur, the great part of that which was 
formerly a desert will become arable or pasture land. 
—(1851). 

Moral influence Exerted as an Element in 

SECURING LARGE NUMBERS OF LABOURERS AMONG 

Rude Tribes. 

In judging the rates of labour at which I believe 
it practicable to excavate a large canal leading from 
the Indus through the heart of the desert to the hills 




81 


of Beloochistan, I rested my calculations on principles 
which refer to wild tribes, human passions, and a 
patriarchal rule. Not indeed that I disregarded the 
rules of ordinary civil engineering. But possessing 
an intimate knowledge of the country, of the people, 
of their statistics and habits, and taking 1 into mv 
account moral forces and influence, which I knew 
could be exerted by myself and my lieutenants in aid 
of the work, I arrived at the conclusion that the 
project of the great desert canal could be successfully 
carried out at the cost mentioned by me,—a cost for 
which, I am equally certain, it could not be carried 
out by the Public Works department, proceeding on 
principles having reference to a more regular, a more 
civilized, and a more highly-organised state of society. 

The forces here employed are not apparently such 
as are commonly calculated on : yet I have used them 
largely: have found them of mighty power, and to 
lead to excellent results. I thus reckoned on them 
according to my own experience and knowledge. 

I would allude to one instance, that of the canal 
leading through the desert to Khyree Ghuree. This 
canal has been extended some thirty miles, with an 
average sectional area of about two hundred square 
feet. It has been executed at the rate of one 
thousand cubic feet per rupee, and the largest boats 
can move along it through the middle of the desert. 
The mode of procedure was as follows :—Those 
tribesmen wishing to become holders of the lands to 
be watered by the canal were assembled, the scheme 
freely discussed for some days ; and, upon their 
becoming convinced of its utility, every man under- 

G 




82 


took to perform a part of the excavation proportioned 
to the area of his lands, receiving a similar proportion 
of the total sum allowed by Government for the 
work. 

A contract to such effect was then regularly drawn 
up, and signed by every individual, the work was 
justly apportioned, and the result is, that the canal is 
completed in good style, without any professional aid, 
and to the entire satisfaction of every man concerned 
in it. The people are as proud of their work, and 
boast of it as loudly, as they would, in former times, 
have boasted of a successful foray. The return to 
Government upon its original outlay is fifty, and will 
soon be seventy-five, per cent. 

The truth is, that having during a long series of 
years dwelt among, and, by acting justly, obtained 
the confidence of the tribes, we found it possible to 
collect a large number of men from the neighbouring 
territory, who were ready to work at very moderate 
rates upon a popular public work. But these men 
would not have worked under, or even appeared before 
strangers; and I am well assured that had the work 
been undertaken by professional officers, not only 
would the preliminary requirements have delayed, and 
the professional rates have enhanced the cost of its 
execution, but labourers would not have been forth¬ 
coming to execute it. 

The principles I had found successful in the case of 
the Khyree Ghuree canal, I had proposed to adopt in 
the case of the great desert canal. And I would not 
advise that, in such a country, and among such a 
people, any proceedings in this matter should be com- 


83 


mcnced, unless upon the principles I have tried, and 
proved to be sound.—(1856). 

Military Commissions as Courts of Civil 

Judicature. 

These trials were always rehearsed before the 
“ civil judge-advocate,” and then the farce was duly 
played off, all being well drilled in their parts before 
three officers, forming what was called a military 
commission. The members of these commissions 
were sworn to try the titles to lands, cases of bribery, 
&c., by civil officers, and all manner of such like 
things relating to revenue matters, &c., “according to 
% the custom of war in like cases.” 

The trials were a mere pretence, a veil to delude 
the public, the only real authority being the pleasure 
of the Governor. 

But even up to the present moment the want of 
proper courts of justice is one of the greatest wants. 
Though it may be true that the system in India, with 
its eternal appeals and reversals, &c., is so bad that it 
is better to have none, still it is a serious want. 
There is now no court in which an action can be 
brought against the collector or against Government; 
while—and this is the greatest evil of all in practice— 
the revenue officers, having the whole judicial duties 
of the province to perform, have little time left to 
attend to their proper fiscal duties.—(1854). 

Police Confessions. 

I would point out to you that a police officer is 
quite forgetful of his duty who, on any occasion, even 
asks, however gently, a prisoner to confess: violence 





84 


of any kind on the part of a police officer, in such 
cases is a deeply criminal offence, for which several 
years’ imprisonment with hard labour would be a just 
reward. 

Police officers should not only never resort to 

•> 

violence or threats to obtain confessions, but should 
invariably abstain even from persuasion in such cases. 
Police officers or men should not even be permitted to 
receive confessions , and should be rebuked when they 
presume to do so. 

It is the function of a magistrate alone to receive the 
confessions of criminals, and this cannot be too often 
or too carefully impressed on the minds of Eastern 
policemen. The neglect of this well-known rule has 
been, in many instances, throughout India, the cause 
of extensive and deplorable evils. 

These principles have been investigated by some 
of the ablest men of the day. They are in accordance 
with sound sense and reason; and they continually 
receive the stamp of the highest legal authorities, in 
being taught and enforced by the judges in our courts 
of law.—(1856). 

On the Supply of Carriage in a Free Market. 

I have to remark, that there are no orders or 
regulations whatever in force in regard to the supply 
of carriage for public or private purposes in the 
bazar of Jacobabad. In this, as in all other respects, 
everything has been left to find its own level. 

To meet existing demands, however, divers persons 
have established themselves at Jacobabad, who profess 
to supply, and who do actually supply tattoos, camels, 


85 


&c., as required, for hire ; but these people are acting 
entirely as private traders, and are not interfered with 
by authority in any way. In this, as in all other 
respects, our market is perfectly free. Every effort 
has been made to remove obstacles to free trade; but 
in all other respects, even on emergencies, interference 
with the natural adjustment of demand and supply 
has been studiously avoided. 

It is absolutely certain that the cheapest market is 
the freest market; and it is only the effects of inter¬ 
ference which cause even superficial observers ever to 
think otherwise. 

When slaves are first emancipated—unfitted for 
freedom, they commit outrages and excesses: but 
these evils are the effects, and the very worst effects, 
of slavery, which debases body and soul, destroys 
self-respect, and unfits men to take their places as 
social beings; not of freedom which tends to bring 
out every good quality, and to make men see that 
their well-being is involved in that of all around them. 
The same laws hold good in trade on the largest 
or on a small scale—the law is universal. 

Interference with a man’s right to sell, how and 
where, and at what price he chooses, keeps sellers 
from the market, limits supplies, and raises prices. 

Compelling men to sell at certain rates, or in any 
manner contrary to their own will, is a species of 
robbery; it can only he perpetuated by violence on 
one hand, and by the payment of exorbitant prices by 
the consumer to meet the cost of the machinery by 
which this force is applied, as well as the price of the 
supply, on the other. 



86 


The extra price paid by the consumer for the 
article he requires in such cases not only has no ten¬ 
dency to improve the rate of supply, but is actually 
expended in hiring men to drive traders away from 
the market. Like all principles which oppose nature’s 
laws, the evils caused thereby must increase until they 
become perceptible to the dullest understandings, or 
until a dead lock occurs. 

On the other hand, where perfect freedom is care¬ 
fully maintained, the most exorbitant prices are 
those which soonest adjust themselves. Where real 
freedom exists, no combination can possibly long 
maintain prices above their natural rates, while com¬ 
petition must bring them down to the lowest healthy 
prices. 

It is evident, where a vicious system of interference 
has long prevailed, especially among Orientals (who 
are naturally dependent, and who fear to stand alone, 
trusting to truth, industry, honesty, only for success), 
that when all restraint may be withdrawn, some time 
may be required to enable natural causes to act, and 
to restore the equilibrium which has been disturbed 
by our faulty proceedings. 

During this interval^ the market may not be sup¬ 
plied at all, or may be very badly supplied ; but to 
restore health we must pay nature’s penalty for vice, 
whether moral or corporeal. 

We must be content to pay; we must open new 
channels of intercourse; we must seek supplies 
further off: all this honestly persevered in for a very 
moderate period brings everything into a sound, 
healthy, vigorous state ! obstacles having been re- 


87 


moved, everything flows towards the spot where it is 
wanted, and all parties are more than satisfied. 

These laws are as well known and recognised 
generally as the theorems of Euclid ; but there always 
seems to be a difficulty in applying them to particular 
occasions. Men seem to want firmness and faith to 
follow out, even in such matters, principles which 
their reason tells them are true. But a verv little 

J 

perseverance would resolve all doubts. 

In these cases, the inconvenience at first expe¬ 
rienced often falls very severely on individuals; and, 
indeed, let these proceed as they will, the evil never 
can be remedied until Government and its officers, in 
their public capacity, act in conformity with the 
natural law. 

For instance, any violent or sudden change in a 
market must take time to adjust itself properly. 

The move of even one regiment, under present 
arrangements, constitutes such a change. 

A demand suddenly arises ; the supply is not forth¬ 
coming : the only remedy applied by Government, or 
its official, is force; every man’s property is seized, 
and an enormous evil perpetrated, which, as all such 
evils must do, ultimately causes to the public reve¬ 
nue a loss, through indirect channels, enormously 
greater than any requisite direct payment could 
amount to. 

Let the only wise principle be established, and 
always be enforced, that the State, requiring any¬ 
thing, is hound to purchase it, like other people, 
fairly in open market, and all difficulty disappears. 

One sudden payment of an immense sum, to enable 


88 


a regiment to move, would at once open the eyes of 
our rulers to the necessity of putting matters on a 
more healthy footing. Yet it is certain that the 
injury to the revenue of the State, through the effects 
on trade and agriculture, is almost infinitely greater 
than the loss which would be caused by such pay¬ 
ment. 

The remedy manifestly is to cause our troops to be 
maintained in a moveable state; officers and men 
being at all times provided with proper carriage. 
There is no difficulty in this ; I have practised it with 
a large body of troops, for fourteen years past, with 
perfect success. 

The effect of such a healthy system is that the 
presence of such troops, whether stationary or moving, 
is felt to be the greatest blessing by all the country¬ 
folk. 

The people find a ready market for labour and 
supplies, and the troops find, and are made to feel 
practically, that the good-will of the people is of vast 
importance to their comfort and convenience. 

A large proportion of all such expenditure as that 
on the permanent carriage of troops, also speedily 
finds its way by a thousand indirect channels to the 
Government treasury. 

By expenditure on the permanent carriage of sol¬ 
diers I mean, of course, bond fide expenditure: the 
sums laid out on gomashtas, contractors, and all 
manner of commissariat underlings, come under very 
different conditions. 

To have things in a healthy state, the soldier must 
be his own commissary. 


89 


In regard to the different working of the systems 
under discussion, it may not be amiss to note one 
glaring fact. 

In December, 1845, when troops were suddenly 
ordered from Sind to take part in the Punjaub war, I 
was in the act of mounting my horse one morning for 
parade at Hyderabad, when the Assistant Quarter¬ 
master-General came to me from the General, and 
asked when I should be able to march with my regi¬ 
ment on service to Bhawulpoor. 

I replied that I was ready to march that moment. 
This was scarcely understood, until I explained that 
such actually was my meaning; but march I did that 
same day, with the whole corps complete and in 
perfect order, without any external aid whatever. 

At the same time, the necessity of the speedy 
march of the regular troops from Hyderabad was 
strenuously urged on General Simpson by Sir C. 
Napier. To supply carriage there was the newly- 
formed Baggage Corps, and, besides this resource, the 
whole country was “ driven ” far and wide by collector 
and commissary. 

Yet, in spite of every effort, and of all this heavy 
machinery, not a single regiment, even of infantry, 
could be moved one march until fifteen days after the 
Sind Irregular Horse had departed ; by which time 
we were encamped at Koree, some 220 miles distant. 

Yet the cost paid for carriage by the State on this 
occasion would probably have paid that of the carriage 
of the Sind Irregular Plorse for ten years together ; 
and in the one case the money would have been 


90 


expended to the improvement of the revenue, while in 
the other the operation caused grievous injury to the 
country generally, and thus to the Government 
treasury.— {July, 1855*) 


PART II. 


ON MILITARY MATTERS. 









MILITARY MATTERS. 


On the arming of a free People ; and on the 
true Principles of the organisation of the 
Armies of England. 

The maintenance of a large standing army by a per¬ 
fectly free people is an unnecessary expenditure, and 
diminishes the total available amount of national 
labour, and, consequently, of national wealth. This 
expenditure is unnecessary, because every legitimate 
object for which a standing army is maintained would 
be more effectually attained by the abolition than by 
the support of such a force; and it diminishes the 
total of national labour and wealth, because it implies 
the setting apart of a portion of that labour exclu¬ 
sively for the unproductive business of war. 

The legitimate object for the maintenance of a 
standing army is the defence of the nation ; and this 
object could be most effectually attained, in the case 
of a people really free, by abolishing a separate army, 
and rendering the entire nation defensively warlike. 

This abolition of the separate army would imply its 
incorporation with the remainder of the people ; and 



94 


thus, while the abolition of a separate army would 
involve a direct saving to that remainder, it would 
also increase the total amount of available natural 
labour by the amount which the incorporation of the 
separate would add to the general national stock. 

To understand what is meant by rendering a nation 
defensively warlike, we need only look back through 
English history, to a period prior to that of the first 
introduction of a standing army, when the English 
people really w r ere thus warlike. In those times, 
every village had its archery-ground, every country 
church its place of arms, and every graveyard its 
yews. The entire youth and peasantry of the country 
were then trained, by habitual practice, to the skilful 
use of those weapons which, in the event of war, they 
would be called upon to use in battle. The effect of 
thus habituating the people to the use of warlike 
weapons, and of associating the use with their pas¬ 
times and sport, was the highest development of indi¬ 
vidual skill, combined with pride and pleasure and 
absolute faith in the use of the weapon,—qualities 
which have ever been found to be invaluable in actual 
war; and which, while they admitted of the soldiers 
readily understanding combined action, rendered them 
also independent and self-reliant. 

Accustom the peasantry of England to the use of 
those arms which the advanced state of mechanical 
science and art have enabled us to invent, as our 
ancestors were accustomed to the use of the bow, and 
the native qualities of the Englishman would soon 
again become as pre-eminently valuable as were those 
of the bowmen of Cressy, Poictiers, Agincourt, or 



95 


even of Ilomildon Hill and Flodden, and it would be 
impossible for any foreign power to insult them on 
their own ground. 

But the thus rendering of a free people warlike 
presupposes them to be represented by a really free 
Government. For there can be no question that, to 
a Government wilfully despotic, the existence of the 
power and spirit implied in a free people habituated 
to arms would be dangerous in the extreme; and this 
arrangement, therefore, although well suited for Eng¬ 
land, could not be adopted by our Continental neigh¬ 
bours with safety to existing despotisms. But assuming 
that an army is still to be maintained in England, 
and admitting that the maintenance of armies is 
absolutely essential to her colonial and Indian rule, it 
seems to me that there exist principles upon which all 
these armies should be organised, and upon organising 
them in accordance with which their efficient main¬ 
tenance must depend. 

Soldiers, like other servants of the State, observe 
the law of demand and supply ; and the supply of 
soldiers will always be regulated by the rates of wages 
held out to them, by the description and remoteness of 
the work to be performed, and by the description of 
the masters to be served for these rates. On this 
subject, then, we may learn from the manufacturer. 
If he desire to establish a factory, and to collect and 
organise the several grades and descriptions of skilled 
labour implied in this organisation, he proceeds to 
invite these grades and descriptions at what he be¬ 
lieves to be the several market values. If the trade 
be dangerous, the rates will rise proportionably. If 


96 


the manufacturer be of ill-repute as a master, the 
collection of servants will be proportionably difficult. 
If prospects of promotion and pension in case of in¬ 
jury be held out, labour will respond at once to these 
advantages. Eventually the factory is started, and is 
maintained simply upon the principle of paying every 
man, from the highest to the lowest, engaged therein, 
what his labour may be worth, and by causing the 
engaged to feel dismissal from employ as a more or 
less grievous punishment. 

What is to the interest of the manufacturer in the 
establishment of a factory, is to the interest of the 
State in the establishment of an army. Let the 
State, therefore, accord to its soldiers such pay and 
position as to draw into its ranks the flower of its 
yeomen and peasantry; train them in accordance 
with their noble nature, by appealing to the highest 
and best faculties of man ; and arm them with wea¬ 
pons suited to skilful workmen. Let there be regi¬ 
ments of counties ;—let, that is, each regiment have 
permanent head-quarters, where a considerable dis¬ 
trict around might be interested in the conduct of 
the corps in the field; where recruits might be en¬ 
listed, and where families, pensioners, &c., might 
reside in comfort during the absence of the regiment 
in the field. Let there be a liberal scale of pensions 
allowed for all ranks of officers and men, both for 
wounds and long service. Let the service be such 
that dismissal from it may be felt as a grievous 
punishment. Let promotion to the highest ranks he 
open to all who may deserve it. Let even the mar¬ 
shal’s baton be within the reach of the grasp of the 



97 

private soldier who may prove himself worthy and 
able to wield it. 

For the rest, the admission of common-sense, and 
the operation of public opinion where no concealment 
is allowed, will necessarily at once sweep away the 
enormous and wasteful follies of half-pay, purchase 
and sale of commissions, unwieldy and inefficient 
weapons, unfit clothing and accoutrements, and all 
similar follies. 

Allow the principle of admitting the free exercise 
of reason and common-sense under the eye of the 
public, and all evil must disappear; while the best 
men for every post, and the best means of effecting 
every object, must soon be known, and, when once 
known, must be employed. 

In the adoption of such principles exists the real 
efficiency of army organisation; yet this seems not to 
have been thought of on any hand, and has not even 
been noticed by late writers on the subject. 

Yet it might have been remembered that the best 
cavalry the world ever saw (and acknowledged to 
have been so by universal consent) was an English 
silidar corps—the Ironsides of Cromwell. The ex¬ 
cellence of these soldiers did not depend on their 
being large men or small men, or heavy or light, or 
anything else with respect to their mere carcases. It 
was caused by their high moral nature and mental 
culture. And the private soldiers of Cromwell were 
eagerly sought for as officers elsewhere, and the whole 
history of the world could not show their peers. 

Experience gained in real work, and upon a suffi- 
cientlv extended scale, during a period of many years, 


H 


98 


has convinced me that the principles which rendered 
the soldiers of Cromwell irresistible may still be 
applied with like effect; and that even with the poor 
Asiatic something may be done in this way, for it is 
working in the right direction, in the path of nature’s 
laws. Man’s power—that which constitutes him man 
and not brute—depends on his brain, not his muscles ; 
on his mind, not his body. Improve the moral and 
intellectual being of the men ; lead them upwards and 
onwards by their best and noblest attributes, and not 
through sordid hopes and fears, — make them love 
their duty, and do it, because it is right to do so ,— 
and success will attend our endeavours, be the mate¬ 
rial worked on European or Asiatic. 

But how different in its operation is this principle 
of attracting by adequate inducements the men best 
suited to the military requirements of the State, of 
supplying these men with the best weapons possible, 
and of developing all their powers—from that which 
at present obtains in our military system, of enticing 
recruits at rates lower than the market permits; of 
arming them inefficiently; of attempting to govern 
them by the fear of punishment, and that punishment 
bodily pain; and of retaining them in the service by 
penal enactment. 

Is it to be wondered at, that however excellent the 
raw material whence our army might be drawn, it 
should be found, under the working of such a system, 
often difficult to obtain for the service of the State 
any but the most inferior class of our citizens or 
peasants ; that the supply even of these does not meet 
the demand ; and that the army of England holds a 


99 


position at an immense distance behind the position 
which the general advance of the nation in moral and 
intellectual power should have enabled it to hold ? 

The chief evil of the present system is the existence, 
and perpetual renewal, of a special code for the army. 
The effect of the Mutiny Act is altogether injurious to 
the military force of England; it is as an instrument 
for harm in the hands of the ministry of the Crown; 
and it possesses no redeeming qualities whatsoever. 

I speak advisedly, after long experience, and after 
expending on this subject an amount of thought and 
labour which few men have either the inclination or 
opportunity to bestow, when I assert that no special 
laws are necessary for the good government of soldiers. 
Those commanders whose object is good—who proceed 
towards that object on right principles, in accordance 
with nature’s laws; who appeal to men’s best and 
highest qualities, instead of to the most base; who 
endeavour to cultivate, draw forth, and aid in the 
development of, the powers and good qualities of those 
under them—will always be able to lead without the 
support of unreasoning authority; while it is certain 
that the more intellectual the men reallv become, the 
more easy will it he for real intellectual and moral 
power to govern them. 

But the military code enables the wrong man to he 
kept uppermost, and all manner of outrages on com¬ 
mon-sense to be practised in the army, without much 
scandal, until the time for real warlike exertion 
arrives. Then real workmen are absolutely necessary, 
and the amateurs at once fail. While the steam- 
engine is at rest, and its fire is out, any one may 

h 2 


100 


pretend to be competent to its management; but get 
up the steam, and the real engineer alone is able to 
maintain and to guide, with safety and utility, the 
mighty pow r er of the machine. 

This has well been shown in our war with Russia. 
There has been plenty of power, for even the poorest 
material of Englishmen is comparatively powerful. 
Our soldiers are still unmatched in fight, and show a 
martyr’s endurance of misery; but these warriors 
have been systematically trained to helplessness. The 
natural qualities of the men make them, in the actual 
shock of battle and in the struggle of personal combat, 
the most formidable soldiers in the Tvorld: they are 
the best and bravest of the earth. But what has 
their military education done for these noble beings ? 
It has merely crippled them, body and soul! What 
the stock, the belts, the pipeclay, the tight coat, the 
knapsack, &c., are to the soldiers’ bodies, their moral 
and intellectual training has been to their minds: 
they must only think, as Frederic’s soldiers prayed, 
according to regulation. 

o O 

The men can do nothing for themselves; while 
their amateur leaders and heads of departments can 
neither feed, clothe, shelter, nor move the army. At 
the commencement of operations, our generals en¬ 
deavoured to enforce regulations regarding stocks and 
jackets, &c. And with such matters many of them 
seem alone competent to deal. 

Under our present system, there can be no long 
reach of understanding of military affairs, and no 
practical readiness in handling and supplying the 
wants of soldiers in the field: it seems abundantly 

•r 


101 


certain that thousands of our English merchants are 
really better able to command an English army than 
many of our general officers. 

To attempt to reform, that is, to improve on, the 
present system, is plainly futile. It must be entirely 
abandoned, and new principles (directly the opposite 
of those now acted on) adopted, or continual failure 
may be expected. 

The military arrangements should be thrown open 
to public view and public opinion: evil things cannot 
bear the light , and will disappear before it—generally 
without the harsh exertion of force or punishment. 
Reason, good sense, good feeling, with individual 
activity and practical knowledge, should be the 
guides; and the rule should be, to endeavour to de- 
velope these as much as possible in all members of 
the army, of whatever rank. 

At present, every law of nature is reversed in our 
military system; and the rule of brute force is sub¬ 
stituted for that of reason.—(1855.) 

The Defects of the Bengal Army. 

The defects and indiscipline of the Bengal army, 
even as compared with the other armies of India,— 
in which also numerous faults and deficiencies might 
be pointed out,—are manifold and glaring. Let us 
inquire what really are these defects, and what the 
best method of remedying them. Let the officers of 
the Bengal army apply themselves fairly and honestly 
to the task of reform, where reform is really needed, 

AND LET THEM NOT FLATTER THEMSELVES, AS IT TOO 
OFTEN IS THE CASE, that THEY HAVE REMEDIED A DEFECT 



102 


WHEN THEY HAVE ONLY CONCEALED IT, OR DENIED ITS 

existence : old sores must be laid open with an un¬ 
sparing hand, and the caustic be freely applied, before 
they can be properly healed,—let not the patient 
think the surgeon an enemy because he gives pain. 

For myself, I shall endeavour to write exactly as if 
I were myself an officer of the Bengal army: my 
judgment may be erroneous, and my opinions un¬ 
sound ; but my motives are undoubtedly good—they 
are the wish honestly to serve my honourable masters 
and my country, and to benefit, in my humble capa¬ 
city, the service to which I am proud to belong. I 
have served altogether twenty-three years, have never 
been absent from my duty, and have long commanded 
a native corps of high repute; during the course of 
my service I have seen a good deal of the Bengal . 
armv, and have conversed much with its officers. 

With the opportunities and experience above- 
mentioned, my observations and opinions may be 
useless and unsound, but they cannot justly be 
deemed presumptuous or hasty. 

The most serious faults existing in, and peculiar 
to the Bengal army, appear to me to be as follow:— 

First .—The absence of the highest moral tone, and 
of a simple and vigorous Anglo-Saxon honesty in 
dealing with Asiatics on the part of the English 
officers of the army of Bengal. 

Secondly .—The want of power placed in the 
hands of regimental commanding officers ; the want 
of confidence reposed in* and support afforded to 
them, by the Commander-in-Chief and by Govern¬ 
ment. 



103 


Thirdly .—The most pernicious system of drawing 
pay by companies direct from the divisional pay¬ 
master, instead of by regiments, which again tends 
to bring regimental commanders in contempt, and to 
reduce their power and usefulness. 

Fourthly .—The most defective system of conduct¬ 
ing officers’ messes. 

Fifthly .—The entire absence of a proper confidence 
between the officers and the native soldiers. 

Sixthly .—The most pernicious practice of attend¬ 
ing to the caste of native soldiers, thereby frequently 
excluding from our ranks the best material for sol¬ 
diers, and enlisting the very worst. 

Seventhly .—The very bad and fatally injurious 
system of promotion existing with respect to native 
officers and soldiers. 

Eighthly .—The entire absence of a proper disci¬ 
pline throughout the native part of the Bengal army. 

Ample proof of the first-mentioned fault is found 
in proceedings towards mutineers—in the late orders 
to the Bengal army regarding courts of requests, &c. 
—in disclosures which have been made regarding 
gambling affairs, banking transactions, &c., too noto¬ 
rious to require detailing, and too extensive and 
numerous to be attributable to causes affecting indi¬ 
viduals only. These proofs are public, and patent to 
all men. 

The defect being admitted, where shall we look for 
the cause and the remedy? One cause appears to 
me to consist in the lowering of the English character, 
by insensibly adopting Asiatic habits, manners, and 
feelings. The Anglo-Saxon becoming partly merged 


104 


in the Hindoo. That is extensively the case in the 

%! 

army of Bengal. 

From the moment a young officer sets foot in the 
Bengal presidency, he is perpetually reminded that 
every English idea and habit is the sure mark of a 
griffin (that is, of a fool). He must not go out in 
the sunshine—he must travel in a palkee instead of 
on horseback; he must be punkaed, and tattied, and 
God knows what else; he must have a “ khansa- 
maun,” a “ kidmutgar,” a sirdar-bearer, and bearers, 
and a host of other servants—one for his pipe, an¬ 
other for his umbrella, another for his bottle, another 
for his chair, &c.—all to do the work of one man; 
and which work would be done by one man in the 
case of a Bombay griffin. By all these people the 
youth is called “ ghureeb purwar,” “ hoodawund,” 
&c. &c. 

This state of affairs bewilders the new comer, till, 
resigning himself to his fate, he becomes accustomed 
to it, and gradually loses part of the manliness of the 
Anglo-Saxon character. With the external luxurious 
and lazy habits of Hindoostan, he imperceptibly 
adopts somewhat of Oriental morality. 

Another cause is the difficulty existing in obtaining 
furlough to Europe, which, if removed, would effect a 
wonderful improvement on the tone of Indian society : 
this cause, although of grave importance, is, of 
course, not peculiar to Bengal, but common to all 
India. 

The remedy is evident,— let it be the fashion to 
be English. It is a fallacy to suppose that the 
climate compels to be otherwise. There are faults 



105 


enough, I suppose, in the European society of the 
Western presidency, but assuredly it is ten times 
more English than that of Bengal; yet the climate 
is no better than that of the latter. 

Let the griffin have no more than two body-servants 
at most; let him have no one in his service who will 
not do such work as his master bids him do: if the 
Hindoos object to such service, there are plenty of 
Mussulmans, ready, willing, and able to take their 
places, and with no more prejudices than a Christian. 

Let the young man never enter a palkee, but go 
about on the back of his pony; let him not fear the 
sun—it may tan his cheeks, but it will not hurt him. 

It is your effeminate gentlefolk, who live in dark 
houses artificially cooled, with a dozen Hindoos at 
work, with fans and flappers to beat the flies off 
them, wdio suffer by exposure—not the hardy young 
Englishman, who, if not intemperate, soon becomes 
acclimated; and the more readily so the less he 
regards the sunshine, which is healthy enough in 
moderation ; experto crede . 

Let him, in short, while studying the character of 
the natives of India as deeply as possible, and making 
himself completely acquainted with their habits, 
thoughts, feelings, modes of expression, &c., endea¬ 
vour himself by all means in his power to remain a 
thoroughly English gentleman . As he succeeds in 
doing so, he will assuredly succeed in commanding 
the respect and regard of every native around him. 
All our power in India rests on this. We may 
lay it down as an absolute certainty, that the millions 
of natives which a handful of Englishmen govern in 



106 


this vast continent will not consent to be governed by 
a handful of their equals . Our power consists in our 
being essentially different from them, and in their 
belief in our moral superiority only. The only thing 
which can endanger the existence of this power, is the 
destruction or weakening of that belief. 

The state of the body will often affect the mind; 
habits and manners will act on, and be reacted on by, 
morals and religion. 

Let us then be English in all things, to the utmost 
of our power, internally and externally—in morals, in 
habits, and in feelings, allowing absolute freedom of 
opinion and fair play to all men—and all will be well. 

The second evil is notorious : it has been frequently 
remarked on, its existence is everywhere acknowledged, 
and its effects are lamentable. The commanding 
officer of a regiment in the Bengal army is almost 
powerless for good : he is allowed to do nothing; his 
men are almost taught to despise him ; and in many 
instances of late years the sepoys have been allowed 
and encouraged to forward written complaints against 
their commanders direct to army head-quarters. What 
can be worse than this ? It is utterly destructive of 
all military discipline and soldier-like pride. 

The third and fourth mentioned evils are closely 
connected with the second. In the Bengal army the 
practice prevails of each commander of a company 
drawing pay for that company himself separately, 
direct from the divisional paymaster, so that the 
pecuniary transactions of the regiment are carried on, 
in a great measure, independently of the commanding 
officer, and often without his knowledge ; as, for exam- 


107 


pic, has appeared in some late disclosures regarding 
banking transactions, wherein the officers commanding 
companies appear to have made arrangements with 
divisional paymasters for the recovery, by regular 
instalments, of payments on account of various hank¬ 
ing transactions, without the commanding officers of 
the regiments knowing anything of the matter. All 
these also tend to reduce the useful power of regi¬ 
mental commandants, and make them be despised. 

With regard to messes, the state of affairs is very 
bad. In some regiments no mess exists: the main¬ 
taining a mess is not only not made compulsory, but 
even where a mess is maintained, it is optional with 
officers whether to belong to it or not. Such a state 
of affairs is fraught with the worst consequences : it 
breaks a regiment up into separate parties, and gives 
rise to all manner of ill-feeling. It also lessens the 
power and good influence of the commanding officer 
in an extraordinary degree. It takes away much of 
the support which a commander quietly and imper¬ 
ceptibly receives from all well-disposed officers, who 
have a proper pride in their noble profession; and it 
enables others, who may be ill-disposed, to work mis¬ 
chief unperceived, till its effects become apparent in 
the bad state of the regiment.* 

The remedy for all these evils is in the hands 
of the Commander-in-Chief and of Government: let 
the commander of a regiment be systematically and 
effectually supported in the exercise of his legitimate 
powers ; let those powers be as ample as possible in 

* This defect has lately been to some extent remedied. 


108 


every respect; regarding regimental affairs, let all 
turn, centre, and rest on him; and with these full 
powers, make him responsible that all goes well. If 
it do not, displace him from his command. Let there 
be a regimental paymaster, to whom the company 
officers send their muster rolls, and whose duty it is to 
draw the pay of the regiment, under the authority of 
the regimental commander. 

Let the mess be a public institution, to belong to 
which is compulsory on all officers. Let the com¬ 
manding officers be held responsible that it be con¬ 
ducted with due and proper regard to economy, 
comfort, and propriety, and give them full power to 
enforce such a state of things. There is nothing new 
in these rules; they exist with the happiest effect in 
the other armies of India, and would be equally advan¬ 
tageous to that of Bengal. 

The fifth evil is notorious, and is plainly proved by 
men deserting their officers in the field, by frequent 
mutinies, &c., where nothing has been known by 
the officers of what was going on, until it resulted in 
open resistance to authority. The causes of this are 
various, part depending on what has been mentioned 
above, but chiefly on the abominable system of recog¬ 
nising caste in our ranks, and on the absurd system of 
promotion, whereby the native officers are absolutely 
useless. 

The remedies are, of course, as described with 
respect to those causes. 

The sixth evil is of a very grave and important 
nature. The effect of enlisting men of a certain 
caste or creed, to the exclusion of others, in the Indian 


109 


army, is to subject that army to the control, not of the 
Government and of the Articles of War, hut to that of 
Brahmins and Goseins, Moollas and Fakeers. By this 
system a man is not to be chosen on account of his 
fitness to be a soldier, his willingness and strength, 
docility and courage, but because he is a twice-born 
worshipper of Vishnoo. Whatever his other quali¬ 
fications, if a man think that a stone with a patch of 
red paint on it is not to be worshipped as the Creator 
—still more, if he have been a shoemaker, &c.—he is 
not to be admitted into the ranks* of the Bengal army, 
for fear of offending the lazy and insolent Brahmins. 
The consequences are ruinous to discipline. By 

REASON OF THIS, A NATIVE SOLDIER ill Bengal IS FAR 
MORE AFRAID OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST CASTE THAN 
OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE ARTICLES OF WAR, 
AND BY THIS MEANS A DEGREE OF POWER RESTS WITH 

the private soldier, which is entirely incompatible 
with all healthy rule. 

Treachery, mutiny, villany of all kinds, may be 

CARRIED ON AMONG THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS UNKNOWN TO 
THEIR OFFICERS, TO ANY EXTENT, WHERE THE MEN ARE 
OF ONE CASTE OF HINDOOS, AND WHERE THE RULES OF 
CASTE ARE MORE REGARDED THAN THOSE OF MILITARY DIS¬ 
CIPLINE. To such an extent does this evil exist, that 
I have known a Bengal commanding officer express his 
regret at being compelled to discharge an excellent 
sepoy, because the other men had discovered him to 
be of inferior caste, and bad demanded his dismissal. 
To a Bombay officer such a state of affairs appears 
incredible—it amounts to open mutiny; but it is the 
normal state of the Bengal army at present. It is 




110 


curious, that though the Bengal sepoys have contrived 
to have it believed that their religion is concerned in 
this business of caste, in our ranks nothing is further 
from the truth. In conjunction with the system of 
promotion which prevails, this attention to caste 

KEEPS ALL REAL POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE PRI¬ 
VATE soldier ; and, as they think, saves them from 
much trouble and annoyance : but when they assert 
that this evil is a necessary consequence of their 
religion, the Bengal sepoys state the contrary to truth. 

This is positively proved by that which takes place 
in the army of Bombay, wherein hundreds and 
thousands of men from Hindoostan, from the same 
villages, of the same caste, and even of the same 
families—brothers by the same fathers and mothers— 
as the fine gentlemen of the Bengal army, are seen in 
the ranks, shoulder to shoulder—nay, even sleeping in 
the same tent—with the Muratha, the Dher, and the 
Purwaree, without scruple or thought of objection. 
The one prides himself on being a Hindoo, the other 
on being a soldier. Which pride is the best for our 
purpose? The system of regarding caste is the 
original cause of many other evils in the Bengal 
army; and much of what has been said regarding the 
adoption of Asiatic manners tells again heavily here.* 
The Bombay sepoy, whatever faults he may have, has 

* The fact is, that when, without giving offence, the English offi¬ 
cer shows, by his habitual conduct towards the sepoys, that he feels 
their caste prejudices, &c., to be marks of inferiority, which excite 
only his pity and regret, the sepoys endeavour to keep all such caste 
prejudices, &c., as much as possible out of sight, will never allow 
them to interfere with duty, and will never willingly obtrude them 
on notice at all. 




Ill 


one great excellence, which is, that he looks on the 
European soldier as his model in all things pertaining 
to soldiership, and endeavours to imitate him. Like 
the European soldier, the native sepoy of Bombay will 
turn his hand to any labour which he may be ordered 
to execute. 

If the lines require cleaning, &c., &c., a working- 
party of sepoys is ordered out as a matter of course, 
with pickaxe and powrah, and the work is well done. 
The technical term “ working party ” is as familiar in 
the mouth of a Bombay sepoy as “ shoulder arms.” 
Nay, I have known more than once the men of a 
Bombay regiment to volunteer for such work as 
building their officers’ houses, mess-room, &c., and to 
do the work well, too, making the bricks, mixing the 
mud, &c., &c., entirely by themselves. This would 
not be credited by the greater part of the Bengal 
army; and to such a state of helplessness has the 
recognition of caste in the ranks brought the Bengal 
sepoy, that a regiment of native cavalry, as I have 
repeatedly witnessed, is unable to picket, unsaddle, or 
groom its horses, until the arrival of its syces and 
grass-cutters—sometimes, as I have seen, several 
hours after the arrival of the regiment at its ground. 
In a Bombay regiment, before that time had elapsed, 
the horses would have been picketed, groomed, fed, 
and watered, stables would have been over, the tents 
pitched, and the men have had their breakfast. To 
such an incredible extent has this helplessness been 
carried, and recognised by authority, that a Bengal 
sentry cannot think of striking the gong at his own 
quarter-guard, and men called “ gunta pandays ” are 


112 


actually maintained, and paid for by Government, to 
do this duty for them. It is the khansamaun, kid- 
mutgar, hookah-burdar, &c., &c., over again. The 
remedy is obvious: never allow any reference to caste 
when enlisting men. If others now in the service 
object, let them be told that Government does not 
care one pin whether its sepoys be Hindoos, or Mus¬ 
sulmans, or Brahmins, or Purwarees, so long as they 
be good soldiers ; and that if they do not like the 
rules of the service, they may leave it. If they still 
object, or make any difficulty about the matter, dis¬ 
charge them on the spot. There are millions of 
better men ready to occupy their places. Let also 
the use of entrenching tools be part of the drill of 
the sepoy, as much as is the musket exercise ; and 
when he has learnt this, let him be occasionally 
employed in working-parties, &c., to prevent his 
forgetting it again. This trifle would be found to 
possess much more importance than at first sight 
appears to attach to it. 

The seventh evil—the bad system of promotion— 
is the worst of all; its effects are crushingly ruinous. 
In the Bengal army the promotion of natives is made 
to depend on seniority only, so that if a man keep 
clear of actual crime, and lives long enough, he must 
become a commissioned officer, however unfit for the 
office. 

Under this system, the private soldier feels himself 
entirely independent of his officers; he knows that 
they neither hasten nor retard his advance in the 
service. He has nothing to do but to live, and get 
through his duties with listless stupidity, and with 



113 


the least possible trouble to himself. No exertion on 
bis part can help him ;—talent, courage, fidelity, nor 
good conduct are of any avail. Confidence and pride 
in each other, between men and officers, cannot exist. 
There is no real co-operation; for the one being 
powerless to aid, the other becomes careless of offend¬ 
ing. This is the effect on the private soldier. The 
system is equally, if not more baneful, as respects the 
native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned. 
The whole of the native commissioned officers are 
entirely useless—the amount of their pay is a dead 
loss to the State; every one of them is unfit for 
service by reason of imbecility, produced by old age, 
or, where in rare instances the man may not be 
altogether in his second childhood, he is entirely 
useless from having been educated in a bad school. 
All should have been pensioned long ago: but, alas ! 
if the present system of promotion be continued, the 
getting rid of these poor old gentlemen, who cut 
such painfully ridiculous figures in the Bengal regi¬ 
ments, would be of no use whatever, for the non-com¬ 
missioned officers, who would have to be promoted in 
their places, are but little better—even the very 
naiques (corporals) are almost too old for service. 

How very different is the state of affairs under a 
proper system of promotion by merit alone ? It gives 
the commanding officers of regiments and companies 
a good deal more trouble, certainly, in making pro¬ 
motions ; but how are they repaid ? If they r ally 
and honestly do their best to choose the men for 
promotion without partiality, favour, or affection, but 
by merit and fitness alone, it is soon found that every 

i 


114 


man in the regiment (at least every man who is fit to 
he in our ranks) exerts himself to aid his officers. 
A degree of vigour and activity, amounting to a new 
life, is infused into every part of the regiment. The 
men, seeing all the prizes of the service within their 
reach, exert themselves to obtain them. They can 
only obtain their end by becoming good soldiers—by 
learning their duty, and performing it to the satis¬ 
faction of their superiors. 

The native officers, being chosen with regard alone 
to their qualifications, and their fitness to hold com¬ 
missions, are alike proud of the distinction they have 
acquired by their appointments, and able to perform 
their duties. They are not enfeebled by age ; and the 
consciousness that their respectability and success in 
life depend on their own conduct makes them exert 
themselves willingly and zealously in maintaining the 
discipline and reputation of the service in which they 
acquire honour. The ill effects of the one system, 
and the excellencies of the other, appear to me so 
self-evident, and have been both proved on so large 
a scale, that I should consider it to be insulting to 
the understanding of my readers were I to enlarge on 
it, if it were not for the astonishing fact that such an 
evil system of promotion still actually exists in Bengal, 
and has been lately enforced, in spite of reason, 
common-sense, and experience, by-. 

With such a system of promotion, the good and 
the bad, the clever and the foolish, the brave and the 
timid, the energetic and the imbecile, are nearly all on 
a par. The officers are powerless for good; and the 
men, keeping just clear of open violence, have their 




115 


own way in all things. It is astonishing, and says 

MUCH FOR THE GOODNESS OF THE RAW MATERIAL OF 

the Bengal army, that, under such arrangements, 

THE WHOLE FABRIC HAS NOT ENTIRELY FALLEN TO 

pieces. The thing is rotten throughout, and 

DISCIPLINE THERE IS NONE ; BUT IT IS WONDERFUL THAT 
EVEN THE OUTWARD SEMBLANCE OF AN ARMY HAS 
BEEN STILL MAINTAINED UNDER SUCH DEPLORABLE MIS¬ 
MANAGEMENT. 

The eighth evil—the want of discipline—is the 
necessary consequence of much that has already been 
described. In speaking of want of discipline, I do 
not only mean that which is shown by serious muti¬ 
nies and misconduct on extraordinary occasions, but 
also as evinced in the ordinary every-day routine of 
duty in the Bengal army : this is such as to be almost 
incredible to an officer of the Boyal army, or of the 
other armies of India. The first thing done by a 
Bengal sepoy when he mounts guard, is to strip 
himself of arms, accoutrements, and clothing; the 
muskets are piled, and a sentry is posted, who remains 
generally (not always) properly accoutred, &c. All 
the others, including non-commissioned officers, dis¬ 
arm and strip: if there be any water near, they go 
and dabble in it after the fashion of all Ilindoo- 
stanees; otherwise they cover themselves with sheets 
and go to sleep, quite naked, with the exception of a 
“ lungootee.” When the sentry thinks that he has 

been on long enough, he bawls out for some one to 

relieve him: after a while, up gets a sepoy from 

beneath his sheet, and, after a few yawns and 

stretches, puts on his clothes and accoutrements, but 

l 2 


116 


does not take his musket—that would be too much 
trouble, and endanger upsetting the whole pile ; he 
then goes to the sentry, takes his musket from him, 
and occupies his place ; away goes the relieved man, 
and strips like the others. No naique attends with 
the relief; he remains fast asleep under his sheet. 
Now this state of things I have mvself seen in 
hundreds of cases. It is so astonishing to a Bombay 
officer that he cannot help remarking on it; yet I 
have been assured by numerous Bengal officers that 
this is the regular way of mounting guard. It should 
be borne in mind, also, that in the Bengal army four 
men are allowed to a sentry, instead of three, as with 
the other armies ; so that a sepoy with them is on 
sentry only six hours altogether, during his tour of 
twenty-four hours, instead of eight, as usual. 

But it is by no means uncommon in the Bengal 
army to relieve a guard once a week, and even at 
longer intervals, when the state of affairs above men¬ 
tioned must take place, even if it were not so on 
other occasions. This was the case when the Bom¬ 
bay and Bengal troops met at Peshawur; and con¬ 
siderable grumbling and complaining took place when 
Sir H. Dundas insisted on the guards being relieved 
daily. To the mind of any practical soldier, no 
further proof is necessary on this subject—want of 
discipline. He must at once see that where guards 
are relieved weekly, where the sentries relieve each 
other as they please, and where the whole guard strips 
naked, there can be no discipline whatever. It is 
useless to ask whether a man can read and write, 
when you find that he does not know a letter of his 




117 


alphabet. If it were necessary, however, I could 
adduce abundance of other facts to the same purport. 
The remedy is apparent, from what has been said 
before. Such are some of the reforms peculiarly 
required by Bengal. But there are many others 
equally requisite, with regard to the native Indian 
army generally; for instance, with respect to the 
regimental orderly-room.—(1851.) 

Comparison between the Systems obtaining in 
the Armies of Bengal and Bombay. 

The native soldiers in the Indian army, other than 
those of Bengal, are, though formed of exactly the 
same raw material, essentially different from them in 
training and in discipline, in habit and in feeling. 
The normal state of the Bengal army is such as must 
appear to an officer of the Boyal, or of the Bombay 
army, as a state of mutiny! I have known the men 
leave the ranks by hundreds at a time, without leave, 
to cook, to plunder, or what not. Yet such is the 
force of habit, that the excessive want, or rather, 
total absence, of discipline, and all the gross evils 
which pervade the native army of Bengal, are looked 
on by the European officers of that army as necessary 
consequences of employing a native army at all. 
Having little opportunity of comparing the native 
soldier of Bengal with others differently educated, 
their eyes are never opened to the true cause of the 
existing evils—they attribute all to the deficiency in 
the numbers of the European officers. The fact 
being, that they are already more numerous than is 




118 


necessary to real efficiency, and that, unless means 
were adopted to improve their quality , addition to the 
numbers would be hurtful. 

The officers are not too few, but they mistake their 
proper functions, and act on wrong principles. The 
officers of the Bengal army are formed exactly of the 
same materials as those of the other armies of India; 
their native soldiers of material, in its raw state, per¬ 
haps, somewhat better than that of the others; but 
from the hour he enters the service, the Bengal 
officer is trained to sink the European and adopt the 
Asiatic. In the Bombay army the “ feeble Hindoo ” 
becomes half European, and adopts the feelings and 
ideas of Europeans, as far as they refer to his position 
as a soldier, till they become his own. In Bengal, 
the European becomes half Hindoo, and thus the 
commanding influence of superior energy and superior 
moral character (I deny any superiority of intellect) 
is, in a great measure, lost. This pervades the whole 
society in Bengal; but its effects are most glaringly 
apparent in the army. In the Bengal army there is a 
constant studying of men’s castes , which the European 

APPEARS TO THINK AS MUCH OF, AND TO ESTEEM AS 
HIGHLY, AS DO THE NATIVES THEMSELVES ; and the 

sepoys, instead of looking on the European officers as 
superior beings, are compelled to consider them as 
bad Hindoos ! ■ Instead of being taught to pride 
themselves on their soldiership and discipline, the 
sepoys are trained to pride themselves on their absur¬ 
dities of caste, and think that their power and value 
are best shown by refusing to obey any orders which 
they please to say do not accord with their religious 


119 


prejudices. It is a grave mistake to suppose that 
religious feelings have any real influence on these 
occasions—it is a mistake which would be ridiculous 
if its consequences were not so serious; hut it is 
certain that the Bengal sepoy is a stickler for his 
imaginary rights of caste for the sake of increased 
power: he knows well that Government never intend 
any insult to his creed, however absurd it may be ; 
but he knows that by crying out about his caste, he 
keeps power in his hands, saves himself from many of 
the hardships of service, and makes his officers afraid 
of him. This is proved by what takes place in the 
other armies of India. In the army of Bombay, even 
a Purwaree may, and often does, rise to the rank of 
subadar by his own merit; in Bengal, such a man 
would not even be admitted into the ranks, for fear of 
his contaminating those fine gentlemen the Brahmins ; 
yet in the Bombay army the Brahmin (father, 
brother, or son, it may be, of him of Bengal) stands 
shoulder to shoulder in the ranks—nay, sleeps in the 
same tent—with his Purwaree fellow - soldier, and 
dreams not of any objection to the arrangement! If 
this subject be mentioned to a Bombay Brahmin 
sepoy, as it is sometimes by Bengal officers, who are 
always asking the men about their caste, the ready 
answer is, “ What do I care; is he not the soldier of 
the State ? ” The reply speaks volumes, and shows a 
state of affairs which officers of the Bengal army 
cannot conceive . 

The system of promotion in the Bengal army is 
exactly in keeping with the principle of the immuta¬ 
bility of caste. No individual merit can advance, no 



120 


individual incapacity nor misconduct (unless actually 
criminal) can retard the promotion of the Bengal 
sepoy,— seniority alone is considered. What is the 
consequence ? The men, not feeling that their pro¬ 
spects of advancement in the service depend on the 
favourable opinions of their European officers, want 
the most powerful stimulus to good conduct. They 
are never disciplined (as I understand the word), are 
often mutinous, and never acquire the knowledge of 
their profession which may qualify them to hold 
commissions with advantage to the service. 

The Bengal native officers are inefficient, and neces¬ 
sarily so under the present system, because they are 
chosen without any regard whatever to their fitness 
to hold commissions, and because they are almost 
always worn out with age before they receive them. 
It is often objected by Bengal officers that the pension- 
list of Bombay is much larger in proportion than that 
of Bengal. It is so : but why ? Poor old wretches, 
feeble in body and imbecile in mind, who would in 
Bombay have been pensioned off ages ago, still remain 
holding commissions in the Bengal army. Does this 
arrangement cause any saving to the State ? Does it 
really enable a greater military power to be maintained 
at the less cost ? Again, the assertion that few men 
of any pretensions to independence will submit to our 
rigid drill, &c., is erroneous as a general rule, however 
agreeable it may be to Bengal experience. Men of 
good family, &c., will enter the service fast enough if 
the service be worth entering, — witness the Sind 
Irregular Horse. But reverting to the question of 
European officers, it is certainly true that more officers 



121 


of artillery and engineers are required for the Indian 
army,—the duties of these officers are generally quite 
independent of the number of men under their com¬ 
mand ; and many more European officers are required 
with European troops than with natives, owing to the 
presence of the native officers with the latter. With 
scientific corps the number of officers has no reference 
to the number of the men; it must be regulated 
altogether by other circumstances. The great number 
of European officers now allowed prevents the native 
officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a respon¬ 
sible or very respectable position in the army ; thereby 
keeping out of its ranks natives of birth, wealth, and 
family, and preventing in the native soldier the full 
development of that love for, and pride in the service, 
which are essential to great efficiency. There are 
already too many European officers with reference to 
regimental duties only. A certain number of European 
officers is necessary, but very few suffice. Three to a 
regiment, actually present, is, perhaps, the best 
number. The duties of subaltern officers, and even 
of captains of troops and companies, are most efficiently 
performed by native officers. 

If there were but one European officer in a regi¬ 
ment, he would, if possessed of proper qualifications, 
— if not trained in a school which makes him half 
Hindoo, and if entrusted with proper power and 
authority, — soon form around him such a body of 
native officers as would make the corps far more 
effective under the one Englishman than it could be 
under any number of Europeans who held the opinions, 
with regard to native troops, which now, to a great 


122 


extent, prevail among the officers of the Bengal 
army. 

Take for example the corps of Sind Irregular 
Horse, 1,600 strong: this has but five European 
officers, yet it has on all occasions proved to be 
perfectly efficient, and is generally believed, by those 
best able to judge, to he the best native cavalry corps 
in India. Yet this corps is most carefully and 
minutely drilled , and is armed and accoutred in the 
European style. The squadron and troop commanders 
of the Sind Irregular Horse are natives, yet the 
greater part of them perform their duties as well, and 
in all respects as efficiently, as the best European 
officers, whether in quarters, on parade, on the line 
of march, or in battle. 

No Bengal officer can understand this; but it is 
nevertheless the truth. There is no native regiment 
in the Bengal army, horse or foot, in which the duty 
is carried on with such steady regularity, as that with 
which all is conducted in the Sind Irregular Horse, 
with its two and a half Europeans to a regiment. 
There are no soldiers on earth better disciplined than 
those of this corps. Their discipline is founded on 
the mutual pride, confidence, respect, and good feeling 
which exist between them and their European officers. 
They are confessedly among the best native soldiers 
in India, yet they cost the State less than one-half 
of the “ regular” native soldiers, and they have been 
trained, educated, and altogether treated, after a 
fashion diametrically opposed to Bengal principles. 

I repeat, then, that the ordinary state of the Bengal 
army is such as must appear, to an officer of the Boyal 


123 


or of the Bombay army, to be a state of mutiny . The 
men are not taught and trained instinctively to obey 
orders, and even the European officers are afraid of 
them. This is not wholly the fault of the regimental 
officers of Bengal. The evil is produced and per¬ 
petuated by the false ideas formed from the first 
moment a young officer enters the service in the 
school of errors, which the native army of Bengal is 
at present; and by the fatal effects of taking all 
power from regimental officers, and concentrating 
it at army head-quarters, thus producing an artificial 
sameness of dull stagnation, instead of encouraging 
the natural uniformity of progressive improvement. 

In the Bombay army, on the contrary, the native 
officer is invaluable, and his authority is respected, 
though he be the lowest of the low in caste ; because 
the practice in Bombay is for the European officers to 
make the Hindoos soldiers, instead of, as in Bengal, 
the sepoys making the European officers half Hindoos. 
—(1850.) 

[In a work published by General Jacob in 1854, he 
remarks that “ the evil influence of the state of affairs 
in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating itself 
to the Bombay army also.” He considers, I believe, 
that the orders, which have within the past few years 
been increasing, for the assimilation of administrative 
details to the practice obtaining in Bengal, to be the 
main cause of the altered condition of the lesser body. 
Like causes produce like effects.— Editor.] 


124 


Remarks on the State of the Native Army of 

India in general ; upon the Principles whereon 

its Efficiency depends ; and on the Means 

WHEREBY ITS EXISTING DEFECTS MAY BE REMEDIED. 

On all sides we hear outcries regarding the state of 
the native army of India. 

The most conflicting opinions are given to the 
world, and continually uttered in conversation, with 
regard to the merits of the Indian soldiers, the number 
of officers with native regiments, &c. 

Little light has lately been thrown on the matter, 
and as directly opposite opinions cannot both be just, 
much false doctrine has been promulgated, and much 
truth concealed. 

The subject of the native army of India was long 
ago discussed, and most ably handled by Sir John 
Malcolm. ( Vide his “ Political History and Govern¬ 
ment of India.”) He well knew the native soldier: 
his words have now, in some instances, proved pro¬ 
phetic. 

The position of European officers of native regi¬ 
ments, whether in command or otherwise, is no longer 
a favourite position, and the native army has been 
thereby ruined, as he foretold that it would be. 

(Particularly the army of Bengal.) 

Every officer of a native regiment of the line now 
endeavours to get away from his corps, to escape from 
regimental duty, by every effort in his power. The 
“refuse” only remain. All proper feeling is thus 
totally destroyed between the native soldier and his 
European superior. 


125 


At the same time, the genius of the Indian, of the 
Oriental generally, has been so little understood, that, 
with the best possible intentions at head-quarters, the 
greatest possible evil has been caused, by the attempt 
to govern and treat the sepoy like an Englishman. 

The native soldiers, to be in a really efficient state, 
must look on their immediate commander, the head 
of the regiment, as their absolute prince—as the 
paramount authority, as far as they are concerned. 

Concentrating all real power at head-quarters of 
the army, and leaving none to the commanding offi¬ 
cers of regiments, has been attended with ruinous 
results. 

In many instances, the sepoy has been allowed and 
encouraged to look on his regimental commander as 
his natural enemy; and, in the Bengal army, at least, 
to forward secret complaints against him to army 
head-quarters. While courts-martial, articles of war, 
rules and regulations, bewilder the native soldier, 
and fill his mind with the idea that his officers arc 
wishing to keep him out of his rights—he knows 
not what, but certainly important ones, or such a fuss 
would not be made about them. 

The only principle of military discipline which 
a native Indian soldier thoroughly understands is 
obedience to his commanding officer. He cannot, 
without great injury to efficiency, be taught to look 
beyond him. 

On the regimental commander he should, and must, 
to be in a healthy state, wholly depend. Enlistment, 
discharge, promotion to all ranks, and everything else 
should rest with the regimental commander alone. 




126 


There should be no Articles of War (at least none 
of the nature of those at present in force, to the 
ruin of our native army); but the commanding 
officer should have full powers in his own right over 
his men. 

The want of power entrusted to regimental com¬ 
manders is one enormous evil now existing in our 
native army. It is, perhaps, a necessary consequence 
of another very great error. 

The seniority rise among the officers of a native 
regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it 
impossible at present to ensure there being at the 
head of each native regiment a man capable of wield¬ 
ing the powers necessary to govern it efficiently and 
well. This is the great difficulty experienced at head¬ 
quarters ; this is the stumbling-block of all honest 
reformers, and must be overcome and removed before 
anything can be done towards effectually remedying 
existing difficulties. 

The posting of officers to native regiments without 
regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with 
ruinous consequences. 

The presence of unselected Europeans, in such 
numbers as are at present borne on the strength of 
native corps of the line, is not less ruinous. 

Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the 
leaders of native Indian soldiers. One active, ener¬ 
getic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English 
gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent 
spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till 
they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, 
and feel the greatest pride in acting in his absence as 


127 


they know he would wish them to do if present. The 
feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most 
honourable. 

The native officers and men feel the deepest 
gratitude towards him who has raised their moral, 
intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated 
by the strongest wish and energetic zeal to show that 
they are worthy of the respectable position in which 
they find themselves. 

With thirty Europeans, on the contrary, instead of 
one, the native officer finds himself of no importance, 
and the sepoy becomes a lifeless automaton. 

The Englishman becomes too common to be held 
in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding 
no important position, but in the performance of 
trifling duties which any native officer or non-com¬ 
missioned officer would do equally well. He is often 
seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his 
energies in vicious, pursuits. The prestige of the 
superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often 
happens that the European officer, having nothing 
important to occupy him, loses somewhat of his own 
self-respect. 

The young boy is placed in command of the old 
suhadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, he 
has to crave instruction; and the men see that, so 
far from taking a pride in them and in the service, 
their European officers are generally longing to 
be removed from them, craving intensely for staff 
appointments, &c. 

The example of the idle, the evil-minded, and the 
indifferent, does more harm than the good can remedy. 


128 


To be in a healthy state, the native soldier should 
never see his European officer living an idle, useless 
life, or holding a degraded or unimportant position. 
While the European officer should be proud of his 
men, and, as Sir J. Malcolm most justly observed 
(“ Government of India,” Appendix E, paragraph 
25), it should be arranged that the command of 
native corps should be the most sought after of all 
existing appointments. 

A most unwise adoption of every useless form of 
office paper-work, style of dress, and accoutrements, 
has accompanied the excess of indifferent European 
officers with the native Indian army. Real efficiency 
has been in all things sacrificed to appearance. Volu¬ 
minous “ returns” &c., on paper, pervert the attention 
of commanding officers and adjutants from their really 
important duties, while knapsacks, basket-hats, stocks, 
tight clothing, pipeclayed belts, and other unspeak¬ 
able absurdities, introduced in imitation of European 
follies, are quite sufficient to crush and cripple the 
soldiers, without much effort on the part of an enemv. 

But it is not my intention at present to enter into 
minute details. My wish is now only to set forth the 
true principles on wdiich the efficiency of our native 
Indian army depends. 

I will, therefore, now brieflv endeavour to show 

7 7 J 

how, in my opinion, all the defects now existing in 
our native Indian army may be remedied. 

The principles I contend for have proved true in 
practice . 

The presence of a great number of European offi¬ 
cers, and the assimilation of everything to an Euro- 


129 


pean model, however absurd that model may he, has 
enabled the native army to accord in all outward 
appearances, ceremonies, and forms, to the European 
armies, but its real efficiency has been thereby de¬ 
stroyed. A sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat; 
trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot 
stoop at all; bound to an immense and totally useless 
knapsack, so that he can hardly breathe ; strapped, 
belted, and pipeclayed within a hair’s-breadth of his 
life ; with a rigid basket-cliako on his head, which 
requires the skill of a juggler to balance there, and 
which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour; 
and with a leather stock round his neck, to complete 
his absurd costume—when compared with the same 
sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with re¬ 
gard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most 
perfect example of what is madly called the “regular” 
system with many European officers, contrasted with 
the system of common-sense now recommended for 
adoption. 

Let the common-sense system be adopted, and nearly 
one-half of the cost of the native army of India might 
be saved to the State by reduction in the number of 
European officers, while the real strength and military 
power of the army would be more than doubled. 

It is quite as absurd to force all our European 
forms of courts-martial, &c., &c., on our native soldiers, 
as it is to force them to cripple themselves with our 
ridiculous chakos, &c., instead of their own most 
soldier-like, easy, and neat pugrees. Let the foolish 
system which crushes the native soldier, and requires 
so many Europeans to render him useless, all go 

K 


130 


together. Abolish it, in toto , and have recourse to 
common-sense, reason, and experience. 

It will not be difficult, if prejudice be lost sight of 
for awhile, to show how principles, similar to those 
proved to lead to good results, can be applied with 
overpowering advantage to the native army of India 
generally. 

Few European officers only, and those carefully 
selected and entrusted with full powers, must be 
appointed to native regiments. 

Three officers to a regiment would suffice. Let 
four be appointed—a commandant, a second in com¬ 
mand, an adjutant, and a quartermaster. 

No army rank solely to he regarded, but individuals 
to be selected on the professed principle, at least, of 
being best qualified. 

Sir John Malcolm proposed that the regiments of 
officers should be retained as they now stand in the 
“ Army List,” but not have regiments of men attached 
to them. All officers of the native Indian army to 
be, in fact, unattached; and that, from the whole 
body, properly qualified individuals should be selected 
for staff appointments, &c., &c. The plan appears a 
good one, and practicable enough, but it appears to 
me that we have a better. Let all the officers of the 
Indian army be borne on the strength of the European 
portion of it. We know that any amount of excess 
of English officers with English regiments can do no 
harm, and the numbers of officers of artillery and 
engineers are totally irrespective of the numbers of 
the men of those corps. 


131 


Suppose, then, in round numbers, the Bombay army 
to be composed as follows :— 

Let each regiment or battalion of officers consist 
of— 


2 Colonels. 

4 Lieutenant-Colonels. 

4 Majors. 

16 Captains. 

16 Lieutenants. 

16 Ensigns. 

Total.58 

Say that there be six battalions of artillery, 58 each. 348 


Three battalions of engineers. 174 

Four European regiments of infantry...... 232 

One European regiment of cavalry . 58 


Total European officers for the whole army. 812 


Of these there would be appointed to, say— 

30 Native infantry regiments, at 4 each. 120 

6 Native cavalry regiments. 24 

Staff appointments, say. 180 

Sick and on furlough . 80 


Total. 404 


Remaining for duty with 14 European battalions. 408 

(I would have no native artillery). Numbers and 
details might be altered and re-arranged to any extent, 
but the above will show the principle on which a 
sufficient fund of European energy and talent might 
be placed at the disposal of the Indian Government 
for the performance of public duties of all kinds ; 
the highest appointments being the prizes for the 
most worthy. While the principle of posting a few 
selected officers to native regiments, instead of a 

k 2 


















132 


crowd taken at hazard, might be fully carried out, 
and for all manner of duty the individual most fitted 
might easily be selected, without incurring the enor¬ 
mous cost of more Europeans, or having to face the 
apparently insurmountable difficulties of an Indian 
staff appointment corps (it is nonsense calling it a 
staff corps, which means quite a different thing). 
The appointments to native regiments, both of horse 
and foot, should be considered as the highest prizes 
of all in their various grades, and should be made so 
both in station and emolument. The allowances 
should be such as to cause the commands of native 
corps to be sought after by lieutenant-colonels, and 
to have commandants of that rank in the army would 
be an advantage; but rank alone should never be 
considered in such appointments. The principle of 
giving them to those best qualified for them should 
always be acted upon, and strictly followed out. 

All pipeclay, metaphorical and actual, should be at 
once abolished ; black leather accoutrements should 
be adopted, and no difficulties should be made or 
allowed to exist with regard to the introduction of 
improvements generally, in respect to arms, clothing, 
accoutrements, and all else. 

The pay of both men and officers should be 
increased, and every man should be compelled (as in 
good silidar corps) at all times and in all places to be 
provided with sufficient carriage for his kit, &c. 

These principles might perhaps be better followed 
out by placing all the European gentlemen required 
for the public service in India, whether civil or 
military, on one unattached list, letting them rise in 


133 


the list by seniority only, calling them generals, 
colonels, &c., &c., as at present, and assigning to each 
grade a proper and liberal amount of pay even while 
unemployed. 

From this general stock all officers might he 
selected, according to merit and qualification, for 
every appointment and duty whatsoever, the amount 
of pay as to the “ unemployed ” being allowed to all 
grades of officers while on leave on any account in any 
part of the world, and on retirement from the service. 

Under such arrangements, and so organised, the 
native army of India would be fully capable of going 
anywhere and doing anything. It would be equal to 
the encounter with equal numbers of any troops in 
continental Europe, and of course far superior to any 
Asiatic enemy. 

It is a grave mistake to suppose, as we are often 
told, that it is necessary to enlist men of the Northern 
tribes—Pathans, Belooche, Goorkas, &c.—to enable 
our Indian army to encounter successfully the warlike 
tribes now on our Indian frontier. 

The Mussulmans of Hindoostan are the very best 
men for our army. The Pathans, &c., are faithless 
and treacherous. These Hindoostanees are very hold, 
brave, strong, well-made, active men, fully equal in 
these respects to the Affghans (though the latter be 
the stouter-looking of the two). They are generally 
most excellent horsemen, and many enlist in our 
cavalry regiments, but under the present system no 
great numbers are found in the infantry corps of the 
line. As an example of the qualities of these Hin- 
doostanec horsemen, I may point to the fact that very 



134 


lately a regular Persian battalion — perfectly well 
drilled, armed, accoutred, &c., after the best Euro¬ 
pean model, composed of splendid men, who stood 
perfectly firm, bold, and confident in their array— 
was ridden over and utterly destroyed by Major John 
Forbes and one troop only of the 3rd Kegiment of 
Bombay Light Cavalry.* Have any soldiers ever 
done better ? 

There cannot be better Eastern soldiers than these 
men make when properly treated. They have scarcely 
more prejudices of religion, &c., than Englishmen, 
whatever the Bengal officers may fancy; they have 
most liberal ideas as compared with those of the 
Hindoo sepoys, to whom they are in every way supe¬ 
rior beings. With all this, they are the most faithful 
and trustworthy of any men in India; they are, in 
fact, more like gentlemen than any other class of 
Indians. 

With such men in our ranks, and fixed head-quar¬ 
ters for each regiment, where their families could 
remain in safety and comfort while the corps might 
be absent on service, the native troops of the Indian 
army might be employed on foreign service for any 
length of time, and at any distance from their homes ; 
and the time may possibly not be far distant when 
their services may be of the greatest value.—(1854.) 

Note , added in 1857 . 

After the fullest study of the subject, I am con¬ 
vinced that Sir John Malcolm’s original proposal was 


* This passage was added in 1857. 


135 


better than mine, in one respect: that the best possible 
arrangement would be to have all the officers in one 
list unattached, rising in army rank by seniority in 
the whole body; and from this general list to select 
for every duty whatever—regimental, staff, military, 
political, and civil. I would pay even the unemployed 
officers fairly, so as to keep them easily above sordid 
want. The mere presence of a number of English 
gentlemen would be of the utmost advantage to our 
rule in India, while most of them would, while 
u unemployed,” be engaged in qualifying themselves 
for employment , which they could only do in this 
country.—(1857.) 

Silidar Horse. 

Remarks on an Article in the “Calcutta Review”for 
March 1846, entitled “Hints on Irregular 
Cavalry ,” <§*£. 

The Bengal irregular cavalry is still, comparatively 
speaking, badly horsed and ill found, and must be so 
on the present miserable pittance of pay,—Bs. 20 a 
man and horse,—which sum is altogether insufficient 
to support a respectable horseman. Bad customs 
ought immediately to be changed, which can always 
be done if the commandant be fit for his situation. 
With regard to the qualifications mentioned by 
Captain Trower as necessary for a commandant of 
irregular cavalry, and on which the reviewer remarks 
that “ such men are not to be obtained in these 
degenerate days,” it appears to me that the Bengal 
army must be in a miserable plight if such men be 


136 


not obtainable by hundreds. Some of the qualifi¬ 
cations mentioned by Captain Trower are of little 
moment, such as not being of hasty temper, concilia¬ 
tory manners, &c. These things, however desirable, 
are little thought of by the men (who are excellent 
judges of their officers’ real characters), if higher 
and more necessary qualities exist. The supposing 
it necessary to flatter men’s prejudices, &c., which 
appears to be so much insisted on throughout the 
Bengal army, is a sad mistake,—it is the greatest evil 
which can exist,—it is the destruction of all mutual 
confidence and respect. It creates and fosters those 
very prejudices and mutual misunderstandings which 
it professes to “ conciliate.” Why did the soldiers of 
the Tenth Legion love Caesar? Because they were 
proud of him, not because he coaxed them. Men and 
soldiers, native or European, hate being commanded 
by “ spoons.” Show the men that you respect and 
regard them as soldiers and men , not as Hindoos or 
what not; treat all men under your command as men 
and soldiers, without any regard to (although without 
giving offence to) caste or prejudices ; treat the native 
officers as gentlemen, and you will soon understand 
each other perfectly. The differences of religion, 
&c., between officer and man are forgotten—posi¬ 
tively never thought of: you have one common inte¬ 
rest, and the European commander, if worthy by 
nature of his command, becomes the object of the 
most profound respect and regard—even though his 
demeanour be not very “ conciliatory.” 

There are other qualifications, besides those men¬ 
tioned by Captain Trower, which, in my opinion, are 


essential to, or very desirable for, a good commandant 
of irregular cavalry. He should, if possible, be a 
good and successful partisan soldier, quick in danger, 
fertile in resources : indeed, until a commanding- 
officer and his regiment have been on service together, 
the corps must be considered in a greater or less 
degree in an imperfect state : the proper feeling 
between each other can hardly exist. But after all, 
everything else is of trifling consideration when com¬ 
pared with a natural talent for command , — that 
quality, or combination of qualities, whereby a com¬ 
mander gains not only the respect of his own men, 
but makes them respect themselves , and raises their 
character in their own estimation, and in that of the 
world. This is the grand secret of being loved, 
respected, almost adored, by the native soldier. 
Get him “ abroo let him find himself honoured and 
respected wherever he goes,— even among strangers, 
on account of the service he belongs to, and there is 
nothing he will not gladly do to please his com¬ 
mander ; there is no inconvenience he will not wil¬ 
lingly undergo to maintain or increase the abroo of 
the regiment. The commandant and his men are 
naturally proud of, and confident in each other : the 
discipline is perfect, for it is the discipline of the heart. 

Commanding officers should be most carefully 
chosen by Government, with whom the means of 
judging correctly do certainly exist. When once ap¬ 
pointed, they should have ample powers—they should 
in fact be absolute in their regiments; they should 
have all promotions in their hands, and power to 
discharge any man of any rank. The appointment, 


138 


also, of the subordinate European officers should rest 
with them: they should be allowed to go their own 
way to work in all things, but be held strictly respon¬ 
sible for the efficiency of their regiments in every 
way ; no excuse should be admitted. If the regiment 
be not what Government wishes, and has a right to 
expect it to be, the commandant should he removed 
at once. In fact, it should be a contract between the 
commandant and Government. A good commander 
will always make a good regiment: its state will he 
the best possible both for the men and Government. 
Without a properly qualified commander, no rules, 
orders, nor regulations, will avail in the least; they 
will only make bad worse. The sepoy should never 
think of looking to higher authority than the com¬ 
mander of his regiment, who should be the patriarch 
of his tribe, the chief of his clan; every member of 
the regiment should feel identity of interest with him, 
and instinctively look to him as his natural head. 
Unless this state of things be fully carried out, the 
regiment is imperfect; where it exists, all is healthy 
and strong. To do justice to silidar cavalry, Govern¬ 
ment cannot give commandants too much power: 
there should be no rules, no code of laws, nor any 
trammels whatever. This I consider essentially the 
one thing needful. Whatever trouble it may he sup¬ 
posed to give Government in the choice of officers, 
scores of well qualified men do exist in the Indian 
armies, and Government can find them if they think 
proper to do so. 

With regard to making “ Horse Guards ” of the 
irregular cavalry, some grievous errors prevail. It is 


139 


not the European discipline which native gentlemen 
dislike—it is the stable duties, the European riding- 
school, and all those little harassing frivolities, having 
no connection with duty under arms, which exist in 
the regular cavalry, and are so disgusting to the 
purely Indian soldier ; and above all, the low rank , 
below the junior cornet, to which he can ever hope to 
attain. With the exception of the riding-school (that 
is, the dragoon riding-school), sword exercise, and 
stable duties, the silidar cavalry (the word irregular 
ought to be abolished) may be, and ought to be, as 
well disciplined and drilled as the regulars. When 
mounted and under arms, there ought to be no dif¬ 
ference, except that in the regular cavalry, the 
powers of the horses being more equal, and the 
horses better drilled, than those of silidar corps can 
be now , their movements must always be more steady, 
and their formations made with more squareness and 
precision, than those of the silidar cavalry; but in pro¬ 
portion as this difference lessens, the silidar cavalry is 
good. The discipline of the latter ought to be better 
than that of the regulars, inasmuch as you have better 
security—the men have more at stake, and discharge 
from the service is a very severe punishment. 

With regard to the number of assamees or silidarees 
allowed to be held by one individual, no rule should 
be laid down: it may be for the advantage of the 
service that a certain individual should hold fifty or 
a hundred assamees, and as regards another indi¬ 
vidual, it may be advantageous that he should not be 
allowed to hold more than three: of this the com¬ 
mandant is the proper judge ; all should rest with 



140 


him. One man, I believe, in the Nizam’s service 
holds five hundred assamees, and one in the Guzerat 
Horse some three hundred. 

The assamees are of course hereditary, and saleable 
property, hut only during good behaviour, and subject 
to the commandant’s approval. All assamees are 
liable to be forfeited for misconduct on the part of 
the silidar, by sentence of a punchayet, and the orders 
of the commandant. The system of allowing men 
not in the service to hold a very great number of 
horses in a regiment works, I am told, excellently 
well in the Nizam’s service, and in the Guzerat 
Horse, but for the foreign service it is altogether 
bad; indeed it could not exist long, for the absent 
silidar would find so little profit, even from his five 
hundred horses, that he would sell off as soon as 
possible. Not a single assamee in the Sind Irregular 
Horse is now held by any one not belonging to the 
corps; and in my opinion the system of “ be-nokur ” 
silidars is bad under any circumstances, but for a 
regiment always serving at a distance from the men’s 
native country, as in the Sind Horse, the system is 
certainly most injurious, and Captain Jacob with 
much labour completely destroyed it in that corps. 

On the death of a silidar, whose heir is not a 
member of the corps, the horse and assamee are sold 
by auction, and the amount realised paid to the heir 
as a part of the estate. The heir, unless in the 
regiment, or a youth likely to he soon fit for service, 
is never allowed to retain the assamee. 

The reviewer is in grievous error about bargheers : 
if the state of affairs he describes be that of the 


141 


Bengal irregular cavalry, it is nevertheless very bad. 
The bargheer is certainly more likely to misconduct 
himself than the silidar, and therefore to remedy this 
in the Sind Horse no bargheer is admitted without 
two silidars becoming security for him. This security 
is not a mere form, but is always enforced. Under 
this simple arrangement, it is not found that the 
bargheers are much more liable to misconduct them¬ 
selves than the silidars.* 

It is also a very grave error on the part of the 
reviewer, and one likely to lead to much harm, to 
assert that “ every additional bargheer is a burden 
on the State,” and that it would be better to have all 
silidars. I can on this point speak positively, and 
with certainty, after having belonged to an irregular 
corps almost constantly on service for many years. 
There is no doubt about it! So far from agreeing 
with the reviewer, I assert, then, that the one-horse 
silidar is the worst of all, and that a regiment 
composed wholly of such men would be wretchedly 
inefficient. The one-horse silidar is always poor and 
miserable; his horse is badly fed and cared for ; he 
cannot afford to keep a pony nor a syce ; and, on the 

* In the Nizam’s cavalry, the silidar enlists his own bargheers, 
who are responsible to him, and under his command. Nothing of 
this kind is allowed in the Sind Horse. The bargheer is not under 
the authority of the silidar in any way whatever : he is enlisted by 
the commandant as a soldier of the State, not as the servant of the 
silidar. It is not even thought necessary that the bargheer should 
always be placed on the horse of the silidar who is his security, 
although of course he is generally so placed. The bargheer may at 
any time be transferred to any horse ; but it is a rule to consult the 
wishes of the men, and to keep friends and relations together as 
much as possible. 


142 


whole, I consider him worse off than the bargheer: 
at least one-half more pay would be required to main¬ 
tain a regiment of owe-horse silidars than on the 
present plan, equal efficiency being supposed in both. 

I am quite certain that for a regiment intended for 
service, and at a distance from the mens homes, your 
three-horse silidar hath no fellow for efficiency: he 
keeps a tattoo or two, or probably a camel, a syce, 
and a grass-cutter, so that he and his two bargheers, 
with their servants, form a very comfortable little 
family. He has generally a little money in hand, 
instead of being in debt, and can on a pinch get on 
for two or three months without pay (the Sind Horse 
have often had to do this), and is altogether as 
superior a man as possible in every way to the 
miserable one-horse silidar. When a man has more 
than eight or ten horses on service, some of them are 
apt to be neglected: they cannot always, perhaps, be 
together, and the bargheers may cheat both the 
horses and the silidar; but the three or four-horse 
silidar is the true mean—he is not poor, and every¬ 
thing is done under his own eye. 

The reviewer is also greatly in error about a russal- 
dar being “ entitled to five assamees, &c., &c.” The 
russaldar may he entitled to hold—that is, he is 
allowed to hold—five or five hundred assamees, but 
these are not taken from others to be given to him ; 
if he wish for more horses than he already has, he 
must buy them, and the assamees too. “ The russal¬ 
dar who is promoted claims a like number of assamees: 
where is he to get them ?” says the reviewer. Now 
all this shows such profound ignorance of the genius 


143 


of the service, that it is difficult to deal with it with¬ 
out much explanation. All that the russaldar has, I 
repeat, is the permission to hold a certain number of 
horses in the regiment: he must get these horses how 
he can—by purchase, of course ; for I should think 
that any vacant assamees in the gift of the com¬ 
mandant would rather be presented to poor and well¬ 
deserving sowars , who could not so well afford to 
purchase, than to the rich russaldar, who had the 
means of buying any number. The russaldar is 
entitled to have so many horses, as he is entitled to 
wear the russaldar’s coat; but he must first buy that 
coat—he has no right to another man’s. But it is a 
great error on the part of Government interfering at 
all in the matter of the number of horses held by 
individuals ; it should be entirely discretionary with 
the commandant. 

With regard to six-horse silidars being excused 
sentry, the idea appears to me had in principle, and 
even absurd: the men ought never to be allowed to 
suppose that they are degraded by 'performing the 
duties of a soldier. 

With regard to men of good family, whether six- 
horse silidars or not, it is well after a short time, when 
they have thoroughly learnt their duties as private 
soldiers , to promote them, but until that takes place 
there should be no distinction allowed. Every rank 
in the service should be considered honourable, even 
that of the private sowar. 

The remark about Government not reducing the 
number of bargheers also betrays bad principles. 
Government ought not to interfere at all in the mat- 


144 


ter; such interference would be highly injurious, if 
not ruinous, to the service. The proper men for irre¬ 
gular cavalry are doubtless the Mussulmans of Hin- 
doostan. The men of the Nizam’s service are the 
best horsemen in India, I believe; and the service 
being so popular, there are always hundreds of excel¬ 
lent oomedwars to choose from. Whenever a vacancy 
occurs, a bargheer will pay for his place Us. 400. 
Such men cannot* misbehave—they have too much at 
stake; neither do they require drilling—they are 
trained soldiers before their enlistment. But this state 
of things, which has so many advantages, cannot exist 
when the regiment is constantly serving in a foreign 
country. 

The remarks about 44 keeping up the prices of 
assamees,” &c., betray the existence of some lament¬ 
able evils in the Bengal irregular cavalry. A thing is 
only worth what it will fetch : if the attempt be made 
to force an artificial price, either above or below the 
real one, immense evil is the consequence. Something 
of the kind formerly existed in the Sind Horse, or 
rather among the men of the Poona Horse who were 
transferred to form the new corps. The old assamees 
of the Poona Horse were supposed to be worth Bs. 500 
each, and at this rate they constantly changed hands; 
hut the silidars were all in debt, and the sale was not 
real —it was merely a transfer of debts in the bankers' 
books. There were no means of knowing the real 
value. Afterwards, as the Sind Horse was raised, and 

* It is not, of course, meant literally that a man cannot misbehave 
as one of my antagonists (“ II") gravely proceeds to refute. A man 
can cut his throat if he likes, but it is not usual to do so. 





145 


new assamees were offered for sale, it was found that 
their value was only about Es. 300 or less, and to 
maintain the regulated price of Es. 500 it was thought 
advisable by the commanding officer to form an 
assamee fund by subscriptions from the silidars, from 
which fund the difference of price was made up to the 
silidar who sold his horse and assamee. This appeared 
to Captain Jacob a strange, troublesome, useless, and 
complicated proceeding; wherefore he abolished the 
assamee fund, repaid the money to the subscribers, 
and let everything find its own natural level. No 
matter whether a silidar chose to sell his assamee for 
Es. 5 or Es. 500, one thing was insisted on—that all 
sales should be for ready money. The change pro¬ 
duced was like magic: within a few months after¬ 
wards a horse in the Sind Irregular Horse would sell 
by auction for ready cash for Es. 500 and Es. 520, or 
even more; and these prices were maintained till the 
raising of the new regiment threw so many assamees 
into the market gratis. With the exception of allow¬ 
ing no one not a member of the regiment to purchase, 
and of insisting on ready money being paid, every 
silidar is free to sell his horse and assamee as may 
seem good to him. 

The recommendation of the reviewer as to the 
filling up of assamees vacant by death, &c., is not 
sound: the assamee is not vacated by death unless the 
deceased leave no heirs, in which case it lapses to the 
commandant, who gives it to any deserving man, or 
orders it to be sold for the benefit of the regimental 
fund. If there he heirs, the assamee is just as much 

L 



146 


their property as anything else belonging to the 
deceased, and should never be otherwise disposed of. 

The fixing the price of assamees at a certain sum 
is very bad (as has been proved on a large scale in the 
Sind Horse), and leads to all manner of evil: they 
are just worth what they will fetch at a public bond 
fide sale, neither more nor less. The remark that this 
would enable many bargheers to purchase without 
getting irretrievably into debt , exposes the besetting 
sin of the irregular cavalry of Bengal. A silidar in 
debt is absolutely and altogether unfit for the service: 
he ought always to have a little money in hand, or he 
cannot be efficient. A rule is established, and acted 
on, in the Sind Horse, whereby any man borrowing 
money for the purpose of buying a horse, ipso facto , 
forfeits his assamee. Men who cannot afford to buy 
and equip a horse are totally unfit to be silidars. When 
men once begin to borrow, there is no end to it; their 
pay will not suffice to cover the interest of their debts ; 
they are ground down to the earth, and always at the 
mercy of their creditors.* 

With regard to the sons of native officers, why 
should they not enter as bargheers? Very many ex- 

* Since these pages were written, another fact has occurred which 
bears on the subject. Another regiment of Sind Irregular Horse 
has been raised, 800 strong, mounted, clothed, armed, accoutred, and v 
drilled, all in first-rate style, without allowing a man to borrow a 
rupee. This fact speaks volumes. By being forced to keep out of debt, 
the men are compelled to save money in spite of themselves. The only 
exceptions to this were a few men who came from the Nizam’s 
cavalry. These men brought their debts with them, which was not 
known to Major Jacob till after they had joined the Sind Irregular 
Horse. 


14 / 


cellent men do so enter, but soon purchase assamees 
and get promoted also. With regard to bargheers 
selling their places, I am of opinion that it ought not 
to be thought of. But the reviewer says, who will 
buy ? The answer is plain: in the Nizam’s service 
the place of a bargheer sells for Rs. 400 ; but if it 
be worth nothing, as in the Bengal irregular cavalry, 
of course it will sell for nothing. The rate of pay in 
Bengal is much too low, and it appears to me most 
injudicious to bring down the pay of the Poona Horse 
to the same rate, the expenses at Seroor being about 
double those in Bengal. To be really efficient, a 
private sowar in Bengal should receive Rs. 30, and in 
Sind and the Bombay presidency in general Rs. 45. 
The adoption of these rates would be true economy 
in the end: a bad article is not cheap, though pur¬ 
chased at a low price. 

With regard to the expediency of altering the 
denominations of the different ranks, as proposed by 
Captain Trower, and objected to by the reviewer, it is 
merely a return to the old nomenclature, which is in 
my opinion in some respects the better of the two : 
the Bengal ranks have only lately been introduced 
into the Bombay army, and appear strange, and some 
of them unmeaning and troublesome. Why call a 
native adjutant a u wordee major,” or a pay duffedar a 
“ wukheel?”—What on earth is a “ nakeeb ?” This 
man ought to be replaced by a kote duffedar major, 
whose duties are defined and well understood. The 
reviewer says that he has a great objection to Captain 
Trower’s one great russaldar, who he says will appa¬ 
rently have no specific duty, &c.; and then he talks 

l 2 


148 


nonsense about his “ cocking' up his beak,” &c. Now, 
after many years’ experience of his use, I assert that 
the one great russaldar, or a russalclar major, is 
invaluable in a regiment of irregular cavalry. He 
holds the place of subadar major of the regulars, and 
no number of European officers could supply his place. 
But the fact is, that the value of native officers is not 
properly understood in the army of Bengal. They 
have in that army little power over the men, are 
perfectly separated in heart and feeling from the 
European officers, and only half understand each 
other: moreover, they are very often old imbeciles, 
incapable of active exertion, whether of mind or body. 
But it is not so with us. A native officer or soldier 
after twenty years’ service in the Bombay army is 
half an Englishman in feeling. He is not valued, 
either by himself or others, on account of his caste, 
&c., but according to his ability as a soldier, and his 
conduct as a man : he is much more proud of being 
an officer than of being a Brahmin or a Syud. What¬ 
ever, then, may be the case at present in Bengal, it is 
certain that arussuldar major, properly selected, is of 
the greatest advantage to the well-being of a regiment. 
He completes the chain connecting the natives with 
the Europeans ; and, when really what he ought to be, 
affords the greatest support to the authority of the 
commanding officer : besides which, the appointment 
is one of great repute and respectability, and is some¬ 
thing to look forward to as a reward for long and 
meritorious service. 

The reviewer’s remarks about kettle-drums and 
trumpets do not appear to he judicious. The kettle- 


149 


drum is an absurd affair altogether, and ought to be 
abolished: it is fit rather for the establishment of a 
nautch-woman than for use as a soldier-like instrument. 
Its very appearance is ridiculous. A trumpet to each 
troop is quite sufficient, and nothing else ought to he 
allowed. With regard to the drums adding to the 
consequence of the russaldars, it may be truly 
remarked, that if the russaldars be fit for their places 
they would blush to hear that their respectability 
rested on such things. Teach them to pride them¬ 
selves upon their officer-like qualities, and they will 
not affect such childish folly. 

We now come to the regimental fund,—a most 
important subject, — about which the reviewer is 
shockingly in the dark, or the system in the Bengal 
irregular cavalry is shockingly bad. 

The whole affair appears so monstrous, that, instead 
of attempting to point out the evils of the system 
described by the reviewer, I will simply mention what 
is the state of affairs in the Sind Horse. 

There is a regimental fund, formed by the subscrip¬ 
tion monthly of fourteen annas per horse, and two 
annas per man; all fines, &c. also go to the fund. On 
the death of a horse, the owner receives Rs. 100 from 
the fund, to assist him in the purchase of another. 
The farriers and artificers of sorts are paid from this 
fund, and some other things of general benefit 
supported by it. There is no regimental banker, and 
no shop-keeper in the regimental bazar dare give a 
man credit beyond the end of the month (this rule is 
strictly enforced). Any man getting into debt to 
purchase a horse forfeits his assamee. Debt is 



150 


considered to be the utter destruction of efficiency; 

and a most constant watch is kept, and the most 

stringent rules are enforced, against it. A man in 

debt is considered just as unlit for the service as if he 

had lost his limbs, and is treated accordingly. In 

consequence, the men are not in debt at all, as they 

never need be, and therefore are always ready for 

service: no more notice or preparation is required to 

march the regiment one thousand miles than to turn 

it out for parade, —indeed, the Sind Horse have 

seldom received more than twelve hours’ warning 

before a march. We have only to consider that 

whatever the rate of pay, much or little, incurring 

debt must reduce the amount by the whole sum paid 

for interest: if the pay be already too small, borrowing 

money, to be repaid with interest from that pay, only 

makes the state of affairs infinitely worse. Yet to 

such an extent does this evil exist in the irregular 

© 

cavalry of Bengal, that an old and excellent com¬ 
mandant told me that he had been obliged when he 
took command of his regiment, to borrow, on his own 
personal responsibility, some three lakhs of rupees to 
pay off the men’s debts, so as to get rid of the ruinous 
rate of interest they were then paying; and that, after 
all, in a few years’ time, by reason of a famine, they 
were as bad as ever —hopelessly involved ! Another 
commandant told me that before he could come to 
Sind he had to borrow a very large sum (some 
Rs. 80,000) from the Agra Bank. I know also 
numerous other cases in point. This state of affairs 
appears to me to be so utterly destructive of every¬ 
thing like military efficiency, that it is astounding 



how things can go on at all under it. The system is 
rotten at the core, though tolerably fair outside. 

With regard to the arms of irregular cavalry, after 
many trials, I am certain that the native sword and a 
good percussion carbine are the only weapons for use, 
save that the officers and duffedars may carry pistols. 
The Government carbine is almost, if not quite, 
useless to the native horseman, however well it may 
answer for a dragoon ; it is much too long, and, from 
being of musket bore, is far too heavy and clumsy.* 
After many trials, and much correspondence with the 
makers in England, Captain J&cob got a manufac¬ 
turer to supply the Sind Horse with a very perfect 
carbine, description as follows — 

Length of barrel, 22 inches. 

Bore, 17 gauge. 

Weight altogether, under 6 lbs. 

Percussion lock of the best construction, half-cock 
just above the nipple, with sliding stop. 

These pieces are exactly adapted to the men, and 
are most formidable weapons .f They are used easily 

* The Government percussion pistols are most disgracefully bad. 
Those procured lately from England for the Sind Irregular Horse are 
beautiful and excellent, but rather expensive, costing Rs. 56 a pair. 
They are supplied to the native officers and non-commissioned officers. 
The Government cavalry fire -arms have been completely spoiled by 
the adoption of the musket bore in place of the 17 gauge. 

I Vide despatch about the fight of Zemanee on the 1st October 
1847. I have seen the same thing often before as occurred on that 
day, but not to the same extent. No swordsmen on earth could have 
killed five times their own number of armed, brave, and desperate 
enemies, fighting for their lives, which was accomplished by the 
Sind Irregular Horse in the fight of the Zemanee, in two hours’ 
time. 


152 


on horseback in one hand; and in the hands of the 
old sowars, who make the muzzle nearly touch an 
enemy before firing, their effect is terrific. The 
sowars make excellent practice with them on foot: at 
a hundred yards it is quite equal to the generality of 
infantry regiments with percussion muskets. The 
lance is in my opinion (formed after considerable 
experience of its use both in the chase and in battle), 
useless for light cavalry; it may be very showy, but 
out of five hundred lancers not half a score will be 
found really masters of their weapon for war. The 
sword and carbine are “ facile princeps ” among light 
horsemen’s weapons: there cannot be better carbines 
than those of the Sind Horse, but they are rather 
expensive, costing at Hyderabad about Rs. 28 each; 
but the men are delighted with them, and would 
gladly pay much more for them if necessary. The 
matchlocks I should class with the kettle-drums. I 
know them w T ell! 

The truth of the story about the Brahooees and 
Skinner’s Horse at Dadur is not exactly as stated by 
the reviewer. The Sind Horse w T ere present also, 
which he appears not to have known. The best 
Brahooees who ever drew sword would never dream 
of standing a regular charge : it is easy to do “ great 
havoc” on flying enemies; but after all, not much 
was done on that occasion. The enemy (after a feint 
of advancing, to gain time for the Khan and others 
to escape), bolted;—that is the whole matter. As to 
the fire of matchlocks from horseback before the 
charge doing any execution, it is too absurd to be 
thought of. 


153 


With regard to the uniform of irregular cavalry, 
most officers appear pretty nearly agreed except as to 
colour, and to the head dress. For the latter, there 
is nothing in my opinion to be mentioned in the same 
breath with the common scarlet pugree ; it fits close 
to the head, protects it from the sun, and partly 
from a cut; is never in the way, looks beautiful 
and soldier-like, and withal is as light as a feather. 
Its cost also is trifling. The dress of the Sind Irre¬ 
gular Horse is a dark green cloth “alkalug” (tunic, 
with silver lace and embroidery for the officers), 
white drawers, jack-boots, red pugree, and “ kumer 
bund.” The saddle-cloth is green and red, and 
the horse accoutrements are also covered with green 
and red cloth: the whole looks well, plain, and 
soldier-like. The dress of the native officers is very 
handsome. 

With regard to the supply of clothing, the remarks 
of the reviewer again show the crying evil which 
exists in the Bengal army, want of mutual under¬ 
standing and proper feeling between European and 
native. With us no such feelings as those described 
could, I should hope, take place or be dreamt of, and 
it is sad to think that they should exist in Bengal. 
An officer is not liable to be thought a tailor because 
he interests himself about the clothing of his men, 
their arms and equipments in general, and procures 
them for them of far better quality, and cheaper, than 
they could get them themselves. They are delighted 
with, and most grateful for, all such arrangements: 
“ Who else have we to look to—are you not our 
father ?” say they ! 


154 


Is it likely that those whom you have led in a 
thousand difficulties and dangers, who are proud of 
their commander, and he of them—when you perfectly 
understand each other, when you have been inti¬ 
mately associated with each other for many years, 
under all kinds of circumstances, till the accident 
of one being Christian, another Mussulman, &c., is 
completely forgotten—is it to be supposed, I say, that 
anything you please to do for the good of your men 
will be misrepresented among them? Away with 
such nonsense! 

Besides carbines and pistols, the Sind Horse are 
supplied from England with pouches and belts, cap- 
pouches and sword-belts, of black patent leather. 
The clothing, horse accoutrements, &c., are supplied 
by the army clothing agent in Bombay, of excellent 
quality, and at a rate which, though high, is cheaper 
than they could he procured in any other way. Every 
man is under regular monthly clothing stoppages 
from the day he enters the service. What can be 
better ? All that about troop officers and regimental 
bankers is bad in principle, and worse in practice. 
That abominable incubus, the regimental banker, is 
the root of all evil! Thank God there is no such 
monster with us ! 

With regard to the marching of irregular cavalry, 
of course they are, or ought to be, always able to 
move at a moments warning. The Sind Horse is 
so, and seldom has more than twelve hours’ notice 
for a march of any length, or for any service: every 
man always is provided with a sufficiency of camels, 
tattoos, &c. 



155 


With regard to the regimental bazars, they appear to 
be excellently managed in the Nizam’s cavalry (how¬ 
ever, they have had little experience of desert countries 
as yet, I fancy). With us, we cannot carry at the 
outside more than five days’ food for man and horse; 
hut it appears to me, that if the necessary supplies 
exist in the country through which the regiment is 
marching, the bazar can supply itself from day to day. 
If, again, as has often happened to the Sind Horse, 
the supplies do not exist, no bazar, however perfect, 
could carry them for above a few days, for this plain 
reason, that the cost of transport alone of one month’s 
food for man and horse amounts in this country to 
more than the sowar’s whole pay. When, then, the 
country does not afford the necessary supplies, the 
commissariat must feed the irregulars as well as any 
other part of the army, or they starve ; but if food 
exist in the country, the sowars will get it somehow. 
The proper rule is this: let the commanding officer 
of the regiment certify, on honour, that sufficient 
supplies do not exist, and then only let the necessary 
food be carried and supplied at a reasonable rate by 
the commissariat. This is the rule in Sind. The 
men detest being obliged to have recourse to the 
“ godown ” (as they call it), and would far rather 
purchase elsewhere, so that no abuse is likely to 
occur. 

In every regiment there is a “ koti,” or bank, says 
our reviewer. Marry ! is there in every Bengal regi¬ 
ment ! And this koti or bank appears to me to be 
a crushing evil! It paralyses every energy ; nearly 
every man is hopelessly in debt; frequently he cannot 


156 


even pay the interest of these debts. His self-respect 
is gone; he is put to all kind of shifts—sometimes 
most disreputable ones—to enable him to keep up 
appearances; and after all his horse is starved, and, 
with his rider, alike unfit for any efficient service 
away from his home. The bank is of essential ser¬ 
vice in buying remounts, &c., says the reviewer: 
he, however, admits that it has ill consequences, 
but ends by saying that it is of no use to argue the 
question, because no corps can be serviceable without 
one ! ! 

Strange infatuation this ! But so true is it, that 
habit will reconcile us to anything : that which we 
are accustomed to appears best. Exactly the reverse 
of the statement of the reviewer is the truth. No 
corps can be serviceable with one of the banks 
and regimental bankers in full force ! 

There is neither bank nor bankers in the Sind 
Horse, and any man found borrowing money for the 
purpose of buying a horse, ipso facto , forfeits his 
assamee. If a man have not a little money of his 
own he is unfit to be a silidar , and his being allowed 
to become or to remain one without the means 
(independent of borrowing) of supporting himself 
and his horse respectably and efficiently, is, I consider, 
absolutely ruinous to the regiment in which such 
practices exist. The pay allowed (Bs. 20 per man 
and horse to a Bengal regiment, and Bs. 30 to the 
Sind Horse,) is not sufficient, any how, to maintain 
the horseman as he ought to be : how then can he 
pay the interest of his debts ? A horseman in debt 
I consider utterly ruined as a soldier : he mav turn 




out for ordinary duties, or make a decent appearance 
on parade now and then, hut for real service he is 
worth nothing. The evil once begun, the debt once 
allowed, it goes on rapidly increasing ; the case is 
hopeless; there is no remedy: the silidar in debt is 
useless, and ought at once to be discharged. There 
is no rule of such vital importance to the efficiency 
of a silidar corps—none which requires such constant 
watchfulness and determined resolution to enforce— 
as this : never to allow a horse to be purchased with 
borrowed money , and never to allow pauper silidars. 
If the contrary be the state of affairs in the Bengal 
irregular cavalry, the commanding officers of regiments 
ought at once to stop it, sell the horses and assa- 
mees of every silidar in debt, pay the debts with 
the proceeds as far as they would go, pitch the regi¬ 
mental shroff to the devil, and never allow a man 
to borrow a rupee again—no, not to save his life. 
But, alas ! the great mass of these debts has been 
incurred under the sanction and signature of the 
commandants,—a suicidal proceeding, which renders 
them powerless. 

If things cannot be carried on without borrowing 
money, they must become worse with borrowing, which 
lessens the man’s means by the whole amount of the 
interest paid for the loan. If moneyed men will not 
enter the service, leave the ranks vacant till they will 
do so, or until Government increase the pay! The 
system of borrowing money is alike deceptive and 
ruinous. It cannot be too much insisted on, that a 
man without sufficient ready money of his own to 
purchase his horse and equipments is unfit to he a 



158 


silidar, and should never , on any account , be allowed 
to be one. 

The application of articles of war and regimental 
courts-martial, forms of law, &c. to corps of irregular 
cavalry, is injurious in the highest degree (and in 
this I speak advisedly and with confidence). Of 
course, if a man commit murder or such like, try him 
as a camp-follower, but all ordinary offences should be 
left to be dealt with by the commandant of the regi¬ 
ment. The introduction of regimental courts-martial 
is very bad,—it is unmixed evil ! The punchayet 
is ten thousand times more efficient. The genius of 
the service should he kept in mind. The native 
officers of irregular cavalry are really officers : the 
russaldar is as much commanding officer of his troop 
as the captain of regular cavalry is of his. The 
native officers of irregular cavalry do not hold the 
places of the native, but of the European officers 
of the regular army. They are men accustomed to 
think and act for themselves. A punchayet com¬ 
posed of them, and the proceedings of which are 
conducted after their own fashion, is, out of all 
comparison, a more just and efficient tribunal than the 
native court-martial, with its European superintendent, 
interpreter, articles of war, forms of law, &c. &c. 

There never yet has been a court-martial at all in 
the Sind Irregular Horse, and a punchayet is seldom 
known to fail in its duty; and, indeed, I have never 
heard of a single case in which its decisions were not 
strictly just. A regimental punchayet in the Sind 
Irregular Horse is composed of a russaldar as 
president, and four other native officers as members: 


159 


9 


none below the degree of a commissioned officer are 
allowed to sit. Their method of proceeding is 
peculiar, but exactly adapted to the ideas of the men 
themselves, which our forms of courts-martial most 
certainly are not . The witnesses are sworn at the 
discretion of the court, and all evidence is recorded 
in Persian. The sentence of course requires con¬ 
firmation by the commandant before it can be carried 
into effect. 

A punchayet has power to inflict forfeiture of one 
or more assamees, fine, imprisonment (in the regimental 
guard), or to recommend dismissal. 

The commandant of a corps of irregular cavalry 
ought to have it in his power to discharge any man, 
even a russuldar, from the service ; and all promotions 
should be absolutely in his hands, even to the highest 
grades. The appointment of the European officers 
should also be left to him. He should also have 
magisterial powers,—which, indeed, he in general has 


with us. 

With regard to silidars neglecting horses, the 
proper proceeding is simple enough. The com¬ 
manding officer sees a horse in bad order, or unfit for 
service : he immediately, as a matter of course, orders 
the man to get another, and his horse’s pay lapses to 
the fund till he does so. As to the silidar being 
ruined, I repeat, that if the silidar have not sufficient 
money of his own to purchase and maintain a good 
horse, he is useless ; and the sooner he is turned out 
of the regiment, or at least ordered to sell his assamee, 
the better. I have never heard any man of the Sind 
Irregular Horse object to this proceeding in the case 


160 


of bad horses,—its justice is at once felt and 
acknowledged by all: indeed, the more respectable 
silidars often do not wait to be told to change a horse, 
but, when they think that an animal will not be 
approved of by the commandant, frequently of their 
own accord bring another horse, to be passed and 
entered in place of the bad one. 

This is the proper state of affairs. The men see 
that the object of the commandant is the respectability 
of the corps and the good of the whole, and that in 
the end this is for the good of each individual in it. 
Horses in the Sind Irregular Horse are always 
examined by the commandant himself, and, if approved 
of, branded in his presence. 

The reviewer’s remarks about pensions appear just; 
but after all, perhaps pensions are not much required 
in a silidar corps on a proper scale of pay, and 
properly constructed. 

With regard to standards, in my opinion they are 
a nuisance. The Sind Horse have standards, having 
won them at Meeanee, but the corps would be better 
without them : they are never of any use, and on real 
service are only in the way; the better a regiment 
behaves, sometimes, the more risk there is of losing 
its standards. 

The idea of teaching the sowars the sword exercise 
is silly: they are far better swordsmen than the 
regulars as it is. With regard to the riding-school, 
it is different; and, if proper pay were allowed, I 
would establish one,—not, of course, precisely in the 
dragoon style, but appointing some of the best riders 
among the old sowars regularly to teach the recruits 




161 


to ride after their own fashion, and to drill the horses. 
In the Nizam’s service this is not required, for only 
fully trained men are taken into the service, which 
the number of candidates in waiting always enables a 
commanding officer to act up to, the service being so 
popular. 

It is different in the Sind Horse. Our pay is 
small, the country is not liked, the climate is bad, 
and everything very expensive; consequently, our raw 
material is somewhat inferior, and to make it equal 
to the other requires more labour in working up. 
Men will rather take service in the Bengal Irregular 
Cavalry than in that of Sind: the difference of pay is 
not adequate to the increased expenses and incon¬ 
veniences of distance from home, severer discipline, &c. 

In my opinion, it would be greatly to the advantage 
of Government, and materially add to the strength of 
the Indian army, were all the regular (that is bar- 
gheer) cavalry made European : of course much 
fewer regiments would be required, say half the num¬ 
ber now existing, the present cavalry officers of two 
native regiments being appointed to one of Europeans ; 
and all the native cavalry made silidar corps, on a 
scale of pay and establishment which, though at a 
less cost, would enable them to be superior to any 
native cavalry now existing. The cost of each trooper 
of the regular cavalry of the Bombay army is about 
Us. 83 a month. The cost of each man of the Sind 
Irregular Horse as it now stands is about Bs. 36; 
and the cost of each man of the proposed silidar 
cavalry would be Bs. 58 monthly. The saving in 
the native cavalry would pay the increased expense ol 

M 


the European soldiers, and the increase of strength 
would be very great; for I maintain that the silidar 
cavalry on the proposed scale would be superior in 
every way to the native cavalry now existing. The 
best among the native gentry, who now have no con¬ 
nection with the army, would be proud and delighted 
to enter such a service, where the native officers have 
real command and authority, and where much of that 
harassing stable duty, &c., &c., which is so disagree¬ 
able to them, does not exist. Not only would the 
service be composed of a class of men very superior as 
soldiers to any now entering the native army, but the 
political effects of such a service would be immense : 
the most influential native sirdars, men of landed 
property, and so forth, throughout India, would 
have a distinct interest in this part of the British 
army, which would be filled with their brothers and 
sons. Neither could their connection with the army 
in this manner ever be attended with danger to the 
State, for to their position in the British army would 
they feel that they ow T ed greatly increased respecta¬ 
bility and honour: they would be grateful to the British 
Government, and be proud to serve, instead of only 
fearing it. The effect of such a state of things, in 
securing the fidelity and attachment of the people in 
general, must be very great. At the same time, not 
only is the cost of such a service much less than that 
of the present native cavalry, which has no connection 
at all with the most influential and best families of 
India, but the silidar corps is, from its construction, 
at all times much more ready and much more easily 
moved than any other troops whatever ; and by its 


163 


movement the State is put to no extra expense , save 
in the extreme case of a march through a desert 
country for more than a few days successively 

There is but one thing required to ensure the per¬ 
fect success of the proposed scheme, viz., a proper 
choice of officers to command, and the entrusting 
them with full and sufficient powers. The subordi¬ 
nate grades of European officers would then form an 
excellent school for future commandants, and the supply 
would never fail. The commandants should always 
be allowed to choose their own European officers. 
The service should always he one of careful selection; 
and if the commandants be really and honestly chosen 
by merit and fitness alone, Government need never 
find difficulty in appointing properly qualified indivi¬ 
duals. The officers of the regular cavalry are, in 
general , not well adapted for a silidar corps. But if 
they should possess the necessary qualifications, and 
be above the prejudices caused by education and 
habit , they would in such case certainly be the best. 
A certain number of the native officers and men of 
the “ regular ” cavalry might with advantage he in¬ 
corporated into the silidar corps (some of the best 
men of the Sind Irregular Horse are volunteers re¬ 
ceived at various times from the regular cavalry of 
Bombay) ; but a general transfer would not succeed 
at all—indeed it would ruin everything. One other 
thing especially should be borne in mind, viz., the 
absolute necessity of not appointing more than three 
European officers (besides the doctor) to each silidar 
regiment. The essence of the proposed advantages 
of the construction of the corps consists principally in 

m 2 


164 


the respectable position held by the native officers 
inducing a very superior class of men to enter the 
service. This state of things is not compatible with 
many European officers: quality, not quantity, is 
required. This cannot he too much insisted on. 

It is proposed to take the “ Political Advantages of 
Silidar Cavalry in India” as the theme of an essay 
hereafter. The subject is well worth the grave con¬ 
sideration of Government.—(1847.) 

On granting Compensation to Silidar Corps. 

The whole system of granting compensation to 
men of silidar corps appears to me to be founded on 
false principles; to be most injurious to the service, 
by striking at the root of that which forms the pecu¬ 
liar strength and advantage of a silidar corps, viz., its 
entire independence of external aid; to be contrary 
to true economy, inasmuch as it entails a great and 
uncertain expense on the State, without an equivalent 
benefit resulting in increased efficiency; to open a 
door to fraud; and to cause the worst conducted 
corps, or the worst individual silidars, to be the most 
costly to Government. 

The regulations in force since 1849 with regard to 
compensation for horses of irregular cavalry dying of 
fatigue, &c., also involve another practice which ap¬ 
pears to me to be fraught with the greatest evil to 
the service. I allude to the assembling of committees 
of cavalry officers to ascertain the circumstances of 
the case, &c. Such a rule can only be understood by 
the native soldiers as implying that Government dis¬ 
trusted their commandant, and thought it possible 


165 


that he might cheat the State, or allow others to do 
so. I can hardly imagine anything more calculated 
to destroy mutual respect and proper soldierly pride 
than such a proceeding. The rule has never been 
acted on in the Sind Irregular Horse, and I trust 
that it never will be. My opinion of the evil working 
of such arrangements—checks, as they are called—is 
neither vague nor theoretical. 

Let Government call for returns, showing the 
amount of compensation for horses drawn by regi¬ 
ments of irregular cavalry while serving on this 
frontier, in the Punjaub, or in similar positions, 
receiving the same rate of pay as the Sind Irregular 
Horse, under the operation of such checks, and com¬ 
pare it with the amount drawn by the Sind Irregular 
Horse on the same account, while entirely free from 
any such interference, during the last nine years of 
almost constant active service, including a share in 
several great battles, and the practical working of the 
two systems will at once be apparent. * * * 

I have been informed, that when the 6th Regiment 
Bengal Irregular Cavalry was posted at Khanghur in 
1844-45, it received compensation for about five 
hundred horses. Another corps of Bengal Irregular 
Cavalry, when serving on this frontier, had, when I 
visited its lines, three out of four horses suffering 
from sore backs. The horses were still worked in 
that state ; those dying or becoming unserviceable 
being, of course, paid for by Government, under the 
committee system. How was this ? It was assuredly 
not owing to the superiority, or otherwise, of indi¬ 
viduals; but clearly because such a system makes 



166 


men helpless, careless, improvident, and dishonest— 
in a word, unsoldierlike. 

As an illustration of this principle, I beg to men¬ 
tion what appears to me exactly a case in point. 
When on service, in the year 1844-45, I found that 
more of our horses were laid up with sore backs than 
I thought right. The owners and riders of the horses 
had always plausible and ready excuses to offer; 
nevertheless, it appeared to me that the evil could be 
stopped, and, accordingly, I ordered that the bargheer 
riding a horse becoming sore-backed should forfeit to 
the regimental fund at the rate of one rupee a month, 
and the silidar owning the horse two rupees, until the 
animal should be well again; and that, meanwhile, 
the horse should not be ridden, nor anything whatever 
be carried on his back. 

This rule caused much dissatisfaction at first, 
especially among the senior native officers, who, 
having a great number of horses, were usually the 
most careless silidars, and suffered most. However, 
I was certain of my ground, and remained firm ; 
when in a very short time the advantage of the 
arrangement so much complained of became apparent 
to every man in the regiment; the penalty became 
virtually a dead letter, for there was scarcely a sore 
back remaining, and now such a thing is almost 
unknown in the whole corps. 

There is no better method of making a man take 
care of his horse than making him lose by the injury 
or death of the animal. My own opinion is firm, after 
much consideration of the subject, that all manner of 
compensation to men of silidar cavalry should be 


avoided as much as possible, as undoubtedly tending 
to injure their efficiency and make them helpless. 
Any increase of monthly pay which the men may 
receive will, up to a certain amount, in proper hands, 
be attended by a more than proportional increase of 
efficiency: but it is otherwise with occasional grants 
of compensation and such like ; these cannot be regu¬ 
larly calculated on, and the prudent and steady soldier 
does not depend on them ; while they tend to destroy 
honourable feeling, by enabling a rogue sometimes to 
obtain more than the honest man, and the owners of 
the worst horses to receive the most pay. 

With regard to compensation for horses, the only 
exceptions which I would make are in the cases of 
horses actually killed in battle, drowned, or lost when 
proceeding on duty by sea, and such like; where it 
must be evident that no care or providence on the 
part of the man could have prevented the loss, and 
that the condition and quality of the horse had 
nothing to do with the matter. 

Whatever may he the fair amount, on a liberal 
average, necessary to enable a silidar (free from debt, 
which ought not to he allowed) to maintain a ser¬ 
viceable horse, &c., it should be included in his 
monthly pay, which being sufficient for the purpose, 
he should be left to make his own arrangements, 
under the direction of his regimental commander; 
but no excuse should ever be admitted for inefficiency, 
and no external assistance, under any but very extra¬ 
ordinary circumstances, should be either looked for or 
granted. 

The system, then, of casting the horses of silidar 


168 


cavalry by committee, and Government paying for 
them, being shown not only to be enormously expen¬ 
sive to the State, but attended with positive evil to 
the service, it appears unnecessary to discuss the 
question as to what is to become of the cast horses. 

However, my opinion is clear, that such petty 
savings as the one in question, with regard to the 
silidar service, do harm, as tending to check a certain 
degree of liberality which is expected from, and which 
is essential to, a good silidar, and to produce a feeling 
towards Government in the native mind which it is 
most desirable to avoid.— (1856.) 

Silidar Rifle Corps. 

It would, I have not the least doubt, be perfectly 
easy and very advantageous to the State to raise and 
organize infantry on the same principles which I have 
acted on with the Sind Irregular Horse. Such 
infantry would be the most efficient in India. The 
only difficulty which I anticipate is the apparently 
invincible prejudice of authority. I must have no 
courts-martial or articles of w T ar. I want no lawyers 
among my men, neither do I wish to govern them by 
force or by fear. 

I will have “ sober God-fearing men in my troops,” 
as said old Cromwell, and will govern them by 
appealing to their higher, not to their basest attri¬ 
butes. Actual crimes can be dealt with by me and 
my lieutenants as civil magistrates: all else must be 
left entirely to my discretion. 

The men should receive ten rupees a month each, 
and provide their own arms, accoutrements, clothing, 


169 


&c., &c., just as do the Sind Irregular Horse, under 
regimental arrangements made and controlled by me. 
Nothing extra to he furnished by Government except 
hospital stores and hospital tent medicines, ammu¬ 
nition, and carriage for these. I should have full 
power to enlist, discharge, promote, and reduce, also 
of fining or otherwise punishing men, without articles 
of war, as with the Sind Irregular Horse. 

The choice and removal of officers to rest wholly 
with me. I should arm the men with rifles ; and it 
would be our chief peculiarity—for which purpose the 
amount of pay is calculated—that all should at all 
times be provided with proper means of carriage of 
kit to take the field at a moment’s notice, as with the 
Sind Irregular Horse. Carriage for the hospital and 
ammunition being permanently maintained at Govern¬ 
ment cost. 

Permanent head-quarters to be at Jacobabad, but 
the corps to be available for service anywhere, always 
returning, however, when its tour of service was over. 
Families, Pensioners, &c., to remain always at head¬ 
quarters. 

I would also add to each regiment of Sind Irregular 
Horse a troop of Silidar Horse Artillery; the troop 
to form part of the regiment. 

A force so organized would be complete in itself; 
would be independent of departments ; would be able 
to move anywhere at a few hours’ warning; and would 
be capable of long and rapid forced marches, the 
riflemen availing themselves of their baggage ponies, 
&c., to reach the place of action.—(1855.) 



Three Memoranda on the Constitution of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, as exemplifying the 
Silidar Principle. 

Memorandum , No. I. 

On the raising of the 1st Regiment of Sind Irre¬ 
gular Horse, two hundred men were transferred from 
the Poona Horse to the new corps. The men so 
transferred appeared to consider that they had a right 
to a sum of Rs. 500—neither more nor less—for each 
assamee they might choose to dispose of. This right 
appeared to have been recognised by commanding 
officers, and the assamees were constantly transferred 
at that price. At the same time, there was hardly 
ever a real sale; every man was deeply in debt to the 
regimental banker; and the sum of Rs. 500 for an 
assamee was merely transferred in the banker’s books 
from one name to another. On the raising of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, the new assamees were pre¬ 
sented, of course, either to deserving men of those 
received from the Poona Horse, or to others newly 
enlisted. 

The silidars could assert no such claim for a 
guaranteed price, with regard to the new assamees, as 
they had preferred with respect to those of the Poona 
Horse ; and, in consequence, the greatest confusion 
existed. 

There were three or four descriptions of assamees 
in the corps, such as original Poona assamees, pre¬ 
sented Poona assamees, new assamees presented, and 




171 


new assamees purchased, all coming under different 
rules. 

The commanding officer attempted to remedy this 
great evil, by forming an assamee fund. This fund 
was formed by large monthly subscriptions from the 
silidars of the corps ; the prices of the horses were 
registered; and on the sale of an assamee, the differ¬ 
ence between the price of the horse and Rs. 500 was 
made good from the fund. 

This contrivance, which was an attempt to remedy 
one error by another, was found greatly to increase 
the evils of an already vicious system ; and, on my 
joining the Sind Irregular Horse, nothing could have 
been more confused than the silidaree system in the 
regiment. 

O 

Nothing was left to find its natural level; and, in 
spite of all guarantees and artificial supports, there 
was no confidence in the system, and the assamees 
were actually worth nothing ; while many of them 
were held by women, children, shroffs, and all manner 
of persons not in the regiment at all. Wherefore, 
thinking that it was manifestly* impossible that a 
respectable military corps could exist under such 
arrangements, so soon as I had sufficiently mastered 
the subject to see my way clearly, I ordered that the 
assamee fund should be abolished, and the money 
repaid to the subscribers. I explained to the regi¬ 
ment that Government did not recognise the sale of 
assamees at all, but that the proceeding had been 
permitted as a private arrangement among the silidars, 
for their own convenience ; that all differences between 
assamees, however acquired, would immediately cease. 


172 


That all assamees, held by persons not belonging 
to the corps, should be considered vacant on the death 
of the horses now representing them in the regiment. 

That whenever a silidar might be permitted to sell 
an assamee, the sale should be by public auction, for 
ready money only; that no one should be allowed to 
bid except bargheers and silidars not holding already 
more than two horses in the corps. No borrowing of 
money, in order to purchase, to be allowed. 

That under every circumstance, the assamees should 
be held only during good behaviour; and that no sale 
or transfer should ever take place without the express 
permission of the commandant first obtained. 

Finally, that the price of an assamee was just what 
it would fetch, whether Rs. 5 or Rs. 500. 

These rules have been strictly acted on in tbe Sind 
Irregular Horse since 1842, and with the happiest 
results. 

The silidars were at first somewhat startled at the 
complete overthrow of all their accustomed habits and 
received ideas concerning silidar arrangements, and I 
was even told that' the ready-money sales would be 
absolutely impossible; but the arrangements had not 
long been in force before their benefit was apparent 
to all. 

The drain on the capital of the regiment by silidars 
not in the service, and by the interest paid to shroffs 
under the system of purchasing on credit, being- 
stopped, it was found that not only were ready-money 
purchases perfectly practicable, but the prices rapidly 
rose. 

Since I joined the Sind Irregular Horse, 1,100 


173 


assamees have been presented free to the men of the 
corps, each man on receiving his assamee paying 
Rs. 20 donation to the regimental fund. At the 
time of raising my second regiment, when 800 places 
were given to the silidars, of course there was little or 
no selling of assamees, but soon afterwards they were 
sold for Rs. 600 to Rs. 700. This is the price which 
they still fetch, and appears to be the rate to which 
they have settled down. 

With regard to the prices thus obtaining, it should 
be borne in mind that, under the system in force in 
the Sind Irregular Horse, the price of an assamee 
must be wholly regulated by the pecuniary means of 
the poorer members of the corps, no one not in the 
regiment, and no silidar holding three or more horses, 
being allowed to purchase. As the silidar assamees 
had long been considered as hereditary property, and 
had been sold as parts of the estates of deceased men, 
I did not think it advisable suddenly to disturb the 
arrangement, especially while, before the augmenta¬ 
tion of the corps, so large a proportion of the assamees 
had been purchased. 

But I am disposed to think that it would have been 
better had I done so at once ; and that in a corps 
untrammelled by old customs, assamees should be 
vacated by the death of the silidar : at the same time, 
if the deceased silidars left sons or brothers in the 
regiment, being eligible persons, it would be well 
always, as a favour, to transfer the assamees of the 
deceased to them. 

In all these things, consideration for the good of 
the service should be paramount. 


174 


But experience convinces me that the permitting 
property in, and the sale of, assamees, is necessary to 
the well-being of a silidar corps. It gives the greatest 
security for the good conduct of the men, who are not 
likely to misbehave when they have embarked their 
whole property in the service. 

The right of property in the assamees gives a tone 
to the whole structure of a silidar corps, without 
which its greatest strength would be wanting. It is 
this which makes the best soldiers in India attach 
themselves to the service, till they look on their regi¬ 
ment as their country, and their place in it as their 
estate. 

It should be fully understood that it is assumed that 
Government does not recognise the right of property 
in the assamees any further than a private regimental 
arrangement, and that all purchases of assamees are 
made with a full knowledge of the fact that if the 
corps he disbanded to-morrow the silidars have no 
claim on the State on account of any such purchases. 

Unless on a greatly increased rate of pay, it would 
not, I am of opinion, be practicable to raise a regi¬ 
ment, in which the silidar had to commence by the 
purchase of his assamee,—that is, if the purchase- 
money amounted to anything like the value which the 
assamee would be worth soon after the complete 
formation of the corps. 

But the principles of political economy are as true, 
as regards the sale of assamees, as of other things; 
and if the new assamees were sold for what they would 
fetch, as in the Sind Irregular Horse, their real value 
would at once be apparent. 


175 


With an entirely new corps for general service, the 
value of the assamees would at first, in my opinion, he 
almost nominal. 

I have not the smallest doubt but that the best 
proceeding on raising a regiment would be to give the 
assamees to the silidars free, and if they were after¬ 
wards allowed to sell them, it would be by favour and 
permission of the commanding officer. 

Even supposing that it were possible, which I do 
not believe it would be, to get respectable silidars to 
pay a round sum for their assamees on the first raising 
of a corps, and that the money so paid was to be 
applied to the formation of a fund, I have a strong 
opinion that the arrangement would be absolutely 
ruinous to the regiment. 

It would, in fact, he re-introducing the state of 
affairs which was found so injurious in the Sind Irre¬ 
gular Horse, and which was in that corps remedied 
with so much labour. 

Such a proceeding would tend to destroy the self- 
dependence which constitutes the silidar’s peculiar 
strength. 

The less Government interferes with him the better: 
he should receive his pay, and be left to make his 
arrangements for performing his part of the contract, 
being compelled always to have man, horse, arms, &c. 
complete and ready for service; no assistance being 
given, and no excuse accepted. 

On the whole, I have not the least doubt, after nine 
years’ constant attention to the subject, but that the 
best system of silidar arrangements is, that Govern¬ 
ment should not recognise the sale of assamees at all; 


176 


but that their sale should be permitted, at the dis¬ 
cretion of commanding officers, as a private arrange¬ 
ment between the men of the regiment. That such 
sales should be bond fide , for ready money only; and 
that only members of the corps should be allowed to 
purchase or to hold assamees in the corps. 

I am of opinion that it would have been much 
better if Government had never recognised even the 
distinction between bargheer and silidar; and if it 
were to refuse to do so now, a silidar corps should be 
mustered and paid as so many sowars, &c.; the horse 
being considered as part of the man, and commanding 
officers being held strictly responsible that everything 
be kept in an efficient state ; all details being left to 
them to manage as they can. 

It is undoubtedly possible that, under a different 
system, with less left to the regiment, and more esta¬ 
blished by general rule and regulation, no silidar 
corps would ever be in a very bad condition ; but it is 

certain that such a svstem would reduce all to a 

•/ 

decent mediocrity ; the genius of the service would be 
changed, and a tame and listless spirit everywhere 
take the place of emulation and zeal, of attachment to, 
and pride in the service. 

I have seen a good deal of silidar cavalry under 
each of these conditions; and the opinions above 
expressed are founded as much on actual observation 
as on reflection. 

It will be perceived that all I have written above 
refers solely to a silidar regiment, considered as a 
body of cavalry soldiers for general service in any part 
of the world.—( 1850.) 



177 


Memorandum No. II. 

The subject of the pay, &c. of the Sind Irregular 
Horse is a very difficult and a very delicate one for 
me, so deeply interested as my feelings are in it, to 
write on, so as, on the one hand, to do it justice and 
set its merits fairly forth, and, on the other hand, to 
avoid the appearance of presumption and undue per¬ 
sonal bias. 

The truth is, that the Sind Irregular Horse is not 
now an irregular corps at all, and cannot be fairly 
jud ged of if confounded with really irregular corps. 
The whole daily routine of duty in the Sind Horse is 
carried on with quite as much steady regularity, and 
in just as good style, as I have ever known in the best 
regiments of regular native cavalry. The only resem¬ 
blance, as far as I can understand, which exists 
between the Sind Irregular Horse and the other 
regiments of irregular cavalry of the Indian army, 
inclusive of the Nizam’s service, is that all are silidar 
corps. In everything else, the Sind Horse essentially 
differs from them all. The Sind Irregular Horse 
stands alone, and it is a new service lately called into 
existence, and the capabilities of which are only now 
being gradually developed. 

I was appointed to command one irregular regiment, 
and afterwards to raise another: I have made both 
regular. The corps has been formed and trained 
after a fashion entirely opposed to all formerly re¬ 
ceived opinions, to time-honoured prejudices, and to 

N 


178 


reputed experience. Whether I have done right or 
wrong in so acting it is for my superiors to judge,— 
I have at least worked honestly and zealously, to the 
best of my judgment; and the result has been that the 
corps, man for man, even in its still infant state, 
carries far more military power with it, under all the 
various cirumstances of war, than any irregular corps 
(more even than our “ regular ” native cavalry under 
most circumstances) ; and it appears certain, that had 
the Sind Irregular Horse been formed on the model 
of other corps of irregular cavalry, it could not pos¬ 
sibly have performed the service it has done: dis¬ 
graceful failure would, in all probability, have followed 
attempts to do with irregulars that which the Sind 
Horse has done with complete success. 

The corps has been constructed so as to retain the 
activity, independence, and readiness of the best 
irregular cavalry, with the solid strength, certainty, 
and steadiness of action of the regulars. It is armed 
in a style very superior to any other cavalry in India, 
regular or irregular. 

The present rate of pay would suffice well, probably, 
for a really irregular corps; but an irregular corps could 
not possibly have done the duty which has been suc¬ 
cessfully performed by the Sind Irregular Horse, and 
other troops must also have been employed. The 
pay allowed is not sufficient for regular silidar 
cavalry, and on it they cannot be what, with a more 
liberal scale of allowances, they might easily, and with 
true economy, be made. 

It is true that the Sind Horse has hitherto done 
whatever duty has been required of it in a satisfactory 


179 


manner; but it must be borne in mind that the best 
and most influential of its native officers were formed 
in a different school, and entered the service during 
the Muratha war, under the attractions (to the 
uneducated native mind) of a perfectly irregular 
service, and on a scale of pay very far above that now 
allowed. 

Many of these men, although all their prejudices, 
habits, and opinions were in favour of the irregular 
system, possess excellent sound common-sense, and 
are becoming gradually convinced of the superior 
advantages of a higher and stricter discipline, freedom 
from debt, more careful training, regular routine of 
duty, drill, &c., and seeing the success and honour to 
which these things led, they have entered heart and 
soul into the new order of things. Some of these native 
officers are men of good family and considerable 
landed property: being also excellent officers, their 
influence is invaluable in the regiment, and no number 
of European officers would make amends for the loss 
of it; but we may look in vain for a succession of 
such men on our present rate of pay in Sind. It is 
not to be expected that such men will leave their 
homes to serve at first as private soldiers, under a 
strict discipline, in a foreign country, on ten rupees a 
month. 

My constant endeavour has been to make the Sind 
Horse fit for service in any part of the world; and, 
to the extent of the means allowed, these endeavours 
have possibly succeeded. But the corps could not 
have been efficient had it been organized on the 
system prevailing even in the best irregular cavalry of 

N 2 


180 


India. We cannot allow one man (and he not always 
even in the regiment) to hold all the horses in a troop, 
squadron, or more, ridden by bargheers of his own 
choosing, and thereby induce men of birth, wealth, 
and influence, to connect themselves with the service; 
such a system may, and does, after a fashion, succeed 
with local corps serving at or near the men’s native 
homes, but would be ruinous in a corps intended for 
general service; the regiment so constructed could 
not long exist in a foreign country and on rough 
service; and if called on so to serve permanently 
would assuredly fall to pieces, or rapidly deteriorate, 
the actual working soldiers not having sufficient 
interest in the service to induce them to submit to 
its inconvenience under such circumstances. The Sind 
Irregular Horse labours under many disadvantages 
when compared with the service in India. To enable 
the men to do the work required of them, it has 
been necessary to make the corps, with regard to 
drill, discipline, and, in fact, to all intents and 
purposes, regular cavalry; it is armed and accoutred 
in a very superior manner to any cavalry I have ever 
seen in India; its horses, also, though not equal to 
those of the regular cavalry, are very much superior 
to those of any corps of irregular cavalry with which 
I am acquainted. The service in Sind is not generally 
liked by the Indian soldier—in fact, it is much 
disliked by the class of men from whom the best 
cavalry soldiers in India are to he obtained; and our 
expenses are great: from all these causes combined, 
the raw material of the Sind Irregular Horse must 
at present be inferior to that of the irregular cavalry 



181 


serving in India. The men generally prefer ease and 
comfort, on seven rupees a month, in Bengal, to hard 
work, strict discipline, and bad, or at least disagreeable 
climate, on ten rupees a month, in Sind. 

That we have hitherto succeeded so well as we 
have done is chiefly owing to the high character 
which we have been so fortunate as to obtain : in fact, 
this has been our greatest strength ; by reason of it 
we get a better class of recruits than would other¬ 
wise join our ranks ; and the men have willingly 
submitted to all kinds of inconveniences, losses, 
and hardships, for the sake of reputation, which they 
would not have done for the pay. But there is a 
limit to this, and that limit I think the Sind Horse 
has attained. 

As an instance of the extraordinary expenses which 
service in this country entails on a silidar corps, I 
may mention the virulent epizootic disease which 
prevailed among the horses of both regiments of Sind 
Irregular Horse during the year 1847, and which has 
not yet entirely left us. This was brought by me to 
the notice of Government, not with the intention of 
applying for any compensation to the silidar, but that 
Government might know of the losses which the men’s 
small pay had to cover. A return of horses which 
died of the disease above mentioned (“ malignant 
epidemic catarrh ”), was appended to the report, the 
average price paid for horses in the Sind Horse being 
about Ks. 200 each. The loss and injury to the 
regiment by reason of this unprecedented mortality 
among the horses have been very great, and to an 
extent which could hardly have been contemplated by 


182 


Government when fixing the scale of pay to the men ; 
but I did not wish to apply for compensation for such 
losses, because it appears to me that the system of 
granting compensation, pensions, or any extra allow¬ 
ances whatever, to silidar corps under any circum¬ 
stances is bad, and that it would be far the best 
economy for the State to consider all these things 
fairly in the regular monthly pay allowed, and to leave 
the regiment to arrange all details itself, the com¬ 
mandant being responsible to Government, and the 
men to the commandant, that perfect efficiency be 
always maintained. Our present rate of pay is not 
sufficient to enable the men to mount themselves as 
they ought to be mounted, or to meet extraordinary 
losses fairly, and the service must suffer injury 
accordingly. 

It should be borne in mind that up to a certain 
amount every additional rupee allowed is attended 
with an increase of strength and efficiency in far 
greater proportion than the increase of pay. There 
is no analogy in this respect between silidar corps and 
the rest of the army, for the “ regular ” troops being 
mounted, armed, clothed, &c., &c., &c., by the State, 
the amount of pay which the men receive has no 
influence whatever on the state of a regiment in all 
these essentials; but it is all in all to the silidar, who 
provides everything for himself. In this, as in every¬ 
thing else, it is true economy to pay a good price for a 
good article, instead of aiming at cheapness, without 
sufficient regard to quality: the sum paid in the latter 
case is too often absolutely thrown away, while in the 
former full value is received for every pice expended. 


183 


If Government were to raise our pay, for each 
sowar and his horse, to Rs. 45, instead of Rs. 30 
monthly, with proportionate increase to the superior 
ranks, a regular silidar cavalry would speedily be 
formed very far superior to any native cavalry now 
existing in the East, in every respect, yet costing the 
State in time of peace less than two-thirds, and in 
time of war less than one-third of the cost of the 
present regular cavalry of the Bombay army. No 
compensation, commissariat charges, pensions, nor any 
extra allowance whatever, would be required under 
any circumstances, with the single exception that, 
should the regiment be ordered to proceed on service 
to Europe, to Egypt, or elsewhere beyond sea, passage 
for man, horse, followers, and baggage cattle, would be 
supplied by the State. Such a cavalry would be 
available for service in any part of the world—it 
would go anywhere and do anything. Wherever 
there was purchase in money, it would subsist without 
any aid but its regular monthly pay ; and it would 
carry with it the greatest military power at the smallest 
possible cost to the State. 

Memorandum , No. III. 

It would be of very great advantage to the corps 
were there more native officers allowed to each regi¬ 
ment, viz :— 

1 Russaldar major, at ... . 300 rupees per month. 

1 Native quartermaster, at 75 rupees per month. 

1 Kote duffedar major at . . 55 rupees per month. 

The above “ effectivealso the undermentioned 
“ non-effective— 


184 


1 Farrier major, staff pay, 25 rupees per month. 

16 Farriers. 5 rupees each per 

month. 

The nakeeb to be abolished. It would also be a 
great improvement to abolish the wukeels now allowed, 
and to give, in their places, an effective pay duffedar 
to each troop, on a salary of Rs. 45 a month. 

The above will, I trust, suffice to bring the question 
of pay to the Sind Irregular Horse fairly before 
Government; but whatever may be its decision on 
that point, I trust that the designation of the corps 
may he changed, as recommended (after closely 
examining us) by Colonel the Honorable Sir H 
Dundas, C.B., commanding the troops in Sind. 

It would be conferring a very high honour on the 
corps to order it to be styled “ Silidar Light Cavalry ” 
instead of “ Irregular Horseit would be an honour 
deeply and gratefully felt by every man and officer in 
the corps ; it would be a reward for past services, 
and a stimulus to future exertion on the part of us 
all : lastly, I hope I may be allowed to say, with 
honest pride, but without presumption, that it would 
be an honour which we have fairly earned, and a 
favour which we may reasonably hope for from a 
Government ever ready to acknowledge the zealous 
services of its faithful though humble servants. # * * 

An adequate establishment must exist, in some 
form or other, whether paid for and recognised by 
Government or not, in every disciplined regiment, 
whether called irregular or otherwise. 

If this establishment do not exist in the irregular 
cavalry of -, the consequence necessarily follows 




185 


that there is a corresponding defect in their disci¬ 
pline. 

When the-irregular cavalry were stationed on 

this very frontier, now guarded by the Sind Irregular 
Horse, the whole country exhibited one scene of 
violence and bloodshed—of fear and disorder. There 
was no peace anywhere on the border, save where 
there was a void, desert waste. 

The soldiers of the State—the irregular cavalry— 
were only seen shut up in forts, or flying from the 
enemy, on the one hand, or destroying their friends— 
the unresisting peasantry of the country—on the other. 

The notorious state of the frontier detachments, 
and the general orders by the Governor of Sind of 
the 23rd June and 4th July 1844, afford full proof of 
the former position. The latter is sufficiently shown 
by the pensions which Government is paying to 
some fifty or sixty of the survivors of those wretched 
people, who recovered from the wounds they received 
from the hands of the troops who should have pro¬ 
tected them. 

The brigade at Shikarpoor was kept constantly on 
the alert, and, as I was informed by the general 
officer in command, was in continual expectation of 
being attacked by the mountain robbers, who invaded 
the country at their pleasure. On the contrary, what 
was the state of affairs on the same frontier when 
guarded by the Sind Irregular Horse in the year 
1842, during the awfully trying period of the Cabool 
disasters ?—and what has been the state of affairs on 
this frontier since the Sind Irregular Horse again 
became the border force in January, 1847 ? 












186 


On the former occasion the poor people of the 
country looked on the men of the Sind Irregular 
Horse as their friends and protectors, and aided them 
in every way in their power. There were many 
sharp encounters with the enemy, in which the men 
of the Sind Irregular Horse were invariably suc¬ 
cessful; and the general result of the proceedings 
was acknowledged by the Political Agent in Sind 
and Beloochistan. 

On the second occasion the results of similar 
conduct have been even more valuable: plunder, 
rapine, and disorder, which existed to a fearful extent 
wherever there were inhabitants along this frontier, 
have entirely ceased; hostile inroads into the British 
territory, formerly so common and so formidable, are 
entirely unknown; peace, quiet, industry, and plenty, 
with full protection for life and property, everywhere 
prevail; towns, villages, and green fields are gradually 
taking the place of a frightful wilderness. 

The people, who are fast returning to the country, 
are contented and happy, well-disposed towards, and 
confident in the Government. The change produced 
for the better is so great as to be almost incredible by 
those who have not seen it. It has been produced 
by nothing but the discipline of the Sind Irregular 
Horse. To produce and maintain this discipline has 
been my constant study and unceasing labour, since 
Government did me the honour to entrust me with 
the command of the corps in the year 1841. 

I have never been absent a day from my duty; I 
have never swerved from my purpose for one moment; 
but have endeavoured, to the utmost of my ability, in 


187 


spite of all prejudices, to make the Sind Irregular 
Horse efficient for all manner of service in any part 
of the world, and against any enemy ; to develope 
the powers of the native soldiers of India; to do 
justice to those powers, and render them fully avail¬ 
able for the successful performance of any duty which 
might he entrusted to the men of the corps; to attach 
those men to the service and to the Government, by 
their pride in their profession, until their feelings 
and affections became warmly excited in favour of 
good order and military discipline, so that little 
coercion be necessary—for example, there has never 
yet been a court-martial in the Sind Irregular Horse. 
I have laboured at this task for ten years past. How 
far I have succeeded is known to the Commander-in- 
Chief and to the Government of Bombay. 

Sir Charles Napier and Sir Willoughby Cotton 
have both recorded, in general orders, that I have 
brought the Sind Irregular Horse “ to perfection.” 
It is certain that the words of the historian, Macaulay ; 
are as truly applicable hitherto to the men of the 
Sind Irregular Horse as they are to the Ironsides of 
Cromwell, the earliest silidar corps on record. In 
the mountains and plains of Kutchee, in Sind, in the 
Desert, or in the Punjaub, the men of the Sind Irre¬ 
gular Horse, often surrounded with difficulties, some¬ 
times contending against tenfold odds, not only have 
never failed to conquer, but have never failed to 
destroy and break in pieces whatever force was 
opposed to them. 

They came, at length, to regard the day of battle 
as a day of certain triumph, and marched against 


188 


the most renowned soldiers of Asia with disdainful 
confidence. This spirit, which they have hitherto 
invariably shown, whether under personal command 
of their European or of their native officers, without 
a single European present, together with their orderly 
and regular conduct in quarters, has been produced 
by their discipline alone. This discipline is not 
dependent on one man—it has little or no reference 
to individuals; it depends on a regular and proper 
system being introduced and maintained in the 
corps. 

As conducing towards the introduction and main¬ 
tenance of such a discipline among our native troops, 
an adequate establishment is necessary. The duty 
cannot go on properly without it. I beg leave most 
respectfully to submit, that ten years’ hard labour, 
unremitting study of, and close attention to, these 
matters, resulting in invariable success, whether 
myself present or not—and rewarded, I am proud to 
say, with high praise from all my superiors—entitle 
me to be heard on this subject: and will, I trust, be 
sufficient to acquit me of presumption in again urging 
my request that the slight alterations required to 
complete the establishment of the Sind Irregular 
Horse on a proper, sound, and soldier-like footing 
may he granted. You may rest assured that the 
State will be richly repaid for whatever extra expense 
may he caused by the grant of the establishment 
applied for, even if it be granted to all the irregular 
cavalry regiments in India.—(1851.) 





189 


Carriage Arrangements of the Sind Irregular 

Horse. 

The following minute was penned by order of a 
general officer who had just then reviewed a regiment 
(800 sabres when complete) of the Sind Irregular 
Horse:— 

“ The whole of the baggage was packed and laden 
on the reverse flank of the column, ready for a march, 
and everything was in that state of preparation, with 
only a day’s warning, that the whole body on parade, 
numbering 796 sabres, could have moved, on the 
sounding of the trumpet, in any direction where their 
services might be required. 

“ The whole of these appointments, as well as the 
horse furniture, are perfectly uniform and complete, 
even to the small leather water-mussucks for the use of 
the men, carried under the belly of the horse, attached 
to the girths. In short, the marching order parade 
proved, what I had long heard, that the Sind 
Irregular Horse were ready and able to march at the 
shortest notice, complete in every respect, and quite 
independent of the people of the country, in respect 
of carriage. Nothing can, I conceive, be more 
soldier-like and complete than the marching order of 
the Sind Irregular Horse.” 

General (then Major) Jacob being called on to 
report the description and quantity of baggage and 
animals required by each regiment, submitted as 
follows :— 

“ Reason and experience have convinced me that 
the very best, or rather the only good, check on 


190 


excess of baggage, is compelling officers and soldiers 
at all times, and in all places, to be provided with 
carriage; their means being limited, they cannot 
carry too much. 

“It is only necessary to insist on a sufficiency 
of baggage animals being maintained by each and 
all, and these animals being private property, the 
men never injure them by overloading or ill-treat¬ 
ment. 

“ No wheel-carriages are ever allowed in the Sind 
Irregular Horse ; in other respects, no restriction is 
placed on the nature of carriage. The soldiers keep 
camels, ponies, or mules, as they please. 

“ No carriage is ever allowed to be lined , under any 
circumstances. All men are made to keep their own 
baggage animals. 

“ These rules are enforced by heavy fines on those 
who break them ; but for many years past everything 
in the Irregular Horse has worked perfectly smooth, 
and the last instance of a soldier having been fined for 
being unprovided with proper carriage occurred more 
than five years ago, the offender on that occasion 
being an officer lately received from the regular 
cavalry. 

“ Carriage is always ready, sufficient in quantity 
and quality, to carry the men’s bedding, cooking appa¬ 
ratus, tents for such as choose to carry them, and three 
days’ food for man and horse, when necessary. No 
more preparation is required for a march of any 
distance than for a parade. 

“ The only delay beyond the time occupied in 
saddling and loading, is the few hours necessary for 


191 


bringing in the baggage animals from the jungle or 
country, where they go daily for forage. 

“ I have never found more than twelve hours’ 
warning necessary to enable the whole corps of Sind 
Irregular Horse to commence a march of any length. 

“ For instance, in December, 1845, when General 
Simpson received orders to move a brigade from 
Hyderabad to Bhawulpoor with all possible despatch, 
I was in the act of mounting my horse for parade when 
the assistant quartermaster-general rode up and asked 
me from the General when I should be ready to march. 
I replied that we were always ready; and we actually 
did march the same day, reaching Roree with the 
whole regiment in perfect order, and fully equipped, 
before a man of the “ regular ” troops could be moved 
from Hyderabad (fifteen days after our departure), 
although they were aided by a “ Baggage Corps,” by 
the commissariat department, the collector, and the 
police authorities, while the Sind Irregular Horse 
was wholly independent of all external aid. * * * 

“ The whole essence of the strength of the silidar 
system with reference to carriage, as to all else, con¬ 
sists in the men being made to provide for themselves 
in all respects, and the commanding officer being left 
to make his own rules and arrangements untram¬ 
melled by the forms and regulations of the regular 
army. Thus, the regiment is rendered at all times 
complete in itself, and independent of all other depart¬ 
ments. * * * 

“ It should be borne in mind, that there is no fixed 
proportion established, and that the more carriage the 
men have in their possession, and the more baggage 


192 


they can carry, the more efficient is the regiment in 
the field, and the more independent of daily supplies 
from the country through which it may be marching. 

“ The syces, grass-cutters, &c., generally travel 
mounted on the baggage animals, which is a very 
great advantage ; and I have always found all to keep 
up with the regiment, even on long marches, such as 
forty miles a day. 

“ The success of these arrangements has been 
caused especially by the absence of any but regi¬ 
mental regulations, and by the absence of everything 
not found to be useful; by the commanding officer being 
left to manage matters as he finds best, the men not 
being made to be mere machines, but intelligent 
individuals , not controlled by fear of punishment, but 
each one exerting himself to he at all times ready, able, 
and willing to do his duty as a soldier, and proud of 
being and appearing to be so. 

“ Our strength is not so much in our array as in 

the personal character and habits of the individuals, 

engendered by such a system as exists in the Sind 

Irregular Horse. 

© 

“ The discipline is perfect, for all wish to obey and 
to do their best; none look to higher authorities than 
the commander of the corps ; while the possession of 
full powers by the commanding officer almost prevents 
the necessity of ever using these powers, dismissal 
from the service being a severe punishment even to a 
private sowar.”—(1853.) 


193 


» 


Camp Supplies and Baggage Corps. 

In the East it is generally a more difficult business 
to reach than to beat the enemy. And the success of 
an expedition often depends upon the management of 
your baggage animals and supplies. These, like all 
other marketable articles, follow the law of supply 
and demand, and the secret of collecting and main¬ 
taining a full commissariat lies in attracting all the 
resources of the country into your camp. This can 
only he done by publishing, by means of your agents, 
what you require, and by paying punctually, and in 
accordance with the free adjustment of the market, 
for what you purchase. Do this, and nothing can 
prevent your obtaining supplies so long as the country 
affords them ; no, not even the presence of the enemy 
in your neighbourhood. For in the East we have 
seldom to deal with a hostile population; they are 
generally indifferent to either army. It is true that, 
as under such circumstances was found to he the case 
in Affghanistan, prices may temporarily remain ex¬ 
orbitantly high ; hut in the long-run they will cer¬ 
tainly adjust themselves, and the tendency is always 
in this direction. But every attempt to arrange by 
other means—above all, every attempt to regulate 
prices or to restrict the market—upsets supplies and 
induces scarcity. Nevertheless, the crowds of camp 
followers, baggage animals, and provisions, implied in 
the presence of a good camp bazar, have been matter 
of astonishment and horror to officers not experienced 
in eastern campaigning; and attempts have been made 
to remedy the supposed evil by organizing baggage 

o 




194 


corps, which, however, only create the evil they are 
supposed to remedy. I will give you an instance of 
such an attempt; in the Hill campaign of 1845, owing 
to the emptiness of the military chests, and the ab¬ 
sence of proper commissariat arrangements, operations 
were suspended ere well begun. The failure w T as as¬ 
cribed to the want of a baggage corps, and, with a 
view to preventing similar failures in future cam¬ 
paigns, the embodying of a Camel Baggage Corps 
was ordered by Government. The establishment of 
the corps was ultimately fixed at 1,000 privates and 
1,000 camels. 

About three hundred camels w T ere required to move 
a regiment of native infantry, inclusive of tents, 
ammunition, and the private baggage of officers and 
men, but without any commissariat stores; and sup¬ 
posing but one-half of the European officers to be 
present, two hundred of these camels would be em¬ 
ployed in the carriage of the private baggage of the 
officers and men. When the camels of the baggage 
corps were thus employed, they were paid for by the 
men using them, at the rate of ten rupees each camel 
per mensem. 

The camels were attached to regiments, and paid 
for only during actual service, which, for the period 
of the existence of the corps, may have amounted on 
the average to one-fourth of the whole time. 

The baggage corps existed from the middle of the 
year 1845 till the end of 1851, or six and a half 
years. Its total cost during that period amounted to 
Rs. 14,87,855 per thousand camels. 

The total amount received during that period, as 


195 

the hire of 1,000 camels, from officers and men, 
amounts to Es. 1,95,000. 

The total loss to the State, therefore, on 1,000 
camels of the corps, employed in carrying the private 
baggage of the troops, amounts to Es. 12,92,855, or 
nearly thirteen lakhs of rupees, in excess of the cost 
of moving the troops under the old system, on this 
one item alone. 

Again, as respects the camels of the baggage corps 
employed in carrying the tents, ammunition, and the 
public stores belonging to the troops. 

The cost of 1,000 camels on the baggage corps 
system being, as before, Es. 14,87,855. 

The cost of hiring 1,000 camels by the commissariat 
department, when required for the movement of troops 
under the arrangement heretofore adopted in India, 
would amount during the same period to Es. 12,000 
per mensem, according to the usual rate of Es. 12 
per camel. This is the Bombay rate. That of 
Bengal, on service, is about Es. 8. But these camels 
were accustomed to carry about double the loads 
allotted to those of the baggage corps. Their cost 
must, therefore, be reduced by one-half when com¬ 
pared to the others; they were also only engaged 
when required. Assuming this period to have been 
three months in the year, as before; and the total 
cost on the commissariat contract system of 1,000 
camels during six and a half years, employed in 
earning the public stores of the regiments, amounts 
to Es. 1,17,000: total loss to the State on 1,000 
camels so employed amounts to Es. 13,70,855. 

The men of the baggage corps were supposed to be 

o 2 


196 


soldiers as well as camel-men; so that on the line of 
march, in camp, and while out grazing, no other 
haggage-guard would ever he required. This was 
generally, though not always, the case on ordinary 
marches, through a friendly country, where a guard 
was only required as a matter of form; but when 
treasure or other valuables had to be transported, and 
whatever the nature of the loads in the field in an 
enemy’s country, it was always found necessary to em¬ 
ploy the soldiers of the line in guarding the camels, &c., 
as usual. Thus no real advantage was, in practice, 
gained by the camel-men being considered as sepoys. 

On the other hand, the attempt to make them 
soldiers seems to have spoiled them as camel-men; 
for while the common camels of the country could, 
without ever being fed on grain, with ease carry a 
load of 400 lbs. on the average, and the best of them 
very much more than this, the camels of the baggage 
corps could with difficulty carry the smallest weight 
allotted to them by the orders of the Governor of 
Sind, namely, 240 lbs. They also, from the ignorance 
and bad management of the sepoy camel-men, became 
so sickly, and died so fast, that anywhere but in a 
country abounding in camels the corps could not have 
existed for six months. But in such a country, the 
facilities of hiring camels in any numbers, when re¬ 
quired, is so great, that a baggage corps becomes 
there more than usually unnecessary. 

A baggage corps, as has been shown, is exceedingly 
advantageous to the private convenience and comfort 
of the officers and men : the boon granted by its use 
is about equal to the grant of double batta to the 


197 


troops while in the field; but the amount paid by the 
State for this boon is, as shown by the figures set 
forth before, something more than seven times the 
amount by which the troops benefit by the arrange¬ 
ment. Moreover, as respects the facility of moving 
troops, the baggage corps could only be of use in a 
friendly country, abounding in supplies, inasmuch as, 
under any other circumstances, as large a commissariat 
establishment of cattle, &c., &c., must be entertained, 
as if the baggage corps did not exist, for the purpose 
of carrying food, &c., for man and beast; nay, a 
larger commissariat establishment must be maintained 
by reason of the baggage corps, because the sepoy 
camel-men, &c., of that corps must be fed and pro¬ 
vided for like the real soldiers of the army. Extra 
carriage must also be provided for the conveyance of 
the tents, ammunition, and the officers’ and men’s bag¬ 
gage of the baggage corps itself, or, which amounts 
to the same thing, these must be carried on the camels 
of the baggage corps, and the amount of available 
carriage for the rest of the army be lessened by so 
much. 

Again, a baggage corps is evidently useless, even in 
a friendly country, for the transport of battering 
trains or other heavy stores : for this, recourse must 
be had to the old commissariat arrangements, or to 
something equivalent to them. 

It appears, then, that a corps, on the model of the 
late Sind Camel Baggage Corps, could only be main¬ 
tained in a country abounding in camels, in which 
these animals could be readily purchased or hired as 
wanted; or evidently under circumstances wherein 


198 


such a corps must be very little required for the 
convenience of the troops, who could easily provide 
themselves with carriage without it. 

Secondly .—That such a corps could only be main¬ 
tained at a cost, out of all reasonable proportion, 
greater than the value of the benefits accruing from it. 

Thirdly .—That under those cirumstances wherein 
alone it becomes a matter of any real difficulty to move 
troops in India and the countries bordering on it, 
viz. when it becomes necessary to carry all the 
supplies for the use of the troops with the moving 
army itself, such a baggage corps becomes entirely 
useless, being unable to carry a month’s supply of 
food even for itself. Under the old commissariat 
arrangements, there was never more than one driver 
to five camels, each camel carrying about 5 cwt. The 
camel corps had more than a man to each camel, and 
that camel carried 240 lbs. 

Fourthly .—When the army is serving in an enemy’s 
country, and it consequently becomes of the greatest 
advantage to reduce the “ impedimenta ” as much as 
possible, a baggage corps, on the model of that lately 
disbanded, &c. tends only to increase, instead of to 
diminish, the necessary train. An officer, even of 
ability, and though experienced in the armies of 
Europe, may well be excused for at first sight 
becoming alarmed at the train found necessary for 
moving troops in time of war in the East, and being dis¬ 
mayed at all the danger and disorder which apparently 
must accompany such a crowd of animals and fol¬ 
lowers ; but it is soon perceived that the greatest evil 
in the matter exists in imagination and inexperience, 




199 


and that the real difficulties have long ago been 
mastered, and the whole affair reduced to systematic 
rule by those to whom the subject is familiar. 

The arrangements for supplying armies in the field 
in India, and conducting the enormous trains of beasts 
of burden which accompany them, have been brought 
to the greatest perfection by the commissariat depart¬ 
ment of Bengal. The details of the arrangements are 
well known to most old Indian officers who have 
served much in an enemy’s country; the general 
results are familiar to all officers of local experience 
in India; and when these arrangements are properly 
understood by a general, they enable him to reduce 
to sufficient form, order, and regularity, that which at 
first appears an interminable, incongruous, and riotous 
mass of confusion. It is not, perhaps, necessary here 
to enter into the details of the gigantic arrangements 
of the Indian commissariat department. But it has 
been acknowledged as an axiom by the greatest 
generals who ever led armies in India, that the safety 
of an army, or the success of a campaign, depends at 
least as much on the state of the “bazar” of the 
army as on the goodness of the troops. The remarks 
of the Duke of Wellington on Colonel Monson’s 
disastrous retreat are very instructive on this point. 
The Duke shows clearly that the whole of that serious 
misfortune was caused by the inefficiency of the 
Colonel’s bazar and commissariat arrangements; and 
states, that he himself made it a point always to 
have in his camp a month’s provisions for his whole 
force. The multitude of traders of all sorts, and the 
immense train of baggage animals, which this implies, 


200 


and which the Duke justly considered as essentially 
necessary to his safety and success, might have been 
considered by an inexperienced officer as ruinous to 
the army ; but few would probably have had the bold¬ 
ness to propose, as a remedy for the apparent evil, an 
arrangement by which the number of men to be fed 
would be greatly multiplied, and the means of 
transport greatly diminished. Yet such was the 
scheme not only proposed, but attempted to be carried 
into effect, under the title of the Sind Camel Baggage 
Corps, to the amazement of all Indian officers of 
experience, and to the great delight of thoughtless 
young subalterns. 

The experiment of the Camel Baggage Corps cost 
the revenue of India £159,000 sterling; yet, notwith¬ 
standing the enormous outlay lavished on it, and quite 
irrespective of the inadequacy of the return to the 
amount of capital expended, it proved a complete 
failure. It was at once discovered that it was impos¬ 
sible to carry into full effect the original scheme; and, 
to move troops on real service, as many extra camels 
had to be provided as if the camel corps had not 
existed. The attempt to transport the stores and 
provisions of an army by any such arrangement as 
that of the baggage corps was at once, in effect, 
abandoned, and the baggage corps camels were em¬ 
ployed solely in conveyance of the tents, muskets, and 
ammunition in charge of regiments, and of the private 
baggage of the officers and men. For the carriage of 
the latter, it had been hitherto the custom for the 
officers and men to make their own arrangements, and 
to supply themselves as they could; so that the 


201 


baggage corps relieved them of considerable trouble 
and expense, and the scheme was in consequence con¬ 
sidered, by the parties who profited by it, as excellent 
and praiseworthy. 

This circumstance may go far to account for the 
astonishing fact of such a baggage corps having been 
continued in existence for six and a half years ! 

Having discussed the merits of this method of 
transporting the private baggage and tents of an 
army, let us now see if our Indian experience will 
enable us to propose a better plan. 

First, let us observe, that for the transport of 
provisions and stores, park guns, ammunition (other 
than that in regimental charge),—in short, for the 
carriage of at least nineteen-twentieths of the wdiole 


train accompanying an Indian army in the field ,, 
nothing can be imagined more perfect than the system 
of the Bengal commissariat as it appeared with the 
first army of Affghanistan, in 1839* 

But still, however small a proportion it may be, as 
to the general train following an army in the field, the 
carriage of the regimental baggage, public and private, 
is, for many reasons, a matter of great importance. 

Under the present system, the march of regiments 
is sometimes considerably delayed for want of such 
carriage; while our officers and sepoys, having every¬ 
thing done and provided for them by others, become 
helpless, and unable to shift for themselves. 

This is almost always the case with our regular 
army. But let us take a hint from the despised 
irregular, who marches at once when ordered, without 
troubling collector or commissary. 



202 


The scheme, then, proposed in the place of the 
awfully expensive baggage corps, is as follows :— 

Let the plan of paying batta in the field be wholly 
abolished. Let officers and soldiers of the native 
army receive one rate of pay under all circumstances. 
Let there be no allowances. Let this rate of pay be 
sufficient fairly to meet actual wants, which can easily 
he calculated, and then insist on every officer and 
man being at all times, and in all places, provided 
with a proper description of carriage to enable all to 
move anywhere at once at a moment’s warning. Let 
the quarter-master of each regiment have a contract 
for the carriage of tents, ammunition, &c., and hold 
commanding officers strictly responsible that every¬ 
thing is always kept in an efficient state for immediate 
service. 

This is no fanciful scheme ; it is done to our hand; 
in all good silidar corps it has been long proved on a 
large scale, and with admirable success. 

The indirect benefits of such a system would be 
nearly as great as those more directly accruing 
from it. 

The sepoys, instead of being pipeclayed automatons, 
would become comparatively clever and sensible men, 
able to provide themselves with whatever might be 
necessary, without giving the slightest annoyance to 
the people of the country, with whom they would 
necessarily take care to be on the best terms. 

There would also be, in this system, the best pos¬ 
sible check on men carrying too much baggage. A 
sepoy, who had to keep himself provided with proper 
carriage at his own expense, would very soon discover 


203 


what articles were necessary to be carried; and would 
assuredly carry none which were useless or super¬ 
fluous. 

The men might be a little awkward at first, from 
not being accustomed to such work, but would very 
soon master every difficulty. 

If more leisure time were required for the proper 
performance of their new duties, abolish pipeclay, 
give the men black belts, and at least one hour more 
a day would be at their disposal. The ill effects of 
pipeclay, of leather stocks, of chacos, and of knap¬ 
sacks for soldiers in India, are unspeakable; and the 
wisdom of using them in the army resembles that of a 
manufacturer who should tie up the limbs or disable 
the right arms of his artificers, in the hope of improv¬ 
ing their handiwork. 

The Military Fund. 

Unquestionably the military fund has, by encourag¬ 
ing imprudent marriages, been attended with very ill 
consequences. The knowledge that, in the event of 
death, the widow and children will be provided for by 
this fund, has, more than any other cause perhaps, 
contributed to the uncommon spectacle of an army 
a large percentage of whose subaltern officers are 
married. Aware that in any event there will be the 
provision of this fund for the widow and children, the 
parents of the bride are less careful of requiring from 
the bridegroom those very qualities—thrift, energy, 
and power of general management—without pos¬ 
sessing which no young soldier should take on himself 
the responsibilities of the marriage state. Again, 




204 


the youth himself, also trusting to the fund, rushes 
into marriage, without having previously cultivated, 
or even considered concerning those qualities, atten¬ 
tion to which would, in the absence of any fund, have 
been forced on him before he either would or could 
have married. In short, under the operation of the 
military fund, the tendency is to cause precisely those 
to marry who neither should, nor, without the pro¬ 
vision of the fund, could marry. And whatever good 
may, in individual cases, have resulted from this 
fund, I am not the less of opinion that it is in fact 
a joint stock company for the promotion of imprudent 
marriages. 


Furlough Regulations. 

Another subject of vital importance to India—not 
only to the army, but to all the services, and to the 
whole people of the country, natives as well as Euro¬ 
peans—is the furlough regulations. 

The existing rules are not adapted to the present 
state of things; they belong to days long gone by, 
when a period of twelve months or more was neces¬ 
sary to receive from England an answer to a letter 
from Bombay. 

Moreover, the present rules regarding leave of 
absence are excessively unfair in another respect. 
Their tendency in every way is to favour the least 
valuable servants of Government—those who are 
continually suffering from real or imaginary sickness, 
and on that account continually absent from their duty. 

It is an undoubted physiological fact, that hard¬ 
working, energetic men, who continually exercise 



205 


themselves in bodily and mental occupation, suffer 
the least from ill health. They have no time to be 
sick. Authorities are agreed on this point. For 
example, Copland (Med. Diet, page 562) says:— 

“ When the mental energies are depressed by grief, 
anxiety, disappointment, fear, &c., the powers of life 
are less able to oppose the debilitating causes of 
disease which invade them from without, and of 
which nature all the exciting causes of fevers, parti¬ 
cularly those which, as specific or contagious and 
miasmal, generally partake in a most marked manner. 
On the other hand, when the mind is elevated by 
success, by hope, by confidence, and the other excit¬ 
ing passions, the depressing causes make little or no 
impression upon the constitution, and individuals 
thus circumstanced almost always escape from diseases 
which readily invade the fearful, the dejected, and 
the disappointed.” 

Again, Copland (Med. Diet, page 920, para. 118) : 
—“ Confidence, continued mental occupation, and 
moderate excitement are especially efficacious in 
resisting the causes of most fevers. 

“ There is a moral courage sometimes possessed by 
persons, the weakest perhaps in respect of physical 
power, that enables them to resist infectious and 
epidemic influences more successfully than the most 
robust, who are not thus mentally endowed.” 

On the other hand, it is certain that a large portion 
of the sickness which causes so many officers to be 
absent from their duty in India is produced by feeble¬ 
ness of character, by idleness, laziness, listlessness, or 
languor. 


206 


Now, I would not for a moment wish to lessen the 
indulgences granted by a beneficent Government to 
such of its faithful servants as might have the misfor¬ 
tune to be suffering from ill health. I would leave 
the rules regarding leave of absence on sick certificate 
as they are; but, assuredly, I would so order matters 
that long-continued, honest, unremitting, and valuable 
labour should be deemed to constitute at least as 
good a title to the favour of a furlough to England as 
the want of health alone. 

Moreover, if such furlough were obtainable at 
moderate intervals, and with greater facilities than at 
present, the number of sick certificates would assuredly 
be immensely decreased. It is probable that after a 
while they w r ould almost wholly disappear. 

The evil done, both to England and to India, by 
the present furlough regulations, is incalculable. 

A large proportion of the Indian officers who can 
now return to England is composed of those worn out 
in the service, of the aged, the feeble, the sickly, the 
discontented, the idle, and the lazy ; while the ener¬ 
getic, the active-minded, the able, the zealous, and the 
strong, are compelled, for the most part, to remain at 
their work in India without any intermission, without 
a day of real rest, until their failing vigour qualify 
them also for the indulgence of a visit to their native 
land. 

In English society, by reason of this state of affairs, 
India is not fairly represented. 

The real working men of India—the soldiers, the 
magistrates, the statesmen, all those men of clear 
heads, strong minds, and active habits, by whose 


207 


practised intelligence and honourable labours our 
Indian empire is held together—have little connection 
with, or influence on, the English public. They are 
very rarely seen in England. 

From this cause it proceeds that, in the imagination 
of the people of England, the idea of an Indian officer, 
military or civil, is always connected with those of 
rice and curry and diseased livers. 

From this cause chiefly results the deplorable 
ignorance regarding Indian affairs which prevails, 
even among educated gentlefolk, in England. How 
easily might all these evils be rectified! 

Let us have recourse to a principle as old as the 
history of man—the institution of the Sabbath. This 
at once satisfies all our wants, and meets every difficulty 
in every single point; while no obj ection whatever 
can be brought against it, save by those who would 
wish, if possible, still to retain a dark veil between 
India and England for their own supposed private 
advantage, but to tbe grievous injury of both countries. 

My proposal is to give every officer, civil or military, 
every seventh year to himself, if he wished to avail 
himself of the indulgence; to allow him, during that 
period, to go wherever it might please him to go, 
whether in India or any other part of the world ; to 
allow him, during that year, to receive his full 
Indian allowances, to retain his staff appointment if 
he held one, but during his absence not to receive the 
staff salary, which should go to the officer who might 
officiate until his return. If an officer should wish to 
remain in India, even in the very camp in which he 
was serving, and there to enjoy his Sabbatical year, he 


208 


should be allowed to do so. The year should be his 
own, to employ as he pleased. 

If an officer chose to allow his Sabbath to pass by, 
and to wait till he had served twelve years, he should 
be allowed two years’ rest on furlough ; after eighteen 
years’ uninterrupted w T ork three years should be 
allowed, and so on. 

The consequences of this arrangement would be 
great and numerous, and all of them good,—good for 
the Government, good for the people, and good for 
the services. The amount of vigour infused into 
Indian society by this means would be almost 
incredible. Hope, looking forward to the enjoyment 
of the Sabbath, would stimulate even the lazy and the 
idle to work hard during the six years of labour. 

The continual return to England, and reflux into 
India, of the tide of Europeans, would be to the body, 
moral and politic, exactly what the circulation of the 
blood is to the animal body. England would be our 
lungs: the old blood would be there aerated, and 
new life, health, and strength thereby sent flowing 
vigorously to every corner and extremity of our 
empire. Energy and health would everywhere take 
the place of languor and disease. 

The outcry for more Europeans would be at an 
end, for those now in the service would be found 
willing and able cheerfully to do well double the 
amount of work which is now thought to tax their 
powers too highly. 

There would be a far more equal distribution of 

THE EMOLUMENTS OF STAFF APPOINTMENTS, BY REASON OF 
THE NUMBER OF OFFICIATING MEN. There Would also 



209 


be a far greater number of men well acquainted with, 
and ready efficiently to perform, the duties of such 
appointments, to the great advantage of the service, 
which now often suffers from the inexperience of new 
incumbents. 

Society in the two countries would become one, and 
all manner of blessings would indirectly follow. 

Let any man of sound common-sense, and a 
tolerable knowledge of the subject, think over the 
matter, and he must be convinced at once of the truth 
of the conclusions set forth above. 

The doctrine is founded on the laws of nature, and 
its truth will be the more apparent the more those 
laws are studied. 


Daily Orderly-room to be held by every 
Commanding Officer. 

The commanding officer of every regiment should, 
every day of his life, hold his orderly-room in some 
convenient public place, where the commanding officer, 
his staff, and all the European officers not otherwise 
engaged, should assemble. Here all regimental 
business should be transacted in public. Every man 
in the regiment should have an opportunity, every day, 
of seeing his commanding officer. 

Everything being done with perfect openness, in 
the presence of all the English officers, many common 
sources of discontent and grievance, real or imaginary, 
would be removed. Every officer would be habitually 
well acquainted with everything relating to the 
regiment, and would be undergoing a course of 

p 


210 


education calculated, better than any other, to tit him 
for command in his turn. 

While the habitual daily presence of all the English 
officers around the commanding officer would afford 
him the best possible support in doing right, and 
impose the most effective check on wrong: a very 
ordinary mortal might, under such an arrangement, 
be safely trusted with absolute powers, while no 
officer’s qualifications could ever be for a moment 
doubtful. Where everything is open to the public, 
common-sense has the fairest chance of prevailing, 
and “ regulation ” need be but little intruded. 

Officers need be troubled as little as possible with 
form, dress, ceremony, and matters of etiquette at 
their daily orderly-room; and the inconvenience of 
daily attendance would speedily be overcome by an 
increasing feeling of interest in all regimental affairs, 
and all irksomeness would be removed by the grant 
of leave of absence when required for any rational 
purpose. 

The arrangement here contemplated appears to me 
to be of the very highest importance to the welfare of 
the native army of India ; and I may observe that I 
have myself practised it with satisfactory effect during 
the past fifteen years. 

The commanding officer of every regiment, native 
or European, should hold orderly-room every day of 
his life in some public place, hearing every man who 
has anything to say to him. Where is the objection 
to men being properly dressed on these occasions? 
Coming to the commanding officer at improper times, 
and in an improper manner, if permitted, gives rise 


211 


to backbiting, or the reputation of it. Everything 
should be open and public between the officers and 
men.—(1854.) 

The Vices of the Seniority System in the 

Native Army. 

It is a fatal error to suppose that we are guilty of 
breach of faith in promoting according to merit, 
instead of according to seniority; for the sepoys, on 
enlistment, know and think nothing about their rights 
to promotion : they enlist to obey orders, and serve 
the State ; and their notions of seniority are always 
acquired after they enter the service, under the in¬ 
fluence of a vicious svstem. But the evident and 

«/ 

unavoidable consequence of promoting according to 
the seniority system only is the paralysation and ulti¬ 
mate ruin of the army. Talent, skill, energy, high 
principle, and soldierlike pride fall crushed and 
powerless under its operation. Of what use is it for 
the zealous European officer to endeavour to instruct 
the native, and to make him really, and not in name 
onlv, a soldier ? Of what use is it for the latter to 
endeavour to learn, when neither instruction, nor 
acquirement, nor merit of any kind, avail to advance 
the sepoy a single step ? * * 

The fact is, that the native officers of the Bengal 
army have been purposely made powerless for evil or 
for good. Why, then, blame these poor old gentle¬ 
men ? Make them really efficient, by promoting, not 
the oldest, but the most able and deserving men; 
make their advancement depend only on their merits, 

p 2 


212 


as estimated by then regimental commander; and you 
will have no mutinies. * * * 

Where the native army is in a proper state, 
nothing will induce the sepoys to remedy a supposed 
grievance by force, nor even to represent it, except 
through their officers, to whom they entirely trust for 
protection. It is the seniority system (with other 
causes) which has rained the discipline of the Bengal 
army, and destroyed mutual confidence between officers 
and men. The evil influence of this state of affairs 
in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating 
itself to the Bombay army also.—(1854.) 

* * * I plainly and deliberately assert, 

that any one who, wishing well to the native army of 
India, advocates promoting the native officers and 
non-commissioned officers of that army by seniority 
only, must undoubtedly he deplorably ignorant of the 
real merits of the matter. 

My means of forming correct opinions on these 
matters have been stated in my paper on the native 
Indian army, and need not he here repeated. 

I have been accused of asserting that it is right to 
place the brave old “sepoy at the caprice of preju¬ 
diced and ignorant commanding officers.” But I 
never asserted any such thing; but rather strongly 
advocated the having as commanding officers men not 
governed by caprice, ignorance, &c., and leaving the 
promotions to them: and I now assert that such is 
the only wise course of proceeding. 

Men are often very good soldiers, having three or 
four medals on their breasts, &c., who are as unfit to 
he drillmasters as any old woman taken at haphazard 



213 


out of a village ; yet such men are recommended for 
promotion, if senior, rather than one really efficient. 

It is difficult enough to find half a dozen really 
good drill-masters in any regiment; hut if they are to 
be chosen not by qualification but by seniority, it 
would be far better to have none at all. 

The seniority system, so far from being just, is the 
greatest possible injustice to the really deserving men, 
while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement 
to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw 
everything open to fair competition, and let the best 
man win. This is the style of justice which sepoys 
and all other men really like best in their hearts. 
Let there be no favouritism ; but let the European 
officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose 
the best men for promotion, and the best possible 
feeling will assuredly be created and maintained be¬ 
tween them and their native soldiers. 

My officers and myself have acted on these prin¬ 
ciples for twelve years with one regiment, and for 
eight years past with two regiments, with good effect, 
although I have but two European officers under me 
for each regiment. The whole corps of the Sind 
Irregular Horse is as if it had but one heart and 
mind; any difference of feeling on common interest 
between the officers and men would be as unnatural 
as a quarrel between a man’s hand and limbs.— 
(1854.) 

Fixed Head-quarters for Regiments. 

Our system of fixed regimental head-quarters, 
where all the families reside, affords an additional 


214 


and most powerful security for good conduct. It 
forms a very strong bond of attachment to the service, 
which no other corps possesses. It makes the com¬ 
mandant the patriarch of the regiment, as he should 
be. The success which has attended the introduction 
and maintenance, during many years, of this system, 
with the two regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, 
affords a safe ground for recommending its adoption 
on the proposed military reconstruction of our native 
army. Depend on it, that where this security is 
enforced, we may readily increase the numbers of our 
sepoys without risk of adding to those of the muti¬ 
neers.—(1857.) 

The Obedience of Soldiers not to depend on 

their own Pleasure. 

It has been said that Government can supply the 
places of the mutineers with Goorkas. This measure 
may be wise ; but it is not wise to allow the discipline 
and obedience of your soldiers to depend on their 
good will and pleasure; and it is certain that the 
Goorkas would soon be as had soldiers as the Hindoos 
of the Bengal army if treated in the same way. The 
Hindoostanee Mussulmans are the best materials for 
our soldiers in proper hands. —(1854.) 

On the Purchase of Horses by Government for 

Military Purposes. 

Understanding that it is in contemplation to pur¬ 
chase, in the valley of the Euphrates, a large number 
of horses for military service in India, I venture to 
submit a few remarks upon this subject, founded upon 




215 


a long and somewhat extensive experience of the horse 
market and cavalry requirements. 

And it seems to me, that if Government sends its 
own agents to purchase horses, whether in Turkish 
Arabia or elsewhere, it would, by this direct and 
sudden interference with the usual channels of this 
trade, tend to lessen the supply passing through these 
channels, without causing an equivalent increase of 
supply through the extraordinary channel. The pre¬ 
sence of the Government agents in the horse-breeding 
districts would, of course, disturb and injure the 
market for horses at Bombay and other places. The 
prices of horses would immediately be raised in the 
districts themselves. And experience proves, that 
the employment of Government agency in businesses 
of this description is almost invariably attended with 
so much difficulty and delay, as would render the 
purchase of the horses useless in so far as immediate 
service in India is concerned. 

Again, in respect of cost: horses of a size and 
description inferior to those of the class of horse now 
purchased in Bombay for Indian cavalry could not be 
obtained in the breeding districts, and in any con¬ 
siderable number, at a less average price than 35/. 
each; a rate, which, by the time the horses should 
reach Bombay by means of the proverbially costly 
agency of Government, would most assuredly increase 
to the present remount price in Bombay of 50/. So 
that the general result of Government’s direct appear¬ 
ance in the market would in this, as in all other 
markets, he to disturb the common market, to lessen 
and delay the total supply, and to enhance prices. 


216 


I would suggest, then, that the best plan Govern¬ 
ment could adopt for purchasing horses would be to 
inform the horse merchants at Bombay, Kurrachee, 
and elsewhere, that Government is prepared to 
purchase an extraordinary large number of horses at 
the present remount prices; and that if the required 
number cannot be collected of the present standard 
height, Government will accept horses something— 
say an inch—below this standard, at the same rates; 
or horses of a yet lower standard, at reduced rates. 

The standard of the first class of horses would then 
be 14 hands 1 inch, instead of, as at present, 14 hands 
2 inches ; and the standard of the second class might 
be fixed at 14 hands. These sizes may seem very 
small, but it is certain that some of the best Arab 
horses, able to carry any weight, and equal to any 
service, are no larger : and that horses of these sizes, 
if well-shaped and well-bred, are better fitted for hard 
work as cavalry horses in the field than are the tall 
country and stud-bred horses. 

Bemount agencies, with the requisite establishments, 
might be stationed at convenient points, for the 
purpose of purchasing from the dealers, in accordance 
with the above suggestion ; and I am persuaded that 
in this manner, while Government avoided disordering, 
and confined itself to healthily stimulating the market, 
it would at the same time be preserved from all risks 
of bidding against itself in different markets, and 
would obtain, ready for immediate service, as large a 
supply of really serviceable horses as the countries 
whence they are drawn can supply.— ( 1857.) 




217 


Stud-bred Horses. 

There is no doubt but that the stud-bred horse of 
India is the worst of all. But had the physiology of 
horse-breeding been understood and attended to, this 
horse would probably by this time have been the best 
of all on earth. 

Having recourse to English horses at all for 
breeding purposes in India was a grave error. 

The English horse was formed from the Eastern 
horse, and having become peculiarly well adapted to 
the climate, &c. of England, to bring him back to the 
East again was to undo all that the English breeders 
had been doing for centuries. Arab horses should 
alone have been used to breed from after the first 
start, which must necessarily have been made with a 
sufficient number of mares, the best procurable of any 
breed, as Arab mares are not obtainable. 

The qualities of individuals should have been care¬ 
fully and scientifically studied before bringing them 
together. On this depends the whole success of the 
scheme. To ensure a good produce, it is by no means 
sufficient to put a good dam to a good sire. The 
excellencies of each may be great, but may be neu¬ 
tralized in the produce by similar defects in each. 

Both parents may be generally good, but may 
possess peculiarities, which if exaggerated in the 
produce, would render it useless. Many breeders 
suppose that a sire and dam, being both winners of 
races, ought to produce winners ; but their excel¬ 
lencies , though great , may be unlike , and their defects , 
though small, may be alike; in which case it is next 


218 


to certain that in the produce the excellencies will 
have disappeared, and the defects be enormously 
increased. Were all stallions of other breeds now in 
the studs at once sold off, and none but the best Arabs 
used to breed from, in future, no mare or horse of any 
other breed being hereafter admitted, Government 
might reasonably expect in twenty years’ time to 
possess the finest breed of horses in the world — so 
quiet and docile that they might be used entire, with¬ 
out any of the evils now complained of. But the 
physiology of the business and individual incongruity 
must in every case, and with every breed, be most 
carefully attended to, or the result will be a failure. 
A stallion originally vicious should never be employed. 
One becoming so should immediately be removed from 
the stud. Beally good Arabs are never vicious. 

As to the Cabool and Affghan horse generally, he 
is a fine large horse to look at, but his real powers 
are contemptible. He is in reality the worst horse out 
of all the breeds in the East. The first horses to fail 
in any fast work in the hot weather are always the 
Caboolees. In fact, as riding horses, they are as bad 
as can be, though they answer well for draught. 

The Arab horse is unapproachable in excellence, 
for military and general purposes, by any other breed 
on earth. 

A good Arab will fly with fifteen stone on his back. 
He will thrive on any fare, never loses his temper, is 
bold, gentle, docile, and enduring — while he has 
almost as much sense and reason as some men. 

Next to the Arab in the East ranks the Persian. 

The best country horses with us are those of Katty- 




219 


war, Kutch, and the valley of the Bheema. These 
three breeds are excellent. Then follow next in 
merit the horses of the Thurr and Guzerat; then 
those of Kutchee and Khelat; then Punjaubees, 
Kandaharees, and Caboolees ; and, last of all, the 
Bengal-stud breed. The Toorkaman horse is excellent , 
hut a real Toorkaman is never procurable in the 
market. 

The Military Board and Audit Department. 

These are hindrances to the conduct of public 
business. Ruinous delay and prolonged correspond¬ 
ence are the attributes of the Board; while the 
system of audit trammels honest men without checking 
rogues. A dishonest servant, by conforming to the 
forms of the audit department, can cause a false 
account to be passed; while an honest servant is so 
hampered by the forms, that it is with great difficulty, 
and after long delay only, that he can obtain payment 
for his just expenditure. 



220 


MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS. 

Military Rules on High Caste Men. 

It is a positive fact that when a proper discipline 
and a proper soldierly pride exist, the men of high 
caste give less trouble about their castes than the 
low-caste men. The cry about caste among the 
sepoys of Bengal has no real connection with their 
religion; it is maintained as good policy, to enable 
them to keep power in their own hands. But doubt¬ 
less the best materials for soldiers in India are the 
Hindoostan Mussulmans, who are highly-civilised 
beings, with no castes at all.—(1854.) 

Sepoy Mutineers and their Officers. 

I deny the possibility of the sepoys mutinying while 
their English officers are alive and do their duty . 
Men are not suddenly most vicious, and would never 
mutiny for trifles, when they know that the first 
step must be that which they know and feel, even 
among themselves, to be a detestable crime—the 
murder of their officers. Let the officers have 
calmly made up their minds to be obeyed or be 
killed, and there would be little disobedience. To 
show they were in earnest, let the first man guilty of 
open mutiny be shot on the spot by his commanding 
officer, and the thing would spread no further: let 
there be no talking or reasoning with the offenders on 
such occasions. 




221 


It is not that officers want the determination 
necessary to carry out this course successfully, but 
such proceedings are not the fashion at present, and 
the officers feel doubtful of support at head quarters. 
Yet what is here advocated is undoubtedly wholesome, 
good, and merciful.—(1854.) 

Powers of Commanding Officers, and 
Candidates for Enlistment. 

Let commanding officers have power to dismiss and 
to promote, and Government might enlist a million of 
excellent men in India in a day, in spite of any 
impertinent opposition on the part of Brahmins, &c. 

If the commanding officers had more power, and 
were left to make their own arrangements with their 
corps, there would always be with each regiment a 
good body of “ oomedw r ars ” (candidates for enlist¬ 
ment) ready instantly to take the place of any 
discharged men. 

There are generally fifty or more of these “ oomed- 
wars” with the Sind Irregular Horse, so that they have 
always the pick of good, seasoned, and half-trained 
men, eager to serve.—(1854.) 

Prize Property. 

I loudly and frequently uttered my opinion that no 
conquest gave any right over the private personal 
property of individuals, much less over that of women 
and children : and that, be the right what it might, it 
was a shame to strip ladies of their dresses and 
furniture. 




222 


Fortifications. 

Peshawur is one of the very few places where I 
would build a fortress. But, in general, we want no 
fortifications: to be reduced to defend ourselves is 
tantamount to defeat in India. We must assume the 
superiority, be worthy of it, and keep it.—(1854.) 

Flank Companies and Sizing. 

All flank companies are bad in principle. So also 
is all “ sizing.” The companies should all be alike, 
and all able to act in any part of the line in which they 
may find themselves.—(1854.) 

Qualification of Staff Officers. 

The work of most staff appointments requires 
superior qualifications, and involves superior responsi¬ 
bilities to those belonging to the command of a 
company of sepoys. 

If higher qualifications be required, you must pay 
for them, or you will not get them. You cannot buy 
good steel at the price of iron. 

The error is in employing such numbers of costly 
Europeans in command of native companies, whose 
duties would be just as well or better performed by 
native officers properly chosen, and formed in a good 
school.—(1854.) 

Night Attack by Shere Mahomed. 

In June, 1843, Shere Mahomed, with some ten 
thousand men, attempted to surprise my camp; but I 
attacked him with eight hundred native soldiers of all 





223 


arms, on his line of march ; totally defeated and 
dispersed his army ; and took all his artillery.—(1854.) 

The Sepoy’s Musket. 

The sepoy’s musket is too light for the hall, or the 
ball is too heavy for the musket. Call it what you 
will, the recoil is more than the sepoy can properly 
hear.—(1854.) 


Horse Fairs. 

These fairs appear to be silly things; their day is 
gone by. They were useful once, in order that the 
traders might have that safety for goods and person 
in congregated numbers which they had not singly; 
but at present, it seems to me that if we make roads, 
abolish dues, and generally clear away obstacles, we 
do all that Government should do. The trade in 
horses, like all other trades, will then best develope 
itself. But if we interfere by proclaiming a particular 
day for congregating horse-dealers, we tend to spread 
abroad the impression that the fair is a Government 
matter ; and the particularization of one day leads the 
distant Hill men to infer that the other days of the 
year are not equally open to them. It is argued that 
our proclamations do not have this effect; if so, what 
is the use of issuing them ? If they have the effect, 
then Government appears authoritatively to interfere 
in the market, oversteps its proper limits, and does 
harm. There is, of course, no objection to Govern¬ 
ment preparing serais, for the reception of travellers, 
and facilitation of intercommunication ; to do this is, 
in fact, to remove an obstacle to transit. 


224 


Cavalry Swords. 

It is no mistake to arm cavalry sepoys with good 
cutting swords of one uniform pattern. The English 
sword—not the Government regulation iron, but a 
weapon made in England, of good steel, and of proper 
shape—is infinitely better than any Eastern blade. 
All the native soldiers prefer it, and even my wild 
Beloochees are all begging to be allowed to buy these 
swords at any price. The things cut of themselves, 
however unskilfully handled. 

The steel scabbard is best, if it have a complete 
wooden scabbard inside it,—a construction, however, 
which I have never yet been able to persuade any 
English maker to adopt or to understand. They always 
leave the wood open, or imperfectly closed at the edge, 
where it is wanted most, and put a lot of screws and 
iron springs about the mouth of the scabbard, which 
totally defeat the object of the wooden lining. The 
scabbards of the Sind Horse are of wood and leather, 
made as strong as may be ; but still they wear out too 
fast, and break too often to please me. My own 
swords have metal scabbards, made large purposely, 
and lined with complete wooden scabbards, in this 
country, the bell-mouth being formed of wood. These 
scabbards are best of all. 

Great mistakes exist regarding the respective 
powders of the edges and points of swords. On foot, 
or when moving slowly, it is unnecessary to arg^e in 
favour of the point of the fencer—its superiority is 
evident to all. But on horseback, the speed of the 
horse prevents the swordsman from drawing back his 




225 


arm with sufficient rapidity after a hometlirust. So 
that if going at speed, as every cavalry man ought to 
be in attacking, his sword, after passing through his 
enemy, is very liable to he knocked out of his hand, 
the weapon running up to the hilt, and then, of course, 
violently stopping. This has occurred to myself, when 
I should have been disarmed had not the sword been 
buckled to my wrist with a very strong leather strap. 
The same thing must have occurred to others. Such 
a tremendous twist, too, will certainly break any but 
a very first-rate blade, and is not a fair trial for a 
good sword. Wherefore, for cavalry soldiers, curved 
cutting blades are best. Straight swords will not cut, 
save in skilful hands ; curved blades cut fearfully, 
with very little or no skill on the part of the soldier. 
—(1854.) 

The Point and Cut. 

Experience in real fight shows that, for horse 
soldiers, the cut is far more deadly and effective in 
every way than the point of the sword. 

The straight sword, and the use of its point, are far 
more formidable than the cutting sword in the hands 
of men on foot, and I was myself strongly prejudiced 
in their favour for use on horseback also, until many 
trials in the field quite convinced me of the contrary. 

On horseback, when moving at a rapid pace, as the 
cavalry soldier ought always to be in attacking, the 
arm, after a home-thrust, cannot be drawn back 
sufficiently quickly; the speed of the horse carries all 
forward with great velocity, and the blade runs up to 
the hilt, or breaks, before it can he withdrawn. 

Q 


226 


I have had my own sword forcibly struck from my 
hand in this manner, the hilt striking with the 
greatest violence against a man’s breast after the 
blade had passed through his body. The blade hap¬ 
pened to be very good and strong, and the hilt was 
attached to my wrist by a stout leather strap : neither 
gave way; hut, as the horse passed on at speed, the 
body of the tall heavy man who had assailed me was 
turned completely round and over by the blade of the 
sword in it, before the weapon could free itself. 

The violence of the shock, and the concurrent 
circumstances, attending this and hundreds of other 
somewhat similar circumstances, perfectly convince 
me that on such occasions the chances are ten to one 
that the sword will break or the cavalrv soldier be 
torn from his seat; or both these accidents mav occur. 

I have for long past had not a doubt but that the 
cutting sword is by far the most formidable weapon 
for the hands of the cavalry soldier. 

The old curved dragoon sabre is about its best 
form: these blades, made of the best English cast 
steel, mounted with steel basket-hilts, with the 
scabbards lined with a complete scabbard of wood r , 
appear to me to be the most perfect weapons possible. 

The native soldiers much prefer them to any 
eastern blade whatever, and I can imagine nothing 
more effective. 

I have never used any sword exercise with the men 
of the Sind Irregular Horse, thinking that it is not 
required ; but I have myself witnessed very many 
instances of the terrible power of their cutting wea¬ 
pons, and those of the enemy. 


22 7 


Two remarkable instances occur to me, which it 
may be well to mention. 

At the battle of Meanee, a well mounted Belooch 
warrior was flourishing his sword, and challenging 
all comers. A sowar of the Sind Irregular Horse 
rode at him at speed, and in an instant cut the man’s 
head off at one blow. In the same battle, a sowar of 
the Sind Irregular Horse, riding hard at the man 
opposed to him,—a stout, able-bodied Belooch on foot, 
armed with sword and shield,—the latter was knocked 
violently down by the horse’s shoulder; but as he lay 
on his back on the ground, the Belooch warrior 
struck upwards so violent a blow with his heavy 
curved blade, that the sword cut completely through 
both branches of the under jaw of the sowar’s horse ; 
and the front part of the animal’s lower jaw, with 
all its incisor teeth, remained hanging by a piece of 
skin only. 

The force of this blow appeared to me so extra¬ 
ordinary, that I for long preserved the skull of the 
horse on which it took effect. 

In my opinion, it would be of very great advantage 
to replace the straight swords at present in use by the 
broad curved cutting blade, like those now used by the 
Sind Irregular Horse.—(1854.) 

Cloth Pantaloons versus Leather Breeches for 

Mounted Men. 

The cloth pantaloons are out of all proportion 
superior to the leathers. The soldier always covers 
them or the seat over with leather, which gives them 
the advantage of leather breeches without their incon- 

Q 2 



/ 


228 

veniences. The long trowsers are, however, bad. 
Cloth pantaloons and jack-boots should be worn by all 
mounted men.—(1854.) 

Horse Artillery and Cavalry Charges. 

The closer the horse artillery can accompany the 
cavalry the better.—(1854.) 

Good Tools do not make Bad Workmen. 

The possessing superior weapons does not tend to 
keep strong and brave men from closing with their 
foes. The bowmen who won the fields of Cressv, 
Poictiers, Agincourt, and Flodden—did they fear to 
close because they had the power to strike at a dis¬ 
tance, and did actually destroy the enemy’s men-at- 
arms afar off, in spite of plate and mail, hauberk and 
helmet ? Nothing was then esteemed sure fence 
against an English arrow: but when England was in 
exclusive possession of such a powerful missile weapon, 
were her sons less brave, less inclined to grapple with 
their foes, than were their neighbours ? Does the 
seaman—the English sailor—feel less inclined to 
board because his skill in gunnery is improved ? 
Away with such nonsense ! 

The Minie rifle, or rather the Minie ball, has most 
serious defects; the gun may at any moment become 
unserviceable, the ball, or rather a leaden tube which 
was the ball, remaining in the barrel. This happens 
about once in ten shots. Even when the ball is not 
left behind, it often, from being blown into a tube, 
drops short and feebly from the gun. These cups 
and balls are wholly untrustworthy. 



229 


I have expended a small fortune on these things, 
and have probably made more experiments with fire¬ 
arms than any man living. Ten years ago I offered 
Government a rifle which is still quite unequalled for 
military purposes. It was rejected, because the Court 
of Directors did not require anything superior to the 
two-grooved rifles then in use with the English army. 
Yet the two-grooved rifle is the worst of all, being 
painfully difficult to load, and because the ball, being 
confined in one direction only, is at liberty to roll or 
lean over in the other, so that the conical ball cannot 
be used . On the use and proper shape of this ball, 
however, depends the whole power of the rifle at long 
distances. 

My rifle loads more easily than a common smooth- 
bored musket, and never becomes so foul from firing 
as to cause any difficulty in loading. However loose 
the ball, it still follows the twist of the rifle grooves 
with perfect accuracy. It is effective at 1,800 yards, 
and just as good as a common musket at 20 yards, or 
any other distance.—(1854.) 


The Greatest Danger to our Indian Empire. 

There is more danger to our Indian empire from 
the state of the Bengal army—from the feeling which 
there exists between the native and European, and 
thence spreads throughout the length and breadth of 
the land—than from all other causes combined. Let 
Government look to this; it is a serious and most 
important truth .—[Extracted from a pamphlet pub¬ 
lished in 1850.) 


230 


Kemoval of a Prohibitory Order. 

The order issued by-, prohibiting officers from 

proceeding out of camp beyond the cavalry pickets, 
appears to be no longer necessary, and is hereby 
countermanded. 

In removing this restriction, it is expected that the 
officers of this force will exercise due discretion as to 
the distance and direction in which they may proceed, 
and that their soldierlike tact and common-sense will 
enable them to take care of themselves in an enemy’s 
country. 

When proceeding out of camp in pursuit of field 
sports, for their own amusement, all officers and their 
followers should be well armed, and they should con¬ 
stantly bear in mind that foolish rashness and want of 
circumspection are quite as unsoldierlike and blame- 
able as are timidity and excess of caution. 

The brigadier-general has no wish to impose un¬ 
necessary restrictions on the officers and soldiers of 
the force; he is convinced of that manly confidence, 
ready intelligence, and habit of self-reliance which 
are invaluable in war in the absence of such restric¬ 
tions ; and feels confident, that the conduct of those 
now entrusted to his command will be such as to 
justify and confirm this conviction.—(1857.) 

Cavalry Charges should Succeed. 

The whole of the orthodox education of our cavalrv 

J 

soldiers tends to teach them that to attack infantry 
prepared, and standing firm and steady in square, is 
madness, and must prove unsuccessful. The moral 



231 


force of an enemy so prepared is thus increased, and 
becomes to ordinary minds very formidable. It is 
certain, nevertheless, that a cavalry charge delivered 
home is irresistible by any infantry that ever stood in 
the field.—(1857.) 

European and Native Soldiers on Service. 

The only European portion of our whole strength of 

six thousand men of all arms retained at-consists 

of two companies of artillery: the conduct of these 
English soldiers has been in the highest degree praise¬ 
worthy—no men could possibly have behaved better; 
they have been what English soldiers should always be 
in the Indian army — excellent examples of good 
conduct for their Asiatic brethren in arms, the sepoys. 

The main body of the field force has consisted of 
eight native regiments — horse and foot — of the 
Bombay army. The conduct of these regiments has 
been such as to do honour to the army to which they 
belong. Their discipline is perfect, and is of that 
high order which rests, not on external pressure only, 
such as the fear of punishment, but on the influence 
of good feeling, self-respect, honesty of purpose, and 
an honourable determination to do their duty to the 
State. 

The cheerful alacrity and manly power with which 
every sort of work has been performed by the men of 
this field force, whether the task fell within the scope of 
ordinary military duty or consisted in working at 
trenches or erecting buildings, has been most com¬ 
mendable; wdiile their just, kind, and conciliatory 
bearing towards the inhabitants of the country in 


/ 




232 


which they are serving, and their habitually steady 
and orderly conduct at all times, have been worthy 
of the faithful soldiers of a great and benign 
Government. 

The impression left on the minds of the peaceful 

inhabitants of-by the conduct of the British troops 

during their occupation of-and its neighbourhood 

must prove deep and lasting. 

The soldiers—irresistible in war, and before whom 

the best troops of-had fallen or fled in terror— 

have been felt throughout the protracted period of 
their residence in this country to be the greatest bene¬ 
factors and protectors of the inhabitants ; and the 

people of-now feel, on our departure, as if their 

best friends were quitting them. 

In the minds of all those who have come in contact 
with our troops during this expedition, the idea of 
our British army will remain impressed as the com¬ 
bination of the highest power with the highest bene¬ 
volence and justice. 

To leave such a reputation behind us may be as 
valuable to our country as the most brilliant success in 
war.— (July, 1857.) 

Directions for a Saddle to Messrs. Garden and 

Son. 

I shall be obliged by your making me a saddle with 
pommel cut away, and stuffed flaps coming well 
forward at the knee, like a large hunting-saddle, 
without pistol holsters, but with wallets; also bags or 
pockets under the cantle ; plenty of D’s or straps, and 
any other contrivances which your experience may 







233 


suggest ; three girths and surcingle, but no crupper 
nor breastplate. Everything as good and strong as 
possible. A bill-hook, or “ Milton hatchet,” should 
be attached. The saddle-bag should be of thick felt, 
dark colour, and of size to come under the saddle¬ 
bags. The bridle should have the field-collar and 
head-stall in one, with bit not too heavy or broad, but 
suited for Arab horses. The reins to be no thicker 
than those of an ordinary military bridle—a stiff rein 
is a great defect. 

The object in view is to find the best pattern of 
horse gear for real service. Everything superfluous 
should, therefore, be removed ; while everything really 
useful should be retained or added. We want as 
little weight as possible consistent with a full degree 
of strength and durability. Bearing these requisites 
in mind, oblige me by the aid of your skill and expe¬ 
rience, and turn me out a saddle with its appurte¬ 
nances as seems best to you. 

Memoranda on Rifles in their Application to 
the Purposes of War; and on Rifle Practice. 

Memorandum , No. I. 

Man has been called a tool-making animal; and it 
is certain that the perfection of tools and machinery 
is a clear and certain mark of advancing civilization, 
of the progress of the rule of mind over matter, of 
the development and operation of those laws by which 
the working of the human brain makes the force of 
one civilized man equal that of the stalwart limbs of 
thousands, or even millions of untaught and ignorant 
barbarians. 


234 


In no country on earth has this been more apparent 
than in England; to no people on earth have the 
tools and machinery of the arts been of more impor¬ 
tance than to the English. 

It was said, and truly said, by one of the greatest 
of modern statesmen, that it was the spinning 
machinery of Arkwright which enabled England so 
long to stand alone, and to stand successfully, against 
the world in arms. 

If such be the value of the tools employed in the 
arts of peace, those used in war must be even of 
greater importance. On success in war often depends 
the power to follow peaceful pursuits; on the high 
state of the art of war the practice of all other arts 
may depend. 

The military art, like all others, can only approach 
towards perfection by the use of the most perfect tools 
and machinery attainable. 

Yet, notwithstanding this certain truth, it is 
notorious that the inferiority of the arms used by 
modern English soldiers was, for long, a disgrace to 
the intelligence of the age, and an outrage on common 
sense, when compared with the high state of perfec¬ 
tion to which the manufacture of arms, as of all 
other tools and machinery, has been brought in 
England. 

Impressed with the importance of the subject to 
the policy of nations, and having been a diligent 
amateur mechanic since childhood, I have, for twenty- 
five years past, paid much attention to the improve¬ 
ment of rifled fire-arms, with which I have, during 
the last ten years, been carrying on a great variety of 


235 


experiments, on a scale probably almost unequalled, 
even by public bodies, elsewhere. 

The result of these experiments I have, from time 
to time, freely communicated to Government; in 
doing so I had no thought whatever of honour or 
reward of any kind, and in truth I have received but 
little encouragement from authority. In placing at 
the disposal of Government the knowledge which I 
have acquired with great labour and expense, I have 
been actuated solely by the wish of being useful to 
my country, and thought that I was doing my duty to 
the public in making known what might prove of the 
highest importance to the success of our arms in war. 

I have prepared a pattern rifle for the army (spe¬ 
cimens of which have been given to Government) 
lighter, far more handy and convenient in every way, 
than the rifles hitherto in use, of 24-gauge bore only 
(that is, the spherical ball of which weighs twenty- 
four to the pound), with which a tolerably good shot 
can certainly strike an object the size of a man, once 
out of three times, at a thousand yards distance, and 
of which the full effective range is above 2,000 yards— 
the ball, at that range, still flying with deadly velocity. 
These rifles, proposed for the army, I have only 
sighted up to 1,800 yards, but the sights could easily 
be adjusted for longer ranges if necessary. 

The charge of powder used has been small—two 
drachms only for a ball weighing one and three 
quarter ounces; but this is sufficient. Further 
experiments have shown that the 32-gauge bore is 
better than the 24, the ball not being reduced in 
weight, but made somewhat longer. 



236 


The description of my proposed pattern rifle for 
the army* is as follows: single barrel, thirty inches 
long, very stout near the breech, 24-gauge, four- 
grooved ; grooves to take one complete turn in thirty 
inches of length, patent breech, good locks, main¬ 
spring connected with tumbler by link, half-cock 
little above nipple, trap in butt; full-stock barrel 
attached to stock by bands secured with spring 
catches; steel ramrod with deep hollow head, so as 
not to press on the shell tubes in loading ; sword 
bayonet twenty-four inches long, of the best cast steel; 
case-hardened iron mountings, and no brass or bright 
metal anywhere about the piece ; folding sight six 
inches long, with slide, both the sight itself and its 
slide to be made with springs, to prevent their working 
loose. Weight of the whole, with sword included, 
about ten and a half pounds. 

The above makes a very beautiful and wonderfully 
effective weapon; but the short double barrel was 
afterwards found to be much better. 

I have other pieces of the same calibre (24-gauge), 
but made a little heavier, which make excellent 
practice at a range of 2,000 yards, the balls at that 
distance penetrating about four inches into very hard 
dry sun-burnt brick; that is, having sufficient force 
to go through two or more men. Regular practice at 
a further range than 2,000 yards I have not yet tried; 
but from what I have seen of the effect at that 
distance, I am convinced that with these balls, which 
I am now using, a moderately light and perfectly 

*For the best description of army rifle determined on (after conti¬ 
nued experiments) in 1856, vide paper at the end of these memoranda. 


237 


» 

handy rifle may be made to possess as much effectual 
power at a distance of 3,000 yards as the old two- 
grooved rifle with the round ball at 300. 

A double 24-gauge rifle of mine, by Manton, 
twenty-four inches long, with iron-pointed balls two 
and a half diameters long, and with two and a half 
drachms of powder, requires a sight four and a half 
inches high for 2,000 yards, the distance of sight 
from muzzle being nineteen inches. The other eleva¬ 
tions may he judged of from this. 

The experiments by which these results have been 
arrived at extend over a long series of years, but they 
may be shortly summed up; and only during the last 
ten years have I had the means and opportunity of 
carrying them on upon a scale sufficiently large. 

I have up to this time had some fifty or more rifles 
made, of all sorts and descriptions, while the cost of 
target walls alone, used in the course of these experi¬ 
ments, amounts to several hundred pounds, and 
powder and lead have been expended by the ton. 

Our rifle practice-ground at Jacobabad is the best 
possible, being the perfectly-smooth dead level plain 
of the desert; the line of targets stretching away in 
front of the lines of the Sind Irregular Horse. 

These targets are walls of “kutcha” (sun-dried) 
brick, which here attains nearly to the hardness of 
stone. 

There is a small building, open to the front, for the 
accommodation of the shooters, and at accurately 
measured distances from this, the walls are erected at 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 800, 1,000, 1,200, 1,400, 
1,600, 1,800, and 2,000 yards. The 2,000 yard 


238 


wall is forty feet high, fifty feet long, and three feet 
thick with supporting wing-walls and counterforts, 
plastered and whitewashed on the face; and others 
are of similar construction, and of size proportionate 
to their distances: all are marked with circular black 
bulls’-eyes, of one inch radius for each hundred yards, 
and raised one foot from the ground for each hundred 
yards of range. 

The shooting-shed contains various heavy carriages 
or rests, with horizontal and vertical screw adjustments, 
in which rifles can be fixed for trial and fired, instead 
of from the shoulder. These carriages do not, how¬ 
ever, improve the practice, as will be shown hereafter. 

The rifles which have been here used are of all 
calibres, from the single 8-gauge of fifteen pounds 
weight, throwing a ball of near four ounces, to a 
double 32-gauge, weighing six pounds. 

Such are the arms (described at greater length in 
the following memoranda) with which I would pro¬ 
pose to arm the British soldier. Their use implies 
skilful workmen in our ranks, instead of pipeclayed 
automatons. It implies, further, an entire change in 
our tactics, so as to give full scope not only to the 
bodily, but to the high moral and intellectual powers 
of our men. 

English soldiers so armed and developed would 
overpower and destroy any number of mere masses of 
semi-barbarous or ordinary enemies. With open files 
and ranks, each man a skilful single combatant, but 
still all acting in perfect concert (as would be easy 
with such brave, trusty, intelligent, and skilful men), 
they would sweep their enemies from the earth, them- 


239 


selves almost unseen; while a single discharge from 
a company at 1,000 yards’ distance would annihilate 
the best field battery now existing. 

With such infantry, so armed, our artillery must 
be abolished, or improved. And cavalry would be of 
little value against them. 

Memorandum , No. II. 

Our proceedings at Jacobadad with the apparatus 
described in the foregoing memorandum, up to the 
commencement of 1854, are set forth in the following 
memoranda. 

It was very early in these trials discovered that the 
two-grooved rifle has defects which render it quite 
unfit for the army. 

If its ball be made to fit loosely, it is at liberty to 
roll in the direction of its two grooves, and thus the 
advantage of rifling the piece is, in some measure, 
thrown away. 

If the ball be made to fit tightly, the difficulty 
of loading becomes a most serious evil. The two- 
grooved rifle was therefore, after trial, rejected. 

The four-grooved rifle, with the hall with two 
bands round it (No. 1 of Plate 1) w r as then tried, 
and found to be wholly free from the defects of the 
two-grooved and polygrooved rifles. Other shaped 
balls were also tried; hut, as their use has been 
superseded by others of a better shape, it is not 
thought necessary to describe them. 

The two bands gave such a firm hold on the grooves 
of the barrel that, though the ball was made so loose 
as to drop into the barrel, and the twist of the rifle’s 


240 


grooves was more than usual, the ball always followed 
the sweep of the grooves exactly; the gun was more 
easy to load than even a common smooth bored 
musket, w r hile in accuracy of performance the piece 
was surpassed by none. The balls provided for the 
two-grooved rifle, or the common musket ball cart¬ 
ridge, could be use*d for it on emergency, if necessary; 
and the piece seemed to have such important advan¬ 
tages for military purposes over the rifles in use in 
the army, that the results of the experiments, &c., 
w^ere, in the year 1846, placed freely at the disposal 
of the Indian Government. 

But the proposed four-grooved rifle was rejected bv 
authority, for the reason that the two-grooved rifle, 
wdiich was thought good enough for the Royal army, 
was good enough for the soldiers in India. 

The best nature of gun being now established, ex¬ 
periments were continued to determine the best 
shaped ball. 

All manner of forms were tried, until, after a series 
of experiments carried on diligently for many years, 
the conical ball (No. 2 of Plate 1) proved very greatly 
superior to all other shapes thought of up to that 
time. The round ball was found of little use after 
300 yards. This conical ball, though heavier than 
the round ball of the same calibre in the proportion 
of three to two, required a charge of powder in the 
inverse proportion of these weights ; that is to say, 
the charge of the round ball being three drachms, 
that for the conical ball, with the same ranore and 
elevation, was but two drachms. 

All manner of rifles were tried, both breech and 


241 


muzzle loading, of every length, weight, &c., of 
various twists to the grooves, and of various calibres 
from 32 to 8-gauge. 

The conical ball (No. 2) for a long time held its 
ground against all others ; its advantages were over¬ 
powering, and excellent practice was made with it at 
600 and even 800 yards. 

The experiments had reached this point long before 
the Minie ball appeared ; but immediately that in¬ 
vention was known, great things were expected of it, 
and it was tried in the fairest manner, and on a large 
scale. 

The original Minie ball with iron cup is shown in 
figure No. 3. 

After long and patient trials, for months together, 
it was found to fail completely . 

Under the most favourable circumstances, it never 
equalled, or even approached to, the excellence of the 
conical ball (No. 2) ; and it was liable to the enor¬ 
mous defect of having the iron cup blown through the 
ball, the resulting tube of lead not unfrequently re¬ 
maining firmly and most immoveably fixed in the barrel. 

The ball had another great defect: it was cast 
from the foremost end, so that the roughness left by 
the innate of the mould, defects of air-holes, &c., 
must occur where the form of the ball was required to 
be most perfect . 

The Minie ball, to our great disappointment, was 
then condemned ; but others, with modifications of the 
expansion principle, were then largely tried, of all 
manner of shapes. That shown by Figure No. 4 was 
the most promising; it was made with projections to 

R 


242 


fit the grooves, so that its hold on the rifles was not 
dependent on the expansion only; it was cast at the 
hinder end ; the conical forepart gave it great ad¬ 
vantages in getting through the air; while the hole 
in the hinder part was reduced in depth, so as to 
avoid, as it was hoped, the chance of its being blown 
into a tube. 

Still this “ improved” Minie ball proved on trial no 
way superior to the ball No. 2; while, though no 
iron cups were used, still the balls occasionally were 
blown into tubes, and thus often rendered the gun 
unserviceable for the time. 

Figure No. 5 was then tried; and this succeeded 
well, having apparently some small advantage over the 
conical ball, No. 2. 

It will be observed, that a perfect and very firm 
hold on the screw formed by the rifle grooves is given 
by the projections on the ball, quite independently of 
the action of the expansion principle; while the 
conical hollow at the back part of the ball gives 
sufficient expansion to close all windage when the 
piece is fired, however loose the ball may be when 
inserted in loading. 

The hold on the grooves of the gun being so great 
even with the ball quite loose, it was found that the 
twist of the rifles could he increased to any extent 
required, without the least danger of what is techni¬ 
cally termed “stripping;” that is, of the ball being 
driven through the barrel without following the sweep 
of the grooves. The rifles were therefore made with 
the grooves taking one whole turn in thirty inches of 
length ; and this twist was found to answer admirablv. 


243 


The shape of the hall being found to have such 
great influence on the resistance of the air to its 
flight, and the twist of the rifles being found of full 
power to keep the point of the ball foremost with un¬ 
erring certainty, even in the longest ranges, the form 
of the ball was still further studied, till that of Figure 
No. 6 was finally adopted; and this shape, after 
hundreds of thousands of experiments, proves to be 
quite perfect. Some of the results obtained are most 
curious. For instance : the weights of the balls 
Nos. 1, 2, and 6 are very nearly in the proportion to 
each other of the Nos. 2, 3, and 4 ; but the charges 
of powder required for them, with the same elevation, 
are in the inverse ratio of their weights ;—so much is 
the resistance of the air reduced by the shape of the 
ball, that No. 6, being double the weight of No 1, 
requires oidy one-half of its charge of powder. 

The ball No. 6 is perfectly and accurately effective 
up to 1,200 yards, and probably to much greater 
distances. The effect of its shape in overcoming the 
resistance of the air is so great, that its progressive 
velocity, after a flight of 1,200 yards, is but very 
little reduced; and even at 1,400 yards’ distance, or 
further, the percussion shells of this shape burst well. 

These percussion rifle shells constitute the most 
formidable missile ever invented by man . They are 
perfectly simple, and safe in use; and, when properly 
made, cannot be injured by time, weather, &c.; while 
they range to the longest distance, with accuracy 
quite equal to that of the solid balls. 

The shell tubes are best made primed only at the 
points with detonating powder, the remainder being 



244 


filled with common gunpowder. These answer admir¬ 
ably ; they never burst in the gun; and the com¬ 
paratively slow’ ignition of the gunpow 7 der allows the 
shell to penetrate deeply before bursting, and thereby 
increases its destructive effect. 

The great reduction of the resistance of the air to 
projectiles of this shape enables us, with the usual 
initial velocity, to reduce the elevation required for 
long ranges so much, that the ground between the 
rifleman and his mark becomes no longer so safe by 
reason of the high curve of the flight of the projec¬ 
tile ; and errors in judging of distance become, in 
proportion, of less serious importance. 

Judging from our practice at Jacobabad, it seems 
certain that two good riflemen, so armed, could, in 
ten minutes, annihilate the best field battery of 
artillery now existing. 

The shells are formed as shown in Fig. 1, Plate 2: 
a copper tube of proper size and shape, filled witn 
percussion powder in the usual way, is thrust into 
a deep opening cast in the fore end of the ball. The 
tube is first dipped in melted resin, “ kit,” or such 
like cement, so that it cannot ever become loose; the 
ramrod end is hollow, so as to press wholly on the 
lead in loading; all other particulars will be apparent 
from the figure. 

The bead form of the hinder end is not required, 
the simple flat end being found quite sufficient. The 
solid lead gives way under the pressure of the fired 
gunpowder quite sufficiently to cause the shell or ball 
to fit the barrel perfectly air-tight. 

It seems evident, that if the arms above described 


245 


bo supplied to our soldiers, their power would he 
increased at least four-fold. The army which should 
first adopt these weapons would thereby obtain an 
advantage equal to that of the exclusive possession of 
fir e-arms a century ago. One effect of these would 
be that the whole of our field artillery must become 
totally useless . 

The guns must be rifled also ! In which case 
shrapnell shells, of the shape of Fig. No. 6, would 
be fully effective at distances of 5,000 yards or more. 

Nay, from subsequent experiments with my pointed 
balls, it seems that three times this range may be 
accomplished with cannon. Good practice has been 
made at Jacobabad with 8-gauge shells, and with 
iron pointed balls of like size, at ranges of 2,000 and 
2,400 yards. Flat-ended shells with the fore-part as 
shown in Fig. No. 6 of the Plate, and three diameters 
in length, are now found to answer admirably for the 
smaller calibres. The 32-gauge is large enough for 
anything, and with the shells above-mentioned, and 
a charge of 2 drachms of powder, a correct range of 
a mile and more is readily obtainable. The 32-gauge 
shells may carry the same bursting charge as has 
been used with the 16-gauge, so that the destructive 
power of the explosion is as great with the smaller as 
with the larger shell. 

For cannon shot, the hold on the rifle grooves 
could be given by a wooden bottom (Fig. 2, Plate 2,) 
formed with proper projections to fit the grooves, and 
fixed to the shot by a square tenon cast on the latter, 
and a mortice through the wood. The twist of the 
grooves mi°'ht be one-half turn in the length of the 

o o ^ 


246 


gun, but experiment only can determine the proper 
proportion. 

The exact description of rifle (now, 1857,) recom¬ 
mended for use throughout the army is given in the 
paper annexed. 

The charge of powder mentioned is the quantity of 
good sporting powder, which is found most conve¬ 
nient. If the musket powder be of less strength, 
the charge should, of course, be slightly increased in 
proportion; and probably two and a half drachms 
may be found to be best. 


The annexed table of times of flight, &c., is curious. 
The initial velocity appears to be but little reduced 
in the long ranges. The numbers in the table are 
the mean of hundreds of experiments. 



Particulars of Shell Practice with 8-Gauoe Kifles. 


247 

























































248 


Memorandum , No. III. 

The foregoing memorandum was forwarded to the 
military authorities, and a committee of artillery 
officers was assembled to report on its subject. 

This committee conducted its proceedings, no 
doubt, with the greatest fairness : but, owing pos¬ 
sibly in some measure to imperfect explanation on my 
part, and to other causes not necessary to detail, fell 
into several mistakes, which rendered the inquiry 
totally useless for the object in view. 

The pattern rifle proposed by me for the army was 
described in the above memoranda; but at that time I 
had no rifles of proper pattern for the army ready, and 
the four-grooved rifle forwarded by me with the paper 
on the subject was of construction altogether different. 

The rifle forwarded was made for me purposely, 
exactly resembling the two-grooved rifles in use with 
the army, with all their defects, with the sole excep¬ 
tion of its having four grooves instead of two. This 
piece was made for me many years ago, with the sole 
object of obviating the difficulty in loading the two- 
grooved rifle. 

All this is set forth in the first part of the above 
memorandum, and was explained to the military 
authorities, &c., in 1846, as therein mentioned. 

The only trial, then, between this piece and the 
common two-grooved rifle, which could have been of 
any practical use, should have been made with round 
balls, with the one and two bands respectively. It 
would then have been found that, with the usual 
tight-fitting balls of the two-grooved rifle, the number 


249 


of shots capable of being fired with accuracy in a 
given time would have been about ten to one in 
favour of the four-grooved piece. 

The circumstance of easy or difficult loading is of 
the greatest practical importance; the committee, 
however, did not even allude to it. 

Yet, with a view to easy loading alone was the 
piece forwarded by me made. In making it exactly 
like the rifles in use, I had this object in view: 
namely, to show how the great defect of the two- 
grooved rifles—difficult loading—could be at once 
obviated, by adding two more grooves to the pieces 
then in use, and using the two-banded ball. 

Two additional grooves could easily have been made 
in the two-grooved rifles by any ordinary armourer, or 
even by the soldiers themselves, thus : Take a cylin¬ 
drical piece of hard wood about two inches long, of 
size to fit the bore of the piece: through this drive a 
peg, to be left projecting a little at each end to fit 
into the two grooves of the barrel; at right angles to 
this, in the wooden cylinder, insert a steel cutter, with 
its edge of the breadth of the required grooves ; screw 
the ramrod into the wooden cylinder, and thrust it 
up and down inside the barrel; the pegs give the lead 
for the twist of the new groove, which must thus be 
exactly parallel to the old ones. To make the cut of 
the proper depth, insert pieces of paper, card, or 
spills of wood, between the cylinder, on the side 
opposite the cutter, and the barrel. When one groove 
has been cut thus, take the tool out of the barrel, turn 
it half round, and cut the other in like manner. I 
have found this simple method perfectly effective. 


250 


Thus the improvement proposed could at once have 
been adopted into the service, without additional 
expense. 

Easy loading alone was what this piece was intended 
to effect; in other respects it was neither better nor 
worse than the rifles then in use in the army. All 
other improvements referred to the shape of the ball 
only, and of course equally affected both rifles; save 
that the conical ball No. 2 of the memorandum, or of 
other such like shapes, cannot be used with effect 
from the two-grooved barrel, by reason of their being 
at liberty to lean over to one side in the direction of 
the grooves, so that the axis of the ball may not 
coincide with the axis of the gun. 

The committee, however, apparently not knowing 
the object with which the piece was made, nor that it 
was of old date, seemed to imagine that the four- 
grooved rifle before them was of the pattern recom¬ 
mended by me, and proceeded to try it against one of 
the two-grooved rifles, using the same balls for each ; 
when of course it was found that the differences 
between the pieces were merely accidental—such as 
might have occurred between two individual muskets 
of similar pattern. 

The result, therefore, of the inquiry, was of no 
practical use whatever; but, on the contrary, with the 
best possible intention, the proceedings tended only 
to mislead. 

The rifles used were of the old musket bore, and 
much too light, in proportion to the diameter of their 
bore, to enable a proper shaped ball to be used with a 
proper charge of powder; so that no great accuracy 


251 


nor penetration at long ranges could be expected; and 
their practice at 800 yards seems to have been 
inferior to contemporary practice at Jacobabad (with 
leaden balls only) at 1,200. 

Little practical advantage, indeed, was to be 
expected from the proceedings of a committee, how¬ 
ever ably and honestly composed, unless the members 
had some previous practical acquaintance with the 
particular matter in band, and the proposer of the 
improved weapons, &c., had been present to explain 
matters personally. 

As an example, the committee fired the rifles “ fixed 
almost immoveably” in a species of carriage; naturally 
thinking thereby to ensure accuracy of practice. 

Experience shows, however, that by far better 
practice can be made by firing from the shoulder, than 
by fixing the barrel in any vice or carriage. 

It was not long before this was discovered ; and 
numerous trials placed the fact beyond doubt, and led 
to the discovery of the cause. 

I had made several apparently excellent carriages 
for rifles, very strong and heavy, with screw adjust¬ 
ments, both for altitude and azimuth; yet, to my 
amazement, no practice nearly equal to that from the 
shoulder could be made with them. 

The reason I discovered by grasping the barrel 
while being fired. The metal appeared in a state of 
strong vibration, like the ringing of a bell; and the 
whole matter was at once accounted for. The vibration 
was not perceptible to the eye; and the barrel, when 
examined after firing, appeared to be in the same 
position as before; but the velocity of its vibration 


252 


when fired probably bore considerable ratio to that of 
fired gunpowder, and necessarily threw the ball quit¬ 
ting its muzzle upwards, downwards, right or left, in 
an irregular and quite uncertain manner. Take a 
stiff steel spring, hold it in the hand, and it can be 
made to vibrate only with great difficulty, or not at 
all. Screw it fast in a vice, and the least touch 
makes it vibrate rapidly. In like manner, the gun 
fired from the shoulder gives way, moves, and alters 
its position much, probably ; but this motion is slow, 
and does not affect the flight of the ball in a degree 
approaching to the effect of the rapid vibrations of 
the metal itself; which do not take place when the 
gun is not fixed immoveably. 

This at first seems curious ; but however it be, 
there is no doubt of the fact as stated above. In 
these experiments by the committee, also, the rifles 
were laid with a gunner’s quadrant; which does 
not seem to be a workmanlike or effective method 
for small arms. A long folding sight, with slide, 
is by far the best method of elevating the piece, 
whether in actual use in war or for experimental 
practice. 

These sights should be made with springs, both to 
the sight itself and to the slide, to prevent their 
working loose and falling down of themselves. 

Since the date of these proceedings, the experiments 
at Jacobabad have been continued with a great manv 
new rifles, and with curious and important results ; 
such, that the progress made throws all former pro¬ 
posals for improved balls for rifles for the armv in 
the back-ground. 


253 


The ball No. 6 of the foregoing memorandum, 
there described as of perfect shape, is indeed, so so 
long as it retains that shape in front. With a charge 
of powder equal to one-fifteenth of the weight of the 
ball, or less, these balls, of lead only, performed ad¬ 
mirably ; so that a good shot could, with them, at a 
distance of 1,000 yards, put nearly every ball into a 
circle of four feet radius. 

Nothing could have been better as far as it went; 
but rifles were now procured of heavier metal, in 
proportion to the bore of 16 and 24 and 32-gauge, 
and the balls were tried with larger charges ; it being 
supposed that they could be used with advantage with 
an initial velocity at least equal to that used with the 
ordinary round bail. 

It proved, however, on trial, that such was not the 
case, and a new law was at once deve¬ 
loped. A very slight increase of charge 
caused the lead to change its shape under 
the pressure of the gunpowder ; so that 
the balls of the shape of the ball No. 6. 
when inserted into the barrel, came out in 

SHAPE AFTER 

firing. a form resembling the annexed sketch 

(Fig. a). 

It was in vain attempted to remedy this by lengthen¬ 
ing the ball, which was increased to two and a half 
and three diameters ; and by making holes in the 
after-part, as in the Minie ball. Wads also of all 
manner of kinds—loose, and attached to the balls 
in various ways — were employed, but without 
avail. 

The lead was found totally incapable of preserving 


Fig. a . 























254 


any resemblance to its original form (Fig. b of the 
annexed sketch), under the pressure of a charge of 
powder equal to one-eighth of the weight of the ball. 
The balls of three diameters in length, from the 24- 
gauge guns, whose fore-part was shaped as that of the 
ball No. 6, came out of the rifle in the form shown in 
Fig. c. 



SHAPE OF THE FORE PART OF THESE SHAPE AFTER FIRING. 

BALLS BEFORE FIRING. 


These proved the best of all the lead balls, and 
ranged, with deadly force and considerable accuracy, 
up to 1,600 yards, or further; but of course all 
advantage of the peculiar form adapted to overcome 
the resistance of the air was lost. Man- 
ton’s steel points were tried with these 
balls, hut these were worse than the 
others; the lead was squeezed forward by 
one side of the point in an irregular 
manner, as represented in Fig. d; the 
ball assumed this shape, and would not 
fly truly. 

The limit of the powers of leaden balls had thus 
been attained; and to proceed further it became 


Fig. d. 






































255 


necessary to find a method of constructing rifle balls, 
so that the fore -part should be capable of sustaining 
the pressure of large charges of fired gunpowder with¬ 
out change of form, and thereby retain that shape 
best adapted for overcoming the resistance of the air, 
on which all accurate distance practice depends ; and 
at the same time having the part of the ball next the 
powder sufficiently soft and yielding to spread out 
under its pressure, so as to fill the barrel and grooves 
perfectly air-tight. This problem was speedily solved; 
the fore-part of the hall was cast of zinc, in a separate 
mould, of the shape of Figs. e,f 


Fig. e. 



Fig./. 



RIFLE BALL COMPLETE, WITH THE FOREPART OF 
ZINC OR IRON. 


ZINC OR IRON 
POINT. 


AD = 1| diameters. 

DB= ditto. 

D C = 2 diameters. 

AC=2| ditto. 

From E to F the ball is cylindrical. 

From E to A its sides are defined by arcs of circles described from the 
centres C with the radius C A. 


Finally, the best shape for ball and shell was found 





























256 


to be 2\ diameters in length, the cylindrical part 
being 1 diameter only. 

These points were placed in the full-sized mould, 
and the lead cast on to them, the complete ball being 
formed as shown in the diagram. Subsequently, the 
bead form of the large end of the ball and shell was 
abandoned, and the end is now made quite flat. 

I was at first doubtful whether the small specific 
gravity of the zinc would not prove of disadvantage so 
great as to overcome the benefit of its hardness: but, 
on trial, nothing could have proved more perfectly 
effective. 

The 24-gauge balls, of the increased length of two 

and a half and three diameters, proved admirably 

effective at ranges up to 2,000 yards, which had never 

before been attained. Ultimatelv the ball and shell 

•/ 

of two and a half diameters in length proved to be 
the best. 

No change whatever took place in the form of the 
zinc fore-part of the balls with the largest charges, 
while their penetration was found enormous, being 
not less than four inches at 2,000. and nearlv three 
times that depth at 1,000 yards, into very hard dry 
kutcha brick. At the same time, the accuracy of the 
flight of these balls was truly wonderful. 

It may be here remarked, that in the published 
reports of the Enfield rifle practice, it is stated that 
the twist of the rifle grooves throws the ball to the 
right or left, according as a right or left handed screw 
may be employed. 

This seems to be wholly erroneous : no such effect 
is observed in my practice. There may be some such 


tendency to deviation from such cause, but it must be 
of small amount, and is not perceptible. 

The real facts of the matter seem to be these : 
considering the person of the rifleman as a cylindrical 
column, the recoil of a gun fired from the right 
shoulder is a force acting at a distance from the axis 
of that column, and therefore tending not only to 
drive it back, but to run it round on its axis. The 
muzzle of the gun, therefore, must receive a cer¬ 
tain degree of motion to the right hand when 
fired. 

It was found here, in many thousands of trials, that 
on a calm day the balls of the guns which recoiled 
with the greatest force, fired from the right shoulder, 
always deviated to the right hand; this deviation 
amounting to about twenty feet at 800 yards. 

That the cause of this is correctly assigned above is 
thus proved. The same gun fired from the left 
shoulder threw the ball to the left . With the guns 
recoiling most, such as the 8-gauge rifles, used with a 
four-ounce ball and three-drachm charge, the deviation 
was very great; with the 32-gauge rifles, of which the 
recoil was slight, this regular deviation did not occur 
at all. These effects were observed always to occur, 
without any respect whatever to the amount of twist 
given to the grooves of the rifle. In practice, a 
perfect remedy was found for this deviation, or for 
any other similar errors, caused by the action of wind 
or anything else. When taking aim, leaning the gun 
over a little to the left perfectly counteracted the 
deviation to the right; and by practice the habit is 


258 


s 


formed of instinctively adjusting the amount of the 
lateral inclination thus given to the sight, so as 
correctly to compensate the error. 

Thus the matter stands at present. The limit of 
the powers of these missiles has, I am certain, not yet 
even been approached. 

The iron points for the balls I now have made by 
compression from rod-iron; these answer admirably, 
and are much superior to anything cast. 

These points could probably be made wholesale, at 
such prices that the ammunition could be prepared at 
no more cost than the common musket cartridges ; 
while the power of the weapon would be about three 
times that of the best Minie rifles. 

A 32-gauge ball of three diameters in length, with 
this iron point, is perfectly effective up to ranges of 
2,500 yards or more. Shells, also, of this size appear 
to be quite large enough for all ordinary purposes ; 
they take the same sized tubes as those before used 
for the 16-gauge shells, and never fail. On the whole, 

I should recommend the 32-gauge bore for general 
use. 

I have tried every expedient I could think of as a 
substitute for the greased patch for rifle balls, but 
always had to return to this. Any species of wad, 
however attached to the ball, retards its flight so 
much as to render distant practice impossible, what¬ 
ever may be the initial velocity used. 

The best method I am acquainted with of preparing 
military rifle ammunition is to stitch slightly to the 
halls patches of thin cotton cloth completely deprived 


of starch (or conjee), and then to dip them in melted 
tallow. 

The fore-part of the ball being hard, cannot be 
injured by any maltreatment by the ramrod, nor by 
knocking about against each other, and are best 
carried loose in a pouch ; the powder being in blank 
cartridges, in a separate partition. 

Memorandum , No IY. 

For cannon, especially field pieces, similar shot to 
these found so effective for small arms might be used, 
perhaps, with advantage, instead of the shot, with 
wooden bottoms, formerly proposed by me. 

The only objection seems to be the cost of the lead ; 
which, however, would not probably be very great, as 
the quantity may be much reduced by making the 
dove-tailed tenon of the iron larger. 

Shot, partly of lead, for rifled cannon, have been, 
I understand, not long ago tried, and found to fail, at 
Woolwich: but these proposed by me are of entirely 
different construction, and seem free from the defects 
of the others. 

Nothing but actual trial can decide the merits of 
these things; and if such trials be made, it should be 
borne in mind that great weight is essential to the 
correct performance of rifled cannon. The observa¬ 
tions on the vibrations of the barrels of small arms 
tell here with redoubled force. Strength to resist the 
bursting force of the powder is by no means sufficient 
—weight and mass are required; and, whatever the 
strength may be, the rifled cannon should not be of 


260 


less weight than one hundred and twenty times that 
of its shot. 

Judging from experiments made, as an old artillery 
officer as well as a rifleman and practical mechanic, 
I am deliberately of opinion that a four-grooved rifled 
iron gun, of a bore of four inches in diameter, weigh¬ 
ing not less than twenty-four hundred weight, could 
be made to throw shot to a distance of ten miles and 
more with force and accuracy. 

j 

The “ Lancaster ” guns must , I think, fail. The 
mode of rifling adopted in them is the very worst 
possible. It is only the two-grooved rifle in disguise . 
(See Fig. g.) 

Fig. g. 



Let the shoulders of the grooves of a two-grooved 
rifle be removed, as shown by the dotted line in the 
sketch, and you have the Lancaster rifle. 

But by the removal of these shoulders, the friction, 
if the twist be considerable, becomes enormous: the 
ball and the bore are not quite round, but nearly so; 
wherefore, as the ball is compelled to follow the twist 
of the bore, it acts like a “ cam,” and endeavours to 
hurst the gun; or the dotted part in the sketch 










becomes a very acute wedge, which the spiral motion 
causes to be driven with great force into the bore as 
the ball is driven out. 

The heat developed by the friction must be very 
great, and the tendency of the gun to burst, or the 
shell to crush, also very great. 

It would be far better than this to use a four- 
grooved rifle, with projections on the ball, even of 
non, with a greased leather patch. 

One more remark appears requisite. 

The twist I now use, and which I find best, is one 
turn in thirty inches, or, better still, four-fifths of a 
turn in the length of the barrel. 

This I find to maintain the spiral motion of the 
ball quite up to the last, in the long ranges attained 
by my rifles ; and a rapid spiral motion is necessary 
to preserve the light end of the ball truly foremost 
throughout its long flight ; which it is perfectly suc¬ 
cessful in doin£. 

The grooves should be full deep , and of breadth 
equal to that of the lands; the bands on the balls or 
shells being made to correspond so as to fit the 
grooves nicely, but quite easily, with a greased patch 
round them. It may be well to observe that thin 
cotton cloth, well washed to free it from size , &c., 
should be used for patches. This seemingly trifling 
circumstance is of importance, for the use of improper 
cloth for patches, or having these imperfectly greased, 
often causes the time required for loading to be mul¬ 
tiplied tenfold . The patch should contain as little 
substance of cloth , and as much grease , as possible. 




262 


For rifled cannon, the iron shot of two and a half 
diameters long will probably, as for small arms, be 
found to be the best; the shot might be cast with 
hands on it to fit the grooves, and be used with a well 
greased leather patch. This, I feel convinced, would 
succeed better than any other contrivance of wooden 
or leaden bottoms, &c. 

Cast-iron will probably prove to be best for rifled 
cannon, they can be so easily made of this material; 
and the weight required to resist the recoil properly 
is amply sufficient to ensure adequate strength to 
resist the largest charges. 


[Witton and Daw, 57, Threadneedle Street; 
Garden, 200, Picadilly, London ; and Swinburn, of 
Birmingham, are all in possession of full information 
regarding the results of my rifle practice, &c.] 




REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABAD. 


d 

Q 

Description of Rifle. 

Nature and Weight 
of Shot or Shell. 0 

53 

> 

RGE. 

u 

i 

£ 

0 

Ph 

Number of Rounds. j 

Range, Yards. 

Elevation. 

Time of Flight. 

Shot Struck Dis¬ 
tant FROM THE 
Centre, Feet. 

By whom Fired. 

Remarks. 

Right. 

Left. 

In Bull’s Eye. 

Over. 

Under. 

1854 

Single. 

Flat- 

2 drams. 

1 

1200 

6° 1' 

• • 

4 





Maj .Jacob 




bottom 


2 







10 





16-gauge. 

Shells. 


3 







15 





30 in. long. 



4 




3 



10 








5 







15 





Weight 



6 







12 




a 

cs 

10 lbs. 



7 




3 



• . 








8 







10 




o 

,0 




9 







6 




£ 




10 




io 







O 

O 




11 





4 






O 

Q 




12 







4 








13 







• • 


• • • • 

Burst at 





14 





4 


• • 

2 


muzzle. 





15 




3 



4 








16 




2 



, , 








17 




6 



6 








18 




6 



6 








19 




• . 



8 








20 




10 



6 








21 




• . 



10 








22 




6 



• • 

3 







1 

1000 

4 U 36' 

• • 

8 











2 





10 


10 








3 





3 


•• 








1 

800 

3“ 32' 





3 








2 





• * 


1 








1 

600 

2° 30' 



6 


8 








2 




6 



2 








3 






i 

• • 








4 





i 


• , 








5 







4 








6 





4 


4 








7 




3 



2 








8 







2 








9 






i 

• • 








10 




i 



3 








1 

500 

2° 3 ' 





4 








2 







. . 

2 







3 







4 








4 





i 


1 








5 







4 








6 




i 



1 








7 




1 



• # 








8 




. , 

i 


• . 








9 




, . 



1 








10 




• • 



•• 

i 







1 

400 

1° 39' 


1 


• • 

1 

• * 







2 




• • 


1 

• • 

• * 




































































264 


REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABAD. 




Charge. 





Shot Struck Dis- 










TANT FROM THE 










Centre, 

Feet. 




a 

« 















■§) . 
'Ss 


’P 

P 

P 











Date. 

o 

p 

o 

•-£ 

Pi 

•c 

o 

oo 

<D 

ft 

Nature and W 
of Shot or She 

Powder. 

o 

ft 

o 

P 

o> 

.Q 

s 

p 

X 

Range, Yards. 

Elevation. 

Time of Flight 

Right. 

Left. 

In Bull’s Eye, 

Over. 

Under. 

By whom Fire 

Remarks. 

1 

1854 

Single. 

Bead- 

2 drains. 

1 

1000 

4° 36' 


3 





Lieutenant 



ended 


2 







15 

• • 

Green. 



16 Gauge. 

Shells. 


3 





3 







30 in. long. 



4 







15 

• • 







5 





10 






.e 

Weight 



6 





6 






to 

10»s. 



7 








1 



u 

<v 




8 





7 






& 

a 




9 





2 






o 

o 




10 





4 






<5 




1 

1200 

6° 1' 


2 

2 










2 








4 







3 




12 











4 




• • 

• • 

1 

. « 

• a 







5 







3 

a • 







6 




• a 

4 










7 




10 

• . 

, , 

10 

. # 







8 







10 

a • 







9 








5 







10 







3 

• • 







11 








3 







12 




4 

, . 

, # 

12 

, , 







13 




12 











l 

1000 

4° 36' 





15 


Maj. Jacob 






2 







5 



O 




3 







6 




<v 

rO 




4 







• • 


• • t • 

Burst at 

s 




5 






i 

• • 



Muzzle. 

Q 




6 







3 




O 

ft 




7 







15 








8 







3 








9 







• • 

2 







10 






l 

• • 





1 

| 



11 





i 


• . 








12- 




4 



. , 








13 







5 



% 




















































































REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABAD 


Charge. 

Number of Rounds. j 

Range, Yards. 

Elevation. 

Time of Flight. 

Shot Struck Dis¬ 
tant FROM THE 
Centre, Feet. 

Nature and Weight 
of Shot or Shell. 

Powder. 

Right. 

Left. 

In Bull’s Eye. 

Over. 

Under. 

Flat- 

2 drams 

1 

1000 

4° 36' 





5 


bottom 


2 




2 





Shells. 


3 




3 

« • 


2 




4 







5 




5 







4 




6 




4 







7 




3 







8 




4 







9 







6 




10 








4 

Flat 

3 drams. 

1 

1200 

7° 0' 



8 

• • 

10 

• • 

bottom 


2 




• • 

7 

• • 

10 

• • 

Shells. 


3 




• • 

6 

• • 

10 

• • 

s£ ® <n 


4 




10 




3 

.a 


5 




• . 

10 




* 











•g’O 






















Flat 

2 drams. 

1 

to 

o 

o 

6° 1' 





6 

• • 

ended 


2 




3 

• • 

• • 

2 

• • 

Shells. 


3 








5 



4 




3 

• • 

• • 

2 

• • 

Weight 


5 




• • 

6 




782 grs. 


6 








4 



7 




• • 

2 

• • 

2 

• • 



8 







6 

• • 



9 




4 

• • 

• • 

• • 

2 

1 


10 

i 

1 



• • 

1 

• • 

3 





1 

I 

i 








2 

<a 

Q 


<x> 


C 

o 

•pH 

p. 

u 

a 

m 

<w 

O 


1854 


»- 

6 

a 

o 

o 

<u 

o 


<?» 


Single. 

16 gauge. 

130 in.long. 

Weight 
1016s. 


U 

o» 

•O 

a 

o 

9 

o 

C 


Single. 

8 gauge. 
24 inches 
long. 
Weight 
141h. 8oz. 


Single. 

16 gauge. 
!30 in. long. 


T3 

o 

£h 

£ 

a 

o 

.a 

► 

>1 


on 

PS 

os 

a 

o 

w 


Lieut. M. 
Green. 


Lieut. M. 
Green. 






























































































266 


REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABA1X 


<D 

o3 


1855 


A 

■*-» 

co 


o3 


0> 


C 

o 


h 

a 

TO 

a> 

ft 


Charge. 


Single. 

8 gauge. 
<fcc. 


tr . 

‘S ~ 
t>,C 

C fa 

cj O 
£ O 

S 

-M C/2 

>5 •« 

Ac O 


Shells, 
3oz. 8dr. 


t- 

■S 

o 

Ai 


<u 

,Q 


3 drains. 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 


T3 

03 

oT 

bO 

§ 

Ph 


1800 


c 

.2 

e3 

► 

0> 

W 


13*1 7 ' 


Shot Struck Dis 

TANT PROM THE 

Centre, Feet. 


m hp 

-« 

<4-* 

o 

<D 

a 

s 


2000 


15° 52 


-o 

| 

E 

S 

o 

.S 

pe 

m 


15 

15 

10 


5 | 

4 


i-i 

- 

a 

6 

« 


Maj. Jacob 


All the shells 
burst in the 
wall with full 
effect. 


20 | 

15 


Shells biu’st 
in*wall with 
full effect. 


































































































267 


REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABAI). 


s 

« 


a 

© 


Date. 

•c 

o 

CO 

a> 

ft 

Nature 
of Sho 

1855 

Single. 

Flat- 



bottom 


8 gauge. 

Shells, 


24 in. long. 

with 



thick 


Weight 

wad and 

a 

CM 

14?5s. 8 oz. 

patch. 


I 

<1 


I 


Single. 

8 gauge, 
as above. 


Charge. 


sz 

bp . 
'© S 

S> ,£3 

C j- 
ci ° 


3 drams. 


Flat- 

bottom 

Shells, 

&c. 

as before 


O 

£ 

o 


8|drams 


Number of Hounds. 

Range, Yards. ' 

Elevation. 

Time of Flight. 

Shot Struck Dis¬ 
tant FROM THE 
Centre, Feet. 

Right. 

Left. 

In Bull’s Eye. 

Over. 

Under. 

1 

2000 

168 







2 









3 





10 




4 





8 



10 

5 




i 




8 

6 


• 



5 


10 

, , 

7 









8 





2 



6 

9 




i 

• . 


2 


10 









11 









12 





10 



10 

1 

2000 

13° 







2 







• • 


3 







• • 


4 







.. 


5 




i 



3 


6 





is 


, , 


7 





12 


# # 


8 





8 


12 


9 





10 


15 


10 





. • 


20 


11 





• • 


• , 


12 





. . 


* . 


13 





3 


. . 

12 

14 





3 


# , 

15 

15 










<v 

u 

s 

a 

o 

A 

p£ 

>. 

M 


Maj. Jacob 


Maj. Jacob 


C/3 

s 

a 

« 


Over wall. 
Grazed 20 ft. 
short. 


Grazed 30 ft. 
short. 

Over wall. 

All the shells 
which struck 
burst well in 
the wall pen¬ 
etrating from 
4 to 5 inches. 
Over wall. 
Over wall, 
r Close to left 
1 of wall. 

Strong breeze 
blowing from 
right to left: 
all the shells 
burst with 
full effect. 

Top of wall. 

Grazed close to 
foot of wall. 

Close to left of 
wall. 

Grazed 10 feet 
short. 













































































268 


REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE AT JACOBABAD. 


B 

c3 

ft 


0? 

qa 

• r* 


c 

.2 
V-< 
a, 
*C 
o 
c n 


1854 Four 
grooved. 

Single. 

8 gauge. 

124 in. long. 


Weight 
14Z6s. 8 oz. 

Distance 
of sight 
from 
muzzle, 
18.75 in. 


Charge. 


bC . 

*S £3 

g 

§® 
go 
5 ^ 

CB 

f-H O 


Single. 


lo , 16 gauge. 
£ 30 in. long. 


Flat 

bottom 

Shells. 

302. 8 dr. 


ic 
<M 

CO 

2 

to 


Weight 

10 lbs. 


u 

o 

nU 

£ 

o 


4 drams 


‘2 drams. 


—-— , _ _ _ _ — -- 

Height of Sight. 

Range, Yards. 

Elevation. 

Time of Flight. 

Shot Struck Dis¬ 
tant FROM THE 
Centre, Feet. 

By whom Fired. 

Right. 

Left. 

In Bull’s Eye. 

Over. 

Under. 

in. 










4-16 

2000 

1230-24 

9* 12 







3-81 

1900 

11-29-10 

8- 51 







3 47 

1800 

10-29- 5 

7- 90 







314 

1700 

9 30 24 

7- 30 







2-82 

1600 

8 33 11 

6- 71 







2 52 

1500 

7-30*16 

6- 14 







224 

1400 

6-48-45 

5- 60 







1 98 

1300 

6- 1-41 

5* 6 







1-74 

1200 

5-18- 7 

4- 57 







1-52 

MOD 

4-38- 6 

4 9 







1-32 

1000 

4- 1-31 

3- 62 







114 

900 

3-28*45 

3-203 







•97 

800 

23741 

2-785 







•81 

700 

228-25 

2. 38 







*66 

600 

2- 0- 5 








•51 

500 

1-33-28 








No. 










of 










rnds. 










1 

1000 

4® 36' 


2 




1 

Maj. Jacob 

2 




1 

• • 


# . 

2 


3 




• • 

2 


1 



4 




3 



4 



5 




1 



3 



6 




• • 


i 

• • 



7 




1 



• • 



8 




2 



• • 



9 




• • 



4 



10 








i 



is 

i 

« 


burst well 
in the wall. 






























































No. 2,277. 

Head Quarters , Mahablesliwur , 16^ April , 1856. 

From the Adjutant-General of the Army, 

•/ * 

To the Secretary to Government, 

Military Department, Bombay. 

Sir, —With reference to previous correspondence 
on the subject of Lieutenant-Colonel John Jacob’s 
rifle and rifle balls, I am directed to make the fol¬ 
lowing report, for the information of the Bight 
Honourable the Governor in Council:— 

2. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having 
desired to see the effect of the elongated conical shells, 
recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob, C.B., to 
be introduced into the army, a butt for rifle practice 
was built of sunburnt bricks on the Flats at Bombay, 
twenty feet high, and of a similar width. 

3. The rifles used were four-grooved, 24-gauge, as 
recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob for use in 
the army, the charge for all distances being 2^ 
drachms of powder. The shell is cast with four 
bands on the cylindrical part, which fit exactly to the 
grooves; used with a thin greased patch. The rifle 
loads with the greatest ease, and without any force. 

4. The rifles were fired from the shoulder, but 
placed on the army regulation aiming rest, as adopted 
by Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, which gave a correct 
direction and elevation. 

5. At ranges from 300 to 1,200 yards, the flight 
of the shell was always point foremost, and the eleva¬ 
tion at the extreme range inconsiderable. The shells 


270 


which struck the butt invariably hurst with full effect; 
and practice was made by the many officers who 
attended, at distances which could not have been 
attained with any other known missile. 

6. The result was convincing—that, before a small 
body of marksmen armed with such weapons, no battery 
of artillery could long hold its ground. A box filled 
with powder was exploded by a shell fired at 300 
yards, and from the effect of the shells on the butt, it 
was evident that the same result would have been 
attained at the greatest range from which practice 
was made, viz. 1,200 yards ; for the shells on exploding 
at such distances tore out large fragments of the wall. 
Unfortunately, at this practice, the wind was very 
high, with much dust. 

7. The expectation formed of these shells by Lieu¬ 
tenant-Colonel Jacob, and his experiments with them, 
as shown in the accompanying report, are fully borne 
out by the practice made at Bombay ; and the result 
of six shots fired by Colonel Green and Major 
Woosnam at 1,000 yards is shown in the annexed 
diagram. 

8. The accuracy of flight attained by projectiles of 
the peculiar form on which Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob’s 
shells and balls are cast, has now carried the use of 
fire-arms far beyond anything which has come under 
the notice of officers in this country, and the 
experiment made at Bombay can be attested by the 
following gentlemen who witnessed the practice : — 

His Excellency Sir Henry Somerset. 

Honorable Arthur Malet, Member of Council. 

Major-General Lester, Commandant of Artillerv. 

* •/ 



271 


Colonel Green, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General 
of the Army. 

Colonel Willoughby, C.B., Principal Commissary 
of Ordnance. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Swanson, Member of the 
Military Board. 

Mr. Bellasis, Civil Service. 

Major Stock, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Major Shaw, Assistant Commissary-General. 

Major Woosman, Agent for Gunpowder. 

9. It would appear, therefore, a matter of deep 
importance that the subject of rifle shells and bullets 
of the form recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jacob be brought under the special attention of the 
home authorities, for they can be equally well adapted 
to the Enfield Pritchett rifle, now being introduced 
generally into the Boyal army. His Excellency begs 
therefore to recommend that this report may be 
transmitted with that view to the Honourable the 
Court of Directors. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) H. Hancock, Colonel, 

Adjutant-General of the Army. 

(True copy,) 

(Signed) Edward Green, Colonel, 

Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army. 


REPORT OF RIFLE PRACTICE, BOMBAY. 

Present ,—Colonel Green and Major Woosnam. 

Range, 1000 yards. 

Scale of feet . 


A 





© 

CM 



Description of Rifle ( Soldiers ) recommended bp 

Colonel Jacob. 

Charge,—drachms. 

Elevation,—as marked on the sight. 
Remarks,—Clear, calm morning. Six rounds fired. 


H.G. 



























































273 


(Memorandum.) 

RIFLE PRACTICE AT KURRACHEE. 

Friday , 5th September , 1856. 

A powder-box was prepared for explosion by rifle 
shells, at a range of (1,800) one thousand eight 
hundred yards. 

The box consisted of two boards, one and a quarter 
inch thick and ten feet square, put together with a 
space of one inch between their surfaces; this space 
was filled with gunpowder, and was found to contain 
a charge of above 500 lbs. The box was placed 
against the butt, on the ground, and after being loaded, 
was well tarred over. At 7 a.m. on the 5th of 
September, 1856, rifle practice was commenced with 
shells at this box, from a distance of 1,800 yards. 
The morning at first was dark and cloudy ; but after 
a few shots had been fired the weather improved and 
soon became very favourable as regards light, although 
a fresh breeze was blowing across the range from right 
to left. 

The shooters were — 

Captain Gibbard, Artillery, 24-gauge army rifle. 

Captain Thatcher, Major | l6 ge Manton. 

Colonel Jacob.24-gauge Manton. 

Captain Scott, A.D.C.32-gauge Manton. 

The undermentioned gentlemen were also pre¬ 
sent : — 

Colonel Trevelyan, Artillery. 

Lieutenant De Vitre, Artillery. 

Captain Pirie, Lieutenant of Police. 

T 





274 


For the first few rounds, the shells struck near the 
foot of the butt; hut as the morning brightened, the 
practice improved, and many shells in succession struck 
close over and around the box,— so close, indeed, that 
to the naked eye they appeared actually to strike it. 
The practice was steadily and deliberately continued, 
hut the powder still remained untouched, till Colonel 
Jacob’s little double rifle had been fired twenty times. 
The last few shots from this rifle were all very near to 
the box, and, when fired for the twenty-first time, the 
shell from the second barrel struck the box and 
exploded the powder. The effect was magnificent, 
the distance being so great, and the charge in the box 
so heavy. So violent was the explosion, that it 
was thought at first that the butt wall had been blown 
down ; but when the smoke cleared, the wall was seen 
standing uninjured. This wall is built of stone, ten 
feet thick at the base and one and a half at top, is 
100 feet long and 50 feet high. A large portion of 
surface near the powder-box was a good deal shattered, 
but the damage was only superficial, and the butt was 
not seriously injured. 

Throughout the practice at Kurrachee, no rest of 
any kind was used. The rifles were always fired from 
the shoulder, the shooter standing up. 

On further examination, it appeared that a large 
portion of the surface of the butt wall, about twenty 
feet square, was blown in to a depth of nine inches, 
and that the back of the wall near the base had 
bulged three inches. 



Plate 3. 


Komi of Hall and Shell finally adopted 
by Col. Jacob. 


March /did 


.'52 Gu&ge. 



T/ir moulds hr / /u. s f ,s/ff //.>• or bulls should always be made 
fcopen in /he rrudelfr cl a pat/- of ban Met. 

The cnr/s cl both hull unel shellguile Hat The shell-tube, 
/cellprimed at the point with percussion powder, and filled 
with li/ie ipinrioM'der. 


I To face pane 171/ 


Plat e /. 



N°4. 


1° 


•t. 


NTT 



W°P> 


r~\ 


Original Made Ball 
with iron Pup. 





fnpnn ed Mu/ie Balls //W without Pups 


w° o . 



IV? 6 Perfect shape for Rif It Balls 

A2 Du/metcrs 
V.I) 2 _ 

A. C—2/t . 

B. D. _ . 

prom P. tap the hall is cylindrical, from A, /o f 
d is defined by airs of circles described from 
the centres C. with the i a dins (A 


N? 


\ 



deep hole at the smaller end in which/ is (reed a Popper 
Tulf filled with ddonafing powtler 

The shell* and halls are vw found tv answer boot where made guile Bat at 
the large end-theogiirulriculpart being increasedirulength tr 4u diameters 



































































Harr/ wow/ f/ottom nit A Square Jfortfce ru the Centre to fit on to 


1 

4 



























275 


Penetration of Jacob's Iron-pointed Rifle Balls. 

At Kurrachee, on the 26th of September, 1856, a 
24-gauge iron-pointed ball, fired with a charge of 2^ 
drachms of powder at a distance of twenty-five yards, 
penetrated clean through eighteen deal planks, each 
three-quarters of an inch thick, and smashed itself all 
to pieces against stones on the other side. 

Present,— 

Colonel Jacob. 

Captain Scott, A.D.C. 

Lieutenant Macdonald, Revenue Survey. 

Again, at Kurrachee, on the 29th September, 
1856, a 24-gauge iron-pointed ball, with a charge of 
2^ drachms of powder, was fired at twenty-five deal 
boards, each a little more than three-quarters of an 
inch thick, the whole thickness of all the boards 
together being twenty inches ; the boards were packed 
close, one behind the other, and wedged fast into a 
box. The rifle was fired at twenty-five yards distance. 
The ball penetrated clean through the whole twenty- 
five planks, and buried itself its whole length in a 
block of hard wood 2^ inches thick which was behind 
the mass of boards, breaking this block into two 
pieces. 

Best Army Rifle, with Apparatus Complete 

in Case. 

Double 32-gauge—four-grooved— deep grooves, of 
breadth equal to that of lands, to take four-fifths of 
a turn in the length of the barrel-barrels the best 

.[» j o 



276 


that can be made, twenty-four (24) inches long, 
weight of pair of barrels alone about six pounds, 
not less —the ends of the lands at the muzzle to be 
rounded off—Patent breech—no side vents—first site 
exactly parallel to the bore—the muzzle sight being 
raised if necessary for this purpose—full stock, well 
bent, of the best heart walnut wood, attached to barrels 
by bands—best plain case-hardened mountings—fold¬ 
ing sight five (5) inches long, secured by spring below, 
protected by projecting wings when lying flat on the 
barrel; the slide of this sight to be well secured by 
springs at its back, so as never to work loose—the 
slide to come down quite low on the sight, the top of 
the sight and bottom of its slot to be notched. The 
sight, &c., to be strongly made and nicely finished , 
marked , and engraved , for distances as per annexed 
scale—muzzle sight to be fine—leaf sights folding 
flush, for 100 and 200 yards. Best locks, strong main¬ 
springs, and heavy cocks. Half cock half an inch 
above nipple (not less). Triggers easy to pull, plenty 
of play in the cocks, external vents in nipples to be 
small —six spare nipples of each of size to fit Eley’s 
No. 13 and No. 26 caps—one mould for balls, and 
two for Jacob’s shells, flat ended (2^) two-and-a-half 
diameters long—moulds to be made of good steel 
to open in the middle of one pair of bands ,—the 
balls and their bands of size and depth as per annexed 
table of proportions—exact diameter of bore in decimals 
of an inch *539—of shell or ball *524—plugs of shell 
moulds to fit Jacob’s shell-tubes (“long 16-gauge” 
as made by Eley)—plugs or cores of shell-moulds 
to have wooden cross-handles. Best double-edged 














277 


i 


straight sword, with blade 30 inches long, to attach 
to rifle by ring round the muzzle of both barrels, 
as well as by spring socket, with scabbard and belt 
complete — (scabbard of strong wood covered with 
leather, with case-hardened mountings riveted on)— 
all properly fitted into gun-case (two small ammunition 
pouches on the belt—one to hold powder-flask, or 
blank cartridges and caps, the other balls, patches, 
turnkey). The sword to be made with good steel, or 
case-hardened iron, half-basket hilt. Short powder- 
flasks of copper covered with hogskin — charges 
2 J, 2f, 3 drachms — spare tops with charges of 
2, 2^, 2^ drachms—stout steel ramrod in the gun 
with deep hollow head, so as not to press on the shell 
tubes in loading—the rod below the hollow head not 
to be filed away too much, as if thin it is liable to 
split on the iron balls. The grip of the ramrod at both 
ends to be well roughened. Stout spare ramrod with 
knob handle and deep hollow head—brass tube of the 
length of the barrels for loading with powder when 
cartridges are not used—patch punches (1|- inches)— 
small stores, cleaning apparatus, &c., as usual, fitted 
into a rough stout roomy case. The rifle to fit into 
the case when put together, stock and barrel — the 
partitions in the case to be very strongly fixed by 
screws, &c., all of the best quality as to usefulness ; 
strength and durability to be especially considered— 
appearance only of little importance. 

Strong leather sling to attach by good steel loops 
and screws — rifle to fit into case with the sling 
attached. 

There should be proper receptacles in the gun-case 











for some shells or balls, caps, patches, &c. ; the 
partitions, &c., to be very strongly fixed. 

A pair of scissors, pair of pliers, a corkscrew, and 
a knife—a ladle and a shallow melting-pot in gun-case 
—plenty of turnkeys and screw-drivers, oil bottle, &c., 
all very strong and good, and serviceable for hard 
work. 

Eley’s Percussion tubes for Jacob’s Rifle Shells, 
long 16-gauge, primed at the points with detonating 
powder, and filled with gunpowder. 


Cap and Tube-makers employed by Colonel John 
Jacob— 

Messrs. Elev Brothers, 

38, Broad Street, Golden Square, London. 
Messrs. Witton and Daw, 

57, Threadneedle Street, London. 
Messrs. Swinburn and Son, 

16 & 17, Russell Street, Birmingham. 


Gun-makers" 








SCALE TO COMMENCE FROM A LINE EXACTLY PARALLEL TO THE BORE OF THE CUN 


































































































































































279 


PROPORTIONS RECOMMENDED FOR JACOB’S RIFLES 
FOR GENERAL PURPOSES. 


10 th September, 1857. 


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Ball or Shell, 2£- diameters long, shaped as below, the end quite flat:— 



N'B .—It is found that the double Rifle performs better than the single, 
even when the weight of the single equals that of the pair of barrels 
of the double Rifle. 

For general use with Shells the 32 gauge is recommended ; but if Balls 
only are to be used a smaller calibre even will answer admirably. 

JOHN JACOB. 













































280 


Explanation of the Difference between the 
Minie and Jacob Rifle Ball. 

The Enfield rifle is peculiarly adapted for use with 
the Minie ball, with which it performs well up to 800 
yards. But the very peculiarities which make the 
Enfield rifle answer perfectly for the Minie projectiles 
quite unfit it for use with mine. Let us consider 
what these peculiarities are. 

The Minie ball possesses in itself the tendency to 
keep its proper end foremost in its flight; it therefore 
requires very little twist to keep it in the right path. 

The large hollow in its hinder end makes it com¬ 
paratively light in proportion to its diameter; a less 
charge, therefore, of powder is required to give it the 
same initial velocity, as one of my projectiles of like 
calibre. Again, the hollow in the Minie ball renders 
it likely to be blown into a tube if much projectile 
force be suddenly applied to it. 

For this ball, therefore, a thin barrel only is neces¬ 
sary, and the grooves may he shallow, and have but 
very little twist. At the same time, in order to get 
as much projectile force to act on the ball as it will 
bear without injury, it is requisite to lengthen the 
barrel, so as to make the power act for as long a time 
as possible on the ball; while it actually found that 
an inferior description of powder (that is, a slow 
burning powder) is the best for the Minie ball and 
Enfield rifle. The Minie ball will not stand a o T eat 

O 

force aoting with great velocity on it—the lead gives 
way under the shock; wherefore it is necessary to 
impress this hall with a more feeble force , acting for 



281 


a longer time on it , in order to produce an adequate 
projectile effect. 

Well, then, the long weak barrel, with very little 
twist in the grooves, answers admirably to fulfil the 
conditions required so far. But, on the other hand, 
the shape of the Minie ball is by no means well 
adapted for overcoming the resistance of the air; 
while its want of solidity, owing to the hollow in its 
after-part, also very much lessens its virtual specific 
gravity and momentum, and thus adds to the effect of 
the air’s resistance on its fore-part. 

The shape of the ball used by me (those of two and 
a half diameters in length are, I think, best,) is that 
which I find by experience to be the best adapted for 
overcoming the resistance of the air, and, being per¬ 
fectly solid behind, this ball is capable of sustaining 
the shocks of any charge of powder whatever. 

It has, however, a strong tendency to fly with the 
wrong end first, exactly contrary to the behaviour of 
the Minie ; and to counteract this perversity, a great 
twist in the rifle grooves, giving a rapid spiral motion 
to be ball in its flight is necessary. 

In proportion to its calibre, this ball is very much 
heavier than the Minie: to give it the same velocity, 
then, it is necessary to use a larger charge : but the 
advantage of the shape of its fore-part in overcoming 
the resistance of the air, as compared with other 
projectiles, is only fully developed at high velocities, 
which CANNOT BE ECONOMICALLY USED WITH ROUND- 
ENDED balls like the Minie, on account of the 
excessive increase of resistance which they sustain. 
With my projectiles, then, a higher velocity than 


282 


that given to the Minie is proper; the charge, there¬ 
fore, must be still further increased for this purpose; 
wherefore the barrel of the rifle must be very strong. 
Again, the ball is capable of standing the force of any 
sudden shock, so that a large charge of the best 
powder procurable may be used to advantage ; and no 
greet time is required in which to impress the neces¬ 
sary projectile velocity on the ball,—a short barrel, 
therefore, is indicated. For my projectiles, therefore, 
we require a short stout barrel with deep grooves 
and great twist. If we attempt to use these projec¬ 
tiles with a long thin barrel, like the Enfield, they 
must fail signally. The weight of the ball and its 
solid resistance are too great for the weaker barrel, 
which trembles, shakes and vibrates, when fired, to a 
degree which shows it to be altogether overstrained ; 
in fact, the iron of the barrel must be distorted into 
a series of waves as the ball passes along it, and the 
elastic action of so thin a tube near the muzzle end 
must make it jerk the ball about in a wonderful 
manner as it leaves it. Under the operation of this 
irregular elastic action of the metal of the barrel, the 
heavy end of the ball is almost certain to get foremost, 
or it may even fly about sideways,—in fact, its flight 
must be altogether irregular. For it is only to the 
steady quiet action of a rapid spiral motion that these 
balls remain in their umiatural position of point 
foremost , which, however, they retain accurately and 
invariably during a flight even of a mile and a 

QUARTER, WHEN FIRED FROM A PIECE ADAPTED TO THEIR 

use, with a proper charge. 

The short barrel, if found sufficient to enable us to 



283 


impress a proper velocity on the ball, has very great 
contingent advantages. The effect of all sorts of 
errors, personal and instrumental, on the flight of the 
ball , must evidently be proportionate to the time 
during which the causes act: the effect of the recoil, 
for instance, on the hall, must be twice as great in 
a rifle thirty-six inches long as in one of eighteen 
inches, for the gun must have been acting on the 
shoulder, and the giving way of the shoulder, &c., 
on the ball, twice as long in the one case as in the 
other. 

In practice, the proportion of advantage is very 
much more in favour of the short barrels ; because 
a certain time is required to act at all, or at least to 
act at all sensibly, on the shoulder; and with a short 
barrel the ball may have left the gun before the latter 
may have changed its position in the least. 

With regard to the sizes of rifles, I think 32-gauge 
is large enough for anything, and that twenty-four 
inches is long enough for the barrel of any calibre 
whatever ; the grooves should be full deep, of breadth 
equal to that of the lands, and may turn once in three 
feet of length. For an army rifle, requiring to be 
adapted for use as a pike, the short barrel is no dis¬ 
advantage, for the requisite length may easily be 
made up by using a longer sword. 

The 24-gauge is, however, quite unexceptionable, 
and I think the best rifle I have is of that calibre. 

The balls and shells of two and a half diameters 
long, are, I think, the best. 

Swinburn & Son, 16 & 17, Russell Street, Bir¬ 
mingham, are the best men, I think, for army rifles 


284 


in England. They know my pattern, and have 
worked for me. 

A fourth edition of my book on rifles has just been 
published by Smith, Elder & Co., 65, Cornhill, and 
you would find its contents interesting, as would all 
others engaged in such pursuits. The thing costs 
two shillings, I believe, and contains the results of 
twenty years’ labour. 


PART III. 


RELATING TO 


THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA. 





















































. 































• 












































287 


THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OE INDIA. 


Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North 
of Kutchee, to the North-West of the Frontier 
of Sind. 

In the year 1839, after Lord Keane and his army had 
passed through Kutchee en route to Afghanistan, the 
predatory tribes inhabiting the eastern part of that 
province, namely the Doombkees and Jekranees, with 
others of less note associated with them, infested the 
road from the neighbourhood of Shikarpoor to the 
mouth of the Bolan in such numbers, and with such 
boldness, that a whole regiment was required to escort 
a convoy in safety from Shikarpoor to Dadur. The 
matter was of serious importance, for the safety of the 
army in Afghanistan might depend on the supplies 

forwarded to it from Sind: while the number of 

/ 

troops in Upper Sind was totally inadequate to the 
furnishing, for a continuance, the strong escorts 
required. The heat, also, in this part of the world, 
from April to October, is more deadly than the sword 
of a human enemy, and scarcely an escort at this time 
marched through the country without losing many 
men from this cause alone. 

Mr. Bell, the political agent, in vain made every 



288 


effort to obtain a free passage through Kutchee by 
negotiation and pecuniary arrangements with the 
plundering tribes; their chiefs were deaf to all per¬ 
suasion, and scorned every offer. 

The Doombkees and Jekranees reside wholly in 
the plain of Kutchee, and possessed the towns of 
Lahree, Poolijee, and Chuttur, with some villages in 
that neighbourhood and the adjoining lands. Their 
fighting men were all mounted; they were, indeed, 
tribes of horsemen. The Murrees and Boogtees in¬ 
habited the neighbouring hills ; the chief town of the 
former Kahun, of the latter Deyra. These mountain 
tribes were nearly all footmen, and seldom or never 
ventured in hostile guise into the plain country. 
While the Doombkees and Jekranees were in power, 
the horsemen were far too strong for them in the 
plain, while, on the other hand, they were safe in 
their mountain fastnesses from the attacks of the 
lowlanders. Such being the respective positions, 
these warlike tribes, with occasional exceptions, were 
usually on friendly terms, and afforded each other 
mutual support. 

The head of the whole Doombkee tribe by birth 
was, and is still, Belooch Khan, of Lahree: but he 
being of a quiet, peaceable disposition, preferred a 
life of ease at home to one of stormy adventure and 
predatory warfare : he never joined in any plundering 
excursion, and quarrelled with nobody, but lived like 
a quiet country gentleman, in the midst of his tur¬ 
bulent brethren. He was, on this account, held in 
contempt by the warlike part of his tribe; and Beejar 
Khan, in power, influence, and all else but name, had, 


289 


long before we entered the country, made himself the 
real head, not only of the Doombkees, but also of the 
associated tribe of Jekranees. Beejar Khan was a 
man of considerable ability ; he not only kept his 
wild riders completely under his authority, but was 
far-famed for his justice and excellent civil arrange¬ 
ments. His ryots, far from being oppressed, were 
protected and made much of; his lands were well 
cultivated, and the traders, as well as the peasantry 
of the whole countrv, were safe and contented under 
his rule. He paid his revenue regularly to his feudal 
lord, the Khan of Klielat, who therefore seldom 
troubled himself with regard to his other proceedings. 
All this internal good management enabled the 
Doombkee leader to carry on his predatory excursions 
systematically, and on an extensive scale, against any 
of his neighbours offering a fair prospect of a valuable 
booty. Beejar had at this time under his control 
from one thousand to one thousand five hundred 
horse, the best and boldest in the country; and in¬ 
cited by his prince, Mehrab Khan (or rather by his 
traitorous wuzeer Mahomed Hussun), as well as by 
inclination and habit, he now directed all his efforts 
against the valuable British convoys, &c., passing 
within his reach through Kutchee. This was the 
state of the people. It may be well also to describe 
their principal towns. 

Lahree, the abode of Belooch Khan, is—or rather 
was at that time, for it has since been ruined by 
Murree plunderers—a considerable town, well supplied 
with shops, containing about two thousand inha¬ 
bitants, and surrounded by a good sound mud wall, 

u 



290 


about twenty feet high, and well flanked with round 
towers. From the character of the chief, Belooch 
Khan, already described, his town had no connection 
with the predatory riders of Kutchee. 

The chief town possessed by Beejar Khan and his 
part of the Doombkee tribe was Poolijee. This place 
consisted of two villages, about three-quarters of a 
mile apart; that one towards the north was a small 
place, about seven hundred yards in circumference; it 
had been originally surrounded by a good high mud 
Avail with towers, but these had been allowed to decay; 
some of the towers and large portions of the wall had 
fallen down; manure and heaps of rubbish had ac¬ 
cumulated in and outside these openings, and this 
place could not be considered as at all defensible 
against a resolute enemy. The other village was 
much larger, being a mile and a half in circumference : 
it is surrounded by a mud wall about seven feet high, 
and, for about two feet from the top, not more than 
four inches thick. On the south side, where is the 
principal entrance, the wall is flanked by round 
towers; but by far the greater part of the whole cir¬ 
cumference of the place is unprovided with any flanking 
defence. The wall is, and was when first seen by the 
British, in a wretchedly crazy state; in it were 
numerous holes and wide cracks, which had been 
filled up with a few thorns, to prevent the egress of 
the cattle of the village. A man standing at the foot 
of the wall, and laying hold of the top, which was 
within easy reach with his hands, could with ease 
pull down many square feet of the Avail at once; and 
this has several times been done by way of experiment 
by the writer of this paper. 


291 


Within this enclosure, not far from its north¬ 
eastern side, was another small square mud building, 
with round towers at the angles: this was also com- 
pletely decayed, but was still capable of some defence 
by determined men. It could not, however, have 
held out after the town had been taken. The place 
was supplied with water from five temporary wells 
outside the town, on the south side, about one hun¬ 
dred yards distant from the wall. 

Durva Khan, the Jekranee chief associated with 
Beejar and the Doombkees, occupied the town of 
Chuttur, nine miles south of Poolijee. This is an 
older, and was a more important place as regarded its 
peaceable inhabitants, and it contained a good bazar. 
It is about the same size as the principal Poolijee, 
and surrounded by a wall a little higher than, but of 
a similar description, and in a similar state to, that 
above described. 

The village of Shahpoor, belonging to a Syud, by 
name Enayut Shah,—a peer or saint by birth, but by 
birth only, for his private character was and is any¬ 
thing but saintly. This place was protected chiefly 
by the holy character of the peer; it was occasionally 
occupied by the Doombkees and Jekranees, but none 
of them permanently resided there. In size it was 
about a mile in circumference; it is not surrounded 
by a wall for defence, but the houses, touching each 
other nearly all round, leave only two regular 
entrances. The houses generally are the usual low 
mud huts of the country, but there are two fine large 
upper-storied and terrace-roofed houses adjoining the 
north side of the village, and a high square tower 


292 




towards the eastern side. From the roofs of these 
houses the whole place was overlooked and com¬ 
manded, and they were well adapted for defence. 

The permanent inhabitants of Shahpoor amounted 
to about one thousand. But there were generally 
nearly double that number of Jutts encamped in their 
mat tents close to the village. These were the 
attendants of the syud’s camels, of which he possessed 
some ten thousand. The channel of an occasional 
mountain torrent runs near the south side of Shah¬ 
poor, and an abundant supply of good water is found 
by digging pits in its beds. This good supply of 
water, which is a very rare thing in Eastern Kutchee, 
is the sole advantage which this spot presents as a site 
for a town,—the immediate neighbourhood is a dreary 
waste of barren plain, and hills of drift-sand; at a 
distance, however, of four or five miles from Shahpoor, 
abundant forage exists for horses as well as camels. 

The place is remarkable for its dust-storms, which, 
bad everywhere in Upper Sind and Kutchee, are here 
of almost incredible violence and density. They occur 
frequently, at all seasons of the year, sometimes 
changing the light of mid-day to an intensity of dark¬ 
ness to which no ordinary night ever approaches, and 
this darkness in severe storms lasts occasionally for 
one, two, or more hours. These dust-storms on both 
sides of the desert are sometimes accompanied by 
blasts of the simoom, a poisonous wind, which is 
equally destructive to vegetable and animal life. 

Such was the state of the people and of the country, 
when, at the request of the political officers, a detach¬ 
ment was ordered, in the month of June 1839, to 



293 


proceed from Sukkur and Shikarpoor against Beejar 
Khan. The season was one of intense heat, which 
has never since been equalled: the thermometer in 
the hospital shed at Shikarpoor stood commonly at 
130°, and on several days reached the astonishing 
height of 140°—one day it even stood at 143°. The 
wind appeared like a blast from a furnace, and this 
even at midnight. Such was the weather in which 
British soldiers were sent forth for the first time to 
proceed against the wild tribes of Eastern Be- 
loochistan. 

There had been left behind, from the army of Lord 
Keane, at Sukkur, about one hundred and fifty Euro¬ 
pean soldiers, men chosen from every regiment of the 
army, Boyal and Company’s, and from every troop of 
horse and company of foot artillery, of both the Bengal 
and Bombay presidencies. 

These men were of course the worst which could be 
found: they were composed of those who could not 
march, who were troublesome, disorderly, discon¬ 
tented, or feeble. These men were placed under the 
command of Lieutenant Jacob,* the only artillery 
officer in Upper Sind, and of Lieutenant Corry, of 
her Majesty’s 17th Begiment. Lieutenant Jacob was 
now directed to choose men from these Europeans to 
form a company of artillery, to proceed with the force 
to Kutchee. Accordingly he selected twenty artillery¬ 
men, the best he could find, twenty men belonging to 
the infantry, and, with Lieutenant Corry and these 
fortv men, marched from Sukkur on the 3rd June, 

I 

* The Author of this Memoir.— Editor. 



294 


1839, en route to Shikarpoor, having sent his battery 
in advance by water to that place. 

On the first day’s march of ten miles, seven of the 
soldiers were struck dead by the heat, and Lieutenant 
Corry was brought in dying; the poor fellow rallied a 
little at night, hut as the heat returned next day he 
also relapsed and died. Four other men were sent 
back to Sukkur on camel litters, but they also died, 
either on the road or immediately after reaching the 
hospital. No treatment appeared to have the smallest 
effect in checking this fearful mortality. The men 
became appalled, and wished not to proceed; but a 
few words from their officer roused their English 
hearts to further exertion : at night the detachment 
marched on, but though the men were never directly 
exposed to the sun, the heat was too great for human 
nature to bear, and four men died before or on 
reaching Shikarpoor. Thus, in three very short 
marches, out of a detachment of two officers and forty 
men, one officer and fifteen men had been struck dead. 
It appeared to the military authorities that it was 
impossible at such a season to prosecute the intended 
expedition, and the attempt was abandoned for the 
present, to be renewed when the deadly heat should 
be moderated. 

Accordingly, early in the month of October, 1839, 
a force consisting of a wing of the 1st Grenadier 
Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, about four 
hundred and fifty strong, the light company of the 
5th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, about 
eighty strong, and a bullock battery, composed of two- 
24-pounder howitzers and one 6-pounder gun, marched 


295 


from Sukkur en route to Poolijee, for the purpose of 
operating against Beejar Khan, and the predatory 
tribes of Kutchee described above. 

It was thought unadvisable to have any European 
soldiers with the force; and Lieutenant Jacob was 
ordered to form a native company of artillery as he 
could. He had a havildar and eleven Golundauze 
sepoys, and a few gun lascars, to commence with; and 
he was allowed to select a party of men from the 
Bombay 23rd Regiment, to complete the number 
required. 

A company of pioneers was also formed, consisting 
of one regular sapper, and three regular pioneers, the 
remainder of store and tent lascars, to the number of 
fifty in all. These companies, notwithstanding their 
motley appearance, were soon sufficiently trained and 
organised for service, and proved afterwards eminently 
efficient, with the exception of the men of the 23rd 
Regiment. This regiment, it appeared, had the 
fashion of priding itself on the caste of its members, 
instead of on their soldiership—more like a regiment 
of the Bengal army than one of Bombay; and, not¬ 
withstanding the ridicule of the havildar and sepoys 
of the Golundauze, who happened to be all Brahmins, 
but who thoroughly despised such nonsense, gave so 
much trouble, and proved so very useless in con¬ 
sequence, that the artillery officer soon left them 
behind, and they were replaced by a native officer and 
men of the Bombay 5th Regiment of Native Infantry. 
This regiment was at this time one of the best, 
perhaps the best, in the Bombay army: its men were 
perfect specimens of the Bombay sepoys, as described 


by Sir John Malcolm—“ The true descendants of 
Seewajie’s mountain rats, whom not all the pride and 
power of the armies of Hindustan could prevent from 
marching to the gates of Delhi”; small, and not at 
all good-looking, but of an amazing energy and 
activity, and full of zeal and courage, and with sinews 
that no labour could tire, and hearts that no danger 
could daunt. Very respectful and warmly attached 
to their officers, they not only feared no enemy under 
their guidance, but rejoiced at the prospect of meeting 
a formidable foe for the sake of the “ name of the 
regiment.” They were full of soldier-like pride and 
zeal for the service, while they shrunk from no sort of 
labour or fatigue, and endured cold, hunger, and 
continual dutv with an admirable cheerfulness and 
alacritv. 

J 

Major Billamore, of the 1st Bombay Grenadier 
Begiment, commanded the whole force; Captain 
Baitt the Grenadier regiment; Captain Lewis Brown, 
afterwards well-known as “ Kahun Brown,” the light 
company of the 5th ; and Lieutenant Jacob the 
artillery. 

This little force crossed the desert, and marched to 
Shahpoor without incident worth relating; thence it 
proceeded to Chuttur and Poolijee,—the former place 
was then occupied by Lieutenant Amiel with four 
hundred Belooch horsemen, lately enlisted into the 
British service by the political agent, Mr. Bell. On 
the arrival of Major Billamore at Shahpoor, Beejer 
Khan, with the chief part of the Doombkee and 
Jekranee tribes, still occupied Poolijee; but on the 
force reaching that place, it was found deserted, nearly 



297 


destroyed by fire, and still burning. Beejar Khan 
and all his people had abandoned the town, and taken 
to the hills for safety. 

The force now encamped at Poolijee, until the 
political officers, from whom the commanding officer 
had to receive his instructions, should make up their 
minds as to what further was to be done. The part 
of the Doombkee tribe, under the chief, Belooch 
Khan, inhabiting Lahree and its neighbourhood, had 
once offered complete submission to the British 
political officers : this was accepted; nor could the 
utmost efforts of Beejar, nor persuasion nor reproach, 
ever afterwards induce him, Belooch Khan, to 
commit himself in hostility against the English. 

While the force remained encamped at Poolijee, 
Beejar, having in vain summoned aid from Belooch 
Khan, suddenly left the hills with his own followers, 
and entered the plain near Poolijee, as if to attack 
Major Billamore. The Major had at that time no 
cavalry with him; but on this particular day, 
Lieutenant Amiel, who was not in any way under 
Major Billamore’s orders, had arrived at Poolijee with 
two hundred of his Belooch levy of horse, and 
occupied the town. 

The town of Poolijee is distant from the hills little 
more than five miles. About three miles of this 
distance, next the hills, is open stony ground; there 
is then thick jungle for about one mile, and the 
remaining space next Poolijee is richly cultivated 
arable land, which was at this time covered with high 
standing corn. Having received information of the 
enemy having left the hills, Majoi Billamore moved 


298 


from his camp for the purpose of meeting him in the 
plain. Meanwhile the intelligence had also reached 
the officer in command of the Belooch horse in the 
town, who immediately galloped out with his men, 
passed by Major Billamore’s force, then moving 
through the jungle, and entered the plain beyond. 
Here the horsemen fell in with the enemy, and 
immediately turned and fled at speed; some twenty- 
five of them were cut down, the enemy not losing a 
man; the remainder escaped, owing to the fleetness 
of their mares. So quickly did all this take place, 
that Major Billamore, on clearing the jungle, had 
only a distant view of the enemy filing over the first 
low range of hills. Without cavalry, pursuit was 
hopeless ; to attempt it, absurd; and the major 
returned to his camp, Lieutenant Amiel and his 
cavaliers again returning to Chutta, and shortly after¬ 
wards to Shahpoor, where they thenceforth remained. 

On the representation of Major Billamore as to 
the necessity of his having cavalry at his disposal, to 
enable him to act effectively against these border 
robbers, a detachment of one hundred and eighty 
irregular horse, under command of Lieutenant Clarke, 
of the 2nd Bombay Grenadier Begiment, was ordered 
to join the force at Poolijee. This detachment, 
formerly posted in Kutch (Bhooj), had just before 
been transferred from the Poona Irregular Horse, in 
order to form the nucleus of the new corps, at that 
time ordered to be raised in Sind, since well-known 
by the name of the Sind Irregular Horse. 

On the arrival of Lieutenant Clarke and his 
detachment at Chuttur, he received information of a 


299 


strong party of Beejar Khans horsemen having left 
the hills that evening to plunder. Acting at once on 
this information, and guided by a man of the village 
who had been plundered shortly before, Lieutenant 
Clarke went out about midnight with one-lialf of his 
men, and managed matters so well, that just before 
daybreak he fell in with the Doombkees, about three 
hundred in number, dismounted in a corn-field ; they 
had just time to spring on their mares before Clarke 
closed with them, and in doing so, abandoned some 
of their arms, and nearly all the plunder. They fled 
up the dry bed of the Teywaugh river, and were 
vigorously pursued by the Sind Irregular Horse. 
About fifty of the marauders were killed, and eleven 
were taken prisoners. 

To appreciate this exploit as it deserves, and 
properly to understand the position of Major 
Billamore’s force, it should be borne in mind that the 
country, its people, and all belonging to it, were at 
this time entirely unknown to the officers and men of 
the Indian army. Everything was as different as can 
well be imagined from anything any one had 
experienced in India. Since then all has become as 
familiar to them as the localities of Guzerat or of the 
Deccan; but at that time all of* them, officers and 
men, were “griffins” in this country, and had to find 
out everything for themselves. No information was 
to be acquired from anyone; no European had 
previously entered that part of the country, while the 
few natives who could have assisted the British officers 
were more afraid of the border robbers than inclined 
to trust to British protection. 


300 


Lieutenant Amiel, who had lately been joined at 
Shahpoor by two hundred and fifty of Skinner’s 
Hindoostanee Irregular Horse, now reported to Major 
Billamore that a strong body of the Doombkees and 
Jekranees had for some time past been assembled at 
Ooch, and that they came nearly every night to 
plunder about Shahpoor. On this, Major Billamore, 
with thirty infantry and sixty of the Sind Irregular 
Horse, accompanied by Captain Brown, Lieutenants 
Clarke and Jacob, proceeded to Ooch. 

As this Ooch is one of the most curious places in 
existence, it may be as well to describe it. The place 
is not only curious in itself, but very interesting, as 
affording proof positive of the correctness of the 
description given, by “ the Father of History,” of 
places on the caravan roads in Africa, where fresh 
water runs out of hills of salt. East of Shahpoor is 
a low and very irregular range of hills, composed of 
soft sandstone, in masses more like hard earth than 
rock, and mingled with pebbles of limestone and flint, 
and with a good deal of gypsum. At a spot twelve 
miles E.S.E. from Shahpoor there is in these hills the 
entrance to a little valley some five or six hundred 
yards wide. Through this runs the bed of an 
occasional mountain torrent, known by the name of 
the Muzzerdaun ; and along the northern side of this 
torrent bed, for an extent of a mile and a half in 
length, some twenty-five or thirty feet in height, is a 
rounded bank, partly covered with coarse reeds, and, 
where it is not so, entirely covered with a thick 
incrustation of efflorescent salt . On the top of the bank 
grow a few date-trees, which trees are found nowhere 


301 


else in Kutchee. From this bank, nearly all over it, 
from top to bottom, continually exudes water, which, 
though not exactly sweet to a fastidious taste, is highly 
esteemed by a thirsty traveller, and is largely drank 
by man and beast without any ill effects, except to 
strangers. The natives, who are accustomed to its 
use, appear not to think it had or disagreeable, and 
call it fresh. This water, trickling down the bank of 
salt, collects into a small stream, which, at a distance 
of about a mile from the hill southward, is lost in the 
desert. 

The only permanent inhabitant of this spot is a 
solitary fakeer, and even he is not always at home ; 
there is no building whatever, nor remains of a build¬ 
ing, save the fakeer’s hut of reed sticks and mud. 
The place is, however, in tolerably quiet times, the 
favourite resort of large numbers of Jutts, who, with 
camels and other cattle to the amount of many thou¬ 
sands, sometimes encamp there for several months 
together. 

The country all around is of the most desolate 
appearance ; perfectly bare and barren, hill and plain, 
varied by drift-sand, being alone visible anywhere, 
and this makes the green and moist spot Ooch the 
more remarkable. This place Major Billamore and 
party had to discover for themselves ; no one could be 
found to guide them; the general direction alone was 
pointed out, and the distance given. 

As the Major approached Ooch, single horsemen 
were seen galloping from all quarters towards one 
spot, and towards this also rode the British officers 
and horsemen: they soon found themselves in the 


302 


middle of the Belooch encampment. The enemy’s 
horsemen, in number about one hundred, had time to 
spring on their mares, which are always kept ready 
saddled, and, well knowing the country, which is of a 
nature most difficult to a stranger, easily effected 
their escape unhurt. The footmen, in about equal 
number, with some women and children, while the 
cavalry had in vain attempted to close with their 
fleet-footed foes, climbed to the top of the hills, 
whence, having- secured the women and children in 

7 O 

caves, they opened a smart matchlock fire. The 
infantry detachment was of course far behind, but 
Clarke soon dismounted some of his men, when 
Major Billamore, with them and his European officers, 
immediately attacked the enemy on the hill. In 
entire ignorance, as they at that time were, of our 
usages, the barbarians refused to surrender till about 
twenty of their men were killed, and several others 
wounded; when, seeing resistance hopeless, and the 
women in our possession, the remainder surrendered, 
and were forwarded to Shahpoor with the cattle, &c., 
taken from the enemy. Major Billamore had received 
information from these prisoners that the leaders of 
the party he had surprised at Ooch were Janee and 
Bahmut, the two most enterprising and most famous 
of the Belooch warriors. 

In the hope of again meeting with these noted 
freebooters, and thinking it possible, from their well- 
known boldness and personal courage, that they might 
even attack him, Major Billamore determined to 
remain for the night at Ooch; and, sending back the 
infantry to Shahpoor, to endeavour in the morning to 


303 


follow up tlie enemy with his cavalry. This was 
carried into effect; hut after wandering next day 
many miles in vain, over an unknown and pathless 
waste, the attempt to reach such active enemies was 
unwillingly abandoned, and the troop returned to 
Ooch. Scarcely, however, had the horses of the 
party time to drink, when, as if by magic, suddenly 
appeared, not half a mile off, opposite to an opening 
in the hills, Janee, Rahmut, and a hundred Beloo- 
chees, mounted and drawn up in regular line, as if to 
charge the British detachment. With the speed of 
thought, the men of the latter were in their saddles, 
the next instant they were formed and riding at the 
enemy so fairly opposed to them. Janee and his men 
drew their swords and advanced with a shout, and 
valiant deeds appeared about to take place; the 
ground looked firm and level for a fair passage of 
arms, when suddenly every horse of the British 
detachment sunk into the earth, some planted over 
girth and saddle-flap, many rolled over and over, and 
all in helpless confusion. The cunning Belooch had 
drawn them into an extensive quicksand ! One Euro¬ 
pean officer of the whole party, being admirably 
mounted, alone struggled on through it; but Janee 
carelessly or generously took no notice of him as he 
still rode towards him, but with shouts of laughter 
the Belooch riders went off at speed, and disappeared 
from, almost as suddenly as they appeared on, the 
scene. Major Billamore and party, unable to catch 
their active and subtle foes, returned to Shahpoor, 
and thence to Poolijee, where, at last, final instruc¬ 
tions were received from the political officers, and, in 


304 


the beginning of the month of November, 1839, the 
force proceeded in two detachments to enter the 
Murree and Boogtee hills, wherein the Doombkees 
and Jekranees had found refuge. 

One party proceeded via the Goree Pass, near 
Poolijee, towards Deyra, and the other via Lahree, 
and the pass near that town, towards Kahun. 

The first party consisted of Major Billamore and 
Captain Brown, who acted as staff officers to the 
force. The light company of the 5th Begiment, 
under Lieutenant Stanley, a company of the Grena¬ 
diers, the artillery under Lieutenant Jacob, and one 
hundred and twenty men of the Sind Irregular Horse 
under Lieutenant Clarke. The detachment proceding 
to Kahun was commanded by Captain Baitt, and 
consisted of the main body of the Grenadier regiment, 
and sixty of Clarke’s horsemen. 

Nothing whatever was procurable, it was said, in 
the hills, hut water, wood, and a little grass; so that, 
even for so small a force to be in an efficient state, 
extensive commissariat arrangements were required. 
With little or no assistance from either the military 
or civil authorities at head-quarters, and without 
public treasure, these arrangements were admirably 
made by the officers of the force. There was little 
experience, indeed, for all were on their first cam¬ 
paign ; but the officers were full of unconquerable 
zeal, of an energy which nothing could tire, and 
thrilling with those chivalrous thoughts of military 
service to which the youthful soldier, alas ! is alone 
allowed to give place in his mind, hut which cause 
fatigue, hardship, danger, difficulty, and impossibility 


305 


itself to disappear before them. The greatest point 
was to provide food for the artillery bullocks, of which 
one hundred and twenty necessarily accompanied the 
force. The mention of bullocks may raise a smile on 
the face of the modern artilleryman. In these days 
a bullock battery is unknown—its place has been 
taken by the well-appointed and well-horsed battery 
now in use, equipped and provided in every possible 
way, fully manned and officered, &c. &c. 

The modern horse battery is beautiful, soldier-like, 
and complete; nevertheless, when I hear sometimes 
its immeasurable superiority over “the old beef affair” 
talked of, I cannot help silently thinking of Major 
Billamore’s artillery in the Murree Hills, and of the 
subsequent performances of the Bengal Horse Artillery 
and of Bombay horse batteries in the same locality; 
and a thought then crosses the mind that the material 
is not all in all in these things! Let, then, those 
laugh who may. The bullocks were the object of 
great care and attention; it was managed not only to 
carry a full allowance of grain for a month, but a 
supply of forage enough for a week’s consumption 
was also taken ; all this care was well repaid in the 
sequel. 

There was no baggage corps nor camel corps, but 
there was common-sense ; nothing was forgotten that 
foresight could provide for, or means at command 
procure. Thus provided, the two detachments entered 
the hills, and both reached the respective halting- 
places, Deyra and Kahun, by regular marches; not 
without much labour certainly, owing to the difficult 
nature of the country. Neither detachment was 


x 



306 


opposed by tlie enemy, who attempted no serious 
molestation to the advance of the troops into the very 
heart of their mountain fastnesses. Major Billamore 
was met at Sungseela, eighteen or twenty miles from 
Deyra, by Islam Khan, the son and heir of Beebruck 
Khan, the head of the Boogtee tribe; this Islam 
Khan is now grey-headed, old-looking, careworn, and 
feeble ; he was then a young, active, handsome man. 
So well does trouble supply the place of years! He 
spoke tolerable Hindoostanee, was very civil, full of 
expressions of friendship in his father’s name and his 
own, and thus conducted the Major and party to 
Deyra. 

The town of Deyra is a small place, about one 
hundred and fifty yards square, surrounded with a 
good strong mud wall, twenty feet high, with towers 
at the angles, and one gate in the middle of the 
eastern face. It is supplied with water by a small 
sparkling stream from the hills on the north side of 
the valley, distant about two miles. On this little 
stream, about half a mile from the town, Major Billa- 
more’s camp was pitched. 

The town was full of people; there was a good 
bazar apparently in it, and in and about the place 
there must have been some seven hundred or eight 
hundred armed men. At first everything was smooth 
and friendly; but after a few days, when the British 
detachment had been well scrutinised, its very small 
numerical strength appeared to be exciting contempt 
among the proud mountaineers. They soon showed 
their hostility in various ways, and private information 
was received that the main body of the Boogtee tribe, 


307 


under Alim Khan (chief of the Kulpur branch of 
that tribe), was fast assembling at a spot in the hills 
near Deyra, for the purpose of attacking the British 
detachment. Nearly all the armed Beloochees gra¬ 
dually left Deyra; Islam Khan still came daily to 
call on Major Billamore, full of professions of friend¬ 
ship, &c., until one day, on which these professions 
had been more than usually profuse, he also dis¬ 
appeared from Deyra. The old chief, Beebruck, was 
still in the town; he was very feeble, and could not, 
without much difficulty, ride any considerable distance 
on horseback. 

Information then reached Major Billamore that the 
whole Boogtee tribe was ready to attack the detach¬ 
ment, and that, on the departure of old Beebruck, 
this attack would take place. Measures were taken 
to prevent the old man’s departure; he made an 
attempt to leave the place during the night, but was 
stopped and detained. 

Meanwhile, very similar proceedings had been going 
on at Kahun; at both places the apparent weakness 
of the British detachments tempted the treacherous 
Beloochees to attempt their destruction. 

Captain Baitt, finding his provisions likely to run 
short, and that, from the hostile bearing of the people, 
no more would be in all probability obtainable, under 
orders from Major Billamore, left a company of the 
Grenadiers, under command of Lieutenant Peacocke, 
strongly posted in a small fort about a mile from the 
town of Kahun, and marched with the rest of his 
detachment to Deyra. 

It was on the night after his arrival at that place 

x 2 


308 


that the old Boogtee chief attempted to leave it, in 
order to join his tribe, now up in arms against Major 
Billamore. The British detachment at Deyra was 
under arms the whole of that night, but no attack was 
made until after daybreak, when the videttes galloped 
in, reporting the enemy to be approaching in full 
force. The Boogtees, about twelve hundred in 
number, were soon seen approaching through the 
jungle from the eastward ; their line presented a most 
formidable appearance to the small British detach¬ 
ment ; they were strong, fierce-looking men, and came 
on with loud shouts, with much flourishing of swords 
and firing of matchlocks. During this advance of the 
enemy’s line, the old chief, Beebruck, had been 
allowed, on some specious pretence, to go to a little 
distance outside the town, in charge of a file of 
sepoys; and an attempt, very nearly successful, was 
now made by the Boogtees to carry him off. A small 
party of horsemen contrived to approach unseen up 
the bed of a nulla, and suddenlv made a dash at the 
sepoys guarding Beebruck; these, however, stood 
firm, and in an instant Clarke, perceiving what was 
going on, sprang to the spot, struck one of the 
Boogtees from his horse, seized another by the throat, 
and brought him, as well as the old chief, back 
prisoner. The enemy continued to advance, but the 
firm, silent array of the British detachment appeared 
to appal them. Savage and fierce as the Belooch 
warriors appeared, they feared to close with their 
foes ; not a musket-shot was fired, nor was a man hurt 
on our side. A tremendously noisy but distant and 
harmless fire of matchlocks was maintained for some 


309 


time by the mountaineers, who then withdrew, with a 
loss of thirty-three men and some horses killed by the 
fire of the British artillery, in addition to others 
wounded. 

The town of Deyra had hitherto been treated as a 
friendly place; it was now taken possession of, and 
all property found in it proclaimed to be lawful prize. 
The British detachment moved inside the walls, and 
was quartered in the houses in the town. A consider¬ 
able quantity of grain and flour found in the town was 
handed over to the commissariat, and formed a most 
opportune addition to the means at Major Billamore’s 
disposal; while a great part of the force henceforth 
lived chiefly on mutton and beef, so that the slender 
stores of the detachment were made to last during the 
whole period it was in the hills, or for three and a 
half months, without the smallest assistance or support 
during that time being ever received from head¬ 
quarters, or from the plain country. 

The Boogtee chief, Beebruck, was sent to Shahpoor, 
well guarded, and handed over to the political officers. 

The enemy occupied the hills round Deyra, cut off 
the stream of water which supplied the place, and 
prevented any forage being brought in. Captain 
Brown proceeded with a detachment to turn the water 
on again, which he succeeded in doing after a slight 
skirmish, in which a few of the mountaineers were 
killed; he then remained at the spring all day, by 
which time a large pit close to Deyra had become 
filled with water, so that the shutting off the water, if 
repeated, could give no further annoyance for many 
days to come. 


310 


Next day, a party consisting of one hundred and 
fifty infantry under Captain Raitt, and one hundred 
of the Sind Irregular Horse under Lieutenant Clarke, 
proceeded with all the camels of the detachment to 
some fields, about seven miles west of Deyra, to bring 
in forage. 

This was too tempting an opportunity for the 
Boogtees to lose ; they accordingly assembled in great 
numbers in the hills at a place called Tructnee, close 
to the spot, and the camels had hardly been loaded 
with forage when the mountaineers, outnumbering the 
British detachment in the proportion of five to one, 
came down sword in hand and with loud shouts on 
the sepoys. Captain Raitt, an excellent and stout¬ 
hearted officer, received them with a rapid and well- 
sustained fire; but, unchecked by the musketry, the 
swordsmen rushed on, and were not ten yards from 
the bayonets of the infantry when Clark let loose his 
horsemen: in an instant the mountaineers were 
broken, struck down, trampled under foot, and com¬ 
pelled to flight; seventy-nine of them were killed, 
a great many more wounded, but the remainder found 
safe refuge in their hills, and the horsemen were 
recalled. The loss on the British side was trifling: 
three men of the infantry were killed, and nine or ten 
wounded, some of them severely ; of the horsemen one 
only was slain, but many were wounded, including 
their gallant leader Lieutenant Clarke. There were 
three leaders of the Boogtees, remarkable by being 
the only mounted men among them: these were all 
killed, and this severe defeat convinced the whole 
from that day forth that it was useless to attempt a 


311 


fair fight against the British troops. Major Billamore 
now determined to leave part of his force at Deyra for 
a while, and to proceed with the remainder to Kahun, 
thence to return to the plain by the best route he 
could find. 

It was considered of importance that his artillery 
should accompany him to Kahun, in order to show 
the mountain tribes that their most difficult high and 
rugged hills were not inaccessible to our guns; but 
the nature of the country was reported by the officers 
who had just passed through it to be so difficult as to 
render the transport of artillery through it a matter 
of absolute impossibility: the artillery officer was 
however still confident; wherefore Major Billamore 
allowed him to take a detachment, and examine the 
worst part of the road himself. 

He therefore proceeded from Deyra with a company 
of infantry under Lieutenant Stanley, of the 5th 
Regiment, and a troop of the Sind Irregular Horse 
under Lieutenant Clarke. On entering the Murrow 
valley they were fired on by a small party of the 
Boogtees, who immediately fled, but one of them was 
overtaken and killed by the horsemen. The plain 
was covered with corn-fields, and in these were 
numerous flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. These 
were with much trouble secured, to the number of 
several thousand sheep, and about one thousand head 
of oxen and cows; and the artillery officer, with his 
detachment, then halted for the night at a small 
walled village, by name Meerza-ke-Ghuree, which he 
found newly deserted. Lieutenant Peacocke was known 
to be on his march from Kahun, and Lieutenant 


312 


Jacob expected him next day, when he intended to 
hand over to him the captured cattle to convoy to 
Deyra. This accordingly took place: Lieutenant 
Peacocke brought the cattle safely to Deyra, where 
it proved of the greatest service to the British troops, 
rendering them independent of all further supplies, 
most of the men living on flesh meat as mentioned 
above. 

The artillery officer and his party proceeded on¬ 
wards towards Kahun, and encamped at Kateychee- 
ke-Ghuree. The enemy, both Murrees and Boogtees, 
prowled about the camp at night, and fired into it, 
but, finding everyone on the alert, attempted nothing 
serious. On the next and two following days, the 
extemporary pioneers who had accompanied the party 
from Devra were set to work on the road, and four 
very bad places were made passable for the artillery; 
the rest of the road was thought difficult, but still 
practicable. Beyond Kateychee-ke-Ghuree, towards 
Kahun, Captain Kaitt and his officers had reported 
that there were no parts of the road absolutely 
impassable; wherefore, having removed the worst 
difficulties of the route, Lieutenant Jacob thought it 
unnecessary to proceed further, returned with his party 
to Deyra, and reported to Major Billamore that he 
was ready to proceed with his artillery to Kahun, and 
to reach that place in two marches from Deyra, if 
necessary, while Captain Kaitt’s detachment had per 
formed the journey in three. A few days afterwards, 
Major Billamore, Captain Brown, with the light 
company of the 5th under Lieutenant Stanley, a 
company of the Grenadiers under Lieutenant Wise- 


313 


man, a troop of the Sind Irregular Horse under a 
native officer, and the artillery under Lieutenant 
J acob, marched from Deyra towards Kahun ; they 
marched at six in the morning, and, working hard 
without ceasing all day, reached Kateychee-ke-Ghuree, 
distant twenty miles, at eight o’clock in the evening. 
Here it came on to rain heavily, and it was necessary, 
in consequence, to halt for two days. The weather 
was intensely cold; everything was covered with a 
thick coating of ice: the sepoys were almost frozen 
to death, but they bore all cheerfully. Kahun was 
distant about twenty-five miles; there was water only 
at one spot on the road, and this was about half-way 
to Kahun. Information was now received that the 
whole Murree tribe had assembled near the water, 
expecting the detachment to halt at that place, and 
intending to attack it unawares: to defeat this pur¬ 
pose, it was proposed to march at once straight to 
Kahun, and take possession of the place. This was 
carried into effect. As soon as the rain ceased, and 
the state of the ground would admit of camels moving, 
Major Billamore and his detachment proceeded direct 
to Kahun. Some difficult hills occurred on the road, 
over which the artillery-carriages were transported 
with great labour ; but starting early in the morning 
from Kateychee-ke-Ghuree, the detachment reached 
Kahun in safety shortly after dark, having met with 
no opposition, and having seen no enemy by the way. 
The towm was found quite deserted, and was occupied 
next day by the British troops. 

The artillery officer who had examined and sketched, 
as well as he could, the whole of the country passed 


314 


over by the force since leaving Poolijee, now thought 
that a nearer route could be found back to that place 
than the long, very difficult, and circuitous road via 
Lahree; he had picked up a man"' of the Mussoorree 
branch of the Boogtee tribe, who had long been resi¬ 
dent as a herdsman in the Boogtee and Murree hills, 
and this man, in answer to inquiries, said that there 
did exist a path over the mountains bounding the 
south side of the valley of Kahun, which he was 
willing and able to point out. Under his guidance 
the artillery officer, with some difficulty, proceeded 
to the top of the mountain; the path was only a 
sheep-walk, and seemed tremendously difficult even 
for a single horseman; the part over and through the 
mountain was about four miles in length. This was 
the pass of “ Nuffoosk,” a place whose name has since 
become so familiar, then first beheld by European 
eyes. 

The rock, though hard, was found to yield to the 
pickaxe and crowbar ; and the artilleryman thought 
that he could in a few days, notwithstanding the 
apparently awful difficulty of the task, cut a road out 
of the hill-side over which a gun might be dragged. 

Major Billamore gladly assented ; for the objects, 
to effect which the force had entered the hills, had 
been completely accomplished. Beejar Khan, with 
Durya Khan, the head of the Jekranees, Toork Ali, 
Janee, Bahmut, with other chiefs of less note—in 
short, the whole of the border robbers who had 
taken refuge in the hills—finding, from the proceed- 

* By name Shere Beg ; the same who was afterwards of much 
use to Major Brown, when besieged in Kahun. 



315 


ings at Kahun and Deyra, that the mountain tribes 
themselves were not safe in their rocky fastnesses, had 
gone in and surrendered to the political officers. The 
mountaineers had seen that they could not stand 
before the British troops, even in their own hills ; and 
that these hills, even the highest of them, proved no 
obstacle to the transport of the British artillery. 
Such, then, being the case, it was desirable to return 
to Poolijee and the plain country with all despatch. 

The pioneers and all the camp followers were then 
set to work at the road over Nuffoosk, and in three 
days it was thought practicable for the artillery. The 
Murrees offered no serious opposition to the work. 
They collected in great numbers about the neigh¬ 
bouring hills, and occasionally approached so near to 
the workpeople, gesticulating and flourishing swords, 
that they had to he attacked and driven off by the 
guard; but in general they contented themselves with 
firing long shots at the artilleryman and his party, 
which did no damage. 

On the fourth day the 24-pounder howitzer and 
the other carriages were dragged over the mountain. 
The road was found passable enough; but, from the 
great steepness and length of the pass, the labour 
was very great. However, before evening, Major 
Billamore and his detachment had crossed “ Nuffoosk ,” 
and encamped on the very spot on which Major Clib- 
born, in 1840, gained so signal a victory over, and 
with tremendous loss to, the Murree tribe; and 
then, appalled by the fearful heat and want of water, 
unfortunately followed up his victory by all the con¬ 
sequences which usually attend on a disastrous defeat. 


316 


Next day the detachment marched to “ Surtoff,” 
safely descended that great mountain, and thence 
proceeded, without further adventure, in three or 
four marches to Poolijee, which it reached on the 
11th of February, 1840, about three and a half 
months since it had marched from that place to enter 
the hills. Plere also, shortly afterwards, arrived in 
perfect safety Captain Raitt and the remainder of the 
force. Every object had been fully accomplished, 
without serious loss, and without a shadow of a 
disaster. The mountaineers had been thoroughly 
beaten whenever encountered: the robbers, who had 
fled for shelter among them, compelled to surrender. 
The mountains had been penetrated in every direc¬ 
tion, and roads made in the very heart of them. In 
short, nothing could have been more complete than 
was in every w r ay the success of this expedition. 

So little was this success understood, that unthink¬ 
ing persons supposed a similar feat to be easy enough 
for any men to perform, and this idea led to serious 
disaster. Little detachments were sent to occupy 
dangerous posts; little parties sent to guard immense 
convoys of camels : carelessness prevailed everywhere; 
the fierce and formidable mountaineers w T ere despised, 
and this contempt met with severe punishment. 

The secret of the success of Major Billamore’s 
detachment was, that every member of the force, 
down to the humblest bullock-driver and camel-man, 
worked and felt as if he had some very dear personal 
object in view. To produce this feeling appears to 
me to he one of the chief attributes of a good soldier. 

The beneficial effects of the first hill campaign 


317 


were very great—they are still felt: for the moun¬ 
taineers, having once seen the British troops and 
artillery march all over their worst mountains, know 
that the same can be done again. 

The proceedings of the British troops, who first 
entered the formidable mountains north of Kutchee, 
and encountered their fierce inhabitants, are but little 
known beyond this country. Their commanding officer 
hated writing, contented himself with a verbal report 
of the matter to his superiors, and very soon all 
appeared to be forgotten. In the account above 
given are omitted numerous adventures, many slight 
encounters, personal fights, and single combats with 
the enemy, and such like, which, if duly set forth in 
glowing terms, might, without any exaggeration, have 
given an air of romance to the story. As it is, the 
simple truth has been told in the plainest language. 
Such was the hill campaign of 1839-40, conducted 
by one major, one captain, and six subalterns, with 
seven hundred native soldiers, totally unaided by 
others. 

Subsequent Proceedings on the North-West Fron¬ 
tier of Sind, up to the close of the year 
1847. 

When the British forces first entered the country 
in 1839, the position of these tribes was as has been 
already described under the proper head. 

After the hill campaign in 1845, that portion of the 
Doombkee tribe which had surrendered at Trukhee 
was placed under a chief, by name Jummal Khan, on 
lands near Janadeyra, on the Sind Frontier. 



318 


Durya Khan and Toork Ali, with the Jekranees 
and some men of other clans, were settled at Jana- 
deyra itself and its neighbourhood. 

The lands were granted to these men free for three 
years, which grant was afterwards, at Major Jacob’s 
request, altered to a free grant in perpetuity, and it 
was expected that they would now take to agricultural 
pursuits, and entirely leave their former predatory 
habits. 

A commissioner was appointed to reside at Jana- 
deyra, and superintend the reformed Beloochees. 

A strong detachment was posted at Shahpoor, in 
Kutchee, and the other frontier arrangements were 
made as before described. 

These arrangements did not prove successful. The 
Doombkees, Jekranees, Kosahs, Boordees, &c., with 
or without permission, made repeated plundering 
excursions from British Sind into the neighbouring 
countries, both hill and plain. The Boogtees did the 
same from their side into Sind: murder and robbery 
everywhere prevailed. 

The troops were shut up in forts, and did nothing 
to protect the people. The people themselves were 
encouraged to bear arms, and to commit acts of vio¬ 
lence ; the lives and property of the Boogtees being 

ordered to be taken and destroyed wherever and 

* 

however found, and a reward of ten rupees per head 
being offered for the destruction of the whole tribe, 
and proclaimed throughout the country. 

The district along the border was left uncultivated ; 
the canals were not cleared out for many years, and 
nearly all the peaceable people left the country. The 


319 


troops were perfectly isolated in their entrenchments 
no supplies were drawn from the country-folk but all 
were fed as if on shipboard, by the commissariat, 
even at the distant outpost of Shahpoor, in Kutchee. 
The troops and camp followers were supplied with 
every article of consumption from the public stores, 
forwarded by the commissariat department, at an 
enormous cost, from Shikarpoor, some sixty miles 
distant. Even the horses of the cavalry were fed in 
like manner. 

The troops, so placed, being completely separated 
from the inhabitants of the country, and holding little 
or no communication with them, were entirely ignorant 
of their nature and habits ; knew not friend from foe ; 
were always in a state of alarm, and expecting to be 
attacked, even at Shikarpoor itself. 

Notwithstanding that the Boogtees had been pro¬ 
claimed outlaws, a price set on the head of every man 
of the tribe, and all of them ordered to be treated as 
enemies wherever found, they were not subdued—not, 
indeed, in any way weakened, by any of the proceedings 
of the Governor of Sind. 

The removal of the Jekranees and Doombkees from 
Kutchee left the Sind border temptingly open to 
their incursions, and they failed not to take advantage 
of the circumstances, until at last, becoming more 
and more bold by impunity, they assembled a force of 
some 1,500 armed men, mostly on foot; and on the 10th 
December, 1846, marched into Sind, passed through 
the British outposts, who dared not to attack them, to 
within fifteen miles of Shikarpoor, and remained 
twenty-four hours within the British territory, secured 


320 


every head of cattle in the country around, and 
returned to their hills, some seventy-five miles distant, 
with all their booty ; in perfect safety. 

The Boogtees on this occasion conducted their 
proceedings in the most cool and systematic manner: 
they brought with them, besides the armed force 
above mentioned, nearly five hundred unarmed 
followers, to drive the cattle, of which they obtained, 
by their own account, some fifteen thousand head. 
This inroad was thought to be in too great force for 
the detachments on the outposts to attempt anything 
against it. 

Timely information reached the Shahpoor post, 
but no troops moved from it against the invading 
Boogtees. 

A regiment of cavalry and two hundred native rifles 
were sent from Shikarpoor to repel the invaders. 
The cavalry came on them at Hoodoo, some forty-five 
miles from Shikarpoor—the Boogtees en masse, their 
unarmed attendants meanwhile diligently continuing 
to drive on the cattle towards Loree Kooshtuck and 
the hills. However, the British troops were ignorant 
of the ground, thought the robbers too strong to be 
attacked, and returned to Shikarpoor without 
attempting anything further, the Boogtees ultimately 
reaching their hills, with all their prey, without the 
loss of a man, save one killed by a distant random 
shot from the matchlock of a Jekranee, 

One regiment of the Sind Irregular Horse, then at 
Hyderabad, was now ordered up with all speed to the 
frontier, where it arrived on the 9th January, 1847. 

Major Jacob was appointed to command the frontier, 


321 


and since then has held this post. On arrival 
at Khanghur, desolation and terror was found to 
prevail everywhere in the country. No man could 
go in safety from place to place, even on the main line 
of communication from Shikarpoor to Jaghun, without 
a strong escort. 

Not a man of the Belooch settlers, the Jekranees 
and Doombkees, had as yet attempted any peace¬ 
ful labour, or ever put his hand to any agricul¬ 
tural implement. There were no made roads in 
any part of the country, and no bridges ; indeed, 
there was not a single mile of good road in all 
Upper Sind. 

At Khanghur there was no village and bazar, and 
but four or five wretched huts, containing twenty-two 
souls in all; the cavalry detachment was found on 
arrival locked up in the fort, the gate not being opened 
at eight o’clock in the morning ; and this was the 
normal state of things. 

On the night before the arrival of the Sind 
Irregular Horse, the Boogtees had carried off some 
camels from a detachment of the Baggage Corps 
between Jaghun and Shikarpoor ; and this was their 
last successful attempt at plundering in Sind. Our 
predecessors, during the previous four years, knew 
little or nothing of the country, or of the people on 
the border ; the men of the Sind Irregular Horse 
were familiar with both, and this gave them confidence 
and power. 

After assuming the command and relieving the 
outposts, Major Jacob at once ordered all idea of 
defensive operations to be abandoned; every detach- 

Y 


322 


ment was posted in the open plain, without any 
defensive works whatever ; patrols were sent in every 
direction in which it was thought an enemy might 
appear, and these parties crossed and met so often 
that support was almost certain to be at hand if 
wanted. The parties were sent to distances of forty 
miles into and beyond the desert, and along the 
frontier line. 

Whenever a party of the Sind Irregular Horse 
came on any of the plunderers, it always fell on them 
at once, charging any number, however superior, 
without the smallest hesitation. 

Against such sudden attacks the robber horsemen 
never attempted a stand ; they always fled at once, 
frequently sustaining heavy loss in men, and never 
succeeding in obtaining any plunder. 

These proceedings, and particularly the tracks, 

daily renewed, of our parties all over the desert, and 

at all the watering-places near the hills, far beyond 

the British border, alarmed the robbers, and prevented 

their ever feeling safe, and they soon ceased to make 

attempts on the British territory, although still 

plundering all Kutchee. Meanwhile, Major Jacob 

had discovered that not onlv the Boordees and 

•/ 

Muzzarees, who were always inveterate marauders, 
but the Belooch settlers at Janadeyra, had been, all 
along, systematically carrying on plundering excursions 
on a considerable scale, entirely unknown to their 
commissioner, residing among them. 

The horses of these Jekranees and Doombkees had 
been taken from them a year before, bv order of Sir 
C. Napier, and sold by auction; but Major Jacob 


323 


found that the sale had been fictitious, and that, 
according to the custom of the country, the former 
owners still retained shares in these horses. 

It may be proper to explain here, that, among the 
Belooch border tribes of Sind, ahorse (or rather mare, 
for they ride only the latter), very seldom belongs to 
one man only ; and sometimes the property in one 
mare is shared among as many as twenty men. 

Thus, when the horses of the Jekranees and 
Doomhkees were supposed to have been finally dis¬ 
posed of, only certain shares in them had been sold; 
the animals were kept by various zemindars all over 
the country, and whenever a foray from Sind was 
agreed on, the horses were ready for their old masters. 
The men left Janadeyra, &c., by ones and twos, went 
for their horses, and then proceeded to the appointed 
rendezvous, generally in the territory of Meer Ali 
Moorad, the village of Thool being a favourite place. 

These musters sometimes amounted to as many as 
a hundred horse or more, with many other men on 
foot. After the foray into the hills, or elsewhere, the 
booty obtained was shared at some place beyond the 
British boundary, the plunderers dispersed, replaced 
the horses with the zemindars, and returned, one by 
one, to their homes. 

The existence of these proceedings had never been 
suspected until pointed out by Major Jacob, and then 
at first they were thought impossible; but having 
good information of what was going on, Major Jacob 
caused the places of these predatory rendezvous to be 
suddenly surrounded by parties of the Sind Irregular 
Horse, just after the return of a body of Jekranee 

y 2 


324 


plunderers from a foray; the robbers were all secured, 
with their horses, arms, and a large quantity of stolen 
cattle. 

Concealment was no longer possible, and Major 
Jacob now obtained permission to disarm every man 
in the country, not being a Government servant, 
which was at once done. 

At the same time, Major Jacob set five hundred of 
the Jekranees to work to clear the Noorwah canal (a 
main feeder cleared by Government, then belonging 
to Ali Moorad). The men were very awkward at 
first, but were strong, energetic, cheerful, and good- 
natured ; they soon became used to the tools, and 
were then able to do a better day’s work, and of 
course to earn more pay, than the ordinary Sindhee 
labourers. The men seemed proud of this, and the 
experiment was perfectly successful. 

Soon afterwards the Belooch settlers took to manual 
labour, in their own fields, with spirit and even pride. 
From that time they were really conquered and re¬ 
formed. They are now the most hard-working, 
industrious, well-behaved, cheerful set of men in all 
Sind. 

Their numbers amount to about two thousand adult 
males, but, for three years past, not a man of them 
has been convicted, or even accused, of any crime 
whatever, great or small; yet seven or eight years 
ago they were the terror of the country, murderers 
and robbers to a man, 

Our own subjects ceased to be 
robbers, the occupation of a“lootoo” ceased to be 
respectable, and has now become a subject of shame 


325 


instead of glory to the wild hordes themselves. Peace, 
quiet, safety for life and property, were thus established 
along the border; while the Boogtees, who, now shut 
out from Sind, persisted in making predatory inroads 
on the plains of Kutchee, were, on the 1st October, 
1847, in one of the incursions, intercepted by a 
detachment of the Sind Irregular Horse, under 
Lieutenant Merewether, and signally punished. On 
this occasion, about one-half of the whole fighting 
men of the tribe were killed or taken prisoners. The 
strength of the tribe was completely broken, and the 
Boogtee chiefs soon came in to the British authorities 
in Sind, and surrendered at discretion. They, with 
the greater part of their followers, men, women, and 
children, to the number of some two thousand, were 
settled on lands near Larkhana. 

The prisoners were released, and some of the men 
taken into the British service as police, and all might 
have remained in peace and comfort at their new 
settlement, had it not been for the intrigues of one 
Aliff Khan, a distinguished Patan officer, then native 
adjutant of the Sind Police. Frightened by continual 
threats and demands of bribes by the police officer, 
Aliff Khan, the Boogtee chiefs, in March, 1848, fled 
and again returned to their hills. On this occasion, 
one of the wives of the chief Islam Khan, the families 
of some others of the principal men of the Boogtees, 
and altogether some seven hundred or eight hundred 
persons of the tribe, remained in Sind. 

The chiefs, who had fled to the hills, made several 
attempts to renew predatory inroads, hut without 
success, and, after a while, they again came to the 


326 


political superintendent on the frontier, to beg for 
mercy and favour, the tribe being completely broken, 
and incapable of further mischief. That portion of 
it settled in Sind was allowed to return to the hills, 
and they did so in October, 1851. Some of the best 
of the men belonging to it were afterwards taken into 
the British service, and the Kulpur chief, Allum 
Khan, with thirty of his followers, are now enrolled 
in the Belooch Mounted Guides, employed on the 
Sind Frontier, in which capacity they have proved 
faithful, diligent, and generally very useful. 


APPENDIX. 

Field Orders by Major Billamore, Commanding , fyc. 

Poolijee , 1 Ith February, 1840. 

As the field force under Major Billamore is about 
to be broken up, the commanding officer has much 
pleasure in testifying to the general good conduct and 
steady behaviour of the troops composing it. 

For upwards of three months they have been sub¬ 
jected to many hardships and privations, which have 
been encountered and overcome, not only without a 
murmur, but with a cheerful alacrity which reflects 
the highest credit on them. 

To the officers and men composing the force, the 
commanding officer offers his thanks for their willing 
and cordial co-operation, in effecting the objects for 
which they were ordered to take the field. 



327 


To Lieutenant Jacob, commanding the artillery, 
the thanks of the commanding officer are especially 
due, for the very able and efficient manner in which 
he conducted his battery, over an unknown and diffi¬ 
cult country, offering obstacles of no ordinary nature. 

Major Billamore will have much pleasure in bring¬ 
ing to the notice of the brigadier commanding in 
Upper Sind, the uniform good conduct of the troops 
employed under him. 

By order, 

(Signed) L. Brown, 
Captain 5th Regiment N. I., Staff Officer. 


Brigade Orders by Brigadier Gordon, Commanding 

in Upper Sind . 

Sukkur , 3 rd February , 1840. 

Brigadier Gordon, in turning over the command of 
the troops in Upper Sind to Brigadier Stevenson, 
cannot take leave of them without expressing his 
warmest feelings for their general good conduct, and 
the cheerfulness with which they have performed 
their duty, under, perhaps (at the season their exer¬ 
tions were called for), one of the most trying climates 
in the world. To the commanding officers his thanks 
are justly due. 

To the field force under Major Billamore, and to 
his judicious and zealous operations, the present 
tranquillity of those hitherto barbarous tracts may be 
mainly attributed; * and the active exertions of 

* This shows the immediate effect of the first hill campaign. 



328 


Lieutenant Jacob, now commanding the artillery, 
under Major Billamore, have repeatedly come to the 
notice of the brigadier, and afforded him the highest 
satisfaction. 

By order, 

(Signed) T. Clibborn, Captain, 

Major of Brigade. 


No. 2556 of 1842. 

From the Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan , 
to Lieutenant Jacob, Commanding the Sind 
Irregular Horse * 

Sukkur , 9 th November , 1842. 

I cannot depart from Sind without performing my 
duty to yourself and the corps you command, in 
acknowledging the great obligations I am under to 
you, to Lieutenants Malcolm and Fitzgerald, and 
to the native officers and men of the Sind Irregular 
Bessala. 

For the first time, within the memory of man, 
Kutchee and Upper Sind have been for a whole year 
entirely free from the irruptions of the hill tribes, by 
which villages were annually destroyed, lives and pro¬ 
perty sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state 
of fever. 

During the past year, the emissaries of our enemies 
had been unremitting in their exertions to instigate 
the northern hill tribes to resume their marauding 


* This letter, published to the Sind Irregular Horse by order of 
the Political Agent, shows the state of the Sind frontier during the 
year 1842, up to the arrival of Sir C. Napier in the country. 



329 * 


habits, with a view to disturb our communication with 
A Afghanistan through Sind and Kutchee, and so far 
succeeded, that large hands of freebooters were at one 
time assembled for the purpose, under some of the 
most noted of their former leaders ; but in vain they 
strove to effect their objects, which were solely 
counteracted by the indomitable zeal with which you, 
your officers, and men, so constantly exposed your¬ 
selves, especially throughout the hot months, whereby 
every attempt of the marauders to enter the plains 
was baffled ; the extraordinary vigilance you have 
exerted, and strict discipline you have maintained, 
not merely in the Sind Bessala, but also among the 
quotas of Belooch horse which were under your orders, 
has deterred the northern tribes from committing 
themselves in hostility during the late exciting period, 
in dread of the corps you so ably commanded. 

I am bound, accordingly, to attribute to the Sind 
Irregular Horse the profound tranquillity which has 
been preserved in Upper Sind and Kutchee; and I 
beg you will accept yourself, and convey to your 
officers and men, my grateful thanks. 

I have the honour to annex an extract, paragraph 
11, from despatch I addressed to Mr. Secretary 
Maddock, the 9th ultimo, expressing my obligation to 
you personally. 

I have the honour to be, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

(Signed) J. Outram, 
Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan. 


330 


Manifesto by His Excellency Major-General Sir C. J. 

Napier, G.C.B ., Governor of Sind * 

Sukkur , 13^ January , 1845. 

Being; about to cross the Sind frontier at the head 
of a strong body of troops, I think it right to state to 
the neighbouring tribes why I thus invade the 
territory of our friend the Khan of Khelat, in order 
that these tribes may be satisfied as to the cause of 
my movements, and that they may not think the said 
movements arise from the desire of acquiring territory 
or molesting allies. 

His Highness the Khan of Khelat has given us 
permission to enter his territories; and had he not 
done so, I must still have invaded them for the pro¬ 
tection of our own subjects. 

These territories are occupied, as regards our 
immediate frontier, by three powerful and predatory 
tribes, the Doombkees, Jekranees, and the Boogtees 
(there are also others of inferior note). These tribes 
are in open rebellion against their sovereign, the Khan 
of Khelat. During the whole of last summer they 
were excited by the hopes of pillage, to make, without 
the slightest pretext, frequent predatory inroads on the 
Sind territory, plundering villages, murdering many 
of the inhabitants, and devastating the country. In 
several instances they were engaged with our outposts; 
and on one occasion, falling on two hundred unarmed 
and unopposing grasscutters, they massacred nearly 
the whole of them, together with an officer’s party of 

* This manifesto clearly shows the state of the Sind frontier after 
two years of Sir C. Napier’s administration. 


331 


cavalry who were guarding these poor people, and 
whom the robbers surprised. Many villages on our 
frontier were left desolate; the inhabitants of which, 
abandoning their crops, fled further into the interior 
of Sind, calling aloud upon me, as Governor of the 
province, to give them protection. On my part, I 
applied to their sovereign, the Khan of Khelat, to 
control his subjects. He promised to do this; but 
they were not controlled. 

I believe his Highness the Khan has the most 
friendly intentions with regard to the British Govern¬ 
ment ; but it was evident that the arch-robber and 
rebel, Beejar Khan Doombkee, was too powerful in 
arms to be reduced to obedience by his prince. So 
true is this, that he openly bestowed in jaghire large 
tracts of his sovereign’s territory, and to which the 
latter was constrained to submit. I was, therefore, 
obliged to reinforce our outposts against this unex¬ 
pected and unprovoked enemy; and on one occasion 
our troops wholly failed in an attack made upon 
Beejar Khan. This was at the period of the year 
when the heat was so very great as to be insupportable 
to human beings exposed to mid-day sun. 

My orders to the frontier posts were then issued to 
remain on the defensive during the hot weather. 
These orders, together with the success of Beejar 
Khan, rendered the robber tribes more daring. They 
frequently entered the Sindian frontier in search of 
plunder, and were on two or three occasions attacked 
in our own territory, and defeated by the troops, the 
police, and the villagers themselves, who several times 
turned out to aid the troops. 


332 


It must be evident to every one, that such a state of 
things could not be suffered by any regular govern¬ 
ment; and I was directed by the Governor-General 
of India to take such steps as were necessary to tran- 
quillise the frontier and protect the people of Sind. 

I have here to remark that the Ex-Ameer, Shere 
Mahomed, had located himself among these robbers, 
and excited them to plunder Sind. He was also in 
hopes of exciting an insurrection in his favour. But 
the chiefs of Sind had no desire for his return; still 
less would the people of Sind assist him, conscious of 
having a degree of protection under the British 
Government which they never experienced under that 
of the Ameers. The Ameer consequently gave over 
his attempts, and retired to the Sikh territory. 

Such was the state of things on the frontier when 
the cold season arrived; and, in consequence of the 
solicitations made bv me to the Khan of Khelat, His 
Highness made a feeble effort against his rebel 
subjects: he advanced from Dadur to Poolijee. 

It is evident the rebels well knew the danger they 
would incur were they to meet their prince on the 
plain, when he would be assisted at any moment by 
the British, and each day’s march brought him nearer 
to our outposts. 

The strength of the rebels lay in the Boogtee 
mountains: and to the mountains they of course 
retired. Among these celebrated defiles and passes 
the Khan dared not pursue them. The amount of 
his forces did not exceed two thousand men, and these 
were by no means under his command : an immediate 
retreat was decided upon by His Highness. 


While this prince was at Poolijee, I sent a vakeel to 
beg that he would allow me to have a conference with 
him either at Poolijee, at Dadur, at Bagh, at 
Gundava, or any other place His Highness chose to 
appoint. His answer was a refusal, for reasons which 
I cannot make public, without doing His Highness 
an injury. 

My vakeel therefore returned; but I felt that it 
was necessary to have in writing His Highness’s 
formal acknowledgment of his inability to control his 
subjects, the Doombkees, Jekranees, and Boogtees, 
and his desire that I would punish their rebellion and 
their murderous inroads upon the Sind territory. 

It was also necessary that I should have His 

Highness’s reasons in writing for not meeting me. I 
» 

therefore despatched Mr. Brown, the Secretary to 
the Sind Government, who is a personal friend of the 
Khan’s, and possessing my highest confidence, in hopes 
some arrangements might be made for a united 
exertion to repress these mountain tribes; but in 
vain. The state of the Khan’s territory beyond the 
Bolan Pass rendered him unable to attend to the 
affairs of Kutchee; and he appeared to hold nothing 
but a nominal sovereignty over that rich tract of 
country, of which Bagh is the centre. 

On Mr. Brown’s return from Bagh, so daring were 
the robber tribes, that he was nearly taken (and to be 
taken by them is synonymous with being murdered), 
by three hundred cavalry belonging to the rebels, who 
had pushed about eighty miles from their haunts for 
the express purpose of waylaying Mr. Brown. The 
course to be pursued by me has now become clear and 


334 


r 


decisive. It is to enter the Boogtee mountains, and 
attack these robber tribes in their fastnesses. They 
are the Pindarees of the Indus. 

As Mr. Brown rode through the villages he found 

O O 

them miserable. I will use the words of his report 
to me:— 

“ The route I pursued through Kutchee was by 
Kunda, Kassim-ke-Gote, and Bagh, which line I 
remember in former days to be richly cultivated. It 
is now a desert. I did not meet with an acre of 
cultivation in Kutchee: the condition of the people is 
most miserable. They have no security for their 
property—villages are daily plundered by the hill 
robbers. I heard many villagers (some of whom were 
wounded) declare that, if they were not protected, 
they would fly the country and come to Sind.” It is 
certainly not my duty to protect these poor people, the 
inhabitants of Kutchee; but it is my duty to protect 
the inhabitants of Sind; and therefore I shall march, 
on the 16th of January, beyond the frontier, at the 
head of a strong force, accompanied by the Sindian 
chiefs Wullee Mahomed, Chandiah, Ahmed Khan 
Mugsee, and many others, at the head of many thou¬ 
sands of their followers*, all determined to revenge 
their plundered villages upon the mountain tribes. I 
shall also be assisted by His Plighness Ali Moorad, 
Talpoor, who will march against the enemy, by whom 
his frontier has also been molested. 

It is no small satisfaction to me that I find the 
Sindian chiefs, who but two years ago stood opposed 
to us in battle at Meeanee, now eager to draw the 

* The whole of these thousands amounted to about six hundred. 


335 


sword and fight under British colours. It gives no 
equivocal proof of their contentment with the govern¬ 
ment of Sind. 

What the result of these operations may be, it is 
impossible to say ; but I hope it will be such as per¬ 
manently to secure the tranquillity of the Sindian 
frontier, and enable our ally, the Khan of Khelat, to 
recover the rule of his country from these robbers. 
With this last I have nothing to do. The moment I 
have punished the robbers I shall retire within our 
own frontier*, satisfied that I have performed my 
duty to the East India Company, to the people of 
Sind, and to humanity. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier, Major-General, 

Governor of Sind. 


General Orders by His Excellency Major-General 
Sir C. Napier, G.C.JB., Governor of Sind. f 

Head- Quarters , Camp Shahpoor , 
\Qth January , 1845. 

No. 1.—There are two circumstances, which oc¬ 
curred in the opening of this campaign against the 
robber tribes, which excite the admiration of the 

* Sir C. Napier did not withdraw his troops within the Sind 
frontier ; a strong detachment was posted at Shahpoor, thirty 
miles beyond the British frontier, and retained there for more than 
three years. 

j- The breadth of the desert between Sind and Ivutchee is, from 
Khanghur toManootee, twenty-one miles; from Rojaun to Shahpoor, 
where the Sind Irregular Horse marched on the occasion referred to 
in this order, is thirty-seven miles ; from Khanghur to Ooch, where 



336 


Major-General and Governor, and which he thinks it 
right to make the subject of a separate order. The 
first is, that in the prompt and dangerous attack for 
cavalry of a village like Shahpoor, in the highest 
degree defensible, and built for defence, and which 
was defended, that Captain Jacob and his men carried 
it with the rapidity of lightning, and, while losing 
men, did not injure one of the defenders, but cap¬ 
tured them all. This is a very rare and very glorious 
instance of perfect discipline, as well as courage, on 
the part of the Sind Horse; and though to men less 
acquainted with war it may appear trifling, yet, in 
the mind of the Major-General and Governor, it 
stamps both the Sind Horse and its commandant as 
first-rate soldiers—prompt, resolute, obedient, and 
humane, even in the momentary excitement of action, 
against the most furious of enemies. 

The Major-General Governor feels the greatest 
satisfaction in thus publicly mentioning Captain Jacob 
and his corps, for thus setting an example so honour¬ 
able to themselves and to the army. 

This order to be translated, and to be read to every 
regiment, European and native, serving in Sind. 

By order, 

(Signed) E. Green, Major, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Sir C. Napier marched on commencing the hill campaign, is twenty - 
eight miles. This last-named distance Sir C. Napier in his despatch 
calls forty miles ; Sir W. Napier doubles this, and says that the 
desert is eighty miles wide. 


337 


Extract from General Orders by His Excellency 
Major-General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B ., Gover¬ 
nor of Sind . 

Head-Quarters, Trukkee , 11 th March, 1845. 

Twenty-five brave robbers, on foot, well armed with 
swords, shields, and matchlocks, met twenty of the 
Sind Horse patrolling in the desert. The robbers 
gave a volley and charged. The Sind Horse met 
them; a combat with sabres ensued. The Sind 
Horse had one man killed and two wounded ; four 
horses killed and two wounded. Of the enemy, every 
man fell, sword in hand. Quarter was repeatedly 
offered to these stern gladiators, but they refused, and 
every robber bit the dust. Honour be to their cour¬ 
age— more honour to their conquerors. Another 
laurel leaf has been added to the rich wreath of 
Jacob’s Horse. The conduct of Jemedar Guffoor 
Mahomed and his companions demands the Governor’s 
highest approbation; and he will report their gal¬ 
lantry to the Governor-General of India, and to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, as soon as 
Captain Jacob sends in the names of these brave 
men.* 

(Signed) C. J. Napier, G.C.B., 

Governor of Sind. 

True extract, (Signed) E. Green, Major, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

* Sir W. Napier calls the detachment of the Sind Irregular Horse 
mentioned in this order “ Moguls;” he might as well style the Men 
of Kent “Jutts”—The men of the Sind Irregular Horse are 

Hindoostanees. 

z 


338 


No. 1201 of 1846. 

From Captain Goldney, Collector and Magistrate , 

Shikar poor. 

Sir, —I beg to report for your information, that, in 
obedience to His Excellency’s instructions, I have 
issued notices that a reward of ten rupees will be paid 
for every Boogtee prisoner delivered to frontier posts. 

May I request that you will intimate the same to 
the officers commanding the outposts, both native and 
European, lest any untoward circumstances should 
occur in the receipt of the prisoners, or the payment, 
or certificate for payment, of the stipulated reward, to 
damp the zeal of our borderers. 

I have the honour to be, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

(Signed) P. Goldney,* 
Collector and Magistrate. 

Shikarpoor , 8th August , 1846. 


Directions of His Excellency the Governor of Sind, 
regarding the Treatment of the Boogtees after 
the Hill Campaign .f 

Dated 8th January , 1846. 
Sir, By direction of His Excellency the Governor, 
I have the honour to inform you that the Boogtees 

* This letter, with proclamation in English and Persian, was 
published all over the border country, by order of Sir C. Napier. 

| lliis order was also published throughout Upper Sind, and was 
never countermanded. 



339 


are outlaws ; and all cattle belonging to them, and 
themselves, are to be captured or killed when they 
come near the frontier. 

I have the honour to he, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

(Signed) E. J. Brown, 
Secretary to the Government of Sind. 
Kurrachee , 8 th January , 1846. 


Notification, Political Department. 

Bombay Castle , October 2 7th, 1847. 

The Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased 
to direct that the following despatch from Colonel 
the Honourable H. Dundas, commanding the troops 
in Sind, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, with 
the accompanying reports from Major Jacob and 
Lieutenant Merewether, of the Sind Irregular Horse, 
be published for general information. 

The skilful arrangements and judicious precautions 
of Major Jacob, and the admirable conduct and 
daring spirit of Lieutenant Merewether, and the 
party of the Sind Horse under his command, have 
combined to achieve a signal and most important 
service. By the destruction of this large body of 
marauders assembled on the frontier, the peace of 
the British territories has, it may be hoped, been 
effectually secured, and the Governor in Council 
feels that the highest praise is due to all who have 
borne any part in this gallant and successful exploit. 
The Sind Horse on this occasion has added another 
to the many recorded instances of valour, and devo- 

z 2 



340 


tion to its duty, which have always been conspicuous 
in the short but brilliant career of this distinguished 
corps. 

By order of the Honourable the Governor in 
Council, 

(Signed) A. Malet, 
Chief Secretary to Government. 


To the Adjutant-General of the Army, Poona . 

Sir, —It is with the greatest satisfaction I have 
the honour to transmit, for the information of His 
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the enclosed 
copies of despatches received through Lieutenant- 
Colonel Shaw, commanding in Upper Sind, from 
Major Jacob, commanding the Sind Irregular Horse 
and the frontier, and from Lieutenant Merewether, 
Second in Command of the 1st Regiment, and com¬ 
manding detachment at Shahpoor, detailing a most 
complete and decisive success, gained by Lieutenant 
Merewether and one hundred and thirty-two men of 
all ranks of the 1st Regiment Sind Horse, over the 
combined Boogtee tribe of Beloochees, on the 1st 
instant. 

These reports are so complete in themselves that it 
only remains for me to submit them for the perusal 
of his Excellency, adding, however, the meed of praise 
due to Major Jacob and Lieutenant Merewether. 

To the former officer for the excellence of the 
arrangements which have been made by him, since 
the frontier has been placed under his charge by His 
Excellency Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., who, having 



341 


the highest confidence in Major Jacob’s skill and 
ability (always conspicuous), that officer has now shown 
how fully it was deserved. To these arrangements 
may be attributed the most signal success that has 
ever attended the careful watching of this long-vexed 
frontier, which has ended in the total destruction of 
the most notorious freebooters in Kutchee. 

Major Jacob’s activity, skill, and judgment, have 
been long known to his military superiors, and I am 
most happy in being the means of reporting the suc¬ 
cess which has at last attended his unremitting 
vigilance and untiring exertions. 

To the conduct of Lieutenant Merewether I would 
also most particularly call the attention of His 
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. This officer, 
though young in years and service, has been most 
actively employed in the field almost throughout that 
period of service, and always with credit to himself. 
He wears a medal for the battle of Hyderabad, and, 
since he has been with the Sind Horse, formed under 
the eye of Major Jacob, he has now proved himself a 
first-rate cavalry officer. 

His conduct on the present occasion speaks for 
itself, in his well and modestly worded despatch. 
Watching for months, in the desert, an enemy artful 
and daring as these Boogtee robbers have shown 
themselves, he has bided his time, and, when that 
time came, has swept them from the face of the 
earth. 

He appears to have manoeuvred his squadron with 
great skill and judgment, and the fearful loss of life 
on the part of the robbers will prove to His Excel- 


342 


lency with what gallantry and determination the 
charges were made and executed. 

While mentioning the conduct of the European 
officers, I must not fail to speak of the squadron 
which Lieutenant Merewether commanded and led. 
Officers and men of the Sind Horse appear to be of 
one heart and mind, and the devotion to the service, 
and gallantry of the native officer, non-commissioned 
officers, and troopers, which formed Lieutenant Mere¬ 
wether s small force, is beyond all praise. I have 
therefore thought it right to send the whole of their 
names to his Excellency, for such notice as he may 
think their gallant conduct deserves. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) H. Dundas, Colonel, 
Commanding the Troops in Sind. 

Head Quarters , Kurrachee , 7th October , 1847. 


To Lieutenant-Colonel M. Shaw, Commanding in 

Upper Sind. 

Sir, — I have the honour herewith to forward a 
report from Lieutenant Merewether, commanding at 
Shahpoor, of proceedings with regard to the inroad of 
the Boogtee tribe, reported by me to you yesterday. 
Lieutenant Merewether’s letter requires no comment, 
—it sets forth distinctly and fully the particulars of 
the most perfectly successful affair of the kind I have 
ever witnessed or heard of. One hundred and thirty- 
three men killed nearly six hundred enemies, and 
made prisoners one hundred and twenty, in two 
hours’ fighting, the enemy resisting manfully the 



343 


whole time, and obstinately refusing quarter. Five 
hundred and sixty dead bodies have been counted, 
and there are probably more lying about in the 
jungle. 

The conduct of Lieutenant Merewether himself has 
been beyond praise, and shows a rare and most excel¬ 
lent unison of implicit obedience and great military 
skill, of cool and careful prudence with the most 
daring courage. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) J. Jacob, Major, 
Commanding Sind Irregular Horse, Frontier. 

Shakpoor , 2nd October , 1847. 


To Major Jacob, Commanding Frontier, Khanghur . 

Sir, —Having received the good intelligence of the 
whole Boogtee force having entered the plain, as 
already reported to you, I have the honour to inform 
you that I started at half-past one o’clock on the 
morning of the 1st October, with a party of the Sind 
Irregular Horse, amounting to one hundred and 
thirty-three men of all ranks, from Shahpoor, in 
pursuit of the enemy. I arrived at the Zemanee 
river just as it became light enough to see clearly the 
tracks of the enemy. I observed a spot in the bed of 
the Zemanee river where they had apparently halted 
for a short time; from the marks, I was of opinion 
that their strength might be six or seven hundred 
footmen, with a small party of horse. I thence pro¬ 
ceeded, according to your instructions, along the foot 
of the small hills, intending to take post in the 



344 


Tey waugh, thinking that the enemy would certainly 
return that way, and the ground being favourable for 
cavalry to act on. However, I had not proceeded a 
quarter of a mile beyond the Zemanee river, when 
Jan Mahomed Kvheeree, who was a short distance 
in advance, came back and informed me that he 
heard loud shouting and much noise in the direction 
of Koonree. My detachment was marching in column 
of troops ; I wheeled them into line, and proceeded in 
the direction of Koonree. When near the jungle 
about that place, I saw the enemy formed in a deep 
and long line to my left. They appeared to be 
making a side movement towards the jungle. I 
therefore passed rapidly along their front, to cut 
them off from the jungle, and drive them to the open 
plain. They were at this time posted in some rough 
broken ground, with sand hillocks and bushes; but 
apparently fancying, from my galloping along their 
front, that I did not intend to attack them, they left 
their vantage ground, and rushed forward to attack 
me, with much firing, loud shouts, and howls. This 
at once gave me all I wished for, namely, a fair field; 
I immediately changed front to the left, which the 
men did most steadily, as if on parade. When my 
change of position was executed, I charged. The 
charge was made steadily and rapidly, with irresist¬ 
ible effect. The Boogtees had formed a solid mass 
to receive us, but were overthrown at the first onset, 
with terrible loss. They then moved off towards 
the hills, distant about three miles, in disorder, but 
shouldering together as closely as they could. We 
continued our attacks, killing numbers, until on 


345 


recrossing the Zemanee river, they made another 
short stand. They were again overthrown, and 
driven into the open plain. They were now ap¬ 
proaching the low hills, when Russaidar Shaik Ali, 
very judiciously getting some men in advance, cut 
them off from that place of refuge, and they turned 
back towards Koonree. Their numbers were now 
getting small; but though repeated offers of quarter 
were made to them, they obstinately continued to 
fight, until the destruction was so great that their 
numbers were reduced to about one hundred and 
twenty, many of whom were wounded. At last, 
seeing resistance utterly hopeless, they were induced 
to throw down their arms and surrender. Not a 
single footman escaped capture or death; two horse¬ 
men alone out of the whole force of the enemy, stated 
by the prisoners to have been full seven hundred in 
all, including twenty-five horseman. Among the 
slain are several chieftains of note, in fact, all the 
leaders of repute in the tribe. The undermentioned 
were recognised among the dead:— 

Hundoo.Nothanee. 

Kora.Kulpur. 

Kurreemdad.Raimoozye. 

Jumah. . . . (Outlaw) Jekranee. 

Chuttah. . . (Outlaw) Jekranee. 

(Killed in the attack on Kundranee.) 


Kumber.Nephew of the 

Shumbrane chief, “ Lango.” 
Also a nephew of Hundoos, name unknown. 

Sunjur.Rind. 

There were also many others, esteemed as warlike 







346 


characters, but of less note, killed. Neither Islam 
Khan nor Alim Khan were with the party. 

Our own loss has, I am happy to say, been trifling 

compared to the result, as shown by the annexed 

return of killed and wounded : nine of our horses 

were killed and ten wounded, seven of them mortally 

so. Amongst the wounded is your own horse, which 

I was riding at the time; he has received two 

severe sword-cuts, one on the loins close behind 

the saddle, and the other on the heel. After all was 

over I returned to Shahpoor, via Chuttur, to which 

latter place I had sent all the prisoners able to march, 

under the custody of Naib Russaldar Azeem Khan. 

* 

Russaidar Shaik Ali, with the remainder of my 

J J 

detachment, I left at Koonree, to take care of the 
wounded till I could send out assistance and carriage 
from this place. All returned to Shahpoor this 
morning. 

Before I fell in with the enemy, they had attempted 
to plunder the village of Kunclranee, whence they 
were beaten off bv the head man, Deen Mahomed 
Kyheeree, in splendid style; Deen Mahomed and his 
people killing the notorious “ Chuttah” Jekranee and 
others, and taking one prisoner. Three determined 
attacks were made by the Boogtees on the fort, and 
at one time the assailants had actually reached the top 
of the wall, hut were thrown back by the defenders. 

All mv native officers and men behaved well in this 

w 

affair: nothing could be more perfect than the 
steadiness, resolution, and quickness which they showed 
throughout; hut I beg particularly to bring to your 
notice the excellent conduct of— 


347 


Russaidar Shaik Ali. 

Naib Russaidar Azeem Khan. 

Sowar Sulleen Khan. 

„ Bujjoo Khan. 

,, Bahadoor Khan. 

„ Kurreem Khan. 

I saw these four sowars each kill several of the 
enemy in fair stand-up fight, hand to hand ; but nearly 
all must have done equally well, although it be not 
possible for me to specify every man’s deeds individually. 
I beg leave also to remark that the destructive effect 
of our little carbines, used in the hand, at close 
quarters, w r as quite terrible to behold. Every shot 
appeared to kill or disable an enemy, who were often, 
by reason of the bushes and broken ground, enabled 
just to keep out of sword’s reach. 

I must not omit to mention that Jan Mahomed 
Kyheeree, with four of his followers, was close to me 
during nearly the whole of the action, and behaved 
exceedingly well. Jan Mahomed fought stoutly, killing 
several of the enemy before his sword broke over the 
head of another. 

I have made the best provision I can for the 
wounded prisoners, who are being carefully attended 
to by Assistant-Surgeon J. Pirie. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) W. Merewether, Lieutenant, 
2nd in Command S. I. H., Comg. Outposts, 

Shahpoor. 

Shahpoor , 2nd October , 1847. 


348 


General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief. 

Head-Quarters, Poona , 30 th October , 1847. 

1. Lieutenant Merewether, Second in Command of 
the 1st Sind Irregular Horse, has, with one hundred 
and thirty-two men of that corps, executed a brilliant 
exploit. He routed and totally defeated a body of 
seven hundred freebooters, belonging to the Boogtee 
tribe of Beloochees, on the 1st instant, who, notwith¬ 
standing quarter was repeatedly offered to them, 
obstinately refused the boon, and provoked their own 
destruction. 

The coolness and military science this officer 
exemplified in taking up his position, the promptness 
with which he wheeled his men into line, and the 
gallantry with which he instantly attacked his numerous 
enemy, merit the Commander-in-Chiefs warm appro¬ 
bation, which he thus publicly offers to Lieutenant 
Merewether, and the men of the Sind Horse who par¬ 
ticipated with him on this occasion. 

The Sind Horse, on every service on which they 
have been employed, have conducted themselves in the 
most gallant manner; and to Captain Jacob, who 
commands, and has brought them to this state of 
perfection, the Commander-in-Chief offers his meed 
of praise and approbation, and begs that officer will 
accept the high opinion his Excellency entertains of 
his distinguished merit. 

(Signed) H. Hancock, Lieutenant-Colonel, 

Acting Adjutant-General of the Army. 


349 


Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on 
the North-West Frontier of Sind. 

Entirely offensive measures on the part of the 
troops, the possibility of attack by the marauders 
never being contemplated. No defensive works what¬ 
ever allowed anywhere ; existing ones destroyed or 
abandoned; the troops always freely exposed, and 
obstacles to rapid movements removed, as much as 
possible. The people protected. 

No distinction permitted between plundering and 
killing by private persons, whether friend or foe. 
Robbery and murder treated as equally criminal, 
whether the victim be a British subject or not. 

The plea of family blood-feud, or retaliation, in such 
cases, considered as an aggravating circumstance, as 
proving the most deliberate malice aforethought. No 
private person allowed to hear arms, or possess arms, 
without written permission. 

The highest moral ground always taken in all 
dealings w T ith the predatory tribes, treating them 
always as of an inferior nature so long as they persist 
in their misdeeds; as mere vulgar , criminal , and 
disreputable persons, with whom it is a disgrace for 
respectable persons to have any dealings, and whom 
all good men must, as a matter of course, look on as 
objects of pity, not of dread—with hatred, possibly, 
but never with fear. 

As perfect information as possible of all movements, 
or intended movements, of the plundering tribes 
residing beyond our border. Such information acted 


350 


on with the greatest activity, our knowledge of the 
nature and habits of the Belooch robbers being suffi¬ 
cient to enable us in almost every single instance to 
judge correctly of their probable proceedings, and effec¬ 
tually to check and counteract them at a distance from 
the British boundary. 

The feeling instilled into every soldier employed 
being, that he was altogether of a superior nature to 
the robber—a good man against a criminal; the 
plunderers being always considered, not as enemies, 
but as malefactors. 

The strictest justice always acted on; and no 
success, or want of success, or any other circumstance 
whatever, being allowed to influence the terms offered 
to, or the treatment of offenders, whether whole tribes 
or individuals. Violence, robbery, bloodshed, held as 
equally criminal and disreputable in all men; the 
abandonment of such practices, and the adoption of 
peaceful and industrial habits, being considered as 
most honourable, and encouraged in every way. A 
few words will sum up the whole system. At first, 
put down all violence with the strong hand; then, 
your force being known, felt, and respected, endeavour 
to excite mens better natures, till all men, seeing that 
your object is good, and of the greatest general benefit 
to the community, join heart and hand to aid in 
putting down or preventing violence. 

This is the essence of the whole business. 

The principles on which we have acted on the Sind 
Frontier since January, 1847, have always been 
exactly the same. The great power of a machine is 
shown by its smooth and easy working; a noise and 



351 


struggle show the effects of opposition, and therefore, 
in fact, a deficiency of power. The working of true 
principles is now apparent here, in the almost total 
absence of open physical force. 

When we came to the Sind Frontier in 1847, the 
people had no idea of any power hut violence. The 
proceedings of the British authorities tended to con¬ 
firm this state of feeling. 

When the men of Kutchee plundered in Sind, the 
only remedy applied was to encourage the Sindhees 
to plunder in Kutchee. Both parties then were 
equally guiltless or equally criminal; no idea of moral 
superiority was thought of. 

Such being the case, it was absolutely necessary, in 
the first instance, to have recourse to violent measures, 
to show the predatory tribes that we possessed, in far 
greater degree than themselves, the only power which 
they respected—mere brute force. 

Our first year (1847) on the border was one of 
enormous bodily labour; we had, literally, to lie down 
to rest with our hoots and swords on, for many months 
together. We crushed the robbers by main force, and 
proved far superior to them even in activity. And 
at that time but one regiment of the Sind Irregular 
Horse was on the frontier. 

When our frontier was in a disturbed state, I had 
my posts close to the hills, esteeming this arrange¬ 
ment to be an advantage. Since quiet has been 
established, I have withdrawn them, save as respects 
some Belooch guides. But though we had suc¬ 
ceeded in forcibly subduing the robber tribes, I 
should have considered our proceedings as a failure 


352 


had it been necessary to continue to use violent 
measures. 

Having, by the use of force, made ourselves feared 
and respected, we were able to apply better means, 
and to appeal to higher motives than fear . This I 
had in view from the very first. 

The barbarians now feel (which they could hardly 
imagine before) that strength, courage, and activity 
may he possessed in the highest degree by those also 
influenced by gentle and benevolent motives. 

Under the influence of this growing feeling, the 
character of the border plunderers has been changed; 
whole tribes, within and without our border, amounting 
to more than twenty thousand souls, have totally 
abandoned their former predatory habits, and taken 
to peaceable pursuits. 

Our Jekranees and Doombkees, formerly the 
wildest of the border riders, are now the most honest 
and industrious people in all Sind. 

Every man of the Sind Irregular Horse is looked 
on and treated as a friend by all the country-folk. 
In truth, the moral power of their bold and kindly 
bearing and proceedings has spread far and wide 
through the country, and effected what no mere force 
would have done. Even the Murrees, who have not 
felt our physical force much, are fast coming under 
this influence, and are beginning to feel themselves 
disreputable. 

If the irritation and excitement to evil practices, 
caused by the incursions of our Muzzarees, and other 
proceedings practised and permitted elsewhere, do not 
interfere with the full development of the causes now 


353 


at work on our border, it seems to me certain that 
perfect peace and quiet will be established among all 
the tribes in hill and plain, whose sole or chief 
pursuits have hitherto been robbery and murder.— 
(1854.) 

Summary of Arrangements made on the 
North-West Frontier of Sind. 

At first the country appeared not to be habitable 
by man. It was a dreary waste of sand, swept for 
eight months in the year by burning and noxious 
winds, and was almost wholly deserted. Even at 
Khanghur (now Jacobabad) there were but five 
miserable families, amounting in all to about twenty 
souls. The troops at Khanghur, Shahpoor, and the 
other posts, were shut up within walls and entrench¬ 
ments, completely isolated from the country-folk. 

The troops were fed, both man and horse, as if 
on ship-board, by the commissariat department. 
Provisions, even to forage for the cavalry horses, were 
stored at the various fortified posts for their use. So 
completely were the troops without fresh supplies, that, 
to remedy the effects of stale provisions, it was thought 
necessary regularly to issue with each man’s daily 
rations a quantity of lime-juice, and large stores of 
this article were found at Khanghur, &c., when the 
Sind Irregular Horse took charge of the posts. 

Everything was as in a state of siege in an enemy’s 
country. Even the outpost of Shahpoor was, until 
the arrival of the Sind Irregular Horse, supplied 
with every article of food from Shikarpoor, a distance 
of sixty miles, at enormous cost to the State. 


A A 


354 


The troops, both officers and men, were necessarily 
totally ignorant of the country and of the people ; 
and their sole and most anxious and most natural wish 
was to get away as speedily as possible from such an 
unpleasant abode. 

On taking charge of the frontier, and finding 
matters as above mentioned, I earnestly considered 
what would be the best means of remedying this 
deplorable state of affairs. 

It appeared to me that the thing of the first 
importance to this end was to make it apparent to 
every one that it was intended to make this country 
habitable, and to make it our permanent residence. 
So long as the Government officers and the troops 
w T ere in a wild, unsettled state, and demeaned them¬ 
selves as if in a hostile country, it could not reasonably 
he expected that the poor people could feel secure or 
tranquil. 

I therefore proceeded to build a large house as a 
residence for myself and lieutenants, to plant a garden 
in the desert, and to make all other arrangements for 
myself, officers, and men, as if they w T ere to remain 
on this frontier for the remainder of their lives. 

The forts I pulled down, as impertinent to cavalry, 
and peculiarly improper for Oriental border war, in 
which moral force is of such mighty power. 

But though the proper principles of action were 
determined on, it was no light task to carry th em 
into effect: the country was a desert, almost wholly 
destitute of permanent inhabitants, and a great part 
of the year without water,—the water naturally in 
the soil being as salt as that of the sea, while rain 


355 


was excessively rare, the average fall not amounting 
to one inch per annum. The difficulties to be over¬ 
come were great; but knowing the excellence of my 
officers and men, and confident in the cordial sup¬ 
port ol all under me, I thought them not insuperable; 
and the result has justified my opinion : steady perse¬ 
verance in sound principles has commanded complete 
success. 

The old mud fort of Khanghur has disappeared, 
but near its site there is now the large and flourish- 
ing town of Jacobabad, completely open, without the 
least attempt at any sort of defensive arrangement by 
means of walls or works, with bazars containing some 
four hundred well-stocked shops. 

On the formerly desert border of Upper Sind there 
are now always supplies for an army , without any 
assistance from, or interference on the part of the 
State at all, in any way. Where there was formerly 
only sufficient brackish w ater for a squadron of horse, 
there are now tanks and wells affording an unlimited 
supply of excellent fresh water. Peace, plenty, and 
perfect security everywhere prevail in a district where 
formerly all was terror and disorder on the one hand, 
or a pathless, silent desert on the other. 

Not only has peace and quiet been thus established, 
but, during the last three years, under the direction 
of the Commissioner in Sind, roads and bridges have 
been constructed by me all over the country, in 
communication with the frontier, to Shikarpoor, 
Larkhana, Kusmore, &c., &c., amounting altogether 
to nearly six hundred miles in length. Canals have 
been excavated, which are bringing a great part even 

A A 2 


356 


of the desert under cultivation, and are rapidly 
changing the whole face of the country from arid 
waste to corn-field and pasture.—(1854.) 

Military System introduced for the Protection 
of the North-West Frontier of Sind. 

The officer commanding the frontier in 184/ re¬ 
sided at Shikarpoor, which place was considered as 
the frontier head-quarters. The outposts were,— 

Strength of Detachment . 

Shahpoor. , . .A troop of regular cavalry, two com¬ 
panies of infantry, and one field- 
piece. 

Khanghur. . .A troop of regular cavalry. 

Rojaun.Twenty-five men of regular cavalry. 

Mobarukpoor.Twenty-five men of regular cavalry. 
Meerpoor.. . .A troop of regular cavalry, and fifty 

infantry. 

The lines of the detachment at Shahpoor were 
constructed so as to form a species of field fort. 
There were mud forts at Khanghur, Rojaun, and 
Mobarukpoor, of considerable strength, which were 
occupied by the detachments. The detachment at 
Meerpoor was quartered in the town, which is nearly 
open, being only protected by some detached towers. 
At Janadeyra the Jekranee tribes were located under 
the superintendence of an European commissioner. 
At Shahpoor were five European officers, at Khanghur 
one, and at Meerpoor two. 

The frontier to the westward, from Khyree Ghuree 
to Kumber, was guarded by the Camel Corps at 




357 

Larkhana, but they had no regularly established 
outposts. 

Boordeeka, from Meerpoor to Kusmore, was unoc¬ 
cupied by our troops. At Kusmore was a strong 
detachment of police. Each post reported separately 
to Shikarpoor. The people along both sides of the 
border were permitted to bear arms, and an unarmed 
man was very rarely seen. The disorder prevailing 
was such, that our own subjects, living within the 
Sind border, were in the habit of proceeding on pre¬ 
datory excursions in considerable numbers, with 
perfect impunity. 

There was no system of patrols along the border; 
the detachments at the posts were independent of each 
other, shut up within walls, and thinking only of 
acting on the defensive. The communication from 
post to post was difficult, for want of roads and 
bridges : and the district of Boordeeka was a nest of 
robbers. 

Terror and alarm prevailed everywhere along the 
frontier, which were greatly increased by the impunity 
with which the hill plunderers invaded Sind, and 
carried off their spoil close to our posts and even 
from the neighbourhood of Shikarpoor, at which 
place even the troops were continually expecting to 
be attacked. 

Under these circumstances, it appeared to me that 
the power of the robber tribes consisted in the terror 
with which they were regarded; that their real 
strength was contemptible; and that a great deal of 
the disorder which prevailed in the country was 
caused by our own subjects. 


358 


That it was impossible to protect the people of the 
country, or to gain their confidence, while our detach¬ 
ments were shut up in forts, and acted chiefly on the 
defensive. 

As soon as I had been entrusted with the neces¬ 
sary discretionary power, I proceeded to disarm every 
man in the country, not being in Government employ, 
and to imprison all men found leaving Sind and 
crossing the border, on predatory excursions. A road 
was cut, and the canals bridged between the posts ; 
patrols were kept going, day and night, along the 
whole line; and from Khanghur, which was made 
frontier head-quarters, strong parties went daily and 
nightly to one or the other of the watering-places at 
the foot of the hills on the other side of the desert, 
such as Ooch, Punnian, Hoodoo, Goree Naree, &c. 

These patrols were accompanied by good Belooch 
guides and puggees; and were, as often as possible, 
commanded by myself or my European lieutenants. 
Belooch scouts were also kept at Hassan-ke-Ghuree, 
and spies were frequently sent into the hills. The 
Shahpoor detachment patrolled the country from the 
Teywaugh to Hoodoo, and various persons were, from 
that post, maintained as spies in the hills. Good 
information was thus generally obtained of the assem¬ 
bly and intended movements of the hill tribes in force ; 
and as the whole desert was crossed in every direction 
by our patrols daily, even through the hot season, no 
small parties of robbers could ever approach the 
British border with impunity, for no party of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, however small, ever hesitated 
to fall on any body of the robbers, however large; and 


359 


after two or three encounters such as that alluded to 
by Sir C. Napier in General Order of 20th February, 
1847, where eighteen men discomfited two hundred 
and killed several of them, the latter scarcely ever 
attempted a stand when met with. 

It was a curious circumstance, and one very cha¬ 
racteristic of the predatory border tribes, that while 
the mountaineers were in the habit of plundering the 
whole country, they disposed of much of the plunder 
in Sind, and the marauding chiefs and others had 
regular accounts current with Bunyas living in the 
towns and villages in Sind, who were, for long, never 
even suspected of being in league with robbers, with 
whom they were in constant intimate communication. 
Not only was a ready market for the plunder pro¬ 
vided, but the hill robbers, who were laying waste the 
country, were supplied with food from Sind and the 
plains of Kutchee; while, from their close connection 
with the Sind Bunyas, they were always kept fully 
informed of all our proceedings which might in any 
way concern them. I had in my possession, in 1847, 
the account-books of some Bunyas of Meerpoor, 
showing most extensive dealings with Islam Khan, 
Boogtee, and other predatory chiefs in the hills, for 
years past; and a number of intercepted letters placed 
the existence of the correspondence above mentioned 
beyond doubt. 

The establishing of our frontier patrols, and the 
strict watch kept day and night on the border, en¬ 
tirely put a stop to these proceedings; but such 
impudence had been caused by long impunity, that a 
merchant of Shikarpoor loudly complained of my 


360 


having stopped a camel-load of matchlocks, which he 
was sending to the hills across the frontier near 
Hassan-ke-Ghuree. The predatory tribes, finding 
themselves completely cut off from Sind, and totally 
unable to plunder, as heretofore, in small bodies, 
assembled in force, and, after threatening a descent 
on Sind in various points, proceeded to attack the 

Kyheerees in Kutchee ; but-, in command of the 

Shahpoor post, had been long and patiently watching 
their proceedings in that quarter ; and this skilful 
officer, on the 1st October, 1847, having thrown his 
squadron between the mountaineers and their hills, 
fell on them in such sort, that, although they out¬ 
numbered him more than five to one, he nearly anni¬ 
hilated the Boogtee tribe. 

Since that day, the task of keeping the border has 
been comparatively very easy. Soon after that affair, 
I was allowed to make my own arrangements for the 
permanent guarding of this frontier. I then withdrew 
the posts from Shahpoor and Meerpoor (that at 
Mobarukpoor I had long before transferred to Dil 
Morad-ke-Ghuree), established a chain of posts from 
Kumber to Kusmore, with lines at each place; sunk 
wells where required, and cut a road from Hassan-ke- 
Ghuree to Kusmore, through the dense jungle of 
Boordeeka. 

The duty of guarding this frontier has now become 
a simple matter of routine: patrols always go daily 
from post to post in both directions ; my Belooch 
scouts, who are kept always moving about the desert, 
and who have constant free communication with the 
country-folk, give timely information of everything 



361 


stirring, when a special party is immediately sent to 
any point indicated. 

Having gained the entire confidence of the pea¬ 
santry of the country, who now despise the moun¬ 
taineers as much as they formerly dreaded them, 
these people also are of material assistance to us, and 
every strange footstep on the border is certain to be 
speedily reported to one or other of the posts, and to 
be immediately followed. 

For the relief of the detachments at the frontier 
posts, the plan I have adopted is this : two parties 
leave Khanghur on the first of every month ; one 
proceeds to Dil Morad-ke-Ghuree, and the other to 
Rojaun ; the parties at these two posts, being relieved, 
proceed to relieve the detachments at the next posts ; 
and so on to the end of the chain—the last party, on 
being relieved, returning to head-quarters at Khanghur. 

By this means, the men become well acquainted 
with the country, familiar with the duties of each 
post, while the work is fairly apportioned. A good 
body of men is kept at head-quarters, so that drill 
and discipline do not suffer; and troops are always 
moving about the frontier, in addition to the regular 

On the Kutchee side, the Kyheerees living at 
Poolijee, Chuttur, &c., keep me fully informed of all 
proceedings in their neighbourhood, and in their hills 
in that direction. 

While, having full political powers, and the vakeels 
of the Khan of Khelat and of Meer Ali Morad re¬ 
siding with me, I find no difficulty in dealing with the 
subjects of those princes, who have issued strict orders 




362 


to all their people to obey me as they would them¬ 
selves. 

The greatest physical difficulty I have found on 

this frontier has been the want of water. In the vear 

«/ 

1847 we were greatly distressed on this account, and 
I had to bring water from Janadeyra, on camels, to 
supply the men, who, in the hottest weather in May 
and June, scarcely ever obtained a full allowance of 
even brackish water; this was the more felt as we 
were without shelter, the lines not being built, and 
had to be out patrolling to such distances that we 
were in the saddle frequently for twenty-four hours 
together. 

Arrangements have been made for permanently 
correcting this evil, which I have every reason to 
believe will prove successful. 

There are no fortifications or field works at any of 
my posts; and I am certain that the moral force 
gained by the absence of such works very far exceeds 
any strength they could give in border war. There 
was a fort at Khanghur, which was occupied by a 
detachment when we came to the frontier ; but I had 
this fort pulled down and totally razed, with the 
happiest effect on the country. 

Disarming of the North-West Frontier of Sind. 

None who are not in the service of Government 
are allowed to bear arms without a special license. 

The rule forbidding all but the military and police 
to carry arms without such a written license is strictly 
enforced. Of late years, no penalty has been found 
necessary beyond the forfeiture of the arms, when no 


363 


good cause could be shown for ignorance of, or non- 
compliance with, the rule. 

As the possession of arms in a man’s own house is 
not forbidden, and no search is ever made for them 
without special cause, the rule can never be made an 
instrument of oppression or extortion by our native 
officials. 

Nor does it leave the people defenceless in case of 
their villages being actually attacked by a band of 
plunderers. 

Its simple operation is to draw a clear line of dis¬ 
tinction between the armed servants of Government 
and all other persons. It thus helps a people, long 
used to obtain redress for themselves, to understand 
that there are such things as public wrongs, and a 
public agency to redress them. 

Moreover, it marks every armed man not in the 
service of Government who may move about the 
country, and renders it easier to trace him. Every 
shepherd boy learns to distinguish the armed male¬ 
factor from a neighbouring shepherd or traveller, 
which cannot be done when all bear arms. The 
effect is found to be, that petty thieves and robbers 
cease to carry with them their arms, which would 
excite observation, and facilitate their detection. 

But the most decided and remarkable effect is to 
put a stop to private feuds, and retaliation between 
frontier tribes, and to check inroads of armed men 
from beyond our frontier. Our own people, when 
they can do so with impunity, are as much addicted 
to plunder and aggression as their foreign neighbours. 
On a frontier where clan-feuds have been rife for 


364 


centuries, it must be impossible to say what is aggres¬ 
sion and what retaliation. As long as it is supposed 
that we allow our own subjects to retaliate, our 
neighbours will feel justified in doing the same; but 
when we begin by prohibiting our own people from 
taking the law into their own hands, and compel 
them to submit their feuds and claims for compensa¬ 
tion to the arbitration of the Government authorities, 
foreigners as well as our own subjects become con¬ 
vinced that we are in earnest; and such sense of 
justice as may still exist, even among the rudest, is 
enlisted on the side of good order, and excites some 
respect for measures which might otherwise, perhaps, 
not be fully comprehended. 

Mistaken Leniency towards Marauders. 

With reference to the commutation of the punish¬ 
ment of these prisoners (two borderers, convicted of 
murdering a policeman in the execution of his duty) 
from death to transportation, I have the honour most 
respectfully to point out that, from my knowledge of 
the habits, feelings, and modes of reasoning among 
these border tribes, I am convinced that serious mis¬ 
chief will be caused by this apparent mercy. 

No one living can be more impressed than I am 
with the evils of unnecessary severity. 

The only legitimate object of punishment is the 
prevention of crime—that is, the protection of man 
from injury. 

The practice, or attempt at the practice, of re¬ 
vengeful, retaliatory, or retributive punishment, is 


365 


itself criminal, and always defeats the real object 
and intention of all just human punishment. 

It has been chiefly by keeping this principle con¬ 
stantly in view, always acting on it, and endeavouring 
to impress its truth on the semi-barbarous people of 
the country entrusted to my charge, that I have 
succeeded in replacing the state of terror, dis¬ 
order, bloodshed, and rapine, which prevailed here 
throughout the whole land up to the year 1847, by 
the profound peace, tranquillity, and safety for person 
and property, which has existed on this border for 
long past. 

I have endeavoured, and with partial success, to 
convince these wild Belooch tribes, that attacks and 
inroads on their neighbours, where their property 
may be carried off and their lives destroyed, are 
merely vulgar robbery and murder, alike hateful to 
God and man, and likely, under our rule, to be as 
disastrous in their consequences to the perpetrators 
as they are totally unnecessary for their protection. 
I have endeavoured, in all things, and with some 
success, to appeal to the highest and most generous 
feelings of human nature, rather than to the basest, 
such as fear. 

One of the most manly and warlike tribes in the 
whole country is the Doombkee tribe, of which the 
murdered man in this instance was a member. 

Under the old state of things, a severe and bloody 
revenge would have been taken by them on the 
Muzzarees. As it is, the quietest, best behaved, and 
best disposed people on the border are these Doomb- 
kees, who have completely adopted our principles, and 


366 


abandoned their lawless pursuits, trusting entirely to 
our power and will to protect them. 

The commuted punishment to which the murderers 
in this case are sentenced will, perhaps, be thought 
by the prisoners themselves as worse than death; 
but if the object he, not to hurt the criminal, but to 
prevent crime, it will he equivalent to no punishment 
at all; as it will be so regarded by the people of this 
country. 

I know well what now will be the feelings of these 
men, the Muzzarees, when they hear that the mur¬ 
derers are not to be executed. It will be considered 
as a triumph for the Muzzaree robbers, and a dis¬ 
grace for the brave and faithful Doombkees. It will 
he thought and said on both sides, that the Sirkar is 
more tender of the lives of those who openly defy 
its authority than of those of its most orderly and 
faithful subjects. The Muzzaree will taunt the 
Doombkees with their having killed one of their 
tribe with impunity, and the Doombkees will feel 
shame. 

I have lived for nearly seventeen years among these 
people, and long experience and intimate knowledge 
of their habits and modes of reasoning assure me that 
such will be their thoughts, words, and deeds. 

Knowing this, it seems to be my duty to bring it 
to the notice of higher authority, otherwise the best 
intentions of Government may result in deplorable 
evil. 

Under all the circumstances of the case, I beg 
leave most respectfully, but with most serious earnest¬ 
ness, to recommend that Government be moved to 


367 


confirm the sentence of death on these and other similar 
murderers, and that the sentence be carried into 
effect by the execution of the criminals at Ivusmore, 
near where the crime was committed.—(1855.) 

Standing Orders for the Frontier Posts of the 
North-West Frontier of Sind. 

No policemen are employed on frontier duties. 

With regard to the instructions given to the fron¬ 
tier posts, something is left to the discretion of the 
native officers in command. The standing orders 
are, to send patrols along the border road and the 
northward daily; to keep the Belooch guides con¬ 
stantly at work; to send a party instantly in the 
direction in which an enemy may he indicated; to 
report all occurrences to the posts on each side of 
them, and to cause the information to be rapidly 
forwarded to head-quarters; to stop all armed men, 
not having passes signed by me, nor being servants of 
Government, and to disarm them ; to be particularly 
attentive to all complaints of the country-folk, and to 
preserve the strictest discipline in their detachments. 
—(1853.) 

Assessment on the Land of the Frontier District 

of Sind. 

I have fixed the assessment on all lands in the 
district under my charge at one rupee per beega of 
2,500 square yards per annum, without any regard to 

season or crop. 

I have maturely considered this matter, and feel 
quite convinced that this low and simple assessment 



368 


would yield a very greatly increased, and, probably, 
ultimately a maximum revenue. 

I should propose that, as at present, one-third of 
the area of the land held by a zemindar, and specified 
in his grant, be accounted as under cultivation, and 
that on this the revenue, at the rate of one rupee per 
beega per annum, be levied, however the land may be 
employed, and without respect to produce. 

Under the proposed arrangement, all vexation 
whatever would be removed from the collection of the 
revenue; the ground once measured, and the area 
recorded in the zemindar’s “ putta,” there will be no 
possible room for fraud by any party, and the whole 
business would be reduced to the simplest possible 
form. 

While the moderate rate of assessment proposed 
would enable us to dispense with all remissions and 
other temporary or casual adjustments, which are the 
most fertile sources of injury and fraud—of loss of 
revenue on the one hand, and of careless improvidence 
on the other. 

It seems to me quite unnecessary, and of evil con¬ 
sequence, to vary the assessment with the nature of 
the produce cultivated. Where this is done, it is 
tantamount to giving a premium for the inferior 
grains, &c., and also of inferior skill and industry. 

Let all pay alike for the use of the land, and the 
free action of natural laws will speedily adjust every¬ 
thing in the best possible manner, and on the soundest 
possible basis. 

That which yields the greatest return will be most 
cultivated, and the best lands will be first taken; but 



369 


increased cultivation of the more valuable grains will 
speedily bring down their prices, and if there be a 
real demand for inferior kinds they will rise in price, 
and again be cultivated, in exact proportion to the 
wants of the people. 

As respects the quality of the land, it does not 
vary so much in Upper Sind as to render it advisable 
to have a varying assessment on this account, while 
there is an almost unlimited extent of new, and 
hitherto waste, land in the district, which is all per¬ 
fectly able to bear the amount of assessment proposed. 

There is sufficient good land available for all, and 
more than all, the cultivators, and this will be the 
case, probably, for ages to come. 

Under such circumstances, no inconvenience can 
arise from taxing all the land alike ; while the sim¬ 
plicity and certainty of the arrangement will, as much 
as the moderate assessment, prove inducements to 
extend cultivation. 

I should propose to guarantee to the zemindars— 
and to mention this in their puttas—that there 
should be no increase of assessment for a period of 
twenty years, when revision might take place, if 
thought necessary. 

Payment of the land revenue to be considered due 
on the 1st May annually for the past year.—(1855). 

Advice to a Native Prince. 

It must be evident, from my actions as well as 
words, that from the first I have had but one plain 
object in view ; that my sole object, and that of my 
Government, in this business, is to arrange matters 


p, B 


370 


so that there may be a strong and friendly Govern¬ 
ment established throughout the dominions of your 
highness. To bring this about, it is necessary that 
the officers of your highness should be faithful, active, 
and united. 

Your highness engages to prevent all outrage by 
your subjects on British territory; but to cause the 
country to he prosperous and wealthy, and the Go¬ 
vernment of your highness to be respected, it is 
necessary to do more than this. 

Measures should be taken to protect life and pro¬ 
perty within your highness’s own dominions also; and 
I strongly advise your highness, as your very true 
friend, to adopt means to ensure this result. 

No oppression or violence should be allowed 9 
whether by great or small. 

Justice should be strictly administered to all men. 
Cultivators and traders should be encouraged and 
protected, roads made safe and easy, and no private 
transit, or such like exactions, should be allowed. 
All this cannot be accomplished without exertion ; 
but if your highness attend to this advice, and act on 

it, the State of-will, under your highness’s rule, 

by God’s blessing, become rich, powerful, and re¬ 
spected. But without some such arrangements, and 
efforts from within, no amount of external assistance 
alone will make it really strong and flourishing. 

Your highness should understand that the pecu¬ 
niary aid now to be given to you by the British Govern¬ 
ment is really of far more value to your highness than 
would be assistance by force of arms, inasmuch as, in 
the latter case, it must be apparent to all that your 



371 


highness, wanting strength yourself, is only upheld by 
British troops. On the other hand, the aid now to 
be afforded to your highness will, with proper arrange¬ 
ment, materially assist your highness in establishing 
a strong Government of your own, in improving your 
own resources in various ways, and in making such 
arrangements as will cause your country to become 
rich, flourishing, and powerful, as it is the wish of the 
British Government that it should be. 

The matter stands as if a man, being sick and 
weakly, were assaulted by an enemy, and a friend at 
hand strike that enemy down: in this case one enemy 
may be overthrown, but the weak man is no stronger 
than before, nor in any way permanently benefited. 
But if, instead of acting thus, the friend, when the 
other is threatened, administer food, medicine, &c., 
and thus cause the weak man to become healthy and 
vigorous, and able to support and defend himself by 
his own strength, the assistance thus afforded is far 
more important than the other, and the benefit is 
evidently infinitely greater. 

Your highness may rest assured that no effort will 
be wanting on my part to enable your highness to 
carry out measures such as I have alluded to; and 
that they, and they only, can lead to the happiness 
and prosperity of your highness, your nobles, and your 
people.—(1854.) 

The Brahooees, Affghans, and Patans (being a 
Popular Appellation of the Affghans) con¬ 
sidered as Becruits for our Armies. 

To obtain recruits to be made cavalry, or any other 



372 


soldiers, from the kafilas arriving from Affghanistan, 
&c., is an absolute impossibility. We might as well 
expect to enlist soldiers from among the Bunyas of 
Sliikarpoor. 

Leaving, however, the kafilas out of the question, 
and supposing recruits to be obtained from the elite 
of the Brahooees and Affghans, I am of opinion that 
enlisting such men would be found in the highest 
degree injudicious, and injurious to the service. 

A residence among, and close association with, 
these people, for more than fifteen years, with oppor¬ 
tunities of observing and trying them in every way, 
enables me to write with confidence and certainty 
regarding them. 

Every Braliooee (the Belooch of Khelat) whom we 
enlist is certainly either a thief, a coward, or a traitor, 
or is, very probably, all three combined. 

The Affghans are more ferocious, but have far less 
real courage than the Hindoostanee; they have more 
cunning and less intellect: they have more muscular 
development with far less endurance. 

Both the Affghans and Brahooees are absolutely 
faithless and untrustworthy, whereby they are never 
to be depended on as soldiers in war. 

Both are quarrelsome, unruly, and murderous, in 
quarters in peace; and in domestic life both are given 
to the most detestable vices, which lead to all manner 
of evil. 

Whatever may be thought of these people by those 
who do not know them well, it is certain that the 
Mussulmans of Hindoostan are altogether superior 
beings in every way to the Affghans and Beloochees, 


373 

and are incalculably better adapted by nature to make 
good soldiers. 

In my opinion, not rashly formed, one good Hindoo- 
stanee soldier carries as much military power with 
him as any three of the best of the others. 

At the battle of Goojerat, 4,000 of the very best 
men of Afghanistan, the elite of Dost Mahomed’s 
army, splendid men, on splendid horses, as they were 
described by the officers present, commanded by the 
son and nephews of the Ameer in person, were over¬ 
thrown, beaten to pieces, and driven from the field 
with tremendous loss, by 243 Hindoostanees of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, leaving their leaders slain, and 
their standards in the hands of the victors. 

I might point to numerous other similar instan es 
against the Belooch, also, if necessary. Even where 
there is no suspicion of faithlessness, the Affghans and 
Beloochees are then, as the materials for soldiers, 
altogether inferior to that which we have in such 
abundance ready to our hands in India. 

But these Affghans, &c., are also utterly faithless , 
and we can never feel a just confidence that they will 
be true in the hour of need. The Hindoostanee 
Mussulman has a high feeling of honour—these men 
have none whatever: their absolute faithlessness and 
treachery appear incredible to those who do not know 
them, and form a startling contrast to the frank, open 
manner, the free, manly bearing , the burly forms and 
fair faces, of these Affghan men ; which, until taught 
by experience, we naturally associate with the posses¬ 
sion of European virtues. Of late years, I have never 
admitted either Belooch or Affghan into our ranks, 


374 


and there has not been for many years past a man of 
either race in the corps, though the elite of both are 
at my disposal. 

But formerly, when they were in our ranks, I have 
seen these great, strong, tall, fair-faced warriors throw 
themselves from their horses , and weep like children 
in fatigue, difficulty, and danger, amidst the derision 
of the Hindoostanees, who were always ready to dare 
or to endure anything, without a murmur. 

The subject of enlisting men of these foreign tribes, 
who are, undoubtedly, immeasurably inferior to the 
men of India in all military qualities, and, in fact, in 
everything but personal appearance, appears to me to 
be one of considerable importance; yet so little is the 
truth of the subject known, that great numbers of 
Brahooees, foreigners from the Khelat territories, 

have been enlisted in the-, and are now sepoys in 

the corps. 

It must be evident, that this practice is fraught 
with extreme danger; for in case of service against 
the tribes beyond the border ,—the brethren of these 
people ,—we should assuredly have in our ranks as 
many spies and traitors as we had Brahooees. For 
service in other parts of the world, the objections to 
these men as soldiers would be general only, but on 
this frontier they become special and overwhelming. 

Were I proceeding on service against the tribes 
bordering on our frontier, I should consider the real 
strength of my force to be increased by the absence of 
such soldiers. They could not be trusted without 
imminent risk of failure and disgrace.—(1853.) 



Suggestions towards the Permanent Defence of 
the North-West Frontier of India. 

It seems to me that if arrangements for the per¬ 
manent defence of our North-West Frontier be not 
speedily applied, and manfully carried out, they will 
have caused the loss of our Indian empire within the 
next generation of men. 

The first enormous error consisted in not at once, 
after your report of the state of the Turkish army at 
Erzeroom, sending a strong force, under an able 
commander, to that country, and then driving every 
Russian back to the north of the Caucasian range. 
The next error was allowing Kars to be taken; and 
thirdly, after all this had been committed, another 
egregious error was perpetrated in not making Russia 
withdraw from Turkish Armenia before we moved a 
man out of the Crimea. 

The fall of Kars caused Persia to quarrel with our 
ambassador ; but, with true Oriental cunning, wishing 
to be prepared for our ultimate success, the Persian 
Government pretended that the quarrel was personal 
only. . 

Now Kars is still held by Russia, and Persia invades 
Beloochistan and Affghanistan ; being of course quite 
convinced that we have been well beaten, and that 
Russia is all powerful. This effect is all that Russia 
proposed to produce by the delay in evacuating Kars, 
&c. She will now withdraw, and remain apparently 
perfectly quiescent. 

But the result will be, that Russia, all-powerful in 
Persia, will use that country as she pleases, her sell 


376 


unseen all the while; she will—as she is now in fact 
doing—endeavour quietly and steadily to place Persia 
in settled possession of Herat, and probably of Kan¬ 
dahar, as well as of a considerable portion of Beloo- 
chistan. 

While firmly securing her hold of these countries 
by means of the Persian Government, Russia will be 
recruiting her own strength for another European 
war. In this it is possible , though in my opinion not 
altogether probable, France may not be our ally. If 
we remain friends with France, the renewal of the 
war will only be deferred a little; but in any case, 
whenever the next occasion of war may arise, Russia 
will, under the policy she is now pursuing in the East, 
be able to occupy, not Herat only, but Kandahar, 
with an army of 50,000 Europeans and as much 
Persian rabble as she pleases, before we have begun to 
think seriously about the matter; and Russia might 
then soon be in full possession of the Punjaub and 
Sind, in spite of all the tardy efforts of our stupid and 
unwieldly though really gigantic strength. 

It is Ulysses and Polyphemus all over ! I would 
now make the giant mind his eye. 

If not—if we persist in our present blindness—and 
our rulers, instead of attending to questions of really 
vital importance, persist in occupying themselves in 
miserable fiddling about the salaries of the hardest 
working men on earth, while they should be looking 
the coming danger to the whole empire fairly in the 
face, then good-bye to England’s Eastern power— 
we shall gradually recede further and further, till all 
be lost. 



377 


The time for action is now, and the wise proceeding 
is that which I have proposed. Nothing short of 
this will answer, or will be safe. 

By the arrangements proposed, we should place 
between us and the enemy several wild and warlike 
nations, devoted to our service, and render it impos¬ 
sible for an European army to approach our Indian 
frontiers with hostile intent. 

Ultimately , Herat might become an English 
fortress; but this move would not be required for 
many years, and long before it had become advisable 
to make it, all Affghanistan would be devoted to us. 

However, looking onward to a great European war, 
with a fortress at Herat, and a garrison of 20,000 
men there (which would not necessarily involve any 
increase to our Indian army, or at least to its cost), 
India would be as firmly locked in our grasp as if 
surrounded by the ocean. For no invader could ever 
enter by any of the paths over the Hindoo Khoosh, 
&c., without exposing his flank or rear to destructive 
attacks from a strong force, fresh, vigorous, and well 
supplied, from the garrison of Herat. 

But this is looking far forward, to the time when ( 
Bussia, having been shut out from her long-cherished 
schemes towards Constantinople, shall have again 
matured her preparations for advance in a new 
direction, and have poured her whole strength on our 


Indian frontier. 

At present, all that is required to be done is to 
ensure the certainty of success and security on our 

n .• „ * # * # * * 

own frontier. 

I have for long past thought over the subject of 


378 


the arrangements proper to secure our North-Western 
Frontier of India permanently in such a manner as 
to obviate the necessity of any alarm, unusual stir, 
or hasty operations of any kind, in consequence of 
movements of enemies, or possible enemies, from 
without. 

At present, it appears to me that we are in a great 
measure in the position of a mighty army without 
any outposts of any kind. The whole host is liable 
to be perplexed and disturbed to its centre even by 
any small body of adventurers, who may confidently 
approach its unwieldy strength with impunity. 

It seems to me that we now have the best possible 
opportunity of remedying this state of things—an 
opportunity offering a combination of circumstances 
favourable to our purpose such as must very rarely 
occur. 

Beloochistan is entirely at our disposal, the people 
being really most friendly towards us, and, since the 
late treaty with Khelat, more so than ever ; Dost 
Mahomed and the Affghans generally are inclined to 
favour our advances, and the fairest possible reason 
for precautionary measures on our part exists in the 
Persian advance to Herat, and through Seistan; 
while we have peace throughout the old provinces of 
India and in Europe, with perfectly settled tranquillity 
in Sind and in the Punjaub. 

There are but two great roads into our Indian 
empire from the north-west—but two roads, in fact, 
by which it is possible for a modern army to 
march. 

One of these, the Bolan, lies through an entirely 




379 


friendly country. The Khelat territory extends to 
Pesheen, forty miles beyond the head of the pass, in 
the table-land of Affghanistan, and is inhabited by 
Belooch and Brahooee tribes, who are of an entirely 
different race from the Affghans. 

The road through the Bolan is, even at present, 
generally good, and sufficiently easy for an army to 
proceed by it, with all its artillery, stores, &c. This 
road is also the shortest from Herat to British India, 
and is the natural outlet to the ocean of the commerce 
of a very large portion of Central Asia. 

From the foot of the Bolan, one continuous and 
almost dead level plain extends for nearly six hundred 
miles through Kutchee and Sind to the sea. 

The only other great road, the Khyber, is very 

differently circumstanced. The people are unfriendly 

and barbarous, the country is far more difficult, and 

the distance greater; while there is already a strong 

division of our army at Peshawur, so that we are 

tolerably well secured in that quarter—quite sufficiently 

secured, indeed, under the arrangements contemplated 

by me, because from Quetta we could operate on the 

flank and rear of any army attempting to proceed 

towards the Khvber Pass; so that, with a British 

«/ 

force at Quetta, the other road would be shut to an 
invader, inasmuch as w r e could reach Herat itself 
before an invading army could even arrive at Cabool. 

Such a position would form the bastion of the 
front attacked, and nothing could, with hope of 
success, be attempted against us until this salient 
were disposed of. We may, I think, then, leave the 
Khyber without further discussion of the statistics of 


380 


this road at present, and confine our attention to the 
Bolan. 

The more the matter is considered in all its 
bearings, relations, and consequences, the more 
certain it will appear that there should be a good 
British force at Quetta, a good made road from that 
place through the Bolan Pass to Dadur, and thence 
continued through Kutchee to the British frontier, to 
connect with the lines of road in Sind. The portion 
of this road from Dadur to the sea must, I think, 
eventually become a railway, but probably not till a 
very long period has passed by. 

When we were fairly established at Quetta, we 
might, I think, then subsidise the Affghans with 
advantage ; but until we were so established, such 
a measure would, it seems to me, be unwise. The 
Affghans would not be true to us if we really 
required their services, and might probably turn 
against us the very means with which we had supplied 
them. Such a proceeding would only be characteristic 
of the people. 

But in the first instance, on commencing the 
arrangements for establishing ourselves at Quetta, in 
addition to the subsidy now payable to the Khan of 
Khelat under the present treaty, I would take into 
our pay a body of his troops, both horse and foot, to 
be entirely under their own officers, and managed in 
their own fashion. 

Such wild irregulars are invaluable when there is a 
certain force of our own soldiers to form a nucleus 
of strength, and give tone to the whole. Such a 
nucleus would be formed by the frontier field force 


381 


which I have proposed for Sind, and these troops of 
Khelat would completely connect us with the people 
of the country generally—a point of great importance. 
They would take the ordinary escort duties, and such 
like, and would perform all the work which the 
Cossacks do for the Russian army, which is that 
which in general our regular soldiers perform the 
worst, and which is that by which they are most 
exhausted and demoralised. 

The numbers of these auxiliaries could at any time 
be increased to any extent thought proper; their 
employment would make us in a great measure 
independent of the Affghans, while the enjoyment of 
regular pay by the Khelat people would have great 
influence on the Affghans generally. All would be 
anxious to obtain the same advantages, while our 
evident strength, independent of Affghan aid, in their 
immediate neighbourhood, would he the best security 
for their good faith. 

We might then, if we pleased, and it were necessary, 
safely, and with advantage, subsidise all Affghanistan 
with money and arms; and the propriety of so doing 
would, under the proposed conditions, be in no way 
dependent on the success or on the life of Dost 
Mahomed; nor would there then be much danger or 
possibility of our subsidy being misapplied to the 
prosecution of internal feuds, for such abuses could 
not occur without being immediately known to and 
checked by the political agent at Quetta. 

If we really intend (as I always suppose that we do 
really intend) to be fair and just to all men, and to 
conduct our public proceedings towards other states 



382 


and other people according to the principles which 
guide the intercouse of honest men in private life, the 
true interest of Afghanistan must be one with our 
own, and be felt to be so by all its people. 

If all distrust of us be removed from the Affghan 
mind, as it has been removed from the minds of the 
Government and people of Khelat, the whole country 
would aid us heart and hand, and an invasion of 
India would be impossible. The invaders would be 
starved, or destroyed in detail. 

The confidence in us, and the perception of their 
own interest being identical with ours, which would 
certainly be engendered in the minds of the Affghans 
by the development and full operation of the means 
proposed, would constitute the surest, and indeed, the 
only needful precautions required. The amount of 
subsidy would be determined by the course of events. 

But it is certain that the state of feeling towards 
us among the Affghans would depend on our real 
intentions towards them. It is useless to attempt to 
conceal these from the cunning Afghan; but straight¬ 
forward honesty and justice, if habitually exercised, 
in accordance with our real nature, exert irresistible 
control at all times over all Asiatics, and they will do 
so in this instance; although we must expect, at first, 
to have to undo the evil caused by the impressions 
left by our proceedings and practices during our 
former invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. But 
however well disposed they may be, or may become, 
towards us, neither Affghan nor Belooch will obey or 
live at peace with their equals ; the tribes have end¬ 
less and deadly feuds with each other, and, if left to 


383 


themselves, or only supplied with arms and money by 
us at a distance, they could not be kept to any com¬ 
bined purpose or long-continued effort. The greatest 
public considerations would always be postponed to 
the gratification of private revenge or personal pique. 
No good effect would be produced by our assistance, 
and the means supplied would be wasted in unworthy 
quarrels and intrigues. 

The English mind, to whose leading all these wild 
spirits will bow, must actually be present among them, 
and a sufficient British force be on the spot to support 
moral power and dignity, and to give tone to the 
whole. 

There is nothing in the arrangements proposed by 
me in the least degree resembling our first proceedings 
in Affghanistan. History has now justly decided 
that the former measure was in itself at the very 
outset a great crime and a great error; and in carry¬ 
ing it out, the principles of common justice, common 
honesty, and common-sense, were at every turn ignored 
and offended against. 

These proceedings were alike foolish and wicked 
to that degree which must always appear incredible 
to those who were not, as I was, partly behind the 
scenes at the time, and in a position to be acquainted 
with the whole details of the business after its com¬ 
pletion. 

In the arrangements now proposed, we should act 
in no respect otherwise than as we might be prepared 
to justify before all good men in the world, or before 
the throne of God; and those entrusted with the 
work should be “ men wdth some conscience in what 


384 


they do,” than which nothing has more influence over 
Oriental minds. To attempt to compete with them in 

cunning, as did poor-and-, is to ensure 

failure; we command the Asiatics by high moral 
power alone. 

We should in the present case occupy a position in 
the undisputed territory of an ally, with his most 
cordial assent and approval, and to his great advantage. 

We should offend or threaten no one whatever, 
save those who came to attack and invade our Indian 
empire. We should have all the people of the country 
with us. 

Our worst enemies could not reasonably object to 
such a move on our part. Russia, it may be said, 
might on our move found an assertion of right or 
necessity of advancing on her side to Khiva or else¬ 
where. Be it so ! I would not make the smallest 
objection. 

Those know but little of Russian policy who imagine 
that most plausible pretexts would ever be wanting 
when she thought that she could move with advantage. 

If Russia bring with her advance a better civiliza¬ 
tion, and a higher moral tone—if she introduce 
European honesty, European ideas, and European 
commerce into Central Asia—the better for us. All 
that tends to good must ultimately be for our advan¬ 
tage—for the advantage of free England. But can 
Russia do this ? 

Will she, can she, make known to the clever 
Asiatics a better, nobler, and higher moral power 
than they are now acquainted with ? I much doubt 
this. 




385 


If Russia attempt to proceed by violence, injustice, 
and falsehood, she will exasperate the whole people 
against her, and will entirely fail, or will at all events 
be powerless against us with the people on our side. 

In any point of view, and under any circumstances 
whatever, the arrangement on the frontier of India 
can never be wise or safe while, as at present, the 

UNDISTURBED TRANQUILLITY OF THIS VAST EMPIRE IS 
DEPENDENT, NOT ON ITS OWN MIGHTY INTERNAL 
STRENGTH, BUT ON THE FORBEARANCE OF OUR ENEMIES 
OR NEIGHBOURS OUTSIDE. 

I would remedy this at once, effectually and per¬ 
manently, by establishing ourselves firmly, and in 
sufficient force, in a position the mere possession of 
which would preclude all possibility of successful 
invasion ; which would give us, by moral influence, 
a full control over Affghanistan, establish the most 
friendly relations with us throughout the country, 
and which would ere long bring down a full stream of 
valuable commerce from all Central Asia to the sea. 

Supposing these views to be approved, and that it 
were intended to carry the proposed measure into 
effect, I should propose to arrange the details as 
mentioned in a separate paper accompanying this 
letter. * * * 

Memorandum of Proposed Arrangements in case of 
a British Force being stationed at Quetta, 

OR AT ANY OTHER CONVENIENT SPOT ABOVE THE 

Bolan Pass. 

In the first instance, to enable the Sind Irregular 
Horse, now forming the frontier force, and the officers 

c c 


386 


there employed, to be advanced, some permanent 
arrangement should be made for the administration 
of the frontier district of Upper Sind. 

This should be constituted, as at present, an en¬ 
tirely separate charge, under an officer in subordina¬ 
tion to the Commissioner in Sind; with orders to 
communicate with the Political Commissioner at 
Quetta on the political business of the frontier, and to 
attend to his instructions. This officer to be styled 
“ Superintendent of the Frontier Districts of Upper 
Sind,” and to receive a salary of Rupees 1,500 per 
mensem, with travelling allowance of ten rupees per 
diem. 

A Lieutenant of Police to be appointed for the 
Sind frontier district, on the same scale of allowances 
as the other lieutenants of police in Sind. This 
officer, and the Sind frontier police, to be under the 
orders of the political superintendent, and quite dis¬ 
tinct from the general police of the province. The 
mounted police now employed in the frontier district 
to be increased to 400 men, and 300 foot police 
to be raised, and to be armed and equipped like the 
rural police of Sind, to complete the frontier police 
force. 

A civil surgeon and an assistant surgeon, in charge 
of the police, to be appointed, on the usual allowances. 
An ample establishment of medical subordinates 
should be allowed. 

No troops to be stationed on the frontier, which 
would become a purely civil and political charge. No 
troops to be quartered in Upper Sind at all. 

The military stations of Shikarpoor and Hyderabad, 


387 


together with the arsenal at the latter place, to be 
abolished. , 

A Political Commissioner on the Frontier of India 
to be appointed, with full powers, civil and military, 
over all departments, &c. To have his head-quarters 
at Quetta, or any convenient spot above the Bolan 
Pass, with a staff of— 

1 Military Secretary, 

1 Political Secretary, 

1 Assistant Secretary, 

1 Private Secretary and Aide-de-camp. 

Under the orders of the Political Commissioner it 
is proposed that there should be a field force, or¬ 
ganized as follows:— 

Frontier Field Force. 

Cavalry . 

The whole of the Sind Irregular Horse to be moved 
to Quetta, with 2,000 Belooch irregular cavalry, 
armed, equipped, and officered after the fashion of 
the troops of Khelat, attached to form the cavalry 
brigade of the proposed frontier field force. Each 
regiment of horse, with 1,000 Belooch attached, to be 
under its own regimental commander. 

This cavalry brigade to be commanded by a briga¬ 
dier, with a major of brigade, and a quartermaster 
and interpreter of brigade, as his staff. 

Infantry . 

Two regiments, armed with Jacob’s rifles, each 
1,000 strong, with 1,000 Belooch irregular infantry 
attached, formed into one brigade, commanded by a 
brigadier, with staff as mentioned for the cavalry. 

c c 2 



388 


Artillery. 

Two troops of horse artillery, * 

Two horse field batteries, 

Brigadier and staff as above, 

Ordnance depot as for a division, 

The artillery to be raised for the purpose, not 
forming part of the Indian artillery, or in any way 
under the authorities of the Indian army. 

Engineers. 

1 Executive engineer, 

2 Assistant executive engineers. 

The whole field force to be commanded, under the 
Political Commissioner, by a brigadier-general, with 
the usual staff of a division. 

In case of war or other circumstances occurring to 
render the proceeding advisable, any number of regu¬ 
lar troops might be stationed and accommodated at 
Quetta. 

But, in the first instance, the irregular field force 
above detailed should alone be established above the 
Bolan Pass. This force should form the solid nucleus 
of, and give strength and tone to, the subsidiary troops 
of the native powers ; and eventually, all arrangements 
being previously completed, regular troops might fol¬ 
low when required, their numbers being regulated by 
the position of affairs and the prospects towards the 
North-west. But permanent accommodation need only 
be provided for the frontier field force of the strength 
detailed above. * # * 

The resources of the Khelat State are considerable. 
If the chiefs were united, as they formerly were, 
against us, they could bring forty thousand good men 


389 


into the field; but their Government and nobles 
generally are very poor, and their whole social frame¬ 
work was dreadfully shaken by our proceedings with 
regard to their former head. 

Much has, however, lately been done to remedy 
the ill effects of these proceedings; and the great 
want now in the Khelat State is an able man to guide 
the councils of the Khan. 

Were we established at Quetta, as I have proposed, 
all the resources of Beloochistan would be completely 
at our disposal, while none would be wasted. And 
though assistance in arms and money from us may, 
and probably will, enable the Khelat people for a 
time to prevent the Persians from overrunning or 
establishing themselves in their country, yet I am 
quite convinced that Beloochistan, if seriously invaded 
by a regular army of Persians, under Russian guid¬ 
ance, will not be able successfully to resist without 
the aid of European minds from our side to direct its 
force. 

Jalk, or Julluck, is close to the Khelat frontier. 

This frontier, wherever the country is inhabited, is 
sufficiently well recognised ; but it is not very defini¬ 
tively marked ; the country itself is mostly wild deso¬ 
late hills, and sands without water ; the fertile spots 
being at long intervals and of small extent. 

Nooskee is the nearest place to the frontier where 
the Khan of Khelat maintains any troops. Even this 
is a very miserable place,—a little fertile plain, three 
or four miles long, and of about half that breadth, 
surrounded by barren rocky hills and duft-sand. 
There is, however, a good stream of water there, and 



390 


the spot is well adapted for the first place of assembly 
of the Khelat troops to resist attack from the North¬ 
west. 

It is quite clear to me, that the occupation of the 
Persian seaports, however valuable a measure as a 
diversion in aid of other operations, will not suffice 
really to protect our Indian frontier from insult, even 
if such proceedings should suffice, as seems to be 
thought doubtful, to relieve us of the immediate 
pressure now commencing on the side of Beloochistan. 

It is evidently not merely Persia with whom we 
have now to deal, but Persia guided, moved, and 
aided by Russia; and from this circumstance, the 
proceedings near our frontier now appear to be of a 

much more serious nature than anv mere Persian 

•/ 

occupation or threatenings of Herat, which have been 
so often made or attempted during the last twenty 
years. Wherefore, our demonstrations by sea, if no 
simultaneous proceedings be undertaken by land on 
our North-west frontier, will, it seems to me, have no 
effect but to make Russia push Persia on the more 
vigorously in this direction while we are still unpre¬ 
pared. 

A descent on the coast of Persia would not now 
cause such consternation as did our first demonstra¬ 
tion in that quarter. The Persians have learned to 
regard such attacks at their real worth. If an inva¬ 
sion in force of the interior of Persia were not con¬ 
templated, the Persians would possibly not regard the 
capture of a seaport with special dread; and the 
Russian officers would not fail to perceive (when such 
is really the case) that our proceedings by sea are 


391 


really demonstrations only. They would also explain 
to the Persians, that even if we were to attempt a 
real advance into the heart of Persia, our movements 
must be slow and inconsequential, compared to the 
mighty effect of a rapid but steady advance in force 
on our unprotected North-western frontier, whereby 
the Persians would he able to place themselves in firm 
and secure possession of Kandahar. Such a move, 
they would argue (and I think justly argue, if we did 
not meditate permanent conquest in Persia), would 
soon compel us to withdraw our forces from Persia, 
to concentrate them for a severe struggle with a 
Russo-Persian army on the plains of Northern India; 
and the Russian argument would be sound and just 
in proportion as the temporary occupation of Lahore 
or Delhi by an enemy would be more injurious to 
us than the like occupation of Ispahan would be to 
Persia. 

I would occupy Quetta— not merely as a sudden 

MOVE, CONSEQUENT ON THE HOSTILE DEMONSTRATIONS 
OF PERSIA, BUT PERMANENTLY, AS A PEACEFUL ARRANGE¬ 
MENT NECESSARY FOR OUR FIXED REPOSE. 

I am convinced that no other measures than such as 
I have proposed can possibly secure our Indian fron¬ 
tier, and that some such measures must of necessity 
be ultimately adopted. 

Unless we do advance in the direction indicated, it 
is doubtful whether ultimately even Beloochistan may 
not fall under Persian and Russian influence. And 
with regard to Affghanistan, if we do not so advance, 
there can be no reasonable doubt whatever but that 
Kandahar must ere very long become a Persian— 


392 


that is a Russian—province. The cleverness, acti¬ 
vity, watchfulness, and steady perseverance of Russia 
in such matters are well known ; but these powers 
will fail before us if we proceed with open honesty 
and wisdom. 

Success is now in our own hands, arid may be com¬ 
manded with ease. Our position may be permanently 
secured with perfect safety, and with comparatively 
trifling labour and cost. 

But if we remain idly looking on from the valley of 

the Indus at the movements going on above the Bolan, 

we shall, it seems to me, be throwing away the fairest 

possible opportunity of settling for ever the question 

of the invasion of India bv Russia: and the results 

* 7 

will be, it seems to me, ultimately, such as no English 
statesman would like to contemplate. * * * 

We should not view this question with the eyes of 
men who served in Aflghanistan during the Affghan 
war. My own service, and consequent personal know¬ 
ledge of the statistics of these countries and people on 
our frontier, have been continuous from our first 
entrance into Aflghanistan to the present time. I am 
thus well acquainted with the very great changes 
which have taken place during the last ten years, and 
which are such as to render altogether inapplicable to 
the present state of affairs most of the supposed draw¬ 
backs to the advantages of the plan of operations on 
which I propose now to act, however just the objec¬ 
tions urged might have been under the conditions 
formerly existing. 

There is as much difference between the question 
of posting troops above the Bolan at present and 


393 


formerly as there would be between now moving 
troops up the Bhore Ghaut, and doing so under the 
conditions of the road being as it was up to 1829, 
and the country above being occupied by a hostile 
Muratba army and population. The Bolan Pass 
presents no difficulties for the party which holds it , 
and we should bold it securely at Quetta. 

The road through this pass I would improve, so as 
to make it the easiest mountain road possible for us; 
but I would make such arrangements that the force at 
Quetta could, by occupying the pass itself if neces¬ 
sary , hold it against all the world. 

I would connect the foot of the pass at once by a 
good road with Sind, and ultimately by a railroad, 
and, by means of the subsidised troops of Khelat 
acting as police, I would maintain the most perfect 
security along the whole line. 

The British camp at Quetta would not then be in 
any way isolated; it would, indeed, be as little isolated 
in reality as are the camp and town of Kurrachee at 
present, which, owing to the want of connection by 
canal with the Indus, are still chiefly supplied, even 
with such things as grass, grain, and firewood, by sea. 

As regards the tribes which hang about Quetta, I 
may observe, that for many years past the frontier 
districts of Sind, and the whole plain of Kutchee, 
have been as quiet and peaceable as our old province 
of Guzerat, or even more so. 

The most formidable and most famous of the robber 
chiefs and their tribes have quietly settled down into 
the condition of contented, happy, and most indus¬ 
trious agriculturists. 


394 


The former exploits of the old plunderers are fast 
becoming forgotten, and, as the last generation of 
border riders is passing away, no others are being 
formed to take their places. 

The tribes which formerly overran all Kutchee and 
Northern Sind,—the Boogtees, Doombkees, Jek- 
ranees, &c.,—so far from being now under little 
control, are, almost to a man, ready to obey my orders 
to the uttermost. They are our most obedient, humble 
servants, and have been brought to this state without 
any loss of self-respect or manliness on their part. 
The men have actually been reformed, and now feel 
themselves stronger, better, and happier than before. 
The Kahurs of the Bolan have for years past been 
perfectly quiet and submissive, while the great mass 
of Brahooee subjects of the Khan of Khelat to the 
westward of Kutchee and the Bolan are as quiet and 
peaceable a race, with respect to their conduct towards 
Government, as any in the East, although they are by 
no means unwarlike in their own fashion, and under 
their own chiefs. 

The country intervening between our proposed 
camp at Quetta and Sind would be perfectly occupied 
and governed for us by the Khelat authorities,—more 
perfectly so, indeed, than it could probably he by our 
own officers and police,—not only without our in¬ 
curring any odium as foreign rulers, but while we 
should be looked on as the best of friends. * * * 

For the last seven years, in fact, the Khelat terri¬ 
tory from the Bolan to Sind has been as much under 
our influence and real control, for just and useful pur¬ 
poses, as any part of our own provinces. 


395 


With regard to the capability of Shawl to support 
the force which I propose to entertain there, this 
point was certainly not overlooked by me; for I have 
always been in the habit of considering such arrange¬ 
ments to he the most important of all in military 
operations, and I have had to attend continually to 
such matters on a sufficiently large scale during a long 
course of years. * * * 

Yet, by acting on what seemed to me to be just 
principles, I have found that all difficulties disap¬ 
peared ; and, under the steady action of such 
principles, some hundreds of square miles, even of 
the desert itself, have been converted into fertile fields 
while a town sprung up spontaneously, adjoining our 
camp, in a wild desolate region, and contains already 
more than six thousand inhabitants, quite independent 
of the troops and camp followers, with a flourishing 
bazar of some hundreds of shops. This town now 
affords supplies sufficient for an army, and is still 
rapidly increasing in size and importance. 

I would apply similar principles to those which 
have been acted on here, with a certainty of the like 
effect, to my proposed advance to Quetta. 

The pecuniary cost of supporting the troops, after 
the first outlay on account of quarters and public 
buildings, would be absolutely nothing beyond their 
regular pay. The proposed roads, and the other 
arrangements for the forward move generally, would 
ultimately be a source of commercial profit; while, as 
to the other considerations, I may observe that such 
civil government as we already exert in Kutehee, 
through the political superintendent on the frontier, 


396 


we should continue to exert; but it would not be at 
all necessary or advisable to assume, in these respects, 
greater power, either in nature or extent, than we 
now virtually possess and exercise. 

Indeed, it seems very probable that it would not be 
found necessary that any other troops should be per¬ 
manently posted there; for, with the means of com¬ 
munication and transport which I proposed to 
establish, any force of regular troops which circum¬ 
stances might call for could with ease and rapidity be 
sent from Sind, or the old provinces of India, to 
Quetta, where every species of provision would he 
ready for their accommodation, and which place would 
then form the point from which military operations 
would commence. 

The road from the frontier of Sind to the head of 
the Bolan being improved, and made available at all 
times and seasons, and a body of the Khelat troops 
being subsidised, as I propose, by us, no further public 
arrangements would be necessary for supplying the 
irregular field force in Shawl, and no extra cost need 
be incurred on that head. 

The valleys of Moostung, Pesheen, and Shawl, 
produce large quantities of excellent wheat and 
lucern; sheep are procurable by millions, and all 
that the neighbouring country could supply would 
assuredly flow into our camp; while grain and cattle 
from Kutchee (where the prices are generally very 
much lower than in Sind itself) would be brought 
up the Bolan by private traders, in any quantities 
required to meet the demand. 

Provision must undoubtedly be made for consump- 


397 


tion during the winter season, as is habitually done 
by all the inhabitants of that country. But no 
Government commissariat arrangements would be 
requisite; while, in case of unforeseen accident, or 
any emergent necessity arising, the cavalry, who 
require the greatest provision, could, during the 
winter, when the ground is covered with snow, and 
military operations are necessarily suspended, be moved 
in a march of six days to Dadur, where supplies are at 
all times abundant. 

However, I consider it to be certain that the esta¬ 
blishment of the field force at Quetta would result in 
the growth of a large commercial town at that place; 
the resources of which would, as in the instance of 
Jacobabad, suffice for the wants of an army. 

In a financial point of view, as I have already 
observed, the cost of the proposed measures, when 
compared with the results, would be positively trifling; 
and, in considering the cost of these arrangements, 

IT MAY BE WELL TO BEAR IN MIND, ALSO, THE COST OF 
SUCH EXPEDITIONS AS THAT NOW BEING UNDERTAKEN 

against Persia by sea, and the value of the stake 
which the arrangements proposed by me are in¬ 
tended to secure to us. This value is, I am fully 
convinced, commensurate with that of our Indian 

empire. * * * 

You wish the red line of England on the map to 
advance no further. But to enable this red line to 
retain its present position,—to prevent its being 
driven back or erased from the map,—it is, it appears 
to me, ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO OCCUPY POSTS IN 

advance of it. I cannot see how^, consistently with 



398 


safety, it can ever be otherwise with regard to a 
great empire held by a foreign government as we 
hold India. 

If our deeds be true and just, no consequences 
whatever need be feared. But supineness on our part 
now would, it seems to me, be most unjust towards 
India. 

A war within our own territory, with a European 
enemy, might be ruinous to our reputation, and 
might entirely undermine our strength, although 
that strength might have sufficed successfully to 
meet a world in arms in a field beyond our own 
boundary. 

The evils even of successful war are terrible; and 
such evils are undoubtedly most severely felt—are 
most intolerable, in fact—in those countries the most 
accustomed to regular civilization, and uniform un¬ 
deviating routine of civil administration. 

A severe struggle within our own established and 
long settled limits with a powerful invader—although 
attended with immediate success to us—might shake 
our power in India to its very foundation; might 
certainly for a while overturn all our civil arrange¬ 
ments, destroy our revenue, and render it necessary 
to maintain large armies in the field in the interior 
of our dominions for a protracted period, in order to 
restore that internal tranquillity which might not be 
in the least disturbed even by many battles fought 
beyond our frontier, and which would be completely 
preserved by the arrangements which I have con¬ 
templated. 



PART IV. 


RELATING TO 


THE PERSIAN WAR. 





























































































■ 












































401 


THE PERSIAN WAR. 


Its Policy. 

I had proposed to undertake such arrangements as 
would result in placing the frontier of our Indian 
empire in a state of 'permanent and increasing 
security and repose ; to create such organization, in 
fact, as would render India unassailable by a 
European or other power from the north-west; and I 
propose to effect this without any rushing about or 
appearance of much unusual exertion at all. None 
of the plans of proceeding which I find advocated or 
thought of elsewhere will do anything like this, or 
will even tend to induce such a result; which could, 
it appears to me, be as little attained by sending 
armies up the Bolan, as by sending armies to Persia, 
if mere military expeditions were intended. 

The effects of such expeditions as that now being 
undertaken against Persia will be momentary only, 
will be enormously expensive, and will leave matters 
on our frontier of India, as regards security from 
threat, insult, or real attack, exactly as before. 

If the expedition be undertaken in order to punish 
Persia for insolence, &c., well and good: let us then 
understand that revenge is our sole object; and this 


D D 



402 


we may indeed accomplish, if thought worth our 
while. I have nothing to say to such proceedings. 
But if our object be to secure India, we must fail 
lamentably, and, after wasting immense resources, be 
compelled, under far greater difficulties than any 
which now exist, to undertake, ultimately, some such 
course of proceeding as that indicated by me. * * * 

With regard to possible operations against Persia, 
it appears to me that Persia might be assailed, if need 
be , with full effect from her sea faces. 

We might take possession of Bunder Abbas and 
of Bushire, from which places we threaten Kirman 
and Shiraz. 

No sudden, hurried operations appear to me to he 
necessary or advisable. We might strengthen ourselves 
at Bushire, and show an intention of permanently 
retaining it until Herat were relinquished by Persia, 
and such other arrangements established there as we 
might approve of. 

If necessary, we might, when our position was 
settled and secured at the seaports, and all arrange¬ 
ments were matured, march an army on Shiraz 
without any very great difficulty. From Shiraz, 
should it be necessary to continue the war, the very 
heart of Persia is open to us, via Ispahan. 

But I am convinced that all this will not be 
requisite to insure the complete submission of Persia, 
and to place our Indian frontier generally in the most 
permanently secure state for the future. 

It might be advisable to occupy the seaports 
mentioned above, and in force sufficient to threaten 
seriously all Persia: but we should, I think, find 


403 


really proceeding further with invasion in that 
quarter unnecessary; for it appears to me that we 
could command success by another far more easy and 
more certain mode of proceeding.— Vide Frontier 
Arrangements. —(January , 1857.) 

On the Policy of Invading Persia. 

I hold a decided opinion that the Persian expedi¬ 
tion on which we are engaged, carried out on the plan 
of invasion, wdiich has been determined on by the 
English Government, is a great error; and I am 
quite convinced that ere long this will he as evident 
to others as it now is to me. But the course of action 
having been determined on, no effort on my part shall 
be wanting to command success in any part of the 
proceedings which it may fall to my lot to conduct; 
and I trust, that having strong convictions of my own, 
conscientiously arrived at and expressed, I shall not 
be found deficient in the force and energy necessary 
to the just execution of those of others.—( February , 

1857.) 

The Valleys of the Karoon and Euphrates; and 

Russian Policy. 

-’s report is not very encouraging, but I think 

that we have better information regarding the valley 
of the Karoon, and that its statistics are not quite so 
unfavourable as would appear from-’s report. 

We know what the country was formerly; and it 
appears to me that such a tract, watered by such a 
river, must be able to supply forage and grain for a 
large cavalry force. 


D D 2 




404 


My own opinion with regard to the plan of pro¬ 
ceeding is not at all in favour of making a rush 
through the hills into the interior of Persia, in the 
hope of frightening the Shah into submission. 

Russia would not fail at once to see and inform the 
Persian Government of our faulty position, with the 
sea for our base, barren countries all around the 
isolated valley in which we were operating, im¬ 
mense ranges of mountains across our communications 

o 

with the sea, and across the line of our further 
advance. 

Under such circumstances, the wisest advice which 
Russia could give, as our enemy and to our enemy, 
would be,—“ Induce them to advance into the interior 
as far as you can ; every step they make must render 
ultimate success less and less possible for them.” I 
would not advise any such course, but would occupy 
the whole maritime provinces between the mountains 
and the sea, from the Euphrates to Bunder Abbas. 
This would give us, either in our own possession or 
in that of perfectly friendly allies, the whole line of 
land communication between the Mediterranean and 
India, and render us independent of Egypt and of 
French influence there. 

I would inform the Shah that, he not having 
afforded us the satisfaction which we required, and 
which we had a right to require, we intended to keep 
this country permanently, and to annex it for ever to 
the British empire. 

Kuzistan would undoubtedly prove a most valuable 
possession to us, while the ancient wealth and ancient 
history of Ormus seem to prove that Bunder Abbas 



405 


is the natural outlet for the whole commerce of Persia 
by sea. The interior of the country must undoubtedly 
be more accessible from that port than from any 
other. 

In establishing ourselves in these provinces, the 
mountains, now presenting such formidable difficulties 
in our way, would prove rather an advantage to us, 
as forming a wall of defence to us on the north. 

We might proceed steadily to organize the whole 
country we had taken, and might probably restore the 
district of Kuzistan to its pristine fertility and impor¬ 
tance, while the whole of the warlike and manly 
tribes of Khoords, as well as the Arabs, would be 
ready to serve us against all the world —-for money . 

In possession of this line of country, opening on 
the valley of the Euphrates, taking these maritime 
provinces, especially the valley of the Karoon, as our 
base, with full arsenals, magazines, and supplies 0 * 
all kinds ready there, instead of being immediately 
dependent on distant support from Bombay and 
Sind, we should be in a position, in case of a renewed 
war with Russia, to march an Anglo-Turkish army 
into Georgia, and, there co-operating with other 
forces sent, if necessary, via Trebizond, to drive the 
Russians behind the Caucasus, and to keep them 
there. 

With complete command of the Black Sea, and 
being paramount on the ocean generally, England 
then could not be in a better position for engaging in 
a war single-handed with Russia. 

We should be independent of the French alliance 
in a great measure, and have the most direct route to 


406 


India in our own hands, or securely open to us ; while, 
without first taking Constantinople, no other power 
could interfere with us on the battle-field, or ever 
approach the seat of war. 

Kussia must see all the consequences of our per¬ 
manently settling ourselves in possession of Kuzistan ; 
and, unless now prepared to fight with us “ a l’ou- 
trance,” and to throw her full strength on India 
(which she undoubtedly is not), would assuredly be 
inclined, on perceiving symptoms of such intentions 
on our part, to advise the Shah to accede to any 
terms whatever rather than risk placing us in such a 
favourable position for offensive measures against 

herself. All this seems worthv of consideration.— 

•* 

(j February, 1857.) 

Cavalry for Transport by Sea to the Persian 

Gulf. 

Whatever cavalry I shipped for the Gulf, I would 
sh ip complete in every respect; and I would do this 
even if it were certain that one-half of the horses 
should die on the passage. The despatch of dis¬ 
mounted troopers would end in failure in the event of 
cavalry being required. As regards the description 
of cavalry to be shipped, I would select it from the 
Bombay regular corps. The 3rd, which it seems 
alone is available for this service, is as good a regi¬ 
ment as could be. The organization which gives the 
silidar cavalry a great advantage by land is the worst 
for transport by ship; the readiness and completeness 
of the latter is in great measure dependent on a great 
number of followers, baggage cattle, &c., which to 


407 


transport by sea is intolerably troublesome, and very 
costly, while without them the efficiency of a silidar 
corps would be materially injured. European cavalry, 
particularly as at present organized, should never be 
employed upon service like that about to be undertaken. 
They would be in the way in Persia. They could not 
stand the sun; and would be unable to move without 
supplies, and shelter, and baggage cattle, very greatly 
in excess, or of a description more difficult to procure 
than those which would be required for the march of 
any native corps. It would be more difficult, also, to 
provide for their wounded; and the men themselves 
are, as at present trained, by no means so handy for 
light cavalry duties as natives of India are. They 
are, in fact, unable to shift for themselves; and are 
totally ignorant of the habits and feelings of the 
people among whom they would be serving.—( Feb¬ 
ruary, 1857.) 

Military Requirements in the Expedition to the 

Persian Gulf. 

All the proposed reinforcements of infantry and 
artillery, native and European, should be sent to us 
without the least delay. The European infantry are 
invaluable. But we want no European cavalry; they 
would only trammel us, and be a continual source of 
weakness, rather than an addition of strength in this 
country, and upon such a service. Plenty of materials 
for temporary barracks, huts, &c. for the troops 
should be sent at once from Bombay, also from 
Kurrachee. If necessary, the European infantry and 
artillery might, with proper protection, be kept at 


408 


Bushire during the summer, without any serious 
inconvenience or suffering. Plenty of carpenters and 
tools should be sent to us with all speed from Kutch, 
from Sind, and from Bombay; also some smiths. We 
can get none below the passes, and I doubt if we shall 
be able to get any in Persia at all. The Persian 
authorities have secured all the artificers in the 
country for their own arsenals. The climate of 
Bushire has been represented as being worse than it 
really is. 

Large supplies of provisions, including screwed hay, 
should be sent from Kurrachee, Bombay, and other 
places in India, without any delay, for the monsoon is 
close at hand. I would also despatch all the steamers 
we could spare with transports to Kurrachee, for this 
purpose, and would also have all manner of supplies 
sent in country craft from the Euphrates. 

With full supplies at Bushire, and with the rein¬ 
forcements which you mention it is proposed to send 
us, we shall, I am confident, be in a position to under¬ 
take any military operations you may think proper to 
enter on at present.—( March , 1857.) 

On Holding our own Ground after Victory. 

The Persian forces at the entrance of the hills at 
Nanarck must be attacked in the first instance: 
they would probably escape into the mountains with¬ 
out much loss ; but no matter,—we should clear the 
plain of them, and should then get such supplies as 
the country might afford—which would not be much, 
however, I imagine. 

After heating the enemy at Nanarck, we must not 





409 


go back a foot : we must make all our arrangements 
beforehand for remaining on the ground, and holding 
it up to the hills. 

We might then place our European troops at 
Gurikhan or elsewhere, as you propose, and all our 
proceedings in this quarter might, I think, be carried 
out most satisfactorily. Indeed we might, I think, if 
we had troops enough, even advance to Shiraz this 
season.—( March , 1857.) 

Kuzistan, having become ours by Conquest, should 
be Permanently Occupied. 

It is clear to me that we should not have invaded 
Persia hv sea, and that it was most unwise to do so 
with the intention of penetrating into the interior, or 
indeed for any purpose but a diversion in favour of 
more serious operations elsewhere; unless we were 
prepared for, and determined, if necessary, to engage 
in a great war with Pussia. 

We have , however, invaded Persia in force; we 
have obtained possession of Mohumra, and, virtually, 
of the whole line of the Karoon river, and now to 
abandon this district, and to restore it to Persia, 
appears to me to be an error equalling the original 
fault we committed when, with a view to the security 
of India, we came here at all. 

We should hold the province of Kuzistan by the 
fairest possible right which war can give to any 
power. Persia was engaged in an invasion of India, 
and was endeavouring by every means to create a 
rebellion in our own provinces. 

To retain this piece of country, which we had been 


410 


compelled to occupy, and from which we had driven 
the Persian forces, would be most just. This appears 
to me to be the first consideration, for the wrong is 
never the expedient, and those are not profound poli¬ 
ticians wdio think or act otherwise. 

Further, the possession of Kuzistan would confer 
on us the most important advantages. The province 
was once most fertile and wealthy ; its natural ad¬ 
vantages are as great as ever, and the former pro¬ 
sperity of Susiana might, under our rule, be easily 
restored. The province is divided from the rest of 
Persia by ranges of mountains, forming a most com¬ 
plete natural barrier; it is inhabited by people of the 
Arab race, who generally dislike the Persians, and 
who would warmly welcome our rule. 

It is traversed by rivers navigable throughout, from 
hill to sea, and it adjoins the valley of the Euphrates, 
completely commanding the outlet of that river to the 
ocean. 

The possession of this province of Kuzistan would, 
it appears to me, be as valuable to England as Georgia 
is to Russia. In the event of another war with 
Russia, England, in possession of Kuzistan, would be 
able to meet Russia independently of all aid from 
allies. The advantages of the position are self- 
evident : it is now our own : and to abandon it would 
he to resign an advantage which may hereafter be 
of paramount importance. 

In possession of Kuzistan, the ports of Persia else¬ 
where would be of comparatively little importance to 
us ; but I would recommend the retaining of Bushire. 
—( April , 1857.) 



411 


Water Supplies at Bushire and Karrack. 

I am convinced, myself, that the very best place 
for troops in the Persian Gulf is the island of Kar¬ 
rack, which abounds in fine springs of beautiful water. 
But I am quite convinced that this peace will be con¬ 
firmed, and that our best proceeding will be to get 
the troops, especially the Europeans, out of the 
country as soon as possible. 

I have no doubt but that the aqueduct you mention 
could be made easily enough ; but there is plenty of 
good water for the supply of the camp here in the 
numerous wells in front of the lines, and all over the 
ground, as far as Bushire, and further.—(1857.) 

Mohumra, Karrack, and Bushire, considered as 
Places for Troops to Summer in. 

We know what the deltas of large rivers are all 
over the world. 

I care not what particular spot you select in them 
or near them ; a few miles here or there, or a few 
feet, or a hundred feet, of higher or lower level, make 
no difference. The locality is deadly, and must be 
so, during and after the inundation. 

Mohumra, or other place near the mouth of the 
Euphrates, is only valuable, and should only be occu¬ 
pied, as the extremity of the Karoon line. If we 
have not this line, to attempt to hold the mouth of 
the river is madness; we should have all the injury 
and inconvenience, and none of the advantage. 

The loss by sickness in one season would probably 
be fifty times greater than any which we could suffer 



412 


in retaking the place if necessary; while in the one 
case the survivors would be broken-hearted and de¬ 
moralised, and in the other strengthened and en¬ 
couraged to further exertions. 

There are but two places in the Gulf where you 
can quarter your troops, under existing circumstances, 
with any sort of wisdom or propriety. These are 
Karrack and Bushire. The former is a beautiful 
place, with plenty of excellent water. 

Send a sufficient force there, without any cavalry of 
course, and then provide cover for the coming hot 
season. 

Keep the native cavalry, two batteries of artillery, 
and four native infantry regiments, here at Bushire, 

as detailed by me in my former letters to - and 

yourself; and send away all the rest at once to Kur- 
rachee and Bombay. 

It appears to me a very grave mistake in keeping a 
man at Mohumra at all. The ships would hold the 
place for the present. Keep two large ships of war 
at Mohumra; if the crews get sickly, the ships can 
leave alternately, and go on a cruise for health.— 
{May, 1857.) 

Insalubrity of Mohumra. 

The - had to be withdrawn from Mohumra 

long ago, her crew having become totally disabled by 
sickness, and nearly all the men on board having been 
in raving delirium from fever. They are slowly re¬ 
covering here. But the ships generally are much less 
healthy than we are on shore ; and it is clear to me 
that the evil opinion of this climate was formed in 




413 


consequence of those who described it having resided 
either in the town, which is a dreadful hole, or afloat. 
—{July, 1857.) 

Supplies from Bombay. 

I certainly had not imagined before that the Bom¬ 
bay Presidency possessed such mighty resources at 
once available, or that its departments were at all 
capable of the gigantic efforts necessary for success¬ 
fully carrying out such admirable arrangements on so 
grand a scale. 

Well, indeed, it is that it has been so ! for our in¬ 
formation regarding the resources available for us in 
this country seems to have been sadly defective, and it 
is now clear to me, that the wonderful efficiency of 
the arrangements for supplying, from Bombay, every 
possible want of this force in Persia, has alone pre¬ 
vented the most serious ill consequences occurring to 
this expedition, which I am, now more than ever, 
convinced we ought never to have entered on .—{May 

1857.) 

Supplies from the Valley of the Euphrates. 

It may be well to remark, that on the occupation of 
Mohumra I was informed that no supplies could be 
sent to us from the Euphrates, and none have been 
sent except building materials, mats, reeds, See., of 
which we have received a great quantity from the 
river. Indeed, at first, after the landing at Mohumra, 
the commissariat department at Bushire was called 
upon to send up forage and firewood for the troops 
there. — {June, 1857.) 


414 


Employment of the Men in Hutting themselves. 

The employment of men and officers on the work of 
hutting themselves is most advantageous, as affording 
healthy and interesting occupation for mind and body, 
in making themselves comfortable.—( June , 1857.) 

It is better to Be than to Seem Strong. 

* * * But it seems to me that it will be 

quite useless to attempt to conceal from the Persian 
Government, or the world generally, the state of 
things existing in an Indian army at present; and, 
more, that such attempt will be thought to be the 
surest sign of weakness, while it must deprive us of 
the real strength which the presence of the troops 
would give us in India. In fact, we should make 
ourselves really weaker, without causing people to 
believe that we were stronger. 

Wherefore I do not see the absolute necessity of 
retaining this force, or any force, at Bushire, even 
if the terms of the treaty be not fully carried out by 
Persia. 

The wisest management which suggests itself to me 
would be to establish the Resident in the Persian 
Gulf permanently at Karrack, where the British 
representative could be perfectly protected by an escort 
of a wing of a native regiment and a war steamer. 

This would not involve the necessity of our taking 
possession of Karrack as British territory. 

This being done, the whole force might be 
embarked for Kurrachee, when it would be ready for 
service in any quarter ; and afterwards the Herat 
question could, if still undisposed of, be settled in the 


415 


most direct, the most safe, and most certain manner, 
by moving a force up the Bolan, which movement 
would most effectually erase from the minds of Persia 
and of Eussia all impression of our weakness in India 
owing to internal disorders therein.—( June , 1857.) 

Bushire as a Point of Embarkation. 

Bushire is a terribly bad harbour ; it is, in fact, no 

f 

harbour, but merely an open roadstead. Whenever a 
breeze springs up, all harbour work by country boats is 
at once stopped, and even the small steamers can very 
seldom work more than six hours out of the twenty- 
four, namely from 3 to 9 a. m., when the weather is 
sometimes more favourable. When there is any sea 
on, even the small steamers lie alongside of the ships, 
and all is at a stand-still, communication with the 
shore being at an end. 

Under the most favourable circumstances, with the 
aid of the small steamers, and all other means at our 
disposal, it is considered a good day’s work to embark 
a troop of cavalry complete. 

To send on stores and building materials to Karrack 
appears to you simple enough : but with an unlimited 
number of ships, I am informed that the operation 
would occupy at least two months’ time.—( July , 1857.) 

Orientals are Commanded, not by Etiquette, 
but by Habitual Nobility of Being. 

-can scarcely be considered a high authority as 

to what is or is not likely to give offence to Eastern 
princes. He seems to assume that the British 
reputation can depend upon the proceedings of a 




416 


miserable Persian writer. But happily, both reason 
and experience assure us that a high moral nature, a 
nobility of being, appearing habitually in our actions, 
our conduct, and bearing towards all men, command 
from all Orientals such a respect as it is far beyond 
the power of any number of moonshees, or of any 
defects as to matters of etiquette and formality, to 
injure in the least.—(1857.) 

The School of Smooth Words. 

The strictest justice and fairness, with a generous 
liberality, should be followed; but a confident courage 
and most uncompromising firmness should be shown 
in all our dealings with these Asiatics. I have no 
patience with the school of smooth words, low 
cunning, and present-making. # * * 

In truth, it appears to me to be above all of the 
utmost importance to England, that she be represented 
in this country by straightforward, open, liberal 
English gentlemen, not by clever and cunning 
diplomatists.—(1857.) 4 


PART V. 


OBSERVATIONS 


ON THE 

PRESENT CONDITION OF INDIA, 


AND ON THE 


REORGANISATION OF ITS CIVIL AND MILITARY 

ADMINISTRATION. 


E E 


































































































419 


PRESENT CONDITION OF INDIA, &c. 


Three Extracts on the Present Condition 

of India. 

Extract No. I. 

I have long foreseen what is now occurring, and long 
ago pointed out that the worst effects of the system 
prevailing in our native army were degradation of the 
European mind, and destruction of those powers by 
which we command the Asiatics. For twenty years 
past, the Europeans connected with Bengal have been 
sedulously occupied in concealing faults instead of 
attempting to remedy them. The causes of the 
defects were never fairly investigated, while, for 
discussing them, I was threatened with expulsion 
from the service. The only remedy proposed or 
attempted was, to add more European bodies to the 
Indian army, instead of cultivating European brains. 

However, I have no apprehension regarding the 
ultimate results of the present outbreak. And so let 
us have no recrimination,—no blaming individuals,— 
or saying “ I always said so.” Let England set to 
work manfully, by her own forces, energies, and 
resources, to remedy the existing evils—asking no 
help, craving no forbearance from any foreign nation ; 

e e 2 





420 


and though the effort required may be great, it will 
be successful, and will be nobly repaid. Everything 
in the East thereafter will be established on a firmer 
and sounder basis. I have no fear for the English 
nation ; the people will, I am sure, rise with indignant 
energy, and make any effort which may be requisite 
to restore health to our Indian empire. 

Meantime, I believe, if the English now in India 
would only retain confidence, we could re-conquer 
India with the forces we still have at our disposal. 
For myself, I am most willing and ready to lead 
against the mutineers the force now with me, which 
is composed of native soldiers alone; and I am as 
certain as I am of my own existence that they would 
do their duty as faithfully as any European on earth. 
And I am grievously disappointed—more so than I 
have ever felt in my life before—at this force being 
detained in Persia, when, had it been landed as one 
body in Sind, it might have marched to any part of 
India.—( July , 1857.) 

Extract No. II. 

I cannot express to you how gladly I would now he 
at work in India ; and I am now begging hard for 
permission to leave a small detachment at Karrack, 
and return with the remainder of my field force. It 
is composed, with the exception of a few European 
artillerymen, wholly of native troops, who are in 
excellent condition, and in good temper for work. 
If I could land them as a whole at Kurrachee, we 
should be ready to move anywhere. And, as you 
know, the military power of 6,000 men who have 





421 


already worked together, and become accustomed to 
their commander, is not to be estimated by the 
muster-rolL 

As regards the mutiny, I see no reason to change a 
thought or a word which I have formerly expressed 
on the subject of our rule in India. To my personal 
knowledge, for twenty years past, and for how much 
longer I know not, the European mind in Bengal has 
been sedulously engaged in concealing faults, instead 
of remedying them. And, as I have been en¬ 
deavouring to convince the public during the past 
ten years, the consequences of such deception could 
not be other than we now see them. 

This degradation of the English mind is worse 
than all; because it deadens the perception of right 
and wrong in those who should, from their positions, 
be able to remedy the evils now disgracing us. In 
this diseased body, the most diseased particles now 
seem to have been selected as the centres from which 
to generate new life and health. Indeed, it seems to 
me that Bengal has not within itself nearly sufficient 
vitality to recover, if it ever possessed, a healthy tone. 
To re-establish our Indian empire, an imperial effort 
of all England and India will be required, and I feel 
certain such an effort will be made, and that it will 
succeed. But it must proceed from a very different 
order of mind from that which has been formed in 
our Indian, especially our Bengal, school. What we 
require are men of power, firmness, and insight; 
possessing causality, original thought, perception of 
general law, and able to stand alone. 

The difficulties now encountering us are of our own 


422 


creation. India, and the people of India, offer us 
none—positively none whatever. They aid us at 
every town, and cry aloud, “ Govern us ”—“ We are 
satisfied to have your rule, and are most willing to 
follow if you lead.” What practically has been our 
reply ?—“ No ; we will not govern ; we will sink 
ourselves to your level of moral power, and we will all 
govern together.” In fact, we first destroy all our 
own power of Government,—by making our officers 
contemptible, by making them degraded in their own 
eyes, by stopping the whole moral growth ; and then 
we suppose, or pretend to suppose, that, by so doing, 
we have rendered the natives of India capable of 
self-government. 

Truly, no person, no thing opposes us except our 
own follies—our own persistence in opposing natural 
law. On this subject, there is an excellent passage 
in Macaulay’s Essay on the Life of Clive, where he 
criticises the remarks of Sir J. Malcolm on the 
Omichund business. It truly describes the whole 
source of our power in the East; and, indeed, of real 
permanent power everywhere. But it is very rare to 
find men who will always work with such principles; 
most of the very best that I see faint at heart when they 
think of applying them to others, even although they 
think that they are themselves convinced of their truth. 

I have myself always been looked on as a visionary 
for applying and inculcating them, at all seasons and 
to all things: yet nothing can be more practical— 
more adapted to every-day use—than they are; and 
we must act on them, or we shall fall. — (July, 
1857 .) 


423 


Extract No. III. 

-writes about the non-introduction of Chris¬ 
tianity and ensigns passing in Hindoostanee as the 
props of the falling empire. Good God! has the 
manhood of our nation altogether departed, and 
dissolved into such streams of drivel as these ? 

The poor missionaries are good, harmless men; 
harmless because unconnected with Government— 
which is as well known to the people as to us. But 
the passing of the poor ensigns is only adding 
greatly to the very evil which is crushing our power 
in the East, and which has produced all the lamentable 
results now taking place. The ensign would be 
infinitely better employed on the hill-side after a boar, 
than in breaking his heart and stupifying his brains 
over his Hindoostanee books. 

Search for honestly , promote, and employ the best 
men, each according to his peculiar ability in any 
given line; and whatever acquirement may really be 
necessary or advantageous for the work will always 
be forthcoming in abundance . No examinations are 
wanted— they are all deceptive . Besponsible heads 
of departments and commanding officers are the best 
examiners and the best teachers. They will for their 
own sakes educate—draw out the powers of—their 
own assistants, the men of their choice. If these 
will not learn, let them he rejected; hut let the 
master workman judge, not the committee. It is 
useless to attempt to drive English gentlemen by force, 
in the hope of improving them,—such a course only 
destroys whatever good they may have by nature. 





424 


The remedy proposed by -regarding the ensigns 

is exactly equivalent to attempting to increase the 
supply of cotton by ordering all the cultivators to 
be flogged periodically until they had passed a book 
examination on agriculture. 

I have been preaching till I am wearied out. I 
have practised what I preach, on a large scale: a 
whole people have been civilized, and warmly attached 
to this rule, by this practice. The principles appli¬ 
cable to our native army I have proved before the 
whole world for fifteen years together; yet still the 
attempt is made to govern the Asiatic by emas¬ 
culating the mind of the European gentleman, and 
using English bodies rather than English brain. 
Failure, anarchy, and contempt must follow! The 
attempt is like trying to think with one’s muscles. 

Yet, have I advocated any wild, doubtful, or partial 

theorv ? or have we indeed no men left ? So far from 
•/ 

this being the case, the truth of the principles I 
preach is self-evident; and any honest, true-hearted, 
and manly English gentleman can apply them every¬ 
where with certainty of success. 

My excellent lieutenants-and-took them 

to Turkey, and though they applied them under 
circumstances of great difficulty, they found them as 
truly powerful to govern Bashis and Arnauts as they 
had proved with Hindoostanees and Beloochees. 

The Asiatic bows before generous honesty and high 
moral power—before manliness, in fact. He scorns 
moonshees, and laughs at “ passed ” 


men. 






A SCHEME 


FOR THE REORGANISATION OF THE CIVIL AND MILITARY 

ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA. 


Preliminary Observations. 

The faults which have led to the existing lamentable 
state of the native army of India are not those of 
individuals, but of system. 

Whatever may be the general causes which have 
now convulsed the Eastern World ,—and these are not 
unknown to me ,—it is certain that no external influ¬ 
ence would have sufficed to have turned our own 
native Indian army against us, had not that army 
been internally in a most weak and unhealthy state. 

This weak state has not been the primary cause of 
the outbreak which has taken place, but the absence 
of healthy strength in our army has certainly enabled 
external influences, which otherwise would have 
passed unnoticed, to act with fatal effect. 

The cause of our weakness is inherent in our Indian 
military system. We have, since the great Madras 
mutiny in 1806, sedulously persisted in separating 
the sepoy from his European regimental superiors. 
We have endeavoured to place him “ en rapport” with 
the Commander-in-Chief—a potentate who is gene- 






426 


him despise his own European officers, and cease to 
regard them as superiors. 

This state of things acts and reacts on both parties ; 
and perhaps the most fatal effect of long persistence 
in the system we have pursued is the actual degrada¬ 
tion of the European mind which follows on the stag¬ 
nation which it produces. 

The sepoy has been taught to despise his English 
officers, and to consider them as his natural enemies; 
and the English officers have consequently become, to 
a certain extent, unworthy of his respect. 

Without due exercise, the strongest natural powers 
fade and disappear. Slavery unfits men for freedom ; 

AND THE POWER OF COMMANDING COMES WITH THE 
EXERCISE OF COMMAND. 

The natives of India are quite incapable of self* 
government. They do not in the least understand what 
it means . They cannot conceive that a subject can 
have any righ ts whatever not dependent on the favour 
of the sovereign . They expect their sovereign to 
govern them absolutely, and according to his own 
superior knowledge and ability, not according to their 
instructions. 

We have never appeared to them to have acted as 
sovereigns in India ; we have, on the contrary, shown 
what appear to'the Asiatic to be marks of fear, and 
of distrust of our own rights , throughout our whole 
administration; 'land we have, with unaccountable 
infatuation hitherto maintained a descendant of 
Timoor on the throne of his fathers as Emperor of 
India at Delhi! We hold India as foreign con- 


427 


querors only; but we have been perpetually proclaim¬ 
ing to the natives of India that they are our equals ; 
that we only rule as their representatives, and by 
their sufferance ; that they are not bound to obey us, 
and that we have no right to command them. 

Our “ regulations,” civil and military, are all to the 
same effect. 

Our articles of war form a ludicrous specimen of 
this unwise system. 

The English soldier, as a free citizen, is on an 
equality with his officer: he has rights as such, which 
he well understands, and which he is able to make 
use of; and a portion of such rights he voluntarily 
surrenders on entering the army. Our mutiny act 
defines what portion of such rights he thus surren¬ 
ders ; and he retains all others. 

The pre-existing equality is the very essence of the 
articles of war. 

But this equality is precisely what does not exist 
with respect to the Indian soldier; he does not even 
want such equality, he understands nothing about it. 
In his ordinary state, before enlisting as a soldier, he 
must either be a despot himself, or be subject to 
despotic rule. 

It is , indeed , only because the European officer is a 
superior being by nature to the Asiatic , that we hold 
India at all. 

The native of India enters our service without an 
idea beyond that of implicit obedience to his officers 
being his duty. He cannot even imagine any other 
state of things, if the officers are to have any authority 
over him at all. 


428 


Yet, with amazing* absurdity, the first thing we do 
is to read and explain to him our articles of war, in 
order to impress on him the belief that his natural 
and ordinary state is to be one of disobedience to his 
officers; and that he is not bound to obey them, except 
in certain special instances defined by the articles! 

He soon perceives that his officers are quite power¬ 
less, and that their demeanour, formed in the regula¬ 
tion school, shows that they do not in the least expect 
him to be obedient. His obedience is always, even 
by Government, treated as a great and somewhat 
unexpected favour. 

Nothing can be weaker than this. 

Such a state of things must tend to develope the 
worst qualities only of both parties, native and Euro¬ 
pean. 

The army is therefore not bound together by any 
strong internal force, and the least pressure from 

WITHOUT MUST CAUSE IT TO FALL TO PIECES. 

Brought up in such a school, hut few of the officers 
of our native Indian army can be expected to be 
qualified to carry out the measures necessary for the 
reorganization of that army. 

An almost superhuman power of original thought 
and character would he requisite to enable a man 
successfully to resist the baneful influences, exposed 
to which he has passed half a lifetime or more ; and 
it would be most unjust now to visit the officers of 
the army of Bengal wfith severe punishment for what 
has occurred, and the scheme which I have here 
proposed seems calculated to meet every difficulty in 
this respect. 


v 


429 


Under tlie arrangements indicated, it will ere long 
be discovered what each officer on the general list 
may be fit for, and he may then be employed accord¬ 
ingly to the greatest advantage. 

If on fair trial he appear to be totally useless, let 
him be removed, and let him retire on full or half-pay, 
according to his period of service. But in the varietv 
of work required to be performed in India, this will 
rarely be requisite. 

It is essential to the successful working of the 
organization proposed, that the officers on the unem¬ 
ployed list should be fairly and even liberally paid. 
The presence alone of a number of English gentlemen 
in India is attended with much advantage to the 
English Government ; and these should have the 
means of living respectably, and of pursuing those 
studies and occupations which may qualify them for 
public employment in this country. 

Under a system by which every man must feel that 
his standing and advancement in the service and in 
society depended wholly on his own industry, acquire¬ 
ment, and cultivated natural powers, the greatest 
possible amount of mental power and moral growth 
must be developed. And while the numbers of Euro¬ 
peans in the public service in India might even ulti¬ 
mately be much reduced, their commanding power 
would be very greatly—almost infinitely—increased. 

Where cases of abuse of power occur, as occur they 
must and will, let them be dealt with individually . 
Avoid, as much as possible, making general regula¬ 
tions, which destroy all healthy mental development. 
Avoid striving too much after outward uniformity : 



430 


the same j ust principles, applied equally well and with 
equal success by different men, may cause different 
arrangements with respect to unimportant details. 

No two leaves on a tree may be exactly alike, but 
the same vital process has produced all from the same 
substances. 

Forcing all men’s minds into one mould is fatal to 
mental power. 

Let the system be such as to tend to cultivate and 
to develope such power. Let men apply their powers 
as they find best adapted to produce the desired 
effect, making them strictly responsible for results . 

If officers will not exert themselves, or if they have 
done their best in vain, and the results are unsatis¬ 
factory, such officers are in their wrong places; 
remove them to the unemployed list, till work more 
fitted for their powers be ready for them. 

The obvious objection to the organization proposed, 
is the difficulty of finding properly qualified officers 
for the higher commands. But it is certain that time 
will speedily remedy this,— the school will soon form 
such officers , and nothing else will do so. 

We must expect to meet with some difficulties at 
first in remedying such long-continued and deep- 
seated errors; but if our principles of action be 
sound, their tendency in practice will be to bring 
about the best possible state of affairs. 

However the details may be arranged and carried 
out, it appears to me to be quite certain, that until 
the principles here maintained be acknowledged and 
be acted on, the British Indian empire can never be 
in a sound or satisfactory state. 


431 


I have studied the subject with all the patient 
research and observation, and with all the power of 
thought, I could bring to bear on it. I have had, in 
practice, opportunities of applying, on a tolerably 
extensive scale, the principles which I advocate, such 
as have fallen to the lot of few men living. Thev 
have never failed of success. They are of universal 
application, being founded on natural laws ; and, if 
carried out fairly in India, they would speedily render 
our Asiatic soldiers quite as trustworthy as their 
European brethren in arms. 

The goodness of the sepoy depends on what his 
English officer instils into his mind. 

The raw material has no power for good, and 

VERY LITTLE FOR EVIL. 

The native Indian soldiers are to us collectively 
exactly like the limbs of our bodies individually. 
They are the bones and muscles of the whole frame, 
of which the Europeans are the brains and nerves; 
and when the latter are healthy and vigorous, the 
former will always be perfectly obedient, and strong 
only to do our bidding. 

Our system has paralysed the brains, and it is not 
surprising that the limbs should have lost all healthy 
vital force, and be moved about convulsively under 
the action of any external influence to which they 
may be subjected. 


SCHEME. 

The Queen of England formally to assume the style 
and title of Empress of India. 



432 


The armies of the several Indian presidencies to be 
henceforth styled the royal armies of India. 

In each of these armies, the whole of the European 
officers of the cavalry and infantry of all ranks, and 
the European officers of the artillery and engineers 
above the rank of colonel, to be formed into one 
general gradation list, in which, under ordinary cir¬ 
cumstances, all will rise by seniority. 

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank; 
all regimental and other rank being temporary only, 
and to continue only so long as officers may be serv¬ 
ing with regiments, or be otherwise actively employed. 

In case of officers being promoted for good service, 
&c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in 
the general gradation list according to the dates of 
their promotions, and to enjoy every advantage, exactly 
as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. 

This general gradation list to be styled the “ unem¬ 
ployed list.” All the officers borne on it, who may 
hold no special appointments, will reside in India at 
such places as Government may direct, but will per¬ 
form no public functions. 

A fourth presidency and fourth army to be added 
to India; our Bombay and Bengal armies together 
being divided into three equal parts for this purpose. 
The new presidency and army to be styled the North- 
West presidency, &c. 

The whole establishment of European officers may 
be somewhat less than at present; but under the 
proposed arrangement the number of officers to form 
the whole general list can readily be adjusted in prac¬ 
tice to meet the demands of the public service. When 


433 


these are once correctly ascertained, no further change 
will probably be requisite. 

For an army of the strength of the present army 
of Bombay, the following establishment might be 
proper:— 

No. Battalions or Regiments. Colonels. Lt. Cols. Captains. Lieuts. 


5 Artillery . 5 10 50 50 

4 Engineers. 4 8 40 40 

3 Cavalry . 3 6 30 30 

33 Infantry. 33 66 330 330 


45 Totals . 45 90 450 450 


Generals 5, Lieutenant-Generals 10, Major- 
Generals 15. 

The ranks of Major and Ensign to be abolished. 
The several ranks of officers while unemployed in 
India to receive pay as follows:— 


Generals. 

. Rs. 

1,500 

per mensem 

Lieutenant-Generals — 


1,200 

77 

Major-Generals . 


1,000 

77 

Colonel . 


600 

77 

Lieutenant-Colonel . 


• 400 

77 

Captain . 


300 

77 

Lieutenant . 


200 

77 


These rates of pay to be received wherever residing, 
by permission, in India, and the like number of 
pounds per annum being allowed to each while absent 
from India on leave to Europe. The option of re¬ 
tiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the 
general list to be allowed after thirty years’ residence 
in India, and after twenty years on half-pay. Leave 
of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local 
Governments. 

No distinction to be made with regard to leave on 
account of ill-health or of private affairs. 


F F 



















434 


Subscriptions to military and all other funds to 
cease to be compulsory. 

A distinct and separate civil service to be pro¬ 
spectively abolished. 

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to 
be educated at a military college in England, and to 
reside at such college for at least two vears, and not 
more than four years. The minimum age for admis¬ 
sion to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years. 

The course at the college to include full instruction 
in mechanical and physical science generally, and in 
political economy; also riding, rifle practice, and 
hardy exercises. 

The residence at the college to be free of all pecu¬ 
niary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding 
to join the service in India in due course; in which 
case, to cover all cost to the State, he should pay at 
the rate of 100/. per annum for the period during 
which he has resided at the college. 

From the general list, formed as above mentioned, 
officers are to be selected for every species of public 
employment, civil and military. 

For each native Indian infantrv regiment the 

J O 

establishment of English officers may be as follows; 
the pay assigned to each being in all cases staff pav, 
to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each 
according to his rank in the general list. But though 
an officer may hold a lower rank on the general list 
than that which is assigned to his position in a regi¬ 
ment, &c., the temporary rank is always to hold good 
for precedence and command during the period of 
employment. 


435 


For a Native Indian Regiment. 

1 Colonel . Rs. 600) Regimental pay, in 

1 Lieutenant-Colonel. „ 400 (addition to unemployed 

2 Captains (to be Adjutant and f pay, as per rank in 

Quartermaster) each .. „ 300) general list. 

For the cavalry, the like establishment to be 
allowed, with an allowance of one hundred rupees per 
mensem extra to each rank, to meet the cost of horses 
and other expenses. 

For the General Staff of the Army. 

1 Major-General, to be Adjutant-General of the 


Army, with staff pay. Rs. 1,500 

1 Colonel, to be Deputy Adjutant-General . „ 500 


And the like for the Quartermaster-General’s depart¬ 
ment. 

For a Brigade of any strength. 

1 Major-General . Rs. 1,000 Staff pay. 

1 Captain (Major of Brigade). ,, 400 „ 

For a Division. 

1 Lieutenant General . Rs. 3,000 Staff pay. 

1 Lieut.-Colonel (Adjutant-General) . „ 400 „ 

1 „ (Quartermaster-General) „ 400 „ 

1 Captain (Aide-de-Camp). „ 300 „ 

Proper office establishment, &c. &c., to be allowed 
to commanding and staff officers. Company allowance, 
&c., as usual. 

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the divi¬ 
sion in which they may be serving, are to receive 
unemployed pay only; and, if other officers act for 
them when absent, even within the division, otherwise 
than on duty, the like rule is to he in force; the 
officer acting for the absentee receiving his staff pay 
in addition to his own. 

Officers of the rank of Captain on the general list 
to he considered eligible for selection for any of the 

f f 2 












436 


higher regimental ranks. Lieutenants on the general 
list are not to be considered as eligible for higher 
regimental or other active employment than the rank 
of Lieutenant-Colonel. 

At their own request, and with the approbation 
of regimental commanding officers, any unemployed 
officers may he attached to do duty with regiments, 
without extra pay. 

The recommendations of officers commanding regi¬ 
ments, with respect to the appointment of officers to 
fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal there¬ 
from to the unemployed list, in consequence of proved 
incapacity, to he attended to. 

All enlistments, discharges, promotions to, and 
reductions from, every rank, of native officers and 
soldiers, are to rest with the Colonels of regiments, 
and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if 
necessary, in regimental orders. 

Articles of war for native Indian troops to be 
entirely abolished. 

Colonels commanding native regiments to have full 
magisterial authority over all ranks of natives in their 
regiments, soldiers, and followers. 

The extent of such powers to be the infliction of 
imprisonment with hard labour for a period of seven 
years, without the confirmation of higher authority 
being required ; to imprisonment with hard labour for 
fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the 
General Officer commanding the brigade; to trans¬ 
portation or capital punishment, subject to the 
confirmation of the General commanding the division 
or field force. 


43/ 


Regimental Lieutenant-Colonels and Captains are 
likewise to have magisterial powers, under the control 
of the Colonel commanding the regiment, and to such 
extent as he may think proper to authorise. In all 
cases involving the award of a graver punishment 
than three months’ imprisonment with hard labour, 
the infliction of a corporal punishment of twenty-five 
lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceed¬ 
ings of the trial are to he recorded in full, to be laid 
before the General Officer commanding when required. 

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with sum¬ 
marily, on due investigation by the commanding 
officer at public orderly-room ; a record of all such 
summary proceedings being kept in a book provided 
for the purpose, for the inspection of the General 


Officer commanding. 

Colonels of regiments are to be held strictly and 
solely responsible to their superior officers, and to the 
State, and not to the native Indian soldier, for the 
propriety of such proceedings. 

Permanent head-quarters to be established for each 
regiment, and carriage to be kept up at all times. 

For the European infantry, the establishment of 

officers per regiment may be — 

1 Colonel.Ks. 600 Staff pay. 


2 Lieutenant-Colonels, each 

10 Captains, each. 

1 Adjutant . < 

1 Quartermaster .. 

10 Lieutenants, each.. 


v 

•n 

Y) 

r> 


400 

300 

300) 

300) 

200 




To rank above 
the Lieutenants. 


Artillery. 

Artillery and Engineer officers each to be in a 
separate general list, up to the rank of Colonel 









438 


inclusive, and thereafter to be incorporated into the 
general list of the whole army, the senior Colonel of 
artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being 
promoted to Major-General as vacancies may occur. 

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms. 
Employed pay, whether regimental or ordnance, &c., 
to be allowed as for the cavalry. 

Each battalion of artillery to have field officers and 
staff as for a European regiment, the number of 
Captains and Lieutenants being regulated according 
to circumstances, to the number on leave, and re¬ 
quired for the ordnance and other professional staff 
services. 

All artillery officers in India to be considered as 
“ employed” when not on leave. 

In the ordnance department the rank and pay of 
the various grades to be adjusted as follows: — 

Senior Commissary. as Colonel. 

„ Deputy. as Lieutenant-Colonel. 

Commissaries of Divisions . as Captains. 

Assistant „ „ as Lieutenants. 

Engineers. 

Engineer officers, attached to the engineer corps, or 
holding other military appointments, to be on the 
same footing as artillery officers. But the duties of 
engineer officers generally in India are purely civil, 
and their salaries, &c., must be adjusted specially for 
each appointment. 

In all appointments other than military, officers 
will receive their unemployed military pay in addition 
to such emolument as may be assigned to them in 
their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or 







439 


on any account other than public duty, beyond the 
range of their immediate superior, they will receive 
only the unemployed rates of pay.—( October 1857.) 

Reply to some Observations on the Scheme of 

Reorganization. 

The objections which you mention to my proposed 
arrangements for the reorganization of the Indian 
service are such as have frequently been adduced 
against such proposals. 

I think that such objections have been brought 
forward by myself, when considering these matters in 
my own mind, even more strongly than they have 
been urged on me by others. 

I think also that I have discussed them fully; and 
however formidable they may at first sight appear, it 
seems quite certain that these objections are without 
real force ; and, indeed, that they rather point to 
advantages than to defects, to strength rather than to 
weakness. Their sum total appears to me to amount 
to this—where there is life there is also liability to 
disease. But, while admitting this to he self-evident 
truth, we surely need not conclude therefore, that, in 
order to prevent disease, it would be well to allow of 
no life. 

The stock of power which in the case in question— 
the Indian administration—we have to apply to the 
work before us, is the total amount of the moral and 
intellectual faculties of the English gentlemen in the 
service . 

Whatever tends to lessen the higher mental attri 
butes and the general energy of mind of these English 




440 


gentlemen, does in like proportion diminish our 
administrative, our ruling forces; and whatever tends 
to produce misapplication of existing individual attri¬ 
butes and energies, in like manner uselessly wastes 
our disposable administrative power. In the organi¬ 
zation existing at present in the Indian service, these 
defects are essentially inherent to a ruinous extent. 
Moral growth, and the development of mental powder 
and of cultivated individual energy, are systematically 
crushed. Natural forces are never recognised or 
thought of, and mechanical regulation is ever sub- 
stituted for vital power. Such arrangements cannot 

ENDURE. 

There is no life in our present system; there was 
none in it from the first: and the whole structure has 
now fallen to pieces before the eyes of the world. 

The stoutest prop of dead timber will, after a while, 
decay and fall down ; hut each single little grain, 
even of mustard seed, contains in itself a living prin¬ 
ciple ., which may expand and grow and reproduce for 
ever ! 

One of the greatest evils of our present system is, 
that its long continued habitual action has so obscured 
the judgment of many of our best authorities, that 
the very defects which have been produced by it 
appear to them to be reasons for its continuance. 

Our system has crushed the life out of the minds 
of our officers, and destroyed individual power; and 
now it is said that we cannot change this system 
because individual force of character is wanting, and 
we can find no living men fit to exercise the powers 
with which it is proposed to entrust them. This is 


441 


exactly equivalent to saying that slaves are unfit for 
freedom, and therefore slavery must continue. 

The decisive answer to this is, that the objection 
refers to an evil of an ephemeral nature onlv, which 
must speedily disappear before the remedy proposed, 
—to an evil which is indeed caused solely by the 
measure it is proposed to alter. 

Slaves mav often be unfit for freedom: but the 

i * 

existing slaves are individuals only, who will soon 
disappear from the scene ; while the action of the 
proposed remedy is perpetual. Establish freedom, 
and men will become worthy of being free. Few men 
by nature may be fit to command others ; but let our 
system be such as to tend to develop, instead of to 
destroy, commanding power, and a sufficient supply of 
such power will not long be wanting. In the admini¬ 
stration of a great empire, useful employment can 
always be found for men of every capacity , high and, 
low . The great thing is to get men into their natural 
places, where they can feel themselves useful , and 
justly respect themselves. They will then continually 
grow in mind, and daily acquire more and more power 
to command themselves, and others. This applies to 
high and low, without exception. The proposed con¬ 
dition is one of health, and must add to individual 
power. Let it never be forgotten, that the power 

OF BEING COMMANDED IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE 

power of commanding ; even as the corpuscles of a 
living body are most vigorously alive when they most 
completely conform to the general life-current which 
pervades the whole frame , and to which they contri¬ 
bute. The power of being commanded is not the 



/ 


442 

mere blind submission of an inanimate substance to 
external impulse, but a living and powerful force, 
which contributes greatly to the controlling power of 
a living head, but which has no existence under 
blind and dead mechanical regulation. 

We have few men able to command , and no suc¬ 
cession of commanders, because we strive to command 
by crushing the individual power of those under us. 

The organization which I propose to introduce 
would effect two objects of vast importance: it would 
create a strong tendency to cultivate, to draw out, to 
expand, and to increase, moral power and mental 
energy generally; thereby giving us a very great, and 
continually increasing, addition to the total amount of 
administrative and governing forces at our disposal. 
It would also cause a strong tendency to such adjust¬ 
ment as would place every individual in that position 
in which his powers could be most usefully applied; 
thereby enabling us to produce, with the forces at 
our disposal, the greatest possible effect. It is the 
CREATION OF SUCH TENDENCIES, Such LAWS OF PROGRESS, 
—to keep continually and silently acting in our 
system,—which appears to me to be of paramount 
importance. The mustard seed principle should be 
continually thought of in such matters. It will indeed 
remove mountains ! We are always inclined to over¬ 
government—it is the greatest evil in India: we 
cannot bear to leave anything to natural forces, and 
to the action of living principles; but must have a 
blind, unyielding, unexpanding regulation for every¬ 
thing, Nothing can live by such regulation ! We 
should rather confine our attention to removing 




443 


obstacles to natural development, and to the action of 
natural law. 

We should expect to meet with all manner of 
absurdities and extravagancies and disorders at first 
under the system which I proposed . A very great 
number of the men trained and habitually formed 
under the old system would probably not be able 
to work under the new; as their unfitness became 
apparent they should be removed elsewhere, or got 
rid of altogether. 

Gradually, things would become better and better, 
till the best possible condition of affairs had been 
arrived at; when mighty energies under perfect con¬ 
trol would everywhere appear. 

Our administrative machinery may, I think, well 
be likened to the steam-engine. Our apparatus is 
old, weak, and badly adjusted ; and instead of improv¬ 
ing the working-gear as it became unable to bear a 
strain on it, we have nearly extinguished our fires, 
and reduced the steam so low, that the engine can 
only just move itself, and can do no work at all: 
there may be no danger now of anything breaking, 
even as not a farthing can pass the Indian audit office 

-but THERE IS NO POWER. 

I would do with the machine of the State as with 
the engine. 

Stoke the fire, and get up the steam a little. The 
old engineer would probably exclaim that the boiler 
would burst, and the engine go to pieces. The reply 
might be, very possibly—they may do so, for there is 
a lot of rotten stuff in them ; but we will go quietly 
to work at first, and we will soon restore each part 




444 


which may fail. The steam being now turned on, the 
worn-out old nuts, bolts, rods, and valves probably 
begin to break, and flv off in every direction ; and 
perhaps the triumph of the old party might be com¬ 
pleted by a plate flying out of the boiler, and putting 
the fire out altogether. But the workman, the real 
engineer, nothing appalled, would say—all this I was 
prepared for: this is just what we wanted : we now 
know where the weakest parts are, and will soon put 
all to rights. Accordingly, under his directions, on 
goes a stout plate to the boiler; valves, rods, and 
bolts, of due strength, are all speedily in their places; 
and the engine in a few days is again in motion, as 
smoothly and as easily as ever, but now with full 
power , and doing an infinity of work . 

The analogy appears to me to be complete, and 
exact. 

The principles advocated by me appear to he 
natural laws: I cannot conceive that they could fail 
of success when fairly acted on. 

I have applied them myself for fifteen years to¬ 
gether, on every occasion and at every opportunity : 
they have never failed of complete success ; although, 
in every instance, almost all men were against me ; 
and those supposed to be the ablest authorities looked 
on my proceedings as little short of madness—“ Uto¬ 
pian nonsense.” 

There is an order of mind which cannot conceive 
how the earth can he held to the sun without some 
such contrivance as a chain cable. But we know that 
the most powerful forces are those which are least 
apparent to our vulgar senses. The smallest seed re- 


445 


presents a greater force than the heaviest and most 
massive rock. 

I should be obliged if you would again look over 
my “ Observations ” on the Reorganisation Scheme ; 
I condensed them and made them as short as I cojild; 
hut I think you will find that all real difficulties are 
satisfactorily disposed of .—(December 1857.) 

































‘ 

















































ADDENDA. 


Security for the Good Conduct of Kecruits. 

* You are aware that during many 
years it has been our practice to require security from 
two silidars for the good conduct of every recruit en¬ 
listed. This security is absolute; to the end that the 
securities deem a fault committed by the soldier for 
whom they are responsible as chargeable against 
themselves. The advantages of this system are at 
present being curiously illustrated, by the fact that 
the men of the two regiments already formed cannot 
be induced to go security even for their own relatives 
in Hindoostan, who are desirous of entering the third 
regiment, and from whom they may have been sepa¬ 
rated during the past two years. Many applications 
have been made to our silidars for such security ; but 
the reply has been—“ No; it is true you were loyal 
when we parted. But God knows what may be in 
your hearts now. The times are treacherous. Come 
first, and show what you are, and what you have been 
doing, and then we may agree !”—(1857.) 



448 


Order relative to the Mahomedan Festival of 

the Mohurrum. 

[Note by the Editor. —The subjoined order was 
issued by General Jacob in 1854, in a camp adjoining 
a town where some ten thousand Mussulmans resided. 
Yet no murmur or dissentient voice was beard; and 
the Mussulman soldiers, whom the order affected, 
have not only themselves abstained from infringing 
the command during subsequent years, but have, by 
their example of cheerful obedience, prevented a corps 
of Bengal irregular cavalry, recently stationed in the 
same camp, from attempting any infringement of it 
also. 

The order directly interferes with the religious 
ceremonies of the natives. Yet it was felt by the 
men to be based not on mere regulation, but on rea¬ 
son, and cheerfully obeyed accordingly; for they felt 
that the sole relation between a military commandant 

and his soldiers is the militarv relation. 

•/ 

A discipline which so controls and guides the minds 
of men, while developing and increasing their indi¬ 
vidual power and sense of freedom, must absolutely be 
founded on true and lasting principles—principles 
which, if applied to our Indian armies, would add 
tenfold military power to our arms, at one-half the 
cost to the State.] 


The camp at-has been, for the last week, the 

scene of wild disorder, such as is in the highest degree 
disgraceful to good soldiers. 





449 


A shameful uproar has been going on day and 
night, and this under the pretence of religious cere¬ 
monies. 

The commanding officer has nothing to do with 
religious ceremonies. 

All men may worship God as they please, and may 
act and believe as they choose, in matters of religion ; 
but no men have a right to annoy their neighbours, 
or to neglect their duty, on pretence of serving God. 

The officers and men of the-have the name 

of, and are supposed to be, excellent soldiers, and not 
mad fakeers. 

They are placed at the most advanced and most 
honourable post in all the Bombay presidency. The 
commanding officer believes that they are in every 
way worthy of their honour, and would be sorry if, 
under his command, they ever became unworthy of 
their high position. 

The commanding officer feels it to be the greatest 
honour to command such soldiers, but that it would 
be a disgrace to be at the head of a body of mad and 
disorderly fakeers and drummers. » 

He therefore now informs the-, that in future 

no noisy processions, nor any disorderly display what¬ 
ever, under pretence of religion, or of anything else, 
shall ever be allowed in, or in the neighbourhood of, 
any camp of-. 

This order is to be read on the first of every 
month until further orders, and is to be hung up in 

the bazar in the town of-, and at the kutcheree. 

—( 1854 .) 


G G 





















































































T f> 




















INDEX. 


A. 

Accountants, village, restoration and 
duties of, 73 ; the connecting-link 
between Government and the culti¬ 
vator, 74 ; neces-ary qualifications 
for, 74 ; salaries to, 74 ; who should 
pay them? 74 ; bearings of, and re¬ 
ply to, the question, 75. 

Administration, civil, 1, 419-424 ; mi¬ 
litary, 93, 419-424 ; of the North- 
West frontier of Sind, 349 ; scheme 
for the re-organization of the Indian 
army, 425-431. 

Advice, to a native prince, 369. 

Affghanistan, state of, in 1839, 287 ; 
invasion of, by Persia, 375 ; friendly 
to the British, 377 ; changes in, 
within the last ten years, 392. 

Alfghans, the, as recruits for our 
armies, 371 ; their character, 372 ; 
their appearance, and conduct in 
times of danger, 374 ; subsidising 
of, 380, 381. 

Agriculture, artificial encouragement 
to, impolitic, 71 ; its sole legitimate 
stimulants, 71. 

Ahmed Khan Mugsee, Sindian chief, 
334. 

Aliff Khan, and his intrigues with 
Boogtee settlers, 325. 

Alim Khan, Boogtee chief, 307, 326. 

Ali Moorad, Meer, rendezvous of ma¬ 
rauders in his territory, 323; takes 
part in Sir C. Napier’s hill cam¬ 
paign, 334. 

Amiel, Lieutenant, and his Belooch 
horsemen, 298, 300. 

Anglo-Saxon, the, contrasted with the 
Oriental, 1, 427 ; the dominant 
race in India, 2 ; deteriorating in 
Bengal, 101, 117, 419, 421, 428. 

Apparatus, for army rifle, 275. 

Arabia, purchase of horses in, 214. 

Arabs, 405. 

Arkwright, what his spinning ma- 
chiner}’’ has done for England, 234. 

Armies, of Bengal and Bombay : com¬ 
parison between the systems obtain¬ 


ing in, 117 ; normal condition of the 
Bengal army a state of mutiny, 117, 
122 ; Bengalee idea of the cause, 
117; the true causes, 118, 123; state 
of affairs in the Bombay army, 119; 
seniority system of promotion in 
Bengal, 119 ; drilling, 120 ; propor¬ 
tions of European officers requisite 
with European an 1 native troops, 
120, 121 ; example in the Sind Irre¬ 
gular Horse, 122 ; discipline and 
character of that corps, 122 ; state 
of affairs in Bengal extending to 
Bombay, and why, 123, 212. 

Armies of England : remarks on the 
true principles of their organization, 
93 ; supply of soldiers how regu¬ 
lated, 95 ; inducements and rewards 
to be adopted, 96 ; the Ironsides of 
Cromwell an English silidar corps, 
97 ; source of their excellence, 97 ; 
present military system, and its ope¬ 
ration, 98 ; chief evil a special code, 
99 ; working of the military code, 
99 ; natural qualities of British sol¬ 
diers, 100 ; what their military 
education has done for them, 100 ; 
present system must be abandoned, 
101; base for new arrangements, 101. 

Armies, recruits and recruiting for, 
98, 108, 133, 371, 447. 

Arming a free people, remarks on, 93; 
a large standing army unnecessary, 
93 ; legitimate object how to be at¬ 
tained, 93 ; the English people of 
old really warlike, 94 ; might again 
be made so, 94 ; description of Go¬ 
vernment necessary for such a peo¬ 
ple, 95 ; system dangerous to des¬ 
potisms, 95 ; supply of soldiers how 
regulated, 95 ; lesson from the ma¬ 
nufacturer, 95 ; application of it, 
96 ; principles to be adopted in or¬ 
ganizing an army, 96 ; Cromwell’s 
soldiers, 97 ; how to improve pre¬ 
sent material, 98 ; no special laws 
necessary, 99. 

Arms, training in the use of, 94 ; of 
irregular cavalry, 151 ; the sepoy’s 

G G 2 








452 


INDEX. 


musket, 223 ; cavalry swords, 224 ; 
rifles, 228, 233, 275. 

Army, native of India : remarks on 
its state and efficiency, and the 
means of remedying its existing de¬ 
fects, 124 ; the subject long ago 
discussed, 124 ; defects of the pre¬ 
sent system, 124 ; principle of dis¬ 
cipline the sepoy best understands, 
125 ; want of power in regimental 
commanders one enormous evil, 
124, 126 ; unselected European offi¬ 
cers another, 126; influence of Eng¬ 
lish officers with sepoys, 126, 431 ; 
imitation of European follies unwise, 
128, 203 ; its effects on efficiency, 
129 ; example of the “ regular” sys¬ 
tem, 129 ; common-sense recom¬ 
mended, 129 ; principles to be re¬ 
garded in the appointment of 
European officers, 130 ; Sir John 
Malcolm’s proposition, 130, 134 ; 
plan proposed for the Bombay army, 
131 ; how its principles might be 
better followed out, 132 ; result of 
such arrangements, 133 ; the Mus¬ 
sulmans of Hindoostan the best men 
for the army, 133, 214 ; example of 
their qualities, 133 ; the Indian army 
might be employed abroad, 134 ; 
re-consideration of Sir J. Malcolm’s 
proposition, 134 ; vices of the se¬ 
niority system of promotion, 211 ; 
scheme for reorganization, 425- 
431. 

Army, of Bengal: its defects and in¬ 
discipline manifold and glaring, 101; 
motives for exposing them, 102 ; the 
most serious faults, 102 ; first fault, 
conduct of English officers in deal¬ 
ing with Asiatics, 102, 103 ; princi¬ 
pal cause, 103 ; another cause, 104 ; 
remedy, 104 ; second, third, and 
fourth evils, position of command¬ 
ing officers, system of payment, and 
conduct of messes, 102, 103, 106 ; 
remedy in the hands of Govern¬ 
ment, 107 ; fifth evil, absence of 
confidence between officers and 
sepoys, 103, 108 ; sixth evil, the 
caste system, 103, 108 ; its working 
and effects, 109 ; the Bombay sys¬ 
tem, 110 ; one great excellence of 
the Bombay sepoy, 110; compari¬ 
son of the Bengal and Bombay 
sepoys, 111 ; remedy for the defect, 
112 ; seventh evil, the bad system 
of promotion, 103, 112 ; its effects 
on the private soldier, 112 ; equally 
baneful with the native officer, 113 ; 
difference under a proper system, 
113; maintenance of the semblance 


of an army wonderful under the 
Bengal system, 115 ; eighth evil, 
want of discipline, 103, 115 ; guard¬ 
mounting in Bengal, 115; remedy 
for the evils apparent, 117 ;—source 
of greatest danger to our Indian 
empire, 229. 

Army rifle, description of best, 275. 

Articles of war, injurious to irregular 
cavalry, 158. 

Artillery, horse, and cavalry charges, 
228 ; bullock, in the Kutchee hills, 
305, 311, 315; proposed establish¬ 
ment and pay for, 437. 

Asia, Central, great commercial road 
of, to the ocean, 46, 379. 

Asiatics, desiderata in dealings with, 
2, 102, 103, 415, 416, 424, 426. 

Assamees, property in, 139, 173 ; prices 
of, 144, 172 ; rules respecting, in the 
Sind Horse, 171. 

Assessment on land, in the North-West 
Provinces, 55-57 ; in Sind, 59; in 
the Frontier District of Sind, 367. 

Audit department, the, working of, 
219. 

B. 

Baggage Corps, 193; camp supplies, 
193; importance of their proper 
management, 193 ; rule to be ob¬ 
served respecting prices, 193 ; origin 
of the idea of a camel baggage corps, 
191; establishment maintained, 194 ; 
period of its existence, and cost, 
194 ; cost of commissariat arrange¬ 
ments, 195 ; men of the corps 
soldiers as well as camel-men, 195; 
result of this arrangement, 196 ; the 
corps useless for object contemplated, 
197 ; circumstances under which 
alone such a corps could be main¬ 
tained, 197 ; Bengal commissariat 
perfect, 199, 201 ; cause of Colonel 
Monson’s retreat, 199 ; cost of the 
camel baggage corps experiment, 

200 ; cause for its existence so long, 

201 ; evils of the present carriage 
system, 201 ; scheme proposed, 202 ; 
benefits of such a system, 202 ; how 
success may be commanded, 202. 

Bagh, in Kutchee, mission to the Khan 
of Khelat at, 334. 

Balls, leaden, Jacob’s rifle, 233, 253, 
270, 271 ; Minie, 241, 274 ; cannon, 
245, 259 ; zinc-pointed, 255 ; iron- 
pointed, 255, 258, 275. 

Ball, rifle, explanation of difference 
between the Minie and Jacob, 280 ; 
the Minie ball, 280 ; rifle and powder 






INDEX. 


453 


best adapted to it, 280,281; the Jacob 
ball, 281 ; charge and barrel best for 
it, 281, 282; advantages of short 
barrels, 282 ; sizes of rifles, 283. 

Band instruments, military, 148. 

Banks, regimental, 155. 

Batta, field, recommended to be 
abolished, 202. 

Batteries, horse and bullock, 305. 

Beebruclc Khan, head of the Boogtee 
tribe, 306, 309. 

Beejar Khan, and the predatory tribes 
on the frontier of Sind, 289, 295, 
331 ; his surrender, 314. 

Bell, Mr., and the predatory tribes on 
the frontier of Sind, 287, 296. 

Beloochee horsemen, cowardice of, 298 ; 
scouts, 358, 360. 

Beloochees, fights with, 298, 299, 301, 
310, 343, 358, 360 ; a ruse by, 303 ; 
treachery, 307 ; settlement at Jana- 
deyra, 318, 321 ; plundering excur¬ 
sions, 321, 322 ; disarmed and set to 
work, 324, 325 ; leaders slain at the 
action of Zemanee, 345 ; as recruits 
for our armies, 371. 

Beloochistan, wild tribes of, 287 ; in¬ 
vasion of, by Persia, 375 ; disposi¬ 
tion towards the British, 379. 

Belooch Khan, the head of the Doomb- 
kee tribe, 288, 297. 

Bengal, army of, its defects and indis¬ 
cipline, 101 ; compared with that of 
Bombav, 117. 

Billamore, Major, and proceedings on 
the frontier of Upper Sind, 297, 298, 
302, 307, 309 ; field force order by, 
on the conclusion of the campaign, 
326 ; thanked by the Brigadier com¬ 
manding in Upper Sind, 327. 

Blood-feuds, measures adopted re¬ 
specting, in Upper Sind, 363,365, 366. 

Board, military, its attributes, 219. 

Bolan, the pass of, the grand natural 
outlet to the ocean of the commerce 
of Central Asia, 46 ; road through 
it, 379; proposed arrangements for 
a British force above it, 385, 393. 

Bombay, army of, compared with that 
of Bengal, 117 ; supplies from, for 
the Persian expedition, 413; effi¬ 
ciency of its commissariat arrange¬ 
ments, 413. 

Boogtees, of Kutchee, 288, 306, 394 ; 
fights with, 151 note , 308, 310,311, 
325, 343 ; proclaimed outlaws, 318, 
319, 338 ; successful incursions 

across the British border, 319, 321 ; 
signal punishment, 325, 338, 341, 
360; surrender of the chiefs, 325 ; 
final disposal of the tribe, 326. 


Boordeeka, 357, 360. 

Boordee tribe, marauding propensities 
of, 318, 322. 

Borderer, attempt by a, to raise a re¬ 
bellion, and its results, xv. note. 

Border, the, of Upper Sind, protective 
measures for, 356-362. 

Brahmins, their influence in the Bengal 
army, 109 ; in the Bombay army, 
110, 119. 

Brahooees, as recruits for our armies, 
371 ; their characteristics, 372, 
374. 

Breeches, leather, vs. cloth pantaloons, 
227. 

Bridges, methods of constructing, 35, 
36 ; pavements to, 35 ; preservation 
of roadways of, 35 ; in Upper Sind, 
357. 

Brigade, orders, 327 ; establishment 
and salaries recommended for officers 
of, 435. 

British, the, secret of their rule in 
India, 1 ; contrast of races, 1, 427 ; 
natives grateful to benefactors, 1 ; 
mistrustful of equals, but submissive 
to superiors, 2 ; basis of British 
power, 2; how it may be firmly 
established, 2, 3, 16,427 ; how hope¬ 
less and vicious, 2 ; England power¬ 
less in evil, 2 ;—proceedings in the 
hills north of Kutchee, 287 ; position 
in India, 377, 397. 

Brown, Captain Lewis, of Kahun, and 
proceedings in Kutchee, 296, 300, 
304, 309. 

Brown, Mr. E. J., and his mission to 
the Khan of Khelat, at Bagh, 333 ; 
escape from robbers, 333; descrip¬ 
tion of Kutchee by, 334; directions 
respecting the treatment of Boogtee 
marauders, 338. 

Bunder Abbas, 402, 404. 

Bunds, protection of, by contracts, 76; 
public expenditure on them unsatis¬ 
factory, 76 ; they should be watched 
and guarded, 76 ; contracts for their 
maintenance should be invited, 76 ; 
rules relative to their preservation, 
77. 

Bunyas, their relations with cultiva¬ 
tors, 70; their connection with 
robbers in Upper Sind, 359. 

Burke, Edmund, an authority for non¬ 
interference with market prices, 
24. 

Bushire, 402 ; as summer quarters for 
troops, 408, 411; should be retained 
by the British, 410 ; water supplies 
at, 411 ; as a point embarkation, 
415. 




454 


INDEX. 


c 

u Calcutta Review,” remarks on ail 
article in, entitled “ Hints on Irre¬ 
gular Cavalry, &c.,” 135. 

Camel Baggage Corps, 194. 

Campaign, first, in the hills north of 
Kutchee, 287 ; appendix to the 
memoir, 326. 

Camp supplies, 193. 

Canals, clearing of, 26; to the Indus, 
from Ivurrachee, 40; effect of re¬ 
moving dams from, 79 ; excavation 
of, by robber tribes, 324, 355. 

Candidates, for enlistment, in the 
Nizam’s service, 141; for the Sind 
Irregular Horse, 180, 221; for the 
Indian army generally, 221; edu¬ 
cation of, for the Indian services, 
434. 

Cannon, rifled, ranges of, 245, 258; 
shot and shell for, 245, 258, 275. 

Carriage, remarks on the supply of, 
84; plan adopted at Jacobabad, 84; 
interference with market rates con¬ 
demned, 85; first effects of the with¬ 
drawal of restraint, 85; no remedy 
but conforming to natural laws, 86; 
instance, 87; the only wise principle 
to be established, 87; troops should 
always be ready to move, 88; effect 
of such a healthy system, 88; dif¬ 
ferent workings of the systems 
under discussion, 89 ; difference of 
cost, 89. 

Case for army rifle, with apparatus, 
275. 

Caste, the bane of the Indian army, 
103, 108-117; has no real connection 
with religion, 220. 

Cavalry, for transport by sea to the 
Persian Gulf, 406; should be com¬ 
plete, 406; native regular cavalry 
best for such service, 406; European 
cavalry in the way in Persia, 407; a 
source of weakness, 407. 

Cavalry, native, best men for, 133, 
142; the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry 
in Persia, 134 ; Bengal and Sind 
Irregulars, 135; men of the Nizam’s 
service, 144, 161; rates of pay of, 
147; the Bombay army, 147; debt 
ruinous to, 146, 150, 157; arms for 
irregulars, 151; Skinner’s horse and 
the Brahooees, 152; Sind Horse at 
the fight of the Zemanee, 151 note, 
343; Bengal irregulars, on the Sind 
frontier, 185; swords, 224. 

Caucasus, the, Russia in, 375, 405. 

Chancery, the Indian court of, 38. 

Chapman, Lieutenant, canal proposed 
and planned by, in Sind, 45. 


! Character, European, should be up¬ 
held in India, 2, 3; influence of per¬ 
sonal character, 16; of Englishmen 
deteriorating in India, 102-117, 421, 
422, 440. 

Charges, horse artillery and cavalry, 
228; of cavalry irresistable, 230. 

Chinnee creek, reclaiming of, 40. 

Christianity in India, 8, 423. 

Chuttur, the town of, in Kutchee, 288, 
291. 

Civilisation, advance of, amongst rob¬ 
ber tribes, 4, 318, 321, 324, 363. 

Clarke, Lieutenant, and his horsemen 
in the Kutchee hills, 299, 302, 308. 

Ciibborn, Major, at Nuffoosk, 315. 

College, proposed, for candidates for 
the Indian service, 434. 

Commissariat, how to be maintained 
efficient on service, 193 ; cost for 
moving troops, 195; perfection of 
arrangements in Bengal, 199, 201; 
effects of defectiveness, 199; efficiency 
of the Bombay establishment, 413. 

Commissions, military, as courts of 
civil judicature, 83; re-hearings of 
trials, 83; the trials a mere pretence, 
83; a great desideratem, 83. 

Committee, proceedings of, on pattern 
army rifle, 248. 

Communication, overland, with India, 
404. 

Companies, flank, and sizing, bad in 
principle, 222. 

Confessions, to policemen, 83; should 
be discouraged, 84; the magistrate 
alone competent to receive them, 84. 

Constantinople, Russian schemes to¬ 
wards, 377. 

Contracts, for repairs of roads, 37; 
ferries, 41; protection of bunds, 76; 
canal-digging, 80. 

Copland’s Med. Diet., quotations from, 
205. 

Corry, Lieutenant, and campaigning 
in Upper Sind, 293, 294. 

Cossacks, A Afghans proposed for the 
work of, 381. 

Courts martial, European forms of, 
unsuitable for the native army, 125, 
129, 158 ; injurious to irregular 
cavaly, 158; unknown in the Sind 
Horse, 158. 

Cotton, Sir W., his opinion of the Sind 
Irregular Horse, 187. 

Courts of justice, military commissions 
as, 83; proper courts one of the 
greatest wants, 83. 

Crimea, the withdrawal of the British 
from, 375. 

Cromwell’s Ironsides, an English sili- 
dar corps, 97, 187. 



INDEX. 


4,35 


Cultivation, increased, followed by 
more abundant rain in the desert, 
80; instance in proof, 80. 

Customs dues, 52. 

D 

Dadur, Skinner’s Horse at, 152; rail¬ 
way from, to the sea, 380. 

Dams, effect of removing, 79; project¬ 
ing of off-shoots from canals, 79 ; 
determination to remove them, 79; 
fears entertained by landholders, 
79; results of the measure, 79. 

Deen Mahomed Kyheeree, repulse of 
marauders at Kundranee by, 346. 

Desert, the, taxation of, 73; its pro¬ 
duce, 73 ; main object in dealing 
with the tribes of, 73; effects of in¬ 
creased cultivation in, 80; mistakes 
respecting its breadth, 335 note. 

Detachments, frontier, of the Sind 
Horse, strength of, in 1847, 356; 
plan for the relief of, 361. 

Deyra, the chief town of the Boogtees, 
288; expedition to, 305; description 
of the place, 306; taken possession 
of, 309. 

Dil Morad-ke-Ghuree, outpost of, 361. 

Discipline, in the Bombay army, 111, 
117, 118; want of in Bengal army, 
115, 118 ; essential for its main¬ 
tenance, 184, 188; effects of the 
seniority system on, 211; example 
of the working of a sound system, 
448. 

Disease, malignant, amongst horses, 

181. 

Districts, the frontier, of Sind, pro¬ 
ceedings in, 287, 317; principles of 
procedure, 349 ; summary of ar¬ 
rangements made, 353; protective 
military systems, 356; disarming of 
the population, 358, 362; dealings 
with mauraders, 364 ; standing 
orders for frontier posts, 367; as¬ 
sessment of land, 367. 

Division, officers and pay proposed for 
a, 433. 

Doombkee tribe, of Kutchee, 288, 365, 

' 394 ; their towns, 288, 291 ; fight 
with them, 299 ; their settlement at 
Janadeyra, 318, 321, 352. 

Dost Mahomed, horsemen of, at the 
battle of Goojerat, 373 ; his friend¬ 
liness to the British, 378. 

Dress of soldiers and sepoys, 100,115, 
128, 132, 154. 

Dues, customs and pier, 52 ; pier fees 
should be abolished, 52 ; duty on 
machinery and goods, 52. 


Dundas, Sir H, on guard-mounting, 
116 ; on the Sind Horse, 184 ; 
despatch from, respecting the de¬ 
struction of Boogtee robbers by a 
detachment of the Sind Irregular 
Horse, 340. 

Durya Khan, chief of the Jekranees, 
291 ; his surrender to politicals in 
Upper Sind, 314. 

Dust-storms, of Eastern Kutchee, 292. 

E. 

Education, in engineering, &c., objects 
of, 54; proposed college for candi¬ 
dates for the Indian service, 434. 

Elevations, scales of, for the sights of 
Jacob’s rifles, 278. 

Eley and Brothers, recommended as 
cap and tube-makers, 278. 

Empire, Indian, 299. 

Enayut Shah, of Shahpoor, 291. 

Enfield rifle, the, and Minie ball, 282. 

Engineer corps, the proposed orga¬ 
nisation of, 438. 

Engineering, 54; limiting of normal 
class scholars to Government em¬ 
ploy. 54 ; objects in maintaining the 
institutions, 54; scholars in the 
districts, 55. 

England, powerless in evil, 2; her 
export to counterbalance the reve¬ 
nue drawn from India, 15 ; Indian 
officers in, 207; what Arkwright has 
done for her, 234; work before her 
in India, 419, 421. 

Euphrates, valley of the, and Russian 
policy, 403. 

Examinations, 9 ; objections to our 
competitive examinations, 9; to civil 
service tests, 10 ; to the one test for 
all appointments in India, 11; a 
knowledge of the language widely 
different from a passed examination 
in the vernacular, 11 ; no need for 
such passing, 13; system of selec¬ 
tion must be adopted, 14, 423. 

Expeditions, into Eastern Beloocbi- 
stan, 287, 292, 294, 304; to Persia, 
401, 403. 

F. 

Fairs, proclamations of, 50, 223. 

Fees, at ferries, 41 ; for accommoda¬ 
tion to travellers and traders, 49, 
50; for the use of piers, 52 ; on 
grazing-lands, 71, 73. 

Ferries, public, 41 ; farming of, an 
evil, 41 ; licensing an improvement, 




456 


INDEX 


41 ; perfect freedom the best plan, 

42 ; experiment of freedom, 42 ; re 
suit, 42 ; ferry contracts, 42; ap¬ 
proaches to ferries, 43. 

Field force, frontier, proposed for the 
Bolan Pass, 387. 

Flotilla, Indus, 53. 

Forbes, Major J., and Bombay cavalry 
in Persia, 134. 

Forces, natural, alone important, 3; 
simile for present proceedings, 3 : 
the most powerful forces, 439- 
445. 

Forests, conservancy of, 53 ; Govern¬ 
ment agency should cease, 54. 

Fortifications, unnecessary in general, 
in India, 222 ; none on the frontier 
of Sind, 362. 

Forts, destruction of, on the frontier of 
Sind, 354. 

France, benefits of our alliance with, 
376. 

Frontier detachments, state of, in Sind, 
185, 353-356. 

Frontier, the north-west, of India, 
papers relating to, 52, 287, 317, 349, 
375. 

Frontier trade returns, 52. 

Frontier tribes, 4, 287, 317, 325, 349, 
356, 371-374, 388. 

Fund, military, its effects on the army, 
and on society, 203 ; what it really 
is, 204. 

Funds, regimental, 149 ; assamee, 171; 
military, 203. 

Furloughs, effects of, on Indian society, 
204; existing rules out of date and 
unfair, 204; a physiological fact, 
204 ; authority for it, 205 ; effects 
of present regulations on English 
society, 207; sabbatical system re¬ 
commended, 207; benefits of such an 
institution, 208. 

G. 

Garden and Son, directions to, for a 
saddle, 232; in connection with 
rifle practice, 262. 

General orders, 335, 337. 

Ghizree Creek, 41. 

Gibbard, Captain, trial of rifles by, 273. 

Goldney, Captain P., and notice re¬ 
specting Boogtee marauders, 338. 

Goojerat, incident of the battle of, 373. 

Goorkas, the, as material for a native 
army, 133, 214. 

Gordon, Brigadier, order by, on relin¬ 
quishing command of the troops in 
Upper Sind, 327. 

Goree Naree, 358. 


Green, r Co!onel, reports by, on rifle 
practice, 270, 272. 

Green, Lieutenant, rifle practice by, at 
Jacobabad, 264, 265. 

Griffins, and griffinism, 104, 105. 

Guffoor Mahomed, Jemedar, and the 
Sind Horse, in a fight with Boogtee 
robbers, 337. 

Guides, Beelooch, on the frontier of 
Upper Sind, 358, 367. 

H. 

Hancock, Colonel, report by, on Jacob’s 
rifle and rifle-balls, 271. 

Hassan-ke-Ghuree, spies at, 358. 

Head-quarters, fixed, for regiments, 96, 
134, 169, 213, 437. 

Herat, designs of Russia and Persia 
on, 376 ; as an English fortress, 377. 

Hill tracts, pastoral, management of, 
71 ; chiefly valuable as grazing- 
lands, 71; statistics desirable, 72; 
the people not to be compelled to 
resort to agriculture, 72 ; staple 
wealth of the districts, 72; best 
method of dealing with the inhabi¬ 
tants, 73; results, 73. 

Hindoo Khoosh, the, in connection 
with the security of India from in¬ 
vasion, 377. 

Hindoostanee, passing in, 11, 423. 

Hindoostanees, the best material for 
native soldiers, 133, 214,220; con¬ 
trasted with Affghans, &c., as 
soldiers, 372; at the battle of Goo¬ 
jerat, 373. 

Hoodoo, escape of Boogtee robbers at, 
320. 

Horse fairs, opinion on, 223 ; effects of 
proclamations of, 223. 

Horses, compensation for, to irre¬ 
gular cavalry, 164; neglect of, 166; 
casting of, 167; unprecedented mor¬ 
tality amongst, 181; remarks on the 
purchase of, for military purposes, 
214; Government agency injurious, 
215, 223; cost, 215; plan recom¬ 
mended, 216 ; stud-bred, of India, 
worst of all, 217 ; a great mistake, 
217 ; selection of breeders, 217 ; 
merits of different breeds, 218; pro¬ 
perty in, amongst the Belooch bor¬ 
der tribes of Sind, 323. 

I 

India, natives of, incapable of self- 
government, 1, 426 ; grateful, 1; 
mistrustful, 2 ; appreciate fairness 





INDEX. 


457 


and honesty, 2; ideas of their rights, 
426. 

Indian empire, source of greatest dan¬ 
ger to, 229. 

India, north-west frontier of, 287, 317, 
349, 375 ; suggestions towards its 
permanent defence, 375, 401; British 
errors in Turkey, 375; the Persian 
quarrel, 375; Russian policy in the 
East, 375, 390 ; furtherance of her 
designs on India, 375-385 ; the pre¬ 
sent our time for action, 377; ad¬ 
vantages of arrangements proposed, 
377; Herat as an English fortress, 
377; present position of the British 
in India, 378; opportunity for bet¬ 
tering it, 378 ; great routes into 
India, 378; disposition towards the 
British of the Affghans and Beloo- 
chees, 378, 379; the Bolan Pass, 379; 
the Khyber Pass, 379; Quetta as a 
position for a large force, 379; sub¬ 
sidy of the Affghans, 380, 381; 
raising of auxiliaries, 380; liow to 
render invasion impossible, 379, 380; 
line of conduct to be observed in 
dealing with the Affghans, 381; 
presence of a British force neces¬ 
sary, 383; difference between present 
and former proceedings in Affghan- 
istan, 383 ; Russian advance, 384; 
present frontier arrangements and 
remedy, 385; memorandum of pro¬ 
posed arrangements, 385 ; adminis¬ 
tration of the frontier district, 386; 
officers, 386; arrangements at Quet¬ 
ta, 387; frontier field force, 387; 
relations with Ivhelat, 388; advan¬ 
tages of an establishment at Quetta, 
389; Khelat frontier stations, 389; 
real enemy of the British in Persia, 
390; insufficiency of operations on 
the sea-board, 390, 402, 409; Persia 
and her Russian advisers, 390; 
Quetta should be occupied perma¬ 
nently, 391; the danger of delay, 
391; Affghanistan during the war, 
and at the present time, 392; the 
question of posting a force at Quetta 
discussed, 393; communication with 
Sind, 393; the tribes of the country, 
393; plunderers of Northern Sind 
and the Bolan, 394; country between 
Quetta and Sind, 394; principles to 
be applied in the proposed advance, 
395; cost of troops, 395; arrange¬ 
ments for accommodation and pro¬ 
vision, 395; commercial result of 
such establishment, 397; a financial 
view, 397; position of the “red line,” 
397; consequences of a war in India 
with a European invader, 398. 


India, observations on the present 
condition of, 419; recent occurrences 
long foreseen, 419, 421; causes of 
defects, 419; the work England has 
to perform, 419, 421; ability of the 
English to accomplish it, 420; con¬ 
fidence, and the forces in India 
sufficient, 420; opinion of the Per¬ 
sian field force, 420; its military 
power, 420 : degradation of the 
European mind in Bengal, 421, 
422; cry of the people of India and 
our reply, 422; our only opponents, 

422 ; the supposed “ props ” of the 
falling empire, 423; the real props, 

423 ; theory advocated, 423, 424; 
applicable in all circumstances, 424; 
example, 424; Asiatics and “passed ” 
men, 424. 

India, reorganization scheme for its 
civil and military administration, 
425-439 ; preliminary observations, 
425; faults in the state of the native 
army, and their causes, 425; native 
idea of the rights of the subject, 426; 
our conduct towards the people, 426; 
regulations and articles of war, 427; 
absurdity and effects of the present 
system, 428; advantages of the pro¬ 
posed organization, 429; essentials 
to its successful working, 429 ; 
obvious objection, and remedy, 430; 
principles of universal application, 
431; the sepoy and his officer, 431; 
proposed scheme, 431; general ar¬ 
rangements, 432; the “unemployed 
list,” 432; establishment of Euro¬ 
pean officers for an army, 433; pay, 
433; leave, 433; funds, 434; civil 
service, 434; education of candidates, 
434; number and pay of officers for 
a native regiment, &c., 434, 435; 
powers of commanding officers, 436; 
establishment and pay of officers 
for a European regiment, 437; artil¬ 
lery and engineer officers, 437; 
ordnance department, 437; appoint¬ 
ments other than military, 438. 

India, reply to some observations on 
the proposed reorganization scheme 
for, 439; sum total of the objections, 
439; stock of power for the work in 
India, 439; defects in applying it, 
439; reply to objections to change 
of system, 440; evils of present 
system, 440; what the system 
should be, 441 ; two important 
objects to be accomplished by 
propoposed organization, 442; first 
effects of the new system, 443; 
simile for administrative ma¬ 
chinery, 443; successful application 





458 


INDEX. 


of proposed principles, 444 ; the 
most powerful forces, 444. 

India, secret of British rule in, 1; 
character of the natives, 2; general 
stock of power for government, 14, 
439; native army of, 124; the north¬ 
west frontier of, 287; how to secure 
from invasion, 378-381 ; conse¬ 
quences of a war in, with a Euro¬ 
pean invader, 398; scheme for the 
reorganization of its civil and mili¬ 
tary administration, 425-439. 

Indus flotilla, the, beyond the sphere 
of the State’s functions, 53; arrange¬ 
ments desirable, 54. 

Indus, the, canal to, from Kurrachee, 
40; railway to, 41. 

Infantry, European, invaluable, 407; 
establishment and pay proposed for 
a native regiment, 435; for Euro¬ 
peans, 437. 

Influence, moral, exertion of, amongst 
rude tribes, for securing labourers, 
80; instance of the canal through 
the desert to Khyree Ghuree, 81; 
mode of procedure adopted in this 
case, 81; workmen employed, 81; 
how induced to labour, 81; the same 
principles of action recommended in 
future operations, 82. 

Islam Khan, Boogtee, 306, 359. 


J. 

Jacobabad, rifle practice-ground at, 
237 ; experiments on rifles at, 239; 
shell practice at, with 8-gauge rifles, 
241; reports of rifle practice at, in 
1854-55, 263 ; condition when first 
visited, 353. 

Jacob, Captain (General), on the de¬ 
terioration of the Bombay army, 
123, 212 ; on the silidaree system of 
the Sind Horse, 141 ; on arms, 151, 
223, 224, 233, 275 ; on baggage and 
animals, 190; reports on his rifle 
and rifle balls, 263-268, 273 ; his 
expeditions north of Ivutchee, 293, 
294, 296, 301, 304; settlement by, 
of the Doombkees and Jekranees, 
at Janadeyra, 318 ; appointed to 
command the frontier, 320; measures 
adopted, 321; order, by, relative to 
the Mohurrum, 448 

Jalk, or Julluck, on the Klielat fron¬ 
tier, 389. 

Janadeyra, settlement of robber tribes 
at 318, 356. 

Janee, Belooch robber chief, 303 ; his 
surrender, 314. 


Jan Mahomed Kyheeree, at the fight 
of the Zeinanee, 344, 346. 

Jekranees of Kutchee, 287, 394; their 
towns, 288, 291 ; settlement of at 
Janadeyra, 318, 322-326, 356 ; sur¬ 
prise after a plundering excursion, 
323; disarmed and set to work, 324, 
358. 

Jummal Khan, Doombkee chief, 317. 

Jutts, tribe of, 292. 

K. 

Kahun, the chief town of the Murree 
tribe, 288 ; expedition to 304, 311. 

Kahur tribe, of the Bolan Pass, 394. 

Kandahar, designs of Russia on, 376, 
391. 

Karoon, valley of the, and Russian 
policy, 403; should be annexed by 
the British, 405, 409. 

Ivarrack, island of, the best place in 
the Persian Gulf for troops, 411, 
412 ; water at, 411, 412 ; the best 
position for the British Resident in 
the Persian Gulf, 414. 

Kars, effects of its fall on Persia and 
India, 375. 

Kateychee-ke-Ghuree, difficulties of 
the country around, 312. 

Ivhangur, state of the country around 
in 1847, 321, 353, 355. 

Khelat, the Khan of, and his feuda¬ 
tories, 289, 330 ; manifesto of Sir 
C. Napier on his invasion of the 
Khan’s territories, 330 ; relations 
with the British, 378, 380 ; re¬ 
sources, 388. 

Khoords, the tribe of, ready to serve 
the British, 405. 

Ivliyber Pass, the, in its relation to the 
security of India, 379. 

Kyree Ghuree, caual at, 81; protection 
of the frontier from, 356. 

Kir man, in Persia, 402. 

Koonree, in Upper Sind, fight near, 
344. 

IvosaU tribe, the, marauding propen¬ 
sities of, 318. 

Kotree, as a site for a railway ter¬ 
minus, 44. 

Ivumber, guarding the frontier to, 360. 

Kuudranee, attack on, by Boogtees, 
346. 

Kurrachee, requirements of, as a port, 
40; railway to the Indus from, 41. 

Kusmore, frontier arrangements at, 
357, 360. 

Kutchee, memoir of the first campaign 
in the hills north of, 287; insecurity 
of the route to Affghanistan, 287 ; 



LNDEX. 


459 


positions of the tribes of Kutchee, 
287; the Doombkees and Jekranees, 
287; heads of the tribes, 288; prin¬ 
cipal towns, 288; dust-storms, 292; 
range of thermometer in Sind in the 
hot season of 1839, 293; strength of 
detachment first despatched," 293 ; 
the first day’s march, 294; intention 
abandoned, 294; the second expe¬ 
dition, 294 ; progress of the force, 
296; first encounter with the enemy, 
298; want of cavalry, 297; sur¬ 
prise and pursuit of the Doombkees, 
299; march on Ooch, 300; descrip¬ 
tion of the place, 300 ; Jthe country 
around, 301; fight with the enemy, 
302 ; ruse of the Beloochees, 303 ; 
return to Poolijee, 303 ; expedition 
into the Murree and Boogtee Hills, 
304 ; arrangements, 304 ; “ beef” 
horse batteries, 305 ; unopposed ad¬ 
vance of the troops, 305 ; the 
chief of the Boogtees, 306; descrip¬ 
tion of the town of Deyra, 306 ; 
hostile preparations, 306 ; proceed¬ 
ings at Ivahun, 307 ; demonstration 
by the enemy, 308; Deyra occupied, 
309; annoyances by the enemy, 309; 
decisive victory of the British, 310; 
march on Ivahun, 311; skirmish in 
the Murrow valley, 311 ; difficulties 
en route, 312; occupation of Kahun, 
313; preparations for a return, 314; 
the first view of “Nuffoosk,” 314 ; 
surrender of the robber chiefs, 314; 
the return, 315 ; Clibborn’s disaster, 
315; march over “ Surtoff ” to Poo¬ 
lijee, 316; secret of Major Billa- 
more’s success, 316; beneficial effects 
of the campaign, 316; total strength 
of the detachments, 317 ;—subse- 
subsequent proceedings to the close 
of 1847, 317;—field order by Major 
Billamore on the breaking up of the 
field force in 1830, 326 ; brigade 
order by Brigadier Gordon, on re¬ 
linquishing command of the troops 
in Upper Sind, 327; farewell letter 
from Captain Outram to Lieutenant 
Jacob, 328;—manifesto by the Go¬ 
vernor of Sind on invading the 
Khelat territories, 330]; tribes of 
the country, and their proceedings, 
330 ; Beejar Khan Doombkee and 
his doings, 331; Shere Mahomed, ex- 
Aineer of Sind, 332; proceedings of 
and with the Khan of Khelat, 332 , 
Mr. Brown’s escape from robbers, 
333;report ofthe state ofthecountry, 
334; punishment of the robbers de¬ 
termined on, 338;—Sir C. Napier on 
the discipline and courage of the 


Sind Horse, 335 ; attack and cap¬ 
ture of Shahpoor, 336;—desperate 
fight with robbers, 337; outlawry of 
the Boogtees, 338; Government noti¬ 
fication on the destruction of the 
Boogtees by the Sind Horse, 339 ; 
despatch from the commanding 
officer in Sind on the same subject, 
340 ; letter from Major Jacob, for¬ 
warding the report of the action, 

342 ; Lieut. Merewether’s report, 

343 ; general order by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, 348. 

lvuzistan, the district of, should be an¬ 
nexed to the British empire, 404,409; 
to abandon it an error, 409 ; im¬ 
portance of its possession, 410. 

Ivyheerees their repulse of marauders, 
346; bravery of, 347. 

L. 

Labour forced, abolition of, advocated, 
18; absolute freedom the rule for 
market prices, 18; effects of such a 
rule, 19; similar principles advan¬ 
tageous for labour, 19; present state 
of affairs, 19; remedy, 20; profit by 
the arrangement general, 21. 

Labour forced, abolition of, in Sind: 
minute on objections, 21, the freest 
market the cheapest, 21, 25; in¬ 
creased demand enhances the value 
of labour, 21 ; inducement to immi¬ 
gration, 21 ; importation of labour¬ 
ers, 22; labour how kept out of 
the market, 22; remedy, 22; the 
slave and freeman contrasted, 22, 
25 ; error respecting rates of pay¬ 
ment, 23 ; Sind capable of yielding 
ten times the present revenue, 23; 
payments to inhabitants and foreign¬ 
ers, 23; truest economy for Govern¬ 
ment, 24 ; authority for the axiom, 
24; attempt to force labour criminal, 
24; position of the labourer, 24; his 
rights, 24; freedom, in its effects, 25; 
a corps of Sindhee labourers desira¬ 
ble for public works, 26. 

Labour, forced, abolition of, in Sind, 
26; statistics of canal-clearances, 27; 
question at issue, 27 ; its natural 
laws, 27 ; arguments on both sides, 
28; forced labour should be pro¬ 
hibited. 29 ; rules proposed, 29 ; the 
system a perpetuated abuse, 31 ; 
requisites for the introduction of a 
healthy system, 32; notice issued, 33. 

Labour rates, calculation of, in certain 
districts, 34; mode of procedure and 
results, 34. 






460 


INDEX. 


Lahree, description of the town of, in 
Kutchee, 289. 

Land, titles to, and leases of, 59 *, mis¬ 
apprehensions of instructions, 59 ; 
excessive taxation of cultivators in 
consequence, 60 ; intentions of 
Government, 60; propositions for 
adjustment of claims, &c., 61; rules 
for leasing waste lands, unclaimed, 
61 ; for lands lying waste, hut 
claimed, wholly or in part, 63 ; for 
lands claimed, and under crop or 
lying fallow, 65 ; for the protection 
of tax-payers from fraudulent claims, 
69; liberty to villagers in the em¬ 
ployment of labour and capital, 70 ; 
circumstances beyond the province 
of Government interference, 70 ; 
assessment on lands on the frontier 
of Sind, 367. 

Languages, effects of our examinations 
in, 11; should officers unable to pass 
be removed? 17; no time should be 
fixed for passing in, 17; operation of 
the proposed rule, 17 ;—a supposed 
prop to our Indian empire, 423. 

Larkhana, settlement of Boogtee tribes 
on lands near, 325 ; communication 
with, 355. 

Leases, of forests, to private parties, 
54 ; of land, 59. 

Libel, remedies for, 7. 

Liebeg, example from his “ Let¬ 
ters,” 52. 

M. 

Macaulay, application of remarks of: 
to the Sind Horse, 187 ; to the pre¬ 
sent condition of India, 422. 

Mahomedan, order relative to the 
Mohurrum, 448. 

Mahomed Hussun, wuzeer of Beejar 
Khan, Doombkee, 289 ; 

Malcolm, Sir John, an authority on 
the subject of the native army of 
India, 124, 128, 130, 134; his opinion 
of the 5th Regt. Bombay N. I., 
296; criticism of certain of his 
remarks, 422. 

Manton, John, and Son, their guns 
and rifle balls, 237, 247, 254. 

Marauders, mistaken leniency towards, 
364; instance in point, 364 ; legiti¬ 
mate object of punishment, 364; 
principles of action adopted with the 
tribes of Upper Sind, 365 ; the old 
state of things, 365; feelings of 
parties affected, 366 ; recommenda¬ 
tion, 366. 

Marauders on the Sind frontier, 287; 


Doombkees and Jekranees, 287, 318, 
330, 352; Boogtees, 306, 314, 319, 
325, 330, 333, 338; Murrees, 312; 
Kosahs and Boordees, 318; Muz- 
zarees, 322, 366. 

Markets and market rates, effects of 
regulations on, 5, 18, 19, 50, 84. 

Maxims, 2, 8, 380, 396. 

Meeanee, incident at the battle of, 227. 

Meerpoor, outpost of, 356. 

Mehrab Khan, of Kutchee, 289. 

Merewether, Lieutenant, and the Sind 
Horse, at the fight of the Zemanee, 
151 note, 325, 343-348. 

Messes, defects in the system of, in 
Bengal, 103. 

Military board and audit depart¬ 
ment, 219. 

Military commissions, as courts of 
civil judicature, 83. 

Military fund, 203. 

Minie ball, a failure, 241; original and 
improved, 241, 275 ; best barrel and 
powder for, 281, 282. 

Minie rifle, defects of, 228. 

Missionaries, non-interference with, 8; 
should be wholly unconnected with 
the State, 8; official countenance of, 
dangerous, 8; maxim of government 
with respect to religion, 8 ; State 
religion injudicious, 9 ;—opinion re¬ 
specting them, 423. 

Mobarukpoor, outpost of, on the Sind 
frontier, 356. 

Mohumra, 411; a deadly locality, 412; 
stationing of troops there an error, 
412; sickness on board the shipping 
at, 412. 

Mohurrum, the, order relative to the 
Mahomedan festival of, 448; the 
circumstances under which the 
order was issued, 448 ; its objects 
and effects, 448; its success proof of 
the excellence of the system of dis¬ 
cipline adopted, 448; the order, 448; 
the commanding officer and religious 
ceremonies, 449; the officers and 
men and their position, 449; pro¬ 
hibition of noisy processions, &c., 449. 

Monson, Colonel, causes of his re¬ 
treat, 199. 

Moostung, produce of the valley of, in 
Affghanistan, 396. 

Moral being, 2; maxim to be incul¬ 
cated, 2, 8; source of rank in the 
universe, 2 ; rule for conduct to¬ 
wards rude people, 2; results of 
such procedure, 3 ; our real nature 
alone worth thinking on, 7, 8 ;— 
moral influence, 80 ; sign of weak¬ 
ness, 414; rules for conduct towards 
orientals, 415, 116. 






INDEX. 


461 


Murree Hills, the, expedition into, 
304, 312. 

Murrees, of Kutchee, 288, 312. 

Murrow Valley, the, skirmish in, 311. 

Mussulmans, of Hindoostan, as mate¬ 
rial for the native army, 133, 214, 
220, 372. 

Mutineers, sepoy, and their officers, 
220; first step of mutineers, 220; 
how they should be dealt with, 220. 

Mutiny Act, the, injurious to the 
army of England, 99; objectionable 
in the Indian army, 126. 

Mutiny, at Shikarpoor, xv note; nor¬ 
mal condition of the Bengal army, 
117, 124. 

Muzzaree tribe, of Beloochees, 322,366. 

Muzzurdaun river, the, in Kutchee, 300. 

N 

Nanarck. in connection with proposed 
operations in Persia, 408. 

Napier Sir C., on the marching of 
troops, 89 ; his opinion of the Sind 
Irregular Horse, 187, 335, 337 ; over¬ 
reached by Belooch robber tribes, 
303 ; state of the Sind frontier up to 
his arrival in the country, 328 note; 
manifesto issued on his invasion of 
the Khelat territories, 330 ; error in 
his figures, 335; his mistake re¬ 
specting the breadth of the desert 
between Ivhanghur and Och, 336 
note; his directions regarding the 
treatment of Boogtee marauders, 
338. 

Napier, Sir W., in error respecting the 
width of the desert between Khan- 
ghur and Ooch, 336 note; his mis¬ 
take respecting the Sind Irregular 
Horse, 337 note. 

Noorwah canal, the, clearing of, by 
Jekranees, 324. 

Nooskee, on the Khelat frontier, 389. 

Nuffoosk, the pass of, first visit to, 
314. 

o 

Officers, commanding, test for appoint¬ 
ment as, 10; their want of power, 
102, 106, 121 ; true position of, 125, 
136; qualities necessary in, 126,135; 
powers desirable for, 159 ; should be 
selected, and entrusted with full 
powers, 163 ; daily orderly-room by, 
209. 

Officers, European, should not be 
wasted, 3, 14 ; consequences of ren¬ 


dering them “cheap,” 3, 15; their 
character should be raised in native 
estimation, 3; their energies and 
moral influence the sole return for 
the revenues of India, 15; power 
of personal character, 16 ; should 
unpassed officers be removed? 17 ; 
failure after fair trial should involve 
removal, 17 ; subalterns and the mi¬ 
litary fund, 203 ; Indian officers in 
England, 206 ; new furlough regula¬ 
tions proposed for, 207; qualifications 
of staff officers, 222 ; establishment 
and salaries proposed in a scheme 
for the reorganisation of the Indian 
services, 433-438. 

Officers, native, abilities of, 13, 222 ; 
system for promotion of, 113, 119; 
cause of their inefficiency in Bengal, 
119 ; of irregular cavalry really 
officers, 158 ; more required for the 
Sind Horse, 183 ; vices of the seni¬ 
ority system of promotion, 211. 

Officers, settlement, duties, &e. of, 61. 

Officials, incompetent, non-removal of, 
18; why allowed to remain, and 
consequences, 18 ; superior shrink¬ 
ing from duty unfit to rule, 18; 
practical resemblance, 18. 

Officials, native: village accountants, 
73 ; policemen, 83. 

Ooch, in Kutchee, description of, 300. 

Orderly-room, should be daily held by 
every commanding officer, 209; good 
effects of such an arrangement, 210. 

Orders, general, not adapted for regu¬ 
lation of markets, 5, 84 ; removal of 
a prohibitory order,230; precautions 
in an enemy’s country, 230; field 
force orders, in Persia and in Upper 
Sind, 326; brigade orders, Upper 
Sind, 327 ; general orders by Sir C. 
Napier, 335, 336, 337; standing, for 
the frontier posts of Sind, 367 ; 
order relative to the Mohurrum, 
448. 

Organisation, the, of the armies of 
England, its true principles, 93 ; of 
the armies of Bengal and Bombay, 
101-123; of the native army of 
India in general, 124 ; of the Sind 
Horse, 170; of the Camel Baggage 
Corps, 194; scheme for the reor¬ 
ganisation of the civil and military 
administration of India, 425-439 ; 
reply to objections to the scheme, 
439. 

Oriental, the, characteristics of, 2; 
how commanded, 415,416; the school 
of smooth words, 416. 

Outposts, on the frontier of Sind, 356; 
standing orders for, 367. 



462 


INDEX. 


Outrarn, Captain (Major-General Sir 
J.), on the state of the Sind frontier 
in 1842, 328. 

P 

Pantaloons, cloths, vs. leather breeches, 
for mounted men, 227. 

Pathans, character of, 133 ; as recruits 
for our armies, 371. 

Patrols, border, in Sind, 357, 358, 359, 
367. 

Pay, system of drawing, in Bengal, 
103, 106 ; of the native army, should 
be increased, 132, 147, 156, 160, 175, 

182 ; plan suggested, 202 ; proposal 
respecting, in a scheme for the reor¬ 
ganisation of the Indian administra¬ 
tion, 425, 433, 435, 437. 

Peacocke, Lieutenant, and proceedings 
in the Ivutchee Hills, 307. 

People, free, contrasted with the slave, 

22, 25 ; remarks on the arming of 
free men, 93. 

Persia, effect on, of the fall of Kars, 
375; Russian policy in, 375, 384, 390, 
392, 403 ; British demonstrations on 
the seaboard, 390, 402 ; designs of, 
on Herat and Kandahar, 390, 391 ; 
papers relating to the recent war 
with, 401 ; Russian advice to, 404. 

Persian war, the, papers relating to, 
401 ; its policy, 401 ; what may and 
should be done, 402 ; the expedition 
a great error, 403; annexation of 
the valleys of the Karoon and Eu¬ 
phrates recommended, 403, 405 ; de¬ 
scription of cavalry best adapted for 
the expedition, 406; military re¬ 
quirements, 407; remarks on holding 
onr own ground after victory, 408; 
Kuzistan should be permanently 
occupied, 409 ; water supplies at 
Bushire and Ivarrack,411; Mohumra, 
Bushire, and Carrack, as summer 
quarters for troops, 411 ; insalubrity 
of Mohumra, 411, 412; supplies from 
Bombay, 413; supplies from the 
valley of the Euphrates, 413 ; em¬ 
ployment for the troops, 414; con¬ 
cealment of the condition of the 
Indian army unwise, 414; arrange¬ 
ments recommended before leaving 
Persia, 414; Bushire as a point of 
embarkation, 415. 

Peshawur, a proper place for a fortress, 
222 . 

Pesheen, the valley of, in Affghanistan, 
379, 396. 

Pindarees, of the Indus, 334. 

Plans and estimates vs. a road and ! 


canal, 38 ; instance of too many 
plans and estimates, and no work 
done, 38 ; consequences, 39; descrip¬ 
tion of work required, 39 ; amount 
of money wasted on experiments, 
39. 

Plunder, disposal of, in Sind, 359. 

Point and cut : the cut more effective 
than the point, 225; best swords for 
foot and horseback, 225 ; cutting 
powers of weapons of the Sind 
Irregular Horse and of Belooch 
warriors, 227. 

Policy, of the Persian war, 401, 403; 
Russian, 375, 384, 390, 392, 403. 

Poolijee, description of the town of, in 
Kutchee, 291, 297; proceedings of 
the Khan of Khelat at, 332. 

Presidency, a fourth, recommended 
for India, 432. 

Press, liberty of the, 6; how to com¬ 
mand public praise, 6 ; what we are 
alone worth thinking on, 6 ; public 
servants and publicity, 6; the press 
and its supporters, 6 ; it never wil¬ 
fully misleads the public, 7 ; three 
remedies for libel, 7 ; press gagging, 
and its consequences, 7 ; how 
calumny may be averted, 7 ; laws 
of the moral and physical worlds, 
8 ; maxim, 8 ; perfect freedom is 
perfect law, 8. 

Prince, native, advice to a, 369 ; ar¬ 
rangements necessary for friendly 
relations, 370 ; internal administra¬ 
tion, 370 ; aid afforded, 370 ; simile, 
371 : benefits from attention to 
advice given, 371. 

Prize property, 221; right of conquest 
over private property, 221. 

Processions, prohibition of noisy, 448. 

Promotion, Bengal system of, 113-115, 
211 . 

Property in assamees, 139, 174; prize, 
221 ; personal, 221. 

Provinces, North-West, the, revenue 
system of, 55. 

Punchayets, preferable to courts mar¬ 
tial in native regiments, 158 ; of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, 158. 

Punjaub, the, in connection with a 
Sind railway, 47. 

Q. 

Quetta, as an advanced British post, 
379 ; proposed arrangements for a 
British force at, 385 ; permanent 
occupation recommended, 391 ; cer¬ 
tain commercial result, 397. 






INDEX. 


463 


R. 

Rahmut, a famous Belooch leader, 303; 
his surrender to political officers, 
314. 

Railway, to connect the Indus with 
Kurracliee, 43 ; terms of the con¬ 
tract, 43; why Hyderabad should be 
neglected, 43 ; Kotree unsuitable as 
a terminus, 44 ; railway merely to 
connect Kurrachee with the river 
must prove a failure, 44; best pro¬ 
ject for water communication, 45 ; 
benefits derivable from a canal, 45 ; 
natural commercial road from Cen¬ 
tral Asia to the ocean, 46; country 
from Dadur to Seliwan favourable 
for a railway, 47 ; Seliwan the pro¬ 
per point for a river terminus, 47 ; 
advantages of a line from Kurrachee 
to Sehwan, 47 ; wisest course of 
proceeding, 48. 

Raitt, Captain, and campaigning in 
Kutchee, 296, 304, 307, 310. 

Rank, and pay, proposed, for the 
Indian services, 433, 435, 437, 438. 

Recruits, and recruiting, 96, 109, 133, 
371; security for good conduct, 447; 
object in demanding security, 447 ; 
advantages of the system, 447 ; 
effects of recent events in a silidar 
corps, 447. 

Religion, State interference in, unjust 
and impolitic, 8 ; mischievous, 8 ; 
State religion incompatible with 
security of empire, 9. 

Reorganisation, proposed, of the civil 
and military administration of India, 
425-439; reply to objections, 439. 

Resident, British, in the Persian Gulf, 
station for, 414 ; what he should be, 
414. 

Revenue settlement, what it reallj r is, 
57 ; essence of a really good collec¬ 
tor, 57 ; the people overtaxed, 58 ; 
advice, 58, 59. 

Revenue system, of the North-West 
Provinces, 55 ; remarks on the co¬ 
parcenary system, 55; inconsistent 
to introduce it into Sind, 55 ; objec¬ 
tions and suggestions, 56 ; probable 
effects of its introduction, 57. 

Rifles, memoranda on, in their appli¬ 
cation to the purposes of war, 233 ; 
importance of good tools, in peace 
and war, 234 ; what spinning 
machinery has done for England, 
234; arms of English soldiers, 234 ; 
attention to improvement of rifled 
fire-arms, 234 ; pattern rifled pre¬ 
pared, 235 ; powder, 235; descrip¬ 
tion of the rifle, 236 ; ranges and 


effects, 236, 237 ; extent and cost of 
experiments, 237 ; practice-ground, 
237; distances of targets, 237; what 
may be accomplished with such 
arms, 238, 244 ; proceedings at 
Jacobabad, 239; defects of the two- 
grooved rifle, 239 ; the four-grooved 
rifle, 239 ; reason for its rejection 
by authority, 240 ; experiments to 
determine the best shaped ball, 240, 
252, 273; conical ball, 240; defects of 
original Minie ball, 241 ; improved 
Minie ball, 241 ; form of ball finally 
adopted, 243 ; its range, 243; merits 
of percussion rifle shells of the same 
shape, 243 ; particulars respecting 
the construction of shells, 243, 244 ; 
ranges of rifled cannon, 245 ; 32- 
gauge shells, and cannon shot, 245, 
274; powder used in the experiments, 
245; particulars of the shell prac¬ 
tice at Jacobabad, 247 ; proceedings 
of a committee of inquiry, 248 ; 
description of rifle submitted, 248; 
object with which the piece was 
made, 248 ; groove - making, 249 ; 
result of the inquiry, 250 ; rifles 
used, and how, 250 ; comparison of 
methods of firing, 251; sights, 252 ; 
further experiments with rifles and 
balls, 253 ; effects of increased 
charges of powder on leaden balls, 
253 ; remedies attempted, 253 ; 
description of ball necessary, 254, 
255; illustrations of shapes of balls 
before and after firing, 254 ; rifle 
ball with zinc or iron point, 255 ; 
mode of rifling adopted with “ Lan¬ 
casterguns, 260 ; trial of zinc 
balls, 255; error in reports of Enfield 
rifle practice, 256 ; real facts, and 
proof, 257; iron-pointed balls, 258; 
greased patch, 258; best methods of 
preparing and carrying rifle ammu¬ 
nition, 258 ; cannon and cannon- 
shot, 259, 274; “Lancaster” guns, 

260 ; their liability to burst, 260 ; 
concluding observations on the twist 

261 ; grooves, 261 ; patches, 261 ; 
rifled cannon and cannon-shot, 262 ; 
information on rifle practice, 262 ; 
—reports of rifle practice at Jacob¬ 
abad in 1854-55, 263-268; report 
by the Adjutant General Bombay 
army on Jacob’s rifle and rifle 
balls, 269; description of rifle used, 
269 ; result, 270 ; rifle shells, 270 ; 
gentlemen present at the practice, 
270, 271 ; Jacob’s rifle shells and 
bullets recommended to special at¬ 
tention, 271 ; report of rifle prac¬ 
tice at Bombay, 272 ; rifle practice 





464 


INDEX. 


at Kurrachee, 273 ; result of the 
practice, 274; penetration of Jacob’s 
iron-pointed rifle balls, 275; experi¬ 
ments at Kurrachee, 275. 

Rifles, Jacob’s, 235, 269, 275 ; me¬ 
moranda on, 233; description of 
best, for the army, 275 ; scales of 
elevations for sights, 278 ; propor¬ 
tions recommended for general pur¬ 
poses, 279 ; best sizes, 283. 

Road, commercial, of Central Asia, 
46, 379. 

Roads, repairs of, by contracts, 37 ; 
annual repairs, 37 ; defects of the 
system, 37, 38 ; contracts for long 
periods preferable, 38 ; constructed 
all over Upper Sind, 358. 

Robbers, border, checks on, 358 ; mis¬ 
taken leniency towards, and its 
effects, 364. 

Rojaun, outpost of, 356. 

Rule, British, in India, secret of, 1. 

Rules, military, on high caste men, 
baseless, 220. 

Russia, working of our military code 
in the recent war with, 100 ; policy 
in Persia and the East, 375, 384, 389, 
391, 403 ; advice to Persia respect¬ 
ing the British expedition, 404. 

s. 

Saddle, directions for a, 232 ; object 
in view, 233. 

Salaries, civil, reduction of, 14; officers 
underpaid, and results, 14; English 
energy and morality, 15 ; influence 
of character, 15; desiderata, 16; 
proposed military salaries, 433, 435, 
437, 438. 

Scabbards, wooden, 226. 

Scheme, for the reorganisation of the 
administration of India, 419-424. 

Science, political, related to all science, 
51; false political economy, 51; land 
revenue and taxes on trade, 51 ; 
essential for thoroughly understand¬ 
ing any science, 51; example, and 
authority for it, 52. 

Scott, Captain, rifle practice by, 273. 

Scouts and spies, on the frontier of 
Upper Sind, 358, 359. 

Secret, of British rule in India, 1. 

Security, for the good conduct of re¬ 
cruits, 447. 

Seewajie, true descendants of his 
mountain rats, 296. 

Sehwan, as a site for a railway termi¬ 
nus, 47. 

Selection vs. examination, 9; objec¬ 
tions to our competitive examina¬ 


tions, 9; embryo statesmen and 
clever clerks, 10 ; civil service tests, 
10 ; effects of the examinations in 
native languages, 11, 423; objec¬ 
tions to the present test for appoint¬ 
ments, 11 ; hoAv a knowledge of the 
people is to be acquired, 12; the 
best security for fitness, 13, 423 ; 
secret of opposition to a system of 
selection, 13; English talent in India 
for administrative requirements, 13; 
selection must be adopted, 14, 423 ; 
English officers the general stock of 
power for government, 14. 

Seniority system, vices of the, and its 
unavoidable consequences, 211 ; 
ruinous to discipline, 212; com¬ 
manding officers, 212 ; drill-masters, 
213 ; principles recommended, 213. ; 

Sepoys, their caste, vs. discipline, 109; 
of Bombay and Bengal, 110-117 ; 
promotion in, 112; Bengal sepoys on 
guard, 115; the raw material, 117, 
431 ; relations with commanding 
officers, 125, 426 ; gratitude, 127 ; a 
“regular” in full dress, 129; the 
best men for the army, 133, 214, 
220 ; how mutineers should be dealt 
with, 220; what sepoys should be 
in the field, 231 ; employment of, in 
Persia, 413. 

Service, readiness for, 89, 180. 

Shahpoor, description of the village 
of, in Kutchee, 292, outposts of,356. 

Shaik Ally, Russaidar, at the fight of 
the Zemanee, 345, 346, 347. 

Shaw, Lieutenant Colonel, despatch 
from, respecting the destruction of 
Boogtee robbers, 342. 

Shawl, the valley of, in Afghanistan, 
its capabilities for the support of 
troops, 395, 396. 

Shells, Jacob’s rifle, 243, 244, 271, 
275-278; 32-gauge recommended, 
283 ; for rifle cannon, 275. 

Shere Beg, Boogtee, 314 note. 

Shere Mahomed, night attack by, 222; 
his proceedings on the frontier of 
Sind, 332. 

Siiikarpoor, mutiny at, xv note; range 
of thermometer at, in 1839, 293 ; 
country around in 1847, 356. 

Shot, cannon, 244, 259. 

Silidar corps, compensation to, 164 ; 
regulations of 1849 objectionable, 
164; illustration of the systems of 
Bengal and Sind, 165; compensation 
to be avoided as a rule, 166 ; excep¬ 
tions, 167 ; pay should be liberal, 
167 ; casting of horses, 168. 

Silidar horse, remarks on, 135 ; con¬ 
dition of the Bengal irregulars, 135; 






INDEX. 


465 


qualifications of commanders, 135, 
136; native prejudice, 136; appoint¬ 
ment and powers of commanding 
officers, 136, 137, 157, 160; discipline 
of irregular cavalry, 139 ; assamees 
or silidarees, 139; silidars and 
bargheers, 140 ; three-horse silidars, 
142 ; five-assamee russaldars, 142 ; 
six-horse silidars, 143 ; rule for pro¬ 
motion, 143; interference with 
bargheers injurious, 143 ; prices of 
assamees, 144; vacancies, 145; be¬ 
setting sin of the Bengal irregular 
cavalry, 146 ; sons of native officers 
as bargheers, 146 ; pay, 147 ; deno¬ 
minations of ranks, 147 ; the rus- 
saldar major, 148 ; kettle-drums and 
trumpets, 148; regimental funds, 
149; system with the Sind Horse, 
149 ; indebtedness of Bengal irregu¬ 
lars, 150; arms, 151; Sind Horse 
carbines, 151 ; story of the Bra- 
hooees and Sldnner’s Horse, 152; 
uniform, 153 ; supply of clothing, 
153; accoutrements, 154; marching 
of irregulars, 154; regimental 
bazars, 155 ; regimental banks, 155; 
a horseman in debt ruined as a soldier, 
156,157; courts martial, 158; puncha- 
yets, 158 ; silidars and their horses; 
159; pensions, 160; standards, 160; 
sword exercise, 160 ; riding-schools, 
160; hint respecting bargheer and 
silidar corps, 161 ; cost of regular 
and irregular cavalry of Bombay, 
161 ; proposed silidar cavalry, 162 ; 
requisites to ensure success to the 
scheme, 163 ; security for the good 
conduct of recruits, 447. 

Silidar rifle corps, infantry, organisa¬ 
tion of, 168 ; the only difficulty, 168; 
description of men required, 168; 
regimental arrangements, 168,169; 
additional arm recommended for the 
Sind Horse, 169; capabilities of 
such a force, 169. 

Similes, 3, 7, 18, 95, 99, 100, 350, 371, 
376, 424, 431, 443, 444. 

Sind Horse, carriage arrangements of, 
189 ; minute penned after a review 
of the corps, 189 ; baggage and ani¬ 
mals required by each regiment, 
189; readiness for service, 190; 
essence of the strength of the silidar 
system, with reference to carriage, 
191 ; causes of the success of the 
carriage arrangements, 192. 

Sind Horse, the, celerity of their 
movements, 89, 150, 191 ; strength 
of the irregulars, 122; assamees, 139. 
144, 170; regimental fund, 149; 
penalty for indebtedness, 146, 156 ; 


arms, 151; fight of the Zeman e, 
151 note , 325, 343; dress, 153; 
accoutrements, 153; bazar, 155; 
pay, 156 ; punchayets, 158 ; horses, 
159, 181; standards, 160; drill, 161; 
cost of each man, 161; volunteers, 
163; punishment for neglect of 
horses, 166; compensation for horses, 
167, 168; a troop of horse artillery 
recommended for each regiment, 
169; system of promotion, 213; 
incidents at the battle of Meeanee, 
227; nucleus of the corps, 298; fights 
with marauders, 322, 325, 336, 337, 
339, 343, 345; Sir C. Napier on the 
courage and discipline of the corps, 
337; mistake of Sir W. Napier 
regarding it, 337 note; outposts and 
detachments on the frontier, 355; 
at the battle of Goojerat, 373. 

Sind Horse, the, memoranda on the 
constitution of, as exemplifying the 
silidar principle, 170; transfer of 
men, 170; silidaree system first 
adopted, 170; new rules introduced, 
171; results, 172; prices of assamees, 
173; property in assamees neces¬ 
sary, 174; best system of silidar 
arrangements, 175; pay, 177; the 
regiment not an irregular corps at 
all, 177; result of the peculiar train¬ 
ing of the corps, 177-179; native 
officers, 179; constant endeavour in 
the organisation of the corps, 179, 
186, ; disadvantages under which it 
labours, 180; secret of success, 181; 
instance of extraordinary expenses, 
181; present rate of pay insufficient, 
182 ; advantages to the State from 
extra disbursement, 183; more native 
officers required, 183; change of 
designation desirable, and deserved, 
184; condition of the frontier while 
guarded by Bengal irregular cavalry, 
185; when guarded by the Sind 
Horse at the time of the Cabool 
disasters, 185; state of affairs since 
1847, 185, 186 ; present condition 
and spirit of the corps, 187; requisite 
for the maintenance of its character, 
188. 

Sind, labour abundant in, 22; capable 
of yielding ten times its present 
revenue, 23; forced labour abolished, 
26, 33; canals, 26, 38; railways, 41, 
43; commercial road of Central Asia, 
46 ; flotilla and forest, 53 ; titles to 
land, and leases, 59; the Thurr or 
desert district, 73, 80; bunds, 76; 
dams, 79; the Khyree Ghuree canal, 
81; courts of justice, 83; supply of 
carriage, 84; Sind Horse, 169, 189; 

H II 






66 


1NDKJX. 


Camel Baggage Corps, 193; cam¬ 
paigns on the frontier, 287-317. 

Sind, the North-West Frontier of, 
campaign on, in 1839, 287; subse¬ 
quent proceedings to the close of 
1847, 317; arrangements effected on 
the close of the first campaign, 317; 
position of the troops, 318; success¬ 
ful incursions of marauding tribes, 
319; state of the frontier on the 
arrival of the Sind Horse, 320; 
measures adopted by Major Jacob, 
321; discovery of unsuspected rob¬ 
bers, 322; predatory rendezvous, a 
surprise, 323; the Jekranees, 324; 
result of measures taken with the 
“ lootoos,” 324; power of the Boog- 
tees broken in a single fight, 325; 
flight and final surrender of the 
chiefs, 325;—principles of procedure, 
349; measures, offensive and defen¬ 
sive, 349; grounds of action, 349; 
state of the frontier in 1847, 351; 
first year’s proceedings, 351; result, 
352; anticipations, 352;—summary 
of arrangements made, 353; popu¬ 
lation of Ivhanghur on first arrival, 
353; condition of the troops, 353; 
preliminary proceedings, 354; diffi¬ 
culties encountered and overcome, 
355; results, 355; improvements 
effected, 355;—military system in¬ 
troduced for its protection, 356; 
outposts and detachments in 1847, 
35G; general arrangements, 356, 
357; new system adopted, 358; dis¬ 
covery of relations existing between 
the maurauders and Bunyas, 359; 
signal punishment of a robber 
tribe, 360; further proceedings, 361; 
greatest physical difficulty, 362; 
fortifications, 362 ;—disarming the 
population, 358, 362; possession of 
arms allowed under certain condi¬ 
tions, 363; aggression and retalia¬ 
tion, 363;—standing orders for 
frontier posts, 367;—assessment of 
land, 367; benefits under proposed 
arrangements, 368 ; assessment 
should be stationary, 369. 

Slavery, vs. freedom, 21-26 ; first 
effects of emancipation, 85. 

Sizing, and flank companies, bad in 
principle, 222. 

Soldiers, European and native, on field 
service, 231,232; conduct of English 
portion of the force, 231, 232; of the 
native regiments, 231 ; bearing to¬ 
wards, and impression left with, the 
inhabitants, 232; beneficial results 
of such behaviour, 232. 

Soldiers, obedience of, 214. 


Staff appointments, present longing 
after, 124; corps in India misnamed, 
132; qualifications of staff officers, 
222; establishment and salaries pro¬ 
posed for the general staff of the 
army, 435. 

Statistics — Civil: robber tribes, 4 ; 
examinations, 9 ; labour, 18, 21, 
26, 33; means of communication, 35, 
37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 80; trade, 50, 52, 
214, 223; Indus flotilla and forests, 
53; education, 54; revenue systems, 
55, 57; land, 59, 61, 63, 65; bunds, 
76; tanks, 78; dams, 79; courts of 
law, 83; police, 83; carriage, 84;— 
Military: the Bengal army, 101— 
117; Bengal and Bombay systems, 
117; native army of India, 124 ; the 
“regular” system, 129; cavalry, 135- 
164; compensation, 164; silidar rifle 
corps, 168; Sind Horse, 170; car¬ 
riage arrangements, 189; baggage 
corps, 193; the military fund, 203; 
furlough regulations, 204; orderly- 
rooms, 209; system of promotion, 
211; head quarters, 213; horses, 
214-219; the military board and 
audit departments, 219; high caste 
rules, 220; mutineers, 220; com¬ 
manding officers and candidates for 
enlistment, 221; prize property, 221; 
fortifications, 222; companies and 
sizing, 222; stall' officers, 222; arms, 
223, 224, 225, 228, 279, 280; horse 
fairs, 223; dress, 227; charges, 228, 
230; troops in an enemy’s country, 
230, 231; saddles, 232; recruits, 96, 
109, 133, 371, 447;— North-West 
Frontier of India : campaigning in 
the hills, 287-317, 326; procedure 
with the predatory tribes, 349; pro¬ 
tective arrangements, 353, 356, 362, 
364, 367, 375, 385 ; assessment of 
districts, 367; negotiations, 369;— 
Persian War: its policy, 401,409; 
valleys of the Karoon and Euphrates, 
403, 410; transport of troops, 406; 
requirements, 407; water supplies, 
411; stations for troops, 411, 412; 
supplies from Bombay, 413;— Present 
Condition of India, 419; reorganisa¬ 
tion of the civil and military adminis¬ 
tration, 425-431. 

Sukkur, in the hot season of 1839, 293* 

Sungseela, in Kutchee, 306. 

Supplies, camp, 193; from Bombay, for 
the Persian expedition, 413; from 
the valley of the Euphrates, 413. 

Surtotf, first passage of, 316. 

Swinburn and Son, of Birmingham, and 
information on rifle practice, 262; re¬ 
commended as gun-makers,278, 283. 




INDEX. 467 


Swords, cavalry, best description for 
natives, 224; edges and points, 224; 
curved cutting blades, 225, 226 ; 
straight swords, 225 ; instances of 
the powers of cutting swords, 227. 

T. 

Tank-digging, 78 ; object contem¬ 
plated in the example given, 78 ; 
success of the experiment, 78. 

Taxes, on water, 26; on trade, 50; on 
land, 60; on cattle, 72; on the 
desert, 73. 

Telegraph, line recommended for Sind, 
41. 

Teywaugh river, the, in Upper Sind, 
defeats of marauders at, 299, 344. 

Thatcher, Captain, trial of rifles bv, 
273. 

Tliool, a rendezvous for marauders, 
323. 

Tools, good, do not make bad work¬ 
men, 228 ; closing with foes, 228 ; 
defects of the Minie rifle or ball, 
228 ; Jacob’s v. the English army 
rifle, 229. 

Toork Ali, Boogtee chief, surrender 
of, 314; settlement at Janadeyra, 
318. 

Trade, interference with, opposed to 
the laws of political economy, 5; 
destructive to British reputation, 5 ; 
adjustment of markets, 6 ; non-in¬ 
terference should be the rule, 6, 50; 
fairs, 50; impetus to trade, 51; 
frontier returns, 52; trade in horses, 
214, 223; with robber tribes, 359. 

Travellers, bungalows and serais for, 
49 ; of the greatest advantage, 49 ; 
free accommodation eventually most 
profitable, 49 ; imposition of fees 
unwise, 50. 

Tribes, predatory, chief requisite for 
the control of, 4; source of power 
of the border marauder, 4; results 
of a tew years’ just administration 
in a frontier district, 4; guiding 
principles, 5; contrast of two sys¬ 
tems of dealing, 185 ; campaign 
against, on the North-West Fron¬ 
tier of Sind, 287; intrigues with 
Zemindars, 323 ; connection with 
Sind Bunyas, 359 ; procedure on 


the North-West Frontier of Sind, 
349. 

Trower, Captain, on the qualifications 
of commanders of irregular cavalry, 
135 ; on the denominations of dif¬ 
ferent ranks, 147. 

Tructnee, fight with Boogtees, 310. 

Trukkee, proceedings with the Doomb- 
kees, after their surrender at, 317. 

u. 

Uniforms of English soldiers, 100 ; of 
the sepoy of the line, 129 ; of the 
Sind Irregular Horse, 154. 

Universe, the, rank in, 2. 

w. 

War, Persian, 401. 

Watering-places in the hills of Kut- 
chee, 301, 358. 

Water, want of, on the frontier of 
Sind, 362. 

Wellington, the Duke of, on the causes 
of Colonel Monson’s retreat, 199. 

Wheel-carriages, introduction of supe¬ 
rior description considered, 36 ; 
native carts, 37. 

Wiseman, Lieutenant, and campaign¬ 
ing in Kutchee, 312. 

Witton and Daw, and information on 
rifle practice, 262; recommended as 
gun-makers, 278. 

Wullee Mahomed Chandia, Sindian 
chief, 334. 

z. 

Zemanee, fight of the, 151 note , 339- 
348 ; Lieutenant Merewether’s re¬ 
port of the action, 343; strength of 
the combatants, 343; the fight, 344; 
the slain, 345 ; casualties in the 
Sind Horse, 346 ; conduct of the 
native officers and men in action, 
346. 

Zemindars, supply of labour by, 20, 
31 ; relations with cultivators, 59; 
understanding with marauders, 323; 
assessment of land in the Sind 
Frontier district, 367. 


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tion, as a fresh, full, and luminous report upon 


the condition of one of the most interesting 
divisions of Asia beyond the Ganges.”— Athe¬ 
naeum, Feb. 20th, 1858. 

“ Captain Yule has brought to his narrative 
a knowledge of many things, which is the 
main help to observation. In all that regards 
structure and execution, his profession as an 
engineer makes him an adept; he has a taste 
in architecture, art, and the cognate sciences, 
as well as much information on the history and 
religion of the Burmese. . . . His description 
of these things, especially of the antiquities, 
are not only curious in themselves, but for the 
speculations they open up as to origin of the 
Burmese style and the splendour of the empire 
centuries ago.”— Spectator, Feb. 20th, 1858. 


Suggestions Towards the Future Government 

of India. By Harriet Martineau. 

Second Edition. Demy 8vo, price 5s. cloth. 

“As the work of an honest able writer, I and no doubt they will generally be duly ap- 
these Suggestions are well worthy of attention, | predated.”— Observer. 


British Rule in India . By Harriet Martineau. 

Price 25. 6 d. cloth. 

“ A good compendium of a great subject.” I “ A succinct and comprehensive volume.”— 
National Review. | Leader. 


Tiger Shooting in India. 

By Lieutenant William Rice, 25tli Bombay N. I. 


Super Royal 8vo. With Twelve Plates in Chroma-lithography. 21 s. cloth. 


“ These adventures, told in handsqjne large 
print, with spirited chromo-lithographs to il¬ 
lustrate them, make the volume before us as 
pleasant reading as any record of sporting 
achievements we have ever taken in hand.”— 
Athenaeum. 

“ A remarkably pleasant book of adven¬ 
tures during several seasons of f large game ’ | 


hunting in Rajpootana. The twelve chromo¬ 
lithographs are very valuable accessories to 
the narrative ; they have wonderful spirit and 
freshness.”— Globe. 

“ A good volume of wild sport, abounding 
in adventure, and handsomely illustrated with 
coloured plates from spirited designs by the 
author.”— Examiner. 


The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam to 
the Era of the Ilegira. By William Muir, Esq., Bengal 
Civil Service. 


Two Volumes 8 vo, price 325. cloth. 


“ The most perfect life of Mahomet in the 
English language, or perhaps in any other. . . 
The work is at once learned and interesting, 


and it cannot fail to be eagerly perused by all 
persons having any pretensions to historical 
knowledge.”— Observer. 













SMITH, ELDER & CO. 


WORKS ON INDIA AND THE EAST — continued. 


The Autobiography of Lutfullah, a Moliame- 

dan Gentleman, with an Account of his Visit to England. 
Edited by E. B. Eastwick, Esq. 


Second Edition, Post 8vo, price 10s. 6 d., cloth. 


“ We have read this hook with wonder and 
delight. Memoirs of a live Moslem gentleman 

are a novelty in our letters.Lutfullah’s 

story will aid, in its degree, to some sort of 
understanding of the Indian insurrection.”— 
Athenaeum. 

“ Read fifty volumes of travel, and a thou¬ 
sand imitations of the oriental novel, and you 
will not get the flavour of Eastern life and 
thought, or the zest of its romance, so perfectly 
as in Lutfullah’s book. It is readable, 
instructive, and entertaining.”— Leader. 


“ As an autobiography the book is very 
curious. It bears the strongest resemblance 
to Oil Bias of anything we have ever read.”— 
Spectator. 

“ Everyone who is interested in the present 
state of matters in India should read Lutful¬ 
lah’s own account of himself and his people, as 
well as their peculiar and general feeling 
towards the Feringees.”— Globe. 

“ A treasure as well as a rarity in litera¬ 
ture.”— Eclectic Review. 


The Life and Correspondence of Sir John 

Malcolm, G.C.B. By John William Kaye. 

Two Volumes, 8 vo. With Portrait. Price 36s. cloth. 


“ The biography is replete with interest 
and information, deserving to be perused by 
the student of Indian history, and sure to re¬ 
commend itself to the general reader.”— 
Athenaeum. 

“ One of the most interesting of the recent 
biographies of our great Indian statesmen.”— 
National Review. 


“This book deserves to participate in the 
popularity which it was the good fortune of 
Sir John Malcolm to enjoy.” — Edinburgh 
Review. 

“ Mr. Kaye has used his materials well, and 
has written an interesting narrative, copiously 
illustrated with valuable documents.”— Ex¬ 
aminer. 


Life and Correspondence of Lord Metcalfe. 

By John William Kaye. 

New and Cheap Edition, in 2 Vols., Small Post 8 vo, with Portrait, price 12s. cloth. 

{Just ready.') 

Papers of the late Lord Metcalfe. 

Selected and Edited by J. W. Kaye. 

Demy 8vo, price 16s. cloth. 


“ We commend this volume to all persons 
who like to study state papers, in which the 
practical sense of a man of the world is joined 


to the speculative sagacity of a philosophical 
statesman. No Indian library should be with¬ 
out it.”— Press. 


The Commerce of India. By B. A. Ikying, Esq., 
Author of <c The Theory and Practice of Caste.” 

Post 8 vo, price 7s. 6 d. cloth. 

Review of the Measures adopted in hidia for 
the Improved Culture of Cotton. By Dr. Forbes Royle. 
8 vo, 2s. 6d. cloth. 

The Fibrous Plants of India fitted for Cordage, 
Clothing, and Paper. By Dr. Forbes Royle. 8 vo, 
price 12 s. cloth. 
























WORKS ON INDIA AND THE EAST— continued. 

On the Culture and Commerce of Cotton in 

India. By Dr. Forbes Royle. 8 vo, price 18s. cloth. 

The Productive Resources of India. By Dr. Forbes 
Royle. Super royal 8 vo, price 14s. cloth. 

The English in Western India ; being the Early 

History of the Factory at Surat , of Bombay. By Philip 
Anderson, A.M. 

Second Edition, 8 vo, price 14s. cloth. 


“Quaint, curious, and amusing, this volume 
describes, from old manuscripts and obscure 
books, the life of English merchants in an 
Indian Factory. It contains fresh and amusing 


gossip, all bearing on events and characters of 
historical importance.”— Athenaeum. 

“ A book of permanent value.”— Guardian. 


Ufe in Ancient India. By Mrs. Speir. 

With Sixty Illustrations by G. Scharf. 8 vo, price 15s., elegantly bound in 

cloth, gilt edges. 


“ We should in vain seek for any other trea¬ 
tise which, in so short a space, gives so well- 
connected an account of the early period of 
Indian history .”—Daily News. 

“ Whoever desires to have the best, the 
completest, and the most popular view of what 


Oriental scholars have made known to us 
respecting Ancient India must peruse the work 
of Mrs. Speir ; in which he will find the story 
told in clear, correct, and unaffected English. 
The book is admirably got up.”— Examiner. 


The Cauvery , Kistnah , and Godavery : being 
a Report on the Works constructed on those Rivers , for 
the Irrigation of Provinces in the Presidency of 
Madras. By R. Baird Smith, F.G.S., Lt.-Col. Bengal 
Engineers, &c., &c. 

In demy 8 vo, with 19 Plans, price 28s. cloth. 

“ A most curious and interesting work.”— Economist. 

The Bhilsa Topes ; or , Buddhist Monuments of 

Central India. By Major Cunningham. 

One Volume, 8 vo, with Thirty-three Plates, price 305 . cloth. 


“ Of the Topes opened in various parts of 
India none have yielded so rich a harvest of 
important information as those of Bhilsa, opened 
by Major Cunningham and Lieut. Maisey; and 


which are described, with an abundance of 
h'ghly curious graphic illustrations, in this most 
interesting book.”— Examiner. 


The Chinese and their Rebellions. 

By Thomas Taylor Meadows. 

One Thick Volume , 8 vo, with Maps, price 185. cloth. 


“ Mr. Meadows’ book is the work of a learned, 
conscientious, and observant person, and really 
important in many respects.”— Times. 

“ Mr. Meadows has produced a work which 


deserves to be studied by all who would gain 
a true appreciation of Chinese character. Infor¬ 
mation is sown broad-cast through every 
page.”— Athenaeum. 


















SMITH, ELDER & CO. 


5 


WORKS ON INDIA AND THE EAST— continued. 

A Sketch of Assam; with some Account of the Hill 

Tribes. Coloured Plates , 8 vo, price 14s. cloth. 

Butlers Travels and Adventures in Assam. One 

Volume 8 vo, with Plates , price 12s. cloth 

Dr. Wilson on Infanticide in Western India. 
Demy 8vo, price 12s. 

Rev. James Coley s Journal of the Sutlej Campaign. 

Fcap. 8vo, price 4s. cloth. 

Crawfurd's Grammar and Dictionary of the Malay 

Language. 2 vols. 8vo, price 36s. cloth. 

Roberts's Indian Exchange Tables. 8vo. Second 

Edition, enlarged, price 10s. 6d. cloth. 

Waring on Abscess in the Liver. 8vo, price 35 . 6t/. 
Lauries Second Burmese War — Rangoon. Post 

8vo, with Plates , price J Os. Qd. cloth. 

Lauries Pegu. Post 8vo, price 145. cloth. 

Boyd's Turkish Interpreter: a Grammar of the 

Turkish Language. 8vo, price 12s. 

Bridgnell's Indian Commercial Tables. Royal 8vo, 

price 21s., half-bound. 

The Bombay Quarterly Review. Nos. 1 to 9 at 5s. 

10 and 11, price 5s. each. 

Baillies Land Tax of India. According to the 

Moohummudan Law. 8vo, price 6s. cloth. 

Baillie's Moohummudan Law of Sale. 8vo, price 

14s. cloth. 

Irving's Theory and Practice of Caste. 8vo, price 

5s. cloth. 

Gingell's Ceremonial Usages of the Chinese. 

Imperial 8vo, price 9s. cloth. 


















6 WORKS PUBLISHED BY 


WOKKS OF MR. RUSKIN. 

The P olitical Economy of Art. Price 2s. 6tf. cloth 


“ A most able, eloquent, and well-timed 
work. We hail it with satisfaction, thinking 
it calculated to do much practical good, and 
we cordially recommend it to our readers.”— 
Witness. 

“ Mr. Ruskin’s chief purpose is to treat the 
artist’s power, and the art itself, as items of 
the world’s wealth, and to show how these 
may be best evolved, produced, accumulated, 
and distributed.”— Athenceum. 


“ We never quit Mr. Ruskin without being 
the better for what he has told us, and we 
therefore recommend this little volume, like all 
his other works, to the perusal of our readers,” 

— Economist. 

“ This book, daring, as it is, glances keenly 
at principles, of which some are among the 
articles of ancient codes, while others are 
evolving slowly to the light.”— Leader. 


The Elements of Drawing. 

Second Edition. Crown Svo. With Illustrations drawn by the Author. Price 

7s. 6 d., cloth. 


“ The rules are clearly and fully laid down; 
and the earlier exercises always conducive to 
the end by simple and unembarrassing means. 
. . . . To be entertaining is a great gift 

in a writer. This gift Mr. Ruskin possesses 
pre-eminently. The whole volume is full of 
liveliness.”— Spectator. 

“ We close this book with a feeling that, 
though nothing supersedes a master, yet that 
no student of art should launch forth without 
this work as a compass.”— Athenceum. 

“ It will be found not only an invaluable 
acquisition to the student, but agreeable and 


instructive reading for any one who wishes to 
refine his perceptions of natural scenery, and 
of its worthiest artistic representations.”— 

Economist. 

“ The rules and illustrations will be found 
to be unusually concise, pertinent, and avail¬ 
able .... Original as this treatise is, 
it cannot fail to be at once instructive and sug¬ 
gestive.”— Literary Gazette. 

“ The most useful and practical book on 
the subject which has ever come under our 
notice.”— Press. 


Modern Painters, Vol. IV. On Mountain 

Imperial 8 vo, with Thirty-jive Illustrations engraved on Steel, and 116 
Woodcuts, drawn by the Author, pi-ice 2l. 10s. cloth. 



“ Considered as an illustrated volume, this 
is the most remarkable which Mr. Ruskin 
has yet issued. The plates and woodcuts are 
profuse, and include numerous drawings of 
mountain form by the author, which prove 
Mr. Ruskin to be essentially an artist. He is 
an unique man, both among artists and 
writers.”— Spectator. 

“ The present volume of Mr. Ruskin’s 
elaborate "work treats chiefly of mountain 


scenery, and discusses at length the principles 
involved in the pleasure we derive from 
mountains and then* pictorial representation. 
The singular beauty of his style, the hearty 
sympathy with all forms of natural loveliness, 
the profusion of his illustrations, and above 
all the earnest denunciation of cant, form irre¬ 
sistible attractions. High thoughts, clothed 
in eloquent language, are the characteristics 
1 of Mr. Ruskin’s productions .”—Daily News. 


Modern Painters , Vol. III. Of Many Things. 

With Eighteen Illustrations drawn by the Author, and engraved on Steel, 

price 38 s. cloth. 


‘•Every one who cares about nature, or 
poetry, or the story of human development 
—every one who has a tinge of literature or 
philosophy, will find something that is for him 
in this volume.”— Westminster Review. 

“ Mr. Ruskin is in possession of a clear and 
penetrating mind; he is undeniably practical 
in his fundamental ideas; full of the deepest 
reverence for all that appears to him beautiful 
and holy. His style is, as usual, clear, bold, 


racy. Mr. Ruskin is one of the first writers of 
the day.”— Economist. 

“ The present volume, viewed as a literary 
achievement, is the highest and most strik¬ 
ing evidence of the author’s abilities that 
has yet been published.”— Leader. 

“ All, it is to be hoped, will read the book 
for themselves. They will find it well worth 
a careful perusal .”—Saturday Review. 



















SMITH, ELDER & CO 


7 


WORKS OF MR. RUSKIN— continued. 


Modern Painters. Vols. I. and II. 


Imp. 8vo., Vol. I., 5th Edit., 18 s. cloth. Vol. II., 4 th Edit., 10s. 6 d. cloth. 


“ Mr. Ruskin’s work will send the painter 
more than ever to the study of nature; will 
train men who have always been delighted 
spectators of nature, to be also attentive ob¬ 
servers. Our critics will learn to admire, and 
mere admirers will learn how to criticise: 
thus a public will be educated.”— Blackwood's 
Magazine. 


“ A generous and impassioned review of the 
works of living painters. A hearty and earnest 
work, full of deep thought, and developing 
great and striking truths in art .”—British 
Quarterly Review. 

“ A very extraordinary and delightful book, 
full of truth and goodness, of power and 
beauty .”—North British Review. 


The Stones of Venice. 

Complete in Three Volumes, Imperial 8 vo, with Fifty-three Plates and 
numerous Woodcuts, drawn by the Author. Price 5l. 15s. 6 d., cloth. 


EACH VOLUME MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY. 


THE FOUNDATIONS, with 21 Plates, price 2l. 2s. 
THE SEA STORIES, with 20 Plates, price 2l. 2s. 
THE FALL, with 12 Plates, price 1 1. 11s. 6 d. 


Vol. I. 

Vol. II. 

Vol. III. 

“ This book is one which, perhaps, no other 
man could have written, and one for which 
the world ought to be and will be thankful. It 
is in the highest degree eloquent, acute, stimu¬ 
lating to thought, and fertile in suggestion. 
It will, we are convinced, elevate taste and 
intellect, raise the tone of moral feeling, 
kindle benevolence towards men, and in¬ 
crease the love and fear of God.”— Times. 

“ The ‘ Stones of Venice’ is the production 


of an earnest, religious, progressive, and in¬ 
formed mind. The author of this essay on 
architecture has condensed into it a poetic ap¬ 
prehension, the fruit of awe of God, and 
delight in nature ; a knowledge, love, and 
just estimate of art; a holding fast to fact and 
repudiation of hearsay; an historic breadth, 
and a fearless challenge of existing social prob¬ 
lems, whose union we know not where to find 
paralleled.”— Spectator. 


The Seven Lamps of Architecture. 

Second Edition , with Fourteen Plates drawn by the Author. Imperial 8 vo, 

price ll. Is. cloth. 


“ By the ‘ Seven Lamps of Architecture,’ 
we understand Mr. Ruskin to mean the seven 
fundamental and cardinal laws, the observance 
of and obedience to which are indispensable 
to the architect, who would deserve the name. 
The politician, the moralist, the divine, will 
find in it ample store of instructive matter, as 
well as the artist. The author of this work 
belongs to a class of thinkers of whom we have 
too few amongst us.”— Examiner. 


“ Mr. Ruskin’s book bears so unmistakeably 
the marks of keen and accurate observation, 
of a true and subtle judgment and refined 
sense of beauty, joined with so much earnest¬ 
ness, so noble* a sense of the purposes and 
business of art, and such a command of rich 
and glowing language, that it cannot but tell 
powerfully in producing a more religious 
view of the uses of architecture, and a deeper 
insight into its artistic principles.”— Guardian. 


Lectures on Architecture and Painting. 

With Fourteen Cuts, draivn by the Author. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 


price 8s. 

“ Mr. Ruskin’s lectures—eloquent, graphic, 
and impassioned—exposing and ridiculing 
some of the vices of our present system of 
building, and exciting his hearers by strong 
motives of duty and pleasure to attend to 
architecture — are very successful.”— Econo¬ 
mist. 


6 d. cloth. 

“ We conceive it to be impossible that any 
intelligent persons could listen to the lec¬ 
tures, however they might differ from the 
judgments asserted, and from the general pro¬ 
positions laid down, without an elevating in¬ 
fluence and an aroused enthusiasm.”— Spec¬ 
tator. 




















8 


WORKS PUBLISHED BY 


NEW PUBLICATIONS. 


Captivity of Russian Princesses in the Cau¬ 
casus : including a Seven Months ’ Residence in Shamirs 
Seraglio , in the Years 1854-5. Translated from the 
Russian, by H. S. Edwards. 

With an authentic Portrait of Shamil, a Plan of his House, and a Map. 

Post 8vo, price 10s. 6 d. cloth. 


“ A book than which there are few novels 
more interesting. It is a romance of the 
Caucasus. The account of life in the house 
of Shamil is full and very entertaining; 
and of Shamil himself we see much.”— Ex¬ 
aminer. 


“ The story is certainly one of tne most 
curious we have read; it contains the best 
popular notice of the social polity of Shamil 
and the manners of his people.”— Leader. 

“ The narrative is well worth reading.”— 
Athenaeum. 


Esmond . By W. M. Thackeray, Esq. 

A New Edition in One Volume, Crown 8 vo, price 6 s. cloth. 


“ Apart from its special merits “ Esmond ” 
must be read just now as an introduction to 
“ The Virginians.” It is quite impossible fully to 
understand and enjoy the latter story without 
a good knowledge of “ Esmond.” The two 
first numbers of “ The Virginians” abound 
with references which can only be properly 
appreciated by those who have the previous 
history of the Esmond family fresh in their 
recollection. The new tale is in the strictest 
sense the sequel of the old, not only intro¬ 


ducing the same characters, but continuing 
their history at a later period.”— Leader. 

“ Mr. Thackeray has selected for his hero a 
very noble type of the cavalier softening into 
the man of the eighteenth century, and for 
his heroine one of the sweetest women that 
ever breathed from canvas or from book 
since Raffaelle painted and Shakspeare wrote. 
The style is manly, clear, terse, and vigorous, 
reflecting every mood—pathetic, graphic, or 
sarcastic—of the writer.”— Spectator. 


The Principles of Agriculture; especially 

Tropical. By P. Lovell Phillips, M.D. 

Demy 8 vo, price 7s. Gd. cloth. 

“ This volume should be in every farm- I “ This treatise contains nearly all that is 
house, and it would pay a landlord to present | known of the science of agriculture.”— Ob¬ 
it to his tenants.”— Critic. j server. 


Religion in Common Life. By William Ellis. 

Post 8 vo, price 7s. Gd. cloth. 


“ A book addressed to young people of the 
upper ten thousand upon social duties. Mr. 
Ellis has sound views, and his style is simple 
and clear.”— Examiner. 

“ Lessons in Political Economy for young 


people by a skilful hand; a clear knowledge 
is imparted, and sensible views are worked out 
to demonstration. We cordially recommend 
this work to all who are interested in the edu¬ 
cation of the young.”— Economist. 


Victoria , and the Australian Gold Mines , in 
1857 ; with Notes on the Overland Route. By Wil¬ 
liam Westgarth. 


Post 8 vo, with Maps, price 10s. Gd., cloth. 


“ Mr. Westgarth has produced a reliable 
and readable book well stocked with informa¬ 
tion, and pleasantly interspersed with inci¬ 
dents of travel and views of colonial life. It is 
clear, sensible, and suggestive.”— Athenceum. 

“ A lively account of the most wonderful 
bit of colonial experience that the world’s 
history has furnished.”— Examiner. 

“ We think Mr. Westgarth’s book much the 
best which has appeared on Australia since 
the great crisis in its history .”—Saturday 
Review. 


“ A rational, vigorous, illustrative report 
upon the progress of the greatest colony in 
Australia.”— Leader. 

“The volume contains a large amount of 
statistical and practical information relating 
to Victoria.”— Spectator. 

“ To those who refer to these pages for 
solid and guiding information, they will prove 
most valuable.”— Globe. 

“ The best book on the subject.— Critic. 

















SMITH, ELDER & CO. 9 


NEW PUBLICATIONS— continued. 


The Life of Charlotte Bronte. 

Author of “Jane Eyre,” “Shirley,” “Villette,” &c. 
By Mrs. Gaskell, Author of “ North and South,” &c. 


Third Edition, Revised, Two Volumes, Post 8 vo, with a Portrait of Miss Bronte * 
and a View of Ha worth Church and Parsonage. Price 24s. cloth. 


“ We regard the record as a monument of 
courage and endurance, of suffering and 

triumph.All the secrets of the 

literary workmanship of the authoress of 
‘ Jane Eyre ’ are unfolded in the course of this 
extraordinary narrative.”— Times. 

“ Mrs. Gaskell has produced one of the best 
biographies of a woman by a woman which we 
can recall to mind.”— Athenaeum. 


“ Mrs. Gaskell’s ‘ Life of Charlotte Bronte ’ 
has placed her on a level with the best biogra¬ 
phers of any country.”— Globe. 

“ This work cannot fail to be of the deepest 
interest; and it has a special interest for female 
readers.”— Economist. 

“ The whole strange and pathetic story of 
the Bronte family is faithfully told in Mrs. 
Gaskell’s memoir.”— Critic. 


The Sea Officers Manual; being a Com¬ 
pendium of the Duties of a Commander; First , Second , 
Third, and Fourth Officer; Officer of the Watch; and 
Midshipman in the Mercantile Navy. By Captain A. 
Parish, of the East India Merchant Service. 

Small Post 8vo, price 5s. cloth. 

“A very lucid and compendious manual. “A little book that ought to be in great 
We would recommend youths intent upon a request among young seamen.”— Examiner. 
seafaring life to study it.”— Athenaeum. 


Third Series of Sermons. 

By the late Rev. Fred. W. Robertson, A.M., Incumbent 
of Trinity Chapel, Brighton. 


Second Edition, Post 8 vo, with Portrait, price 95. cloth. 
First Series— Third Edition, Post ftvo, price 95. cloth. 


Second Series— Third Edition, price 95. cloth. 


“ Very beautiful in feeling and occasionally 
striking and forcible in conception to a re¬ 
markable degree.”—Guardian. 

“ Mr. Robertson, of Brighton, is a name 
familiar to most of us, and honoured by all to 
whom it is familiar.”— Globe. 


“ These sermons are full of thought and 
beauty. There is not a sermon in the series 
that does not furnish evidence of originality 
without extravagance, of discrimination with¬ 
out tediousness, and of piety without cant or 
conventionalism .”—British Quarterly. 


Antiquities of Kertcli, and Researches in the 
Cimmerian 3osphorus. By Duncan McPherson, M.D., 
of the Madras Army, F.R.G.S.,M.A.I., Inspector-General 
of Hospitals, Turkish Contingent. 


Imperial Quarto, with Fourteen Plates and numerous Illustrations, including 
Eight Coloured Fac-Similes of Relics of Antique Art, price Two Guineas. 


“ It is a volume which deserves the careful 
attention of every student of classical antiquity. 
No one can fail to be pleased with a volume 
which has so much to attract the eye and 
to gratify the hove of beauty and elegance in 


design.The volume is got 

up with great care and taste, and forms one of 
the handsomest works that have recently 
issued from the English Press .”—Saturday 
Review. 






















10 WORKS PUBLISHED BY 


RECENT WORKS. 

Annals of British Legislation, a Classified 

Summary of Parliamentary Papers. Edited by Pro¬ 
fessor Leone Leyi. 

THE TWENTY-FIRST PART IS JUST ISSUED. 


“A series that, if it be always managed as 
it is now by Professor Levi, will last as long 
as there remains a legislature in Great Bri¬ 
tain.”— Examiner. 

“ It would not be easy to over-estimate the 
utility of Professor Levi’s serial. It has the 


merit of being an excellent idea zealously 
carried out.”— Athenaeum. 

“ We cannot imagine a more truly valuable 
and nationally important work than this. It 
is impossible to over-estimate its usefulness.”— 
Civil Service Gazette. 


Life and Sermons of Tauler. 

Translated by Miss Susanna Winkworth. With a 
Preface by the Rey. Charles Kingsley. 

Small 4 to, Printed on Tinted Paper, and bound in antique style, with red edges, 

suitable for a Present. Price 15.9. 

A Visit to Salt Lake ; being a Journey across 

the Plains to the Mormon Settlements at Utah. By 

William Chandless. 

Post 8uo, with a Map, price 9 s. cloth. 

The Political Life of Sir Robert Peel. 

By Thomas Doubleday. 

Two Volumes, Crown 8 vo, price 305. cloth. 

The European Revolutions of 1848. 

By Edward Cayley. 

Two Volumes, Crown 8 vo, price 185. cloth. 

Signs of the Times ; or , The Dangers to Reli¬ 
gious Liberty in the Present Day. By the Cheyalier 
Bunsen. Translated by Miss Susanna Winkworth. 

One Volume, 8vo, price 165. cloth. 

Stories and Sketches. By James Payn. 

Post 8 vo, Price 85. 6 d. cloth. 

Stoneys Residence in Tasmania. 

Demy 8vo, with Plates, Cuts, and a Map, price 145. cloth. 

The Court of Henry VIII.: being a Selection 
of the Despatches of Sebastian Giustinian, Venetian 
Ambassador, 1515-1519. Translated by Rawdon 

BrOWN. Two Vols., crown 8vo, price 21s. cloth. 

Sight-seeing in Germany and the Tyrol , in the 
Autumn of 1855. By Sir John Forbes, Author of 
“ A Physician’s Holiday,” &c. 

Post 8 vo, with Map and View, price 10.s. 6 d. cloth. 













SMITH, ELDER & CO. 11 

RECENT WORKS — continued. 

Conolly on the Treatment of the Insane . 

Demy 8 vo, price 14s. cloth. 

Hopkins's Handbook of Average. 

8 vo, price 12s. 6 d. cloth. 

Morice's Hand-Book of British Maritime Law. 

8 vo, price 5s., cloth. 

Adamss History and Topography of the Isle 

of Wight. 

Quarto, 25 Steel Plates, cloth, gilt edges, price 21. 2s. 

Waring's Manual of Therapeutics. 

Fcap. 8 vo, price 12s. 6 d. cloth. 

Vogel on Disorders of the Blood. 

Translated by Chunder Coomar Det. 

8vo, price 7s. 6 d. cloth. 

Duncan's Campaign with the Turks in Asia. 

Two Vols., post 8vo, price 2 Is. cloth. 

Boss's Account of Bed Biver Settlement. 

One Volume, post 8 vo, price 10s. 6 d. cloth. 

Boss's Fur Hunters of the Far West. 

Two Volumes, post 8vo. With Map and Plate. 21s. cloth. 

Busso-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 - 9 . 

By Colonel Chesney, K.A., D.C.L., F.R.S. 

Third Edition. Post 8 vo, with Maps, price 12s. cloth. 

Thomson’s Military Forces and Institutions 

of Great Britain. 

8 vo, price 15s. cloth. 

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